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NL-KR Digest Volume 03 No. 41
NL-KR Digest (10/30/87 01:13:47) Volume 3 Number 41
Today's Topics:
ai/c
dynamic KB restructuring
Why can't my cat talk?
Innate Language Ability
Re: The real issue with concepts/words
Re: concepts vs. words; false dichotomies
Re: false dichotomies
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Date: Fri, 23 Oct 87 12:14 EDT
From: Ali Hazzah <hazzah@acf3.nyu.edu>
Subject: ai/c
I am interested in netting with those currently mulling
over Knowledge Representation issues, as well as those doing
NLS research work, utilizing the language C.
Here at NYU, I have just started developing a set of common,
general-purpose C routines, callable by C programs, using as
an interface shell a custom-built i/o graphics/text library.
This work is only starting; it is just this side of vaporware,
but my ruminations are begining to see the light of code.
The idea is to be able to prototype malleable shells, which
can then access "generic" functions, and in the process do
something semi-useful.
What I'm saying, then, is that I'd like to hear from like-minded
individuals, whose intent is participatory, and who'd appreciate
trading "shop-talk", and maybe even a few Great Ideas.
A thousand thanks,
Ali
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 23 Oct 87 17:33 EDT
From: Bruce Nevin <bnevin@cch.bbn.com>
Subject: dynamic KB restructuring
Has there been any work on the problem of reorganizing knowledge bases
in light of evidence for a different set of conceptual categories?
I'm thinking of a `hindsight is better' realization that there is
something seriously deficient or limiting in the system of concepts and
links used at the beginning of building a KR system. This relates to
problems of portability to new domains, merging or communicating between
KR systems built independently for different domains, as well as
incorporating information with kinds of structuring not foreseen
at the outset of work.
Bruce Nevin
bn@cch.bbn.com
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 87 23:00 EST
From: 26-Oct-1987 2000 <glantz@yippee.dec.com>
Subject: Why can't my cat talk?
What is it in humans which makes language possible?
Much discussion about neural networks carries the implication that it
is a human brain researchers are hoping, ultimately, to simulate, and
that a successful simulation will exhibit human linguistic capability.
This is certainly an admirable and worthwhile, if ambitious, goal. But
current models don't seem to have any features which would distinguish
a human brain from, say, a cat's brain (I realize this is very early
days - no criticism intended). This will eventually have to be dealt
with.
One possible explanation for why humans have language and cats don't is
that there may be one or more physiological structures unique to the
human brain, other than its larger capacity, which make language
possible. This is the most obvious explanation that comes to mind, and
is perfectly reasonable, although we haven't yet identified which
structures these are, or what roles they might play.
But another possibility is that maybe the larger brain capacity is
sufficient, but that language is possible only after certain
``internal'' or ``symbolic'' structures are built on top of the
physiological base. This building occurs during infancy and early
childhood, and the resulting structures can be considered to be part of
the human brain, every bit as real as the physiologically observable
features.
We continue this line of conjecture by suggesting that:
o At some point in the past, the human species did not have language,
even though the brain was physiologically identical (or identical in
all essential respects) to today's human brain;
o It is the socialization process which, today, builds these structures
in the brain of the human infant, layer upon layer being added until a
layer at which language can exist is built, and then probably several
layers beyond that;
o That this linguistic-structure-formation process is a small component
of the entire human social system, the whole of which has evolved
through natural selection, just as any physical characteristic of any
species evolves.
The principal hypothesis, here, is that, given sufficient relative
brain capacity, and the appropriate socialization process, any
individual of another species (a porpoise, for example) could acquire
linguistic ability.
[Aside: It is known that the human brain (and that of other mammals, as
well) undergoes physiological changes during the period of infancy and
early childhood. It is possible that the initial acquisition of
linguistic skills can only occur effectively during this period, during
which time these physiological changes are significantly ``molded'' by
the socialization process, where certain ``symbolic'' structures
actually become ``wired in''. If this were the case, then the period
during which basic linguistic ability can be acquired would be limited
to this ``crystallization'' period, which is possibly much longer in
humans than in other mammals. We would then have to amend the
hypothesis to read: given sufficient brain capacity and a sufficiently
long ``crystallization period'' etc. It then remains (among other
things) to determine the exact nature of this ``crystallization'', and
incorporate a sufficiently long duration of this in a computer model.
Does anyone have any concrete information about human brain physiology
which would favor the completely ``physiological'' hypothesis of
linguistic capability over the ``sociological/anthropological''
explanation, or which would shed any other light on the question?
- mike glantz
Disclaimer: My employer is not aware that I have posted this message.
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 87 11:09 EST
From: merrill@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu
Subject: Re: Why can't my cat talk?
There is evidence that supports an argument the humans are
"pre-equipped" to speak and to participate in language. In
particular, the structure of the adult human velum is different from that
found in other great apes, which, like human babies, can brethe while
they swallow. Adult humans (in fact, human one-year-olds) can no
longer do so. This modification is closely associated with the
ability of the tongue to produce a number of the standard vowels.
This argument is not air-tight, since children deaf from birth can
(and do, if given the chance) acquire language, even though they do
not speak. On the other hand, if an external structure has evolved to
participate in linguistic performance, it is reasonable to argur that
many internal structures have, too.
John Merrill
ARPA: merrill@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu
UUCP: merrill@iuvax
BITnet: merrill%iuvax.cs.indiana.edu@psuvax
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 87 08:53 EST
From: Douglas J. Bonn <hao!gatech!rayssd!djb@ames.arpa>
Subject: Re: Why can't my cat talk?
It seems to me that we need to draw a distinction between the mental ability
to comprehend and form independent thoughts (called phrases and sentences)
from the vocal organs necessary for speech. I once had a cat that seemed
smart enough to talk (but didn't often condescend to speak to me :-) though
she didn't have the vocal chords for it, and there are mentally retarded
people that don't seem to have the necessary intelligence to speak.
While it is not exactly "speech", monkeys have been taught sign-language.
They can ask for food, recognize people (even from photographs), ask to
be let out of their cages, etc. I don't know enough about the study
(but perhaps someone out there does), but the last I heard, the research
with monkeys doing sign was curtailed.
"Why can't my cat talk?" Perhaps if she could think as we understand thought,
she would learn to meow in Morse Code or use a PC.
--
Douglas J. Bonn, Esq. djb@rayssd.ray.com
"As far as we can determine, our system has never had an undetected error..."
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 28 Oct 87 13:47 EST
From: Len Friedman <FRIEDMAN@vaxa.isi.edu>
Subject: Innate Language Ability
> One possible explanation for why humans have language and cats don't is
> that there may be one or more physiological structures unique to the
> human brain, other than its larger capacity, which make language
> possible. This is the most obvious explanation that comes to mind, and
> is perfectly reasonable, although we haven't yet identified which
> structures these are, or what roles they might play.
In the 1840's or 50's a French physician named Broca discovered that an
aphasic patient (one who had lost his ability to speak as the result of a stroke)
had suffered a massive lesion in a particular area of the brain. He was able to
demonstrate that any human who suffered an injury in that area lost the
ability to speak. It has since been named Broca's area, and is one of the few in
the brain whose function has been so clearly associated with a known,
uniquely human ability. A great deal of more modern neurophysiological
investigation has shown that other specialized areas of the human brain are
associated not only with speech, but with aspects of language understanding as
well. Norman Geschwind has written several excellent review articles in
Science on the subject in the last 5 years or so.
> It is the socialization process which, today, builds these structures
> in the brain of the human infant, layer upon layer being added until a
> layer at which language can exist is built, and then probably several
> layers beyond that;
There have been extensive investigations by psychologists of the thesis,
advanced in the 60's, that a core language capability is innate, i.e., wired into
the brain of any normal infant. These investigations have taken several
forms, including the sound by sound study of the development of language
capability in normal human infants, and the study of "creole" grammars. The
conclusions of the people studying the development of infant language is that
its course is almost invariant, involving first the production of nouns, then
noun phrases, then noun-verb pairs, etc. The grammar associated with this
development is the same grammar found in "creole" languages.
Creoles are "pidgin" languages that develop when adult communities are
artificially thrown together. When the members of these comingling
communities speak radically different languages like Japanese and Portuguese
they develop a means to communicate with each other in a language that has
the same primitive grammar that infants employ on their way to learning the
grammar of the adult community. An example of such a creole is one
developed by agricultural workers imported into Hawaii to work as pineapple
pickers, mostly from Japan and Portugal around 1900. Other examples of such
languages, all with the same grammar, are described in an article that appeared
in Scientific American. I am sure that many psychologist readers of AIlist can
point you to the literature on infant language development.
> The principal hypothesis, here, is that, given sufficient relative
> brain capacity, and the appropriate socialization process, any
> individual of another species (a porpoise, for example) could acquire
> linguistic ability.
In view of the evidence for specialized brain areas in humans plus the
evidence for innate capabilities in language development, this appears to be
most unlikely. By the way, porpoises, dolphins, and whales, have specialized
areas in their brains for processing echo returns, as do bats.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 87 16:37 EDT
From: Alan Lovejoy <alan@pdn.UUCP>
Subject: Re: The real issue with concepts/words
In article <2485@mmintl.UUCP> franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams) writes:
>Can you give an example of a commonly held false belief which is *not*
>reflected by language in this sense? *Of course* people use words in a way
>which accords with their beliefs. How could they do otherwise?
Exactly. What else were you expecting? Language is the tuple (syntax,
semantics). Since the syntax only specifies form, only the semantics
(the content) could possibly influence thought or opinion.
--alan@pdn
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 22 Oct 87 23:41 EDT
From: Sarge Gerbode <sarge@thirdi.UUCP>
Subject: Re: concepts vs. words; false dichotomies
In article <334@odyssey.ATT.COM> gls@odyssey.ATT.COM (g.l.sicherman) writes:
>To me, a concept or idea is a kind of pattern, and thus a perception in
>its own right. I still distinguish a concept from a statement of it.
I agree that a concept is not a statement.
I don't think a concept is a pattern, but even if a concept were a pattern,
that still doesn't say that it would be perceptible. Lots of patterns are
only *inferred* and cannot be perceived.
>You have touched the fulcrum of the argument. A perception cannot be
>"wrong"--your senses are just doing their job. If you genuinely saw
>pigs fly, it doesn't matter whether the pigs were actually caught in
>a whirlwind, or you were watching an animated cartoon, or you were
>asleep and dreaming. Your perception was *true.*
I think that's right, in a way. *At the time of the perception*, perception
seems infallible. One cannot say "I perceive a flying pig, but there isn;t
one there." If you didn't think a flying pig was there, you wouldn't say, "I
see a flying pig," but "I see an *illusion* or a *picture* of a flying pig."
Nevertheless, ssomething that, at the time, was thought of as a perception may
later be thought of as having been a misperception. For instance, when we
dream, we seem to be perceiving all sorts of things. When we wake up,
however, we see that it was not a true perception but illusory.
--
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 87 09:41 EST
From: g.l.sicherman <gls@odyssey.ATT.COM>
Subject: Re: false dichotomies
More about perception and illusion ...
> I don't think a concept is a pattern, but even if a concept were a pattern,
> that still doesn't say that it would be perceptible. Lots of patterns are
> only *inferred* and cannot be perceived.
It's the rule that you infer, not the pattern. You must perceive a pattern
before you can establish a rule!
> I think that's right, in a way. *At the time of the perception*, perception
> seems infallible. One cannot say "I perceive a flying pig, but there isn;t
> one there." If you didn't think a flying pig was there, you wouldn't say, "I
> see a flying pig," but "I see an *illusion* or a *picture* of a flying pig."
> Nevertheless, ssomething that, at the time, was thought of as a perception may
> later be thought of as having been a misperception. For instance, when we
> dream, we seem to be perceiving all sorts of things. When we wake up,
> however, we see that it was not a true perception but illusory.
The nature of illusion was discussed here a few months ago. Do you know
the story of the sage who dreamed he was a butterfly? Afterwards he was
never sure that he was not a buttefly dreaming it was a sage.
The only difference it makes to _you_ is that you interpret what you
perceive differently. The only difference it makes to others is that
they may want to rely on what you say. If you shout, "Look out! Here
come the flying pigs again!" they can choose between running for cover
and looking foolish when a herd of swine walks past, or laughing, "Ha,
ha! Serge has been dreaming again!" and (just maybe) being killed by
flying pigs.
On the other hand, if you're dealing with Old Age people, you just say
"I had a dream of flying pigs," and they answer, "We don't believe you!
Where is your dream? Let's see it!"
Here's another example, from Myron Moose ("Little Myro`n Slumberland"):
"Oh! boy! A marshmallow bush! I will eat one! Yes!
"Oh! That is good! Oh! Is this marshmallow getting
bigger!
"Hey! Perhaps I had better eat faster! Um! Yes!
"Oh! my! I cannot eat this fast enough! Oh!
"Oh! oh! If I do not eat this up quick I will be
crushed. Oh! I must eat faster! Yes!
"Oh! my! Oh! My goodness! I cannot eat so fast! Oh!
"Oh! What am I to do! Um! It is definitely getting
bigger! Yes I am sure it is!
"What ails this marshmallow?
"Oh! Ow! Um! Help!"
"Oh Myro, now what? What have you done with your
pillow?"
"Ptoo!"
--
Col. G. L. Sicherman
....!ihnp4!odyssey!gls
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 27 Oct 87 02:29 EST
From: Sarge Gerbode <sarge@thirdi.UUCP>
Subject: Re: false dichotomies
In article <344@odyssey.ATT.COM> gls@odyssey.ATT.COM (g.l.sicherman) writes:
>> I don't think a concept is a pattern, but even if a concept were a pattern,
>> that still doesn't say that it would be perceptible. Lots of patterns are
>> only *inferred* and cannot be perceived.
>
>It's the rule that you infer, not the pattern. You must perceive a pattern
>before you can establish a rule!
I think I see what you mean. You seem to be defining "pattern" to mean a
perception. That's OK, so long as that usage is consistent. However,
sometimes one speaks of pattern in different ways, such as "a pattern of
crimes". One may not have perceived any of these crimes, but they appear to
have a certain regularity. Per what you have said, I imagine you would call
this an inferred rule, not a pattern. I can go along with this, although there
is a sense in which *any* perceived pattern involves a certain degree of
inference or interpretation of perception, not a pure perception.
>The nature of illusion was discussed here a few months ago. Do you know
>the story of the sage who dreamed he was a butterfly? Afterwards he was
>never sure that he was not a buttefly dreaming it was a sage.
But what one accepts as reality is not entirely arbitrary as this example
appears to suggest. Standards of consistency, as well as considerations of
predictability, order, aesthetics, and other considerations relative to
credibility come into play in determining which interpretation a person accepts
of his experience.
>The only difference it makes to _you_ is that you interpret what you
>perceive differently.
Another way of putting this is that one "steps back" from the previous
perception one had and sees it now as, not a perception, but a
misinterpretation of a "lower level" perception. For instance, one sees a
ghost in the dead of night. Then, when the light comes, one sees that it was
only a shirt on a chair. In looking at one's prior perception, one "steps
back" from the interpretation of it as a ghost and sees "ghost" as having been
a mere interpretation (In fact, an incorrect one) of the "lower-level"
perception of "a whitish shape in my room".s That doesn't mean that it was
not originally a perception. But now one looks from a different viewpoint,
minus that interpretation. Any act of perception contains multiple levels of
interpretation, into which one can "step forward" or from which one can "step
back".
>The only difference it makes to others is that
>they may want to rely on what you say. If you shout, "Look out! Here
>come the flying pigs again!" they can choose between running for cover
>and looking foolish when a herd of swine walks past, or laughing, "Ha,
>ha! Sarge has been dreaming again!" and (just maybe) being killed by
>flying pigs.
Yes. One selects amongst possible interpretations of perceptions those that
are conducive to the establishment of a universe of discourse with other
people. If not, one is likely to be very lonely at best and at worst end up in
a back ward somewhere or dead.
>On the other hand, if you're dealing with Old Age people, you just say
>"I had a dream of flying pigs," and they answer, "We don't believe you!
>Where is your dream? Let's see it!"
Great point. Those who do not believe in telepathy demand telepathy as proof!
--
"Absolute knowledge means never having to change your mind."
Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
UUCP: pyramid!thirdi!sarge
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End of NL-KR Digest
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