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Netizens-Digest Volume 1 Number 440
Netizens-Digest Sunday, March 23 2003 Volume 01 : Number 440
Netizens Association Discussion List Digest
In this issue:
[netz] Talleyrand, Intelligence Analysis Methods and Netizenship
[netz] A delicate line?
Re: [netz] A delicate line?
Re: [netz] A delicate line?
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2003 10:26:51 -0500
From: "Howard C. Berkowitz" <hcb@gettcomm.com>
Subject: [netz] Talleyrand, Intelligence Analysis Methods and Netizenship
New French diplomats going to their assignments, it has been said,
received their final briefings from the great diplomatic mind of
Talleyrand. "Above all, no zeal," was the key message. He didn't
mean not to be active, but to be objective and dispassionate.
So I'd like to give some basic information on the intelligence
process, as raw material about how more objectivity can enter a
net-world of storm and fury. At the end of this message are some
postings to other lists that may serve as reference material: a
primer on intelligence organizations and a reading list. I'll mention
a few specifics to start some discussion of how some techniques might
apply to Netizen activities.
The Registry
- ------------
Certainly going back to the 1930s, and quite possibly going back
to Sir Francis Walsingham in 1518, the "Registry" or "biographic
registry" is an unglamorous but critical tool in ensuring reliable
intelligence.
Whenever an individual comes to the attention of an analytic
organization, their name is checked against an existing index, to see
if they have been in direct or indirect contact before. By indirect
contact, you might learn that while someone has never been in contact
with you, they show up as the next-door neighbor of local spy ring
leaders from country XXX, in different cities, over 20 years.
Now, this immediately can get criticized as "surveillance." But
like so much else, it's a double-edged sword.
Typically, a new source that has no registry information is
assigned a reliability rating of "not yet determined," or a basic
mid-level rating based on other factors. If contacts are identified,
the reliability goes down if there is reason to believe the source
may be a proxy for other interests, or up if the contacts are
themselves trusted and will vouch for the new source.
Wiring Diagrams
- ---------------
Registries are fundamentally name-oriented, although they may use a
wide range of techniques to manage spelling variations, name changes,
aliases, and deliberate deception. A closely related function, once
some group (e.g., a foreign government) is identified to be of
interest, is to develop a "wiring diagram" that focuses on the
relationships among individuals and, where possible, job functions.
Such diagrams get studied over time, and often provide input into
developing true biographies. They also often provide a template for
pattern recognition of, say, intelligence officers of a given
country, differentiating the diplomats from the "spies" (hey,
diplomats are merely legal spies, among other things, if they are
doing their job well).
Compartmented Information Management of Human Sources
- -----------------------------------------------------
In general terms, it's often necessary, if you have a sensitive
source of information that could be lost if revealed, the
intelligence organization's data about this source is split into
several separately controlled but coordinated pieces.
Actual sources (e.g., spy) and their identities are extremely
closely held. The individuals may have registry entries, but the
basic registry should have no clue as to their actual assignment.
Those with a need to know have ways of getting to the detailed
information.
The most closely held source files identify the true name of the
source, the way the source was acquired, means of communicating with
the source, etc. These files point to, but do not include, the
information learned from the source. Typically, they establish a
cryptonym (e.g., IRONBARK-9) that is used in other references to
material to the agent -- the true name is as closely held as
possible. There may be multiple and/or changing cryptonyms.
Organized by cryptonym are files of all information received from a
source. While these do not contain the true name, they are still
extremely sensitive, because even a moderately competent analyst
often can work out the identity from a career pattern and elimination
of people that did not have access to all information in the file.
Most information available to analysts are in subject-oriented
files of varying sensitivity. The greater the sensitivity, the
easier it is to identify the source. A highly sensitive file might
identify certain former Soviet missile details as from IRONBARK 9. A
less, but still sensitive, file might be a little less specific about
the information, and describe it as coming from "a senior Soviet
officer of the General Staff, from whom we have received generally
accurate information". At the next level of sensitivity, the data
might be combined with that of other sources and be identified as
"collected material from several usually accurate sources in the
Soviet government."
Why this emphasis on security?
==============================
I'm simply trying to give some perspective on why things get
censored, or all information may not be public. It is equally
important to a journalist or intelligence agency to protect their
sources, but it is also essential that the consumers of their
reporting apply quality control checks before accepting it as gospel.
===========================================================
From: Howard Berkowitz <hcb@gettcomm.com>
Newsgroups: alt.war.nuclear.biological-chemical-radiological-moderated
To:
alt-war-nuclear-biological-chemical-radiological-moderated@moderators.isc.org
Subject: Intelligence Organization
User-Agent: MT-NewsWatcher/3.0 (PPC)
Date: Sun, 19 Jan 2003 12:51:16 -0500
Message-ID: <hcb-3CDE7F.12511619012003@text.giganews.com>
Given there have been a number of questions about what makes up
"intelligence" and resources about them, I threw this draft together. It
does not include paramilitary or other special operations. I realize
I've overreported the number of techniques in collection -- there are
just as many in analysis, but they often are much more specialized or
don't break out as easily.
You can look at it as a "toolbox" rather than a description of any
specific organization.
As it is, there's a lot of blurring between collection platforms and
sensors. An EP-3, for example, carries ELINT and COMINT sensors, and
may also have MASINT and IMINT.
I'm going to follow this with a draft reading list.
Collection
Collection Guidance and Tasking
HUMINT
Diplomatic reporting, including attaches
Covert assets (usually "spies", but include couriers, support, etc.)
Debriefing of travelers
Agent support
Cover, documents, finance, records
Open Source Intelligene (OSINT)
Broadcast monitoring (Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service)
Books, journals
Open consultation with experts
Electronic Intelligence (targeted at non-communications intentional
signals, such as radar frequencies)
Platforms
Manned airborne (EP-3, EC/RC-135, U-2, and tactical)
Unmanned Airborne
Seaborne (CLASSIC OUTBOARD)
Ground intercept stations
Space based systems
Low orbit
Medium orbit
Geosynchronous and higher orbit
Sensor type
Communications Intelligence
Platforms
Manned Airborne (EP-3, EC/RC-135, U-2, and tactical)
Unmanned Airborne
Seaborne (e.g., CLASSIC OUTBOARD)
Ground intercept stations
Space based systems
Low orbit
Medium orbit
Geosynchronous and higher orbitDirection finding
Methods
Traffic analysis
Cryptanalysis
Interception through other technical means (acoustic, compromising
electronic interception)
"Practical cryptanalysis" -- stealing or buying cryptomaterials
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT) -- covers lots of
things that aren't SIGINT or IMINT.
Non-intentional electronic emissions intercept (e.g., sidelobes)
Acoustic collection
Non-imaging infrared (e.g., DSP)
Seismic collection
Environmental sampling (e.g., fallout, CW/BW byproducts)
Magnetic (e.g., MAD)
Nuclear intelligence
Radio frequency/EMP
Electro-optical (can go under imaging)
Directed energy device sensors
Chemical spectroscopy
Remote laser measurement
Radar measurement
Geodesy and mapping
Imaging intelligence collection
Airborne, seaborne, ground, and space systems
Photographic (light and infrared), imaging radar
Onsite inspection for arms control
Analysis
Basic Reference
Current Intelligence/Watch Center
Biographical
Registry (name index used in counterintelligence/counterespionage)
Economic
Scientific
Technical analysis of foreign weapon systems
Arms control/nonproliferation
Order of Battle
Weather
Imagery Interpretation
Medical and Psychological
Organizational, especially for transnational/non-national
Estimates and Reporting
Intelligence estimates (broad) and Special National Intelligence
Estimates
Equipment handbooks
Intelligence Annexes to military operations plans
Indications & Warnings lists
Specialized publications (Bombing Encyclopedia, electronic signature
handbooks)
Policy-level briefings and "classified newspapers & magazines"
- --------------
From: Howard Berkowitz <hcb@gettcomm.com>
Newsgroups: alt.books.tom-clancy
Subject: Intelligence Bibliography
User-Agent: MT-NewsWatcher/3.0 (PPC)
Date: Sun, 19 Jan 2003 17:17:56 -0500
Again following up on various questions, don't assume a given book or
reference falls into only one category.
Substantive Online Sources
- --------------------------
http://www.fas.org
http://www.odci.gov
www.cia.gov/csi/studies/ Declassified "Studies in Intelligence,"
the internal professional journal
http://www.adtdl.army.mil/atdls.htm Army online library. Lots of
manuals. In addition to intelligence
documents, get Staff Officers FM
http://www.nsa.gov
http://www.cryptome.org
Academic curricula
- ------------------
http://www.c4i.org/teachintel.html
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/refmats_folder/refmatsteaching.html
Strategic/Policy Interaction
- ----------------------------
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence and American Foreign Policy
Richard Helms, The Man Who Kept The Secrets
Colby, Lost Victory
Marchetti & Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
Organizational
- --------------
Richelson, The American Intelligence Community (2nd Ed)
Prouty, The Secret Team (highly critical of US intelligence)
Kirkpatrick, The US Intelligence Community
Agee (highly critical and intended as an expose, but quite detailed
on field station organization and procedures
Cryptology & Communications intelligence (not especially mathematical)
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Kahn, The Codebreakers (get the used 1st ed if you can --
he added very, very little to the 2nd)
Friedman's declassified Military Cryptanalysis
Cryptologia, a quarterly journal
Smith, Internet Cryptography
www.nsa.gov for historical work -- VENONA is especially interesting
Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret
Counterintelligence/Counterespionage
- ------------------------------------
West, Molehunt (British orientation)
Wise, Molehunt (US orientation)
Winterbotham, The Double-Cross System
Agee, Inside the Company
Pincher, Their Trade is Treachery
General analytical
- ------------------
Adams, War of Numbers
Hilsman, To Move a Nation
Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Analysis and Decision
Layton, I Was There
Allen, War Games
Military intelligence
- ---------------------
Used to be a fair amount of branch organization in the Staff Officers'
Field Guide, which has been renumbered. See ATDL online library--some
intelligence field manuals are available
Interrogation
- -------------
Sedgwick Tourson, Conversations with Victor Charlie (also quite good
on order of battle analysis)
Overhead recon (aircraft and satellite) & special sensors
- ---------------------------------------------------------
Dino Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball
Lindgren, Trust but Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War
Dwayne Allen Day et al (eds), CORONA
Burrows, Deep Black
Sontag et al, Blind Man's Bluff
Tradecraft
- ----------
Wise, Molehunt (US molehunting)
West, Molehunt (British)
www.odci.gov -- search for Penkovsky and IRONBARK
Orlov, Handbook of Intelligence and Special Warfare
Sudoplatov, Special Tasks
Prange, Target Tokyo: The Sorge Spy Ring
Perrault, The Red Orchestra
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 22 Mar 2003 23:32:52 -0500
From: "Howard C. Berkowitz" <hcb@gettcomm.com>
Subject: [netz] A delicate line?
I've seen reporting of an incident that challenges on multiple levels.
1. What are the boundaries of "the net" with respect to netizenship?
Are commercial television and radio part of the net? We can certainly
communicate with them electronically as never in the past, with email
feedback.
2. What are the lines of demanding "content correctness" from a source
of information? Where do freedom of expression and of journalistic
(including alternate media) integrity arise?
Here's the situation, to which I do _not_ have any easy answer, but
think it's just marginally within scope. It's definitely not my
intention to discuss the specific content being discussed, but the
process of creation and distribution of content, and the freedom
given to producers of content.
News reports today cite about 1500 protesters in front of CNN
Headquarters in Atlanta, criticizing CNN for "glorifying war." Now,
I don't have one key bit of information: were the demonstrators
sitting in or otherwise blocking access to the CNN building?
There was also a protest at CNN's Los Angeles bureau
(http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/22/sprj.irq.protests/index.html)
demanding that the networks give more coverage to the peace movement.
Now, do let me confess a prejudice. When someone "demands" anything
of something they do not control or own, I tend to get very hostile
to them. As I say, a personal bias to be considered.
Recognizing that this is an international list, I want to make an
observation about the true meaning of the "freedom of the press"
guarantee of the First Amendment to the US Constitution. Freedom of
the press, as I have always understood it, means that anyone who
wants to can set up a press and print what they will. Freedom of the
press does not mean that I can compel a publisher to present my
views. These "demands" seem, to me, to fall into the second case.
_I_ want to see CNN's content and decide for myself how credible it
is. It might be glorifying war as did a samurai, but, as long as
there are facts below the editorializing, I want to make my own
decisions about the content. If the demonstrators interfered with
CNN operations, I see them as no different than hacktivists defacing
websites. If they are simply protesting the coverage, then they
become much more like someone putting up an issue-oriented website.
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2003 13:34:25 -0500 (EST)
From: lindeman@bard.edu
Subject: Re: [netz] A delicate line?
Howard,
> I've seen reporting of an incident that challenges on multiple levels.
>
> 1. What are the boundaries of "the net" with respect to netizenship?
> Are commercial television and radio part of the net? We can
> certainly communicate with them electronically as never in the
> past, with email feedback.
I'm having trouble getting my head around the question. No, I don't think that
TV and radio are "part of the net." But certainly I'm concerned about trends
in media concentration, and I'm interested in how Net-based media play off
against those trends. Am I being too literal?
> 2. What are the lines of demanding "content correctness" from a source
> of information? Where do freedom of expression and of journalistic
> (including alternate media) integrity arise? [Account snipped.]
On the first part of this question, you've drawn one line very reasonably, I
think. Anyone can beef at CNN, but they are not obviously entitled to try to
shut down (or to coerce) CNN [and, like you, I have no idea whether there was
any effort to interfere with CNN's operations]. I said "not obviously,"
not "obviously not," because I'm sure someone believes that shutting down CNN
would be a defensible revolutionary act -- and it's not for me to say that that
is _obviously_ wrong. But it seems pretty silly to me.
I have no idea whether the demonstrators were asking CNN for anything that
would compromise CNN's journalistic integrity. The phrase "content
correctness" evokes "political correctness," which is generally understood as
self-censorship (enforced through social pressure as necessary) of any improper
ideas. I would guess that folks who are demonstrating against CNN aren't so
much annoyed about what it is saying that it shouldn't, as what it isn't
talking about that they believe it should be.
A tangent: At Brown a few years ago, after the student newspaper ran a
controversial advertisement opposing reparations to blacks (the controversy had
to do with some of its other statements), a small student group threatened
reprisals against the paper unless it apologized, paid reparations, and (as I
vaguely recall) temporarily changed its name from the _Brown Daily Herald_ to,
perhaps, the _White Daily Herald_. The staff of course refused, and the group
went around campus destroying one daily run of the paper. I found this not
only distasteful but embarrassing. Probably not an actual threat to freedom of
discourse at Brown (I'd guess that the paper got a considerable short-run
readership boost), but utterly misguided as a strategy -- in part because it
really was an attempt to enforce "content correctness."
Anyway, trying to think both as a netizen and as a political pragmatist, I am
more interested in efforts to build a credible independent media than in
complaints about CNN. I'm not saying that people shouldn't complain to CNN;
the major media obviously play a large role in our political discourse, and the
media shouldn't expect people always to defer to their judgments. (I remember
CNN getting slammed from the right during Gulf War I.)
Mark Lindeman
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 23 Mar 2003 14:19:42 -0500
From: "Howard C. Berkowitz" <hcb@gettcomm.com>
Subject: Re: [netz] A delicate line?
>Howard,
>
>> I've seen reporting of an incident that challenges on multiple levels.
>>
>> 1. What are the boundaries of "the net" with respect to netizenship?
>> Are commercial television and radio part of the net? We can
>> certainly communicate with them electronically as never in the
>> past, with email feedback.
>
>I'm having trouble getting my head around the question. No, I don't
>think that
>TV and radio are "part of the net."
And that, in and of itself, is an assumption that needs close
examination. First, do take into consideration my technical
perspective that the net, first and foremost, is a tangible system of
optics and electronics over which information flows.
There are excellent technical and economic reasons to build
"converged" networks, which gain economies of scale by moving
telephony, video/television, etc., onto shared media. Those
economies of scale have a direct relevance to the penetration of what
I'll call the "social" (lousy term) net past the "digital divide."
It may be too expensive to run separate facilities for telephones,
cable TV, broadband access, etc. into a housing project, but it's
been demonstrated that a combined link can be affordable.
So, given those physical and economic realities, I do consider TV
(perhaps radio less so) to be part of my definition of the net.
_Not_ considering it such may perpetuate the digital divide.
>But certainly I'm concerned about trends
>in media concentration, and I'm interested in how Net-based media play off
>against those trends. Am I being too literal?
>
>> 2. What are the lines of demanding "content correctness" from a source
>> of information? Where do freedom of expression and of journalistic
> > (including alternate media) integrity arise? [Account snipped.]
>
>
>
>I have no idea whether the demonstrators were asking CNN for anything that
>would compromise CNN's journalistic integrity. The phrase "content
>correctness" evokes "political correctness," which is generally understood as
>self-censorship (enforced through social pressure as necessary) of
>any improper
>ideas. I would guess that folks who are demonstrating against CNN aren't so
>much annoyed about what it is saying that it shouldn't, as what it isn't
>talking about that they believe it should be.
Again, this is fruit for discussion--I don't have the answer, but I
contend that content correctness is a generic demand for outside
parties to have control over what does not -- or does -- get into the
delivered content.
This becomes especially complex when it can be argued that a media
outlet is in some manner subsidized by use of the "commons" with
respect to radio frequency space and the like. One obvious area of
exploration here is the effect, at least in the US, of the effect of
cost of political television advertising on the integrity of the
political process. That integrity potentially is challenged both by
the need of the candidates to generate advertising dollars if they
are to be competitive, and the impact of often-unaccountable soft
money and issue campaigns.
>
>A tangent: At Brown a few years ago, after the student newspaper ran a
>controversial advertisement opposing reparations to blacks (the
>controversy had
>to do with some of its other statements), a small student group threatened
>reprisals against the paper unless it apologized, paid reparations, and (as I
>vaguely recall) temporarily changed its name from the _Brown Daily Herald_ to,
>perhaps, the _White Daily Herald_. The staff of course refused, and the group
>went around campus destroying one daily run of the paper. I found this not
>only distasteful but embarrassing. Probably not an actual threat to
>freedom of
>discourse at Brown (I'd guess that the paper got a considerable short-run
>readership boost), but utterly misguided as a strategy -- in part because it
>really was an attempt to enforce "content correctness."
Let me make an emotional, unreasoned response here. I wouldn't trust
myself to be peaceful toward "bookburners", regardless of their
ideology. Going back to the late sixties, I remember well dealing
with radicals spouting about "reprisals" and "demands", and somehow
losing interest in threatening me or blocking access to my classroom
when they looked into my eyes, felt my breath on their face, and
realized that they were facing reality -- and consequences they
weren't prepared to accept.
Again completely anecdotal, but I remember well a time when I was
trying my best to be an objective journalist at major antiwar
demonstrations -- I was accredited by both sides and tried to be fair
and honest to all. At one point, one protester was trying his best
to slam my head into the concrete wall of the Pentagon -- in other
words, something that very well could have been fatal. The
revolutionary theorists' distinction between "force" and "violence"
was very irrelevant in that moment. I took the physical action
necessary to defend myself, and not with "minimum force" but with
force adequate to be certain that individual was not in any condition
to endanger me further. I was neither sending messages nor trying to
maim or kill, but intending to disable -- and did. Almost 40 years
later, I have no regrets over my actions.
>
>Anyway, trying to think both as a netizen and as a political pragmatist, I am
>more interested in efforts to build a credible independent media than in
>complaints about CNN.
My model may be closer to building _analytical_ independence than
_source_ independence. I believe that the Netizen has to realize that
virtually any source is going to have biases, whether "independent"
or not.
>I'm not saying that people shouldn't complain to CNN;
>the major media obviously play a large role in our political
>discourse, and the
>media shouldn't expect people always to defer to their judgments. (I remember
>CNN getting slammed from the right during Gulf War I.)
As long as commercial media are getting slammed from both sides, they
are probably doing something right!
------------------------------
End of Netizens-Digest V1 #440
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