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NL-KR Digest Volume 06 No. 20
NL-KR Digest (Sat Apr 15 16:45:18 1989) Volume 6 No. 20
Today's Topics:
Philosophy/Cog Sci Colloquium
SUNY Buffalo Cog Sci--Eric Dietrich
CSLI Calendar, April 13, 4:22
AI and Law Conference - Program Announcement
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Back issues are available from host archive.cs.rpi.edu [128.213.1.10] in
the files nl-kr/Vxx/Nyy (ie nl-kr/V01/N01 for V1#1), mail requests will
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to use `turing.cs.rpi.edu' instead.
---------------------------------------------------------
To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu
Date: Fri, 7 Apr 89 11:50:55 EDT
From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport)
Subject: Philosophy/Cog Sci Colloquium
UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
and
GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES
PRESENT
LYNNE RUDDER BAKER
Department of Philosophy
Middlebury College
HAS REPRESENTATION BEEN NATURALIZED?
Physicalism either denies or denigrates beliefs, by maintaining either
that there are no beliefs or that beliefs are identical with physical
states. Baker's book gives close examination of each of these proposals
in turn, concluding that they come up short. One of the most subtle and
influential proponents of physicalism is Jerry Fodor. At the American
Philosophical Association meetings in December 1988, Baker read a cri-
tique of Fodor's book _Psychosemantics_, with Fodor giving a reply. The
paper she will read here is a revision of her APA paper that takes
Fodor's reply into account.
Wednesday, April 19, 1989
3:00 P.M.
684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus
Contact Newton Garver, Dept. of Philosophy, 716-636-2444, or Bill Rapaport,
Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193, for further information.
------------------------------
To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu
Date: Mon, 10 Apr 89 15:23:36 EDT
From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport)
Subject: SUNY Buffalo Cog Sci--Eric Dietrich
UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES
PRESENTS
ERIC DIETRICH
Program in Philosophy and Computer & Systems Science
Department of Philosophy
SUNY Binghamton
FODOR'S PERVERSE FRAME PROBLEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC A.I.
Over the last several years, Jerry Fodor has developed a theory of mind
which has the unintuitive consequence that one part of the human brain
routinely solves an intractable (or undecidable) problem. This problem
is Fodor's version of the frame problem, which was first discovered in
1969 by McCarthy and Hayes, and is currently the subject of controversy
and debate. I will briefly discuss Fodor's theory of mind--the modular-
ity thesis--and his version of the frame problem. Then I will show that
Fodor's frame problem is not solvable by any physical computer with
realistic resources. Though Fodor apparently embraces this conclusion,
I do not. Instead, the modularity thesis should be rejected. The gap
left by the modularity thesis, however, poses at least one serious prob-
lem for AI. I will suggest one way of handling this problem and its
implications for a scientific AI.
Monday, April 17, 1989
4:00 P.M.
684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus
There will be an evening discussion at 8:00 P.M.
at David Mark's house, 380 S. Ellicott Creek Road, Amherst.
Contact Bill Rapaport, Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193, for
further information.
------------------------------
To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu
Date: Wed, 12 Apr 89 17:56:37 PDT
From: emma@csli.Stanford.EDU (Emma Pease)
Subject: CSLI Calendar, April 13, 4:22
C S L I C A L E N D A R O F P U B L I C E V E N T S
_____________________________________________________________________________
13 April 1989 Stanford Vol. 4, No. 22
_____________________________________________________________________________
A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and
Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
____________
CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR THIS THURSDAY, 13 April 1989
2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar
Cordura Hall Varieties of Context: Session 2
Conference Room Reading: "Cognitive Significance and New Theories
of Reference"
John Perry, Philosophy, Stanford
Respondent: Jim Greeno
3:30 p.m. Tea
Ventura Hall
4:00 p.m. STASS Seminar
Cordura Hall The Frog, the Fly, and the Coffee Cup: Part 2
Conference Room John Perry and David Israel
(john@russell.stanford.edu and israel@ai.sri.com)
Abstract below
____________
CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR NEXT THURSDAY, 20 April 1989
2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar
Cordura Hall Varieties of Context: Session 3
Conference Room Indexicality in Context
Geoffrey Nunberg, Xerox PARC
Respondent: Brian Smith
3:30 p.m. Tea
Ventura Hall
4:00 p.m. STASS Seminar
Cordura Hall Dewey on Defeasible Reasoning
Conference Room Tom Burke
(burke@csli.stanford.edu)
Abstract below
____________
CSLI SPRING SEMINAR SERIES
Varieties of Context
led by
Jim Greeno, Brian Smith, Susan Stucky
(greeno.pa@xerox.com, briansmith.pa@xerox.com, stucky.pa@xerox.com)
2:15, Thursdays
Everyone knows that `I' can be used to refer to different people
depending on circumstance. So why is such a fuss being made of this
fact? We think there are two reasons. First, rather than view
contextual dependence as a peripheral or complicating incident, recent
theories of language have started to treat it as central and
enabling---as a core phenomenon. Second, contextual dependence has
been cited in other semantical fields, too: logic, psychology,
computation, etc.
In this seminar, we'll look at context in a wide range of
examples---drawn from syntax, Tarskian satisfaction, the Mac
interface, natural-language discourse, programming-language semantics,
even mechanics. We'll try to understand what's in common among such
cases, and also see how they differ. The real question is whether
context-dependence is sufficiently cohesive to justify the single
rallying cry?
We've divided up the subject matter, varieties of context,
according to local talent and interest, with the idea that there would
be short presentations (say, thirty minutes) followed by a reply and
general discussion.
This is the last general message about the CSLI Seminar on context
you will be receiving. If you'd like to be on the mailing list and
you weren't at the first meeting, please send your net address to
stucky.pa@xerox.com, and you'll be added. Notices will still appear
in the CSLI Calendar.
____________
THIS WEEK'S STASS SEMINAR
The Frog, the Fly, and the Coffee Cup: Part 2
John Perry and David Israel
(john@russell.stanford.edu and israel@ai.sri.com)
Thursday, April 13, 4:00
In this session we will continue to discuss some basic concepts,
problems, and ideas concerning the incrementality of information. We
are convinced that the key to this lies in two principles:
The relativity of (useful) concepts of linguistic and
informational content has its roots in the structure of action.
The useful, interesting, familiar, deep relations among contents
come at the incremental level.
____________
NEXT WEEK'S STASS SEMINAR
Dewey on Defeasible Reasoning
Tom Burke
(burke@csli.stanford.edu)
Thursday, April 20, 4:00
This will be a report on my study of John Dewey's "Logic: The Theory
of Inquiry" (1938). This book is relevant to STASS for historical
reasons since a notion of `situation' plays a central role in Dewey's
logical theory.
Dewey's logic has been ignored for the past forty years, largely
because (a) it isn't compatible with the philosophical underpinnings
of `formal logic' as we now think of it (Fregean, Quinean, syntactic,
etc.), and (b) no one seems to know what to make of it otherwise. I
want to take a few steps in the direction of showing that Dewey's
logical theory is technically sound and worth further development.
Consider the following example of common, everyday `defeasible
reasoning':
(1) That thing is apple-shaped and is predominantly reddish; so
(2) That thing is an apple.
Everyone would agree that this is not an example of `deduction'. But
what is it an example of? Dewey would suggest that proposition (1)
concerns the present registration of certain `qualities' of some thing
while (2) goes further to classify that thing as being of a `kind'.
For Dewey there are two different sorts of predicates involved here
whereas current logical theory sees only one. The problem, as Dewey
sees it, is not the classical epistemological matter of figuring out
how to get in some principled way from propositions about appearances
to propositions about facts, but rather from propositions about
qualities to propositions about kinds.
The focus of my presentation will be to explain this distinction
between qualities and kinds---a distinction yielding two different
sorts of properties and relations (hence two basic sorts of `infons',
in STASS jargon, and so two sorts of prepositions). I will then look
briefly at inference in a Deweyan framework. I will show how Dewey
can account for simple deductions without having to explicitly specify
`rules of inference' based on syntactic features of linguistic
expressions. Rather, such rules essentially supervene on how one
treats particular determiners like `all', `some', `many', `few', etc.
____________
SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS FORUM
Indexicality in Context
Geoff Nunberg
(nunberg.pa@xerox.com)
Xerox PARC and Stanford Linguistics
Friday, 21 April, 3:15, 60:62N
Most of our semantic accounts of indexical expressions---words like
`I' and `now', for example---have been developed primarily on the
basis of observations about how they are used in one-on-one,
face-to-face conversation. But there are some essential aspects of
indexicality that only emerge when we widen the net to consider how
they are used in other types of communicative contexts, like road
signs, published books, or telephone answering machines. In this
talk, I'm going to draw on examples like these to show that it's not
just the reference of an indexical expression that varies from one
occasion of use to another, but the meaning of the expression as
well---that is, the type of relation that the referent bears to the
utterance. (So, to take a simple example, a written token of `I' on a
printed greeting-card verse refers to the sender, not the person who
inscribed it or composed it; but a token of `I' in a forwarded mail
message refers to the original composer.) I'll talk about how the
meaning of a particular use of an indexical is determined by the
circumstances of communication---the mode of production, transmission,
presentation, and so forth---and why you have to allow a role to
intentions in determining the meaning in these cases. Finally, I'll
say something about how observations like these are relevant to
certain questions that literary theorists have asked about the nature
of the context (and in particular, the notion of `audience') that is
relevant to textual interpretation.
____________
SITUATION THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS
The first conference on Situation Theory and its Applications (ST&A)
was held at Asilomar from March 23 to 26. Fifty-five people attended
from England, Scotland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Japan, and Korea, as
well as from the U.S. The format of the conference consisted of
sixteen refereed papers, chosen from thirty-three submitted papers.
Presentations of an hour's length took place in the mornings and
evenings, with the afternoons free for less formal activities. The
papers were on topics ranging from situation theory itself, to
applications in linguistics, computational linguistics, theories of
inference, and prototype theory, for example.
The meeting was considered a great success by all. It became clear
that a body of shared intuitions, theory, and notation has developed
over the past few years, and that situation theory now has a momentum
of its own. The program committee (Robin Cooper, Jens-Erik Fenstad,
Kuniaki Mukai, John Perry) plans to publish a book based on the
proceedings of the meeting.
The meeting was such a success that it was decided to have a second
ST&A conference in the Scottish Highlands, probably in September of
1990. Jon Barwise will chair the program committee. A call for papers
will go out early this summer.
____________
CSLI VISITORS
Keith Devlin
Professor of Mathematics
Manchester University
Dates of visit: September 1987--July 1989
Devlin is a member of the STASS and MOST projects and an occasional
attender at POST meetings. He is a mathematical logician, trying to
develop an information-based logic that can handle situated inference.
He is writing a book, "Logic and Information," that includes a lot of
the basic work on situation theory currently under development here at
CSLI.
Marilyn Ford
Senior Lecturer
Computing and Information Technology
Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia
Dates of visit: December 1988--June 1989
Ford is visiting CSLI again to continue working with Joan Bresnan.
Her interests include reasoning and natural-language perception and
production.
Hideyuki Nakashima
Researcher
Cognitive Science Section
Electrotechnical Laboratory, Japan
Dates of visit: February--May 1989
Nakashima is a member of the CAST and STASS projects. A programming
language based on ST called PROSIT is being developed in the CAST
project. His research interests include knowledge representation,
nonmonotonic reasoning, combination of learning and ST, and a computer
model of language acquisition.
Hiroyuki Suzuki
Researcher
Tokyo Systems Research Department
Corporate Engineering Division
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.
Dates of visit: September 1987--April 1989
Suzuki, who is visiting CSLI as a Corporate Scholar, is a member of
the CAST, STASS, and SITSEM projects. His research interests include
computer science, natural-language processing, and especially Japanese
discourse understanding.
------------------------------
To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu
Date: Mon, 10 Apr 89 10:59:31 AST
From: carole hafner <hafner@corwin.ccs.northeastern.edu>
Subject: AI and Law Conference - Program Announcement
PROGRAM ANNOUNCEMENT
ICAIL-89 - The Second International Conference on
Artificial Intelligence and Law
June 13-16, 1989
University of British Columbia
Vancouver, BC CANADA
Sponsored by: Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia
In Coooperation with ACM SIGART
Additional Support from:
IBM Canada Ltd.
The Center for Law and Computer Science, Northeastern University
To receive registration material contact:
Ms. Rita Laffey
School of Law, Northeastern University
(617)437-3346
For information about exhibits or local arrangements contact:
Ms. Rosemarie Page
Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia
(604)228-2944
SCHEDULE OF EVENTS
Tuesday, June 13
5:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. - Registration and Reception, Gage Conference Center
(Registration will continue through the conference)
Wednesday, June 14
8:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. - Tutorials and Workshop
2:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. - Welcome, Paper Presentations, and Invited Talk
7:00 p.m. - Gala Banquet
Banquet Speaker: The Honorable Chief Justice Beverly M. McLachlin
Supreme Court of British Columbia
Thursday-Friday, June 15-16
8:30 a.m. - 6:00 p.m. - Paper Presentations, Invited Talk, and Panel
Thursday evening, June 15 - Salmon Barbecue, Museum of Anthropology
INVITED TALKS
"The Marriage of AI and Law - A New Analytical Jurisprudence"
Donald H. Berman, Richardson Professor of Law, Northeastern University
"`That reminds me of a story' - How Memory Organization Supports Retrieval
of Relevant Cases"
Roger C. Schank, Professor of Computer Science, Yale University
PANEL DISCUSSION
"Research Funding for AI and Law: Opportunities and Pitfalls." Moderated by
J.C. Smith, Professor of Law and Directory of the Legal Expert Systems Project,
Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia
TUTORIALS
Tutorial A. "Artificial Intelligence and Law: Opportunities and Challenges"
Donald H. Berman, Richardson Professor of Law, Northeastern University
Carole D. Hafner, Associate Professor of Computer Science, Northeastern Univ.
Tutorial B. "Case-Based Reasoning"
Kevin D. Ashley, Ph.D., J.D.
WORKSHOP
"Deontic Logic." Presented by Andrew J. I. Jones, Professor of Philosophy,
University of Oslo, Norway
RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS
Toward a Computational Theory of Arguing with Precedents
Dr. Kevin D. Ashley
IBM Watson Research Laboratories
Cutting Legal Loops
Professor Donald H. Berman
Northeastern University School of Law
Representing and Reusing Explanations of Legal Precedents
Mr. L. Karl Branting
Department of Computer Sciences
University of Texas
Boyd V. Deaver - Litigation Strategies
Mr. Dan Burnstein
Harvard Law School
Deep Models, Normative Reasoning and Legal Expert Systems
Dr. T.J.M. Bench-Capon
Department of Computer Science
University of Liverpool, England
Xcite (an expert system for naturalization cases)
Dr. Andreas Galtung
Norwegian Research Center For Computers and Law
Representing Developing Legal Doctrine A Problem for AI Programs
Dr. Anne v.d.L. Gardner
Atherton, CA
A System for Planning Arguments and Searching Interpretation Spaces
Dr. Thomas F. Gordon
German National Research Center for Computer Science
Sankt Augustin, Federal Republic of Germany
A Specialized Expert System for Judicial Decision Support
Dr. L.V. Kale
Department of Computer Science
University of Illinois
The Treatment of Negation in Logic Programs for Representing Legislation
Dr. Robert Kowalski
Department of Computing
Imperial College, London, ENGLAND
LESTER: Using Paradigm Cases in a Quasi-Precedential Legal Domain
Dr. Kenneth A. Lambert
Department of Computer Science
Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA
The Design of an Attorney's Statistical Consultant
Dr. Leonard S. Lutomski
The American Institutes for Research
Expert Systems in Case-Based Law: The Hearsay Rule Advisor
Dr. Marilyn T. MacCrimmon
The University of British Columbia
Vancouver, CANADA
Representing the Structure of a Legal Argument
Ms. Catherine C. Marshall
Xerox Palo Alto Research Center
Palo Alto, CA
LRS Legal Reasoning System
Professor Antonio A. Martino
Istituto per la Documentazione Giuridica
Del Consiglio Nazionale Delle Richerche, ITALY
A Language for Legal Discourse
Dr. L. Thorne McCarty
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ
An Attempted Dimensional Analysis of the Law Governing Government Appeals
in Criminal Cases
Mr. Simon Mendelson
Cambridge, MA 02140
Market Realities of Rule-Based Software for Lawyers Where the Rubber
Meets the Road
Mr. Rees Morrison, Esq.
Price Waterhouse
New York, NY
Building GRANDJUR Using Evidence and Other Knowledge to Prepare Casefiles
Dr. Roger D. Purdy
School of Law
The University of Akron, OHIO
Dimension-Based Analysis of Hypotheticals from Supreme Court Oral Argument
Dr. Edwina L. Rissland
Dept. of Computer Science
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Interpreting Statutory Predicates
Dr. Edwina L. Rissland
Mr. David B. Skalak
Dept. of Computer Science
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Legal Information Retrieval A Hybrid Approach
Dr. Daniel E. Rose
Institute for Cognitive Science
University of California, San Diego
A Framework for Legal Knowledge Base Construction
Dr. Tom Routen
Department of Computer Science
Leicester Polytechnic, ENGLAND
EPS II Estate Planning With Prototypes (with L. T. McCarty)
Mr. Dean A. Schlobohm
Stanford Law School, Stanford CA
Expert Systems and ICAI in Tax Law: Killing Two Birds with one AI Stone
Dr. David Sherman
The Law Society of Upper Canada
Toronto, CANADA
ASSYST - Computer Support for Guideline Sentencing
Dr. Eric Simon
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Washington, D.C.
Taking Advantage of Models for Legal Classification
Mr. David Skalak
Dept. of Computer Science
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
The Latent Damage System A Jurisprudential Analysis
Dr. Richard Susskind
Ernst and Whinney
London ENGLAND
PROLEXS, A Model to Implement Legal Knowledge
Mr. P.H. van den Berg
Computer/Law Institute
Juridische Faculteit Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam, THE NETHERLANDS
Legal Reasoning - A Jurisprudential Description
Dr. Peter Wahlgren
The Swedish Law and Informatics Research Inst.
University of Stockholm, SWEDEN
CACE: Computer-Assisted Case Evaluation in the Brooklyn District
Attorney's Office
Mr. Steven S. Weiner
Yayes, Mechling, Kleiman, Inc.
Cambridge, MA 02138
Amalgamating Regulation- and Case-based Advice Systems Through Suggested
Answers
Dr. David E. Wolstenholme
Department of Computing
Imperial College, London, ENGLAND
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
Robert T. Fraonson, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Co-Chair
J. C. Smith, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Co-Chair
Carole D. Hafner, Northeastern University, Secretary-Treasurer
PROGRAM COMMITTEE:
Edwina L. Rissland, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Program Chair
Kevin D. Ashley, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon, University of Liverpool, ENGLAND
Donald H. Berman, Northeastern University
Jon Bing, University of Oslo, NORWAY
Michael G. Dyer, University of California, Los Angeles
Anne v.d. L. Garner, Atherton, CA
L. Thorne McCarty, Rutgers University
Marek J. Sergot, Imperial College, London, ENGLAND
------------------------------
End of NL-KR Digest
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