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NL-KR Digest Volume 02 No. 46
NL-KR Digest (5/28/87 18:04:10) Volume 2 Number 46
Today's Topics:
(philosophy)
Re: Natural Languages: They're about the World
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Sun, 24 May 87 12:58 EDT
From: Sarge Gerbode <sarge@thirdi.UUCP>
Subject: Re: Natural Languages: They're about the World
In article <4569@milano.UUCP> wex@milano.UUCP writes:
>In article <35@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
>> 1. I agree that every mental act has intention behind it. In fact,
>> every act _whatsoever_ has intention behind it, or it wouldn't be an
>> "act" -- just an event with no conscious agent.
>
>I'm sorry, Sarge, I apparently wasn't clear enough. The phenomenological
>use of "intentionality" is not related to the ordinary English use of
>"intention". The latter, as you indicate in your article, deals with the
>purpose or goals of the speaker.
>
>However, Brentano's intentionality is not a statement about the thinker, but
>rather about the thought. Intentionality is the name given to the
>"directedness" property of thoughts. That is, thoughts always seem to be
>"about" something....
Thanks, Alan, for the clarification on "intentionality". Brentano is not
someone I've studied. Perhaps you could forward me a good reference by
email.
Meanwhile ...
I've read with interest the recent interchange between you and Laura. I think
you haven't fully answered Laura's point on the indistinguishability of I-class
thoughts and R-class thoughts (or the non-existence of R-class thoughts).
The problem, I think, is that your approach is not radical enough,
phenomenologically. You state:
> My point is about the intentionality of thoughts. Example:
> Laura is hit on the head by a falling pine cone, but thinks
> it is a snowball.
> Nothing wrong here. My point is that your thought about the
> thing-that-hit-your-head was directed at the thing itself, not at some
> mental representation of it. You were mistaken about the nature of the
> thing (thought it was a snowball), but the intentionality of the thought is
> still directed at the object.
The point where I lose you is where you talk about "the thing itself", a very
un-phenomenological concept, if I'm not mistaken.
I think I get what you are driving at, and perhaps the following thought will
show how both you and Laura are right (or perhaps it won't):
Phenomenologically, or from a purely subjective viewpoint, a person does
indeed have different kinds of ideas: ideas that he believes to be true and
ideas that he believes to be false. More accurately, each individual has a
set of ideas, some of which are believed more strongly than others, ranging
from thoughts that are absolutely (or nearly absolutely) known as fictional to
ideas that *might* be true, to ideas that are thought with great certainty to
be true. Subjectively, there is no difference between ideas that are believed
and those that are true, so what is really being talking about is a continuum
of belief, ranging from complete disbelief to complete belief. In other
words, one could say that there are simply ideas, and then a person considers
these ideasz and decides which to agree with, which to disagree with, and
which to assign a probability to.
Brentano notwithstanding, I'm not sure what, if anything, it adds to say that
ideas "refer" to something. It could be a trick of the language that we speak
of "ideas of" or "ideas about". It seems to me that when we state what an
idea is "about", we are just stating what the idea *is*. Some would say that
a true idea is one that, somehow, corresponds to "the facts". In this, I
agree with Anders Weinstein's position that ideas need not "refer".
I think it would be most parsimonious to *define* a fact as an idea that is
believed, where a fiction would be an idea that is not believed. An idea,
then, would be a "candidate fact", which would be graduated from candidacy
(elected?) by being believed or assented to. Obviously, by this definition,
one person's fact could be another's fiction, and different individuals
therefore inhabit different worlds to the degree that their beliefs disagree.
A major function of communication, and therefore of language, is to permit
individuals to negotiate their differing beliefs and arrive at an
intersubjective reality.
Certainly, in this definition, an idea being factual would not mean that an
idea would have to be an idea "of" the physical universe. If you aren't a naive
realist or a behaviorist, then you will admit the existence of ideas or mental
pictures as non-physical entities.
One other point about "indefinite regresses" of ideas of ideas. I agree that
there are a limited number of levels of reference that one can keep track of
at one time. However, one can be "subliminally aware" (to use Michael
Polanyi's term) of a great many layers or ideas, while being "focally aware"
of only a few. In fact, in doing something like driving a car, one takes
account of a large number of factors without being aware of doing so. The
same is evidently true of ideas, in that our concepts are built up of other
concepts, which, in turn, are built up of others, etc. etc., yet somehow we
can live and (usually) not go crazy.
This is an area in which I have intense interest. I'm interested in your
views.
"From his own viewpoint, no one ever has false beliefs; he only *had* false
beliefs."
Sarge Gerbode
Institute for Research in Metapsychology
950 Guinda St.
Palo Alto, CA 94301
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 25 May 87 08:36 EDT
From: "J. A. \"Biep\" Durieux" <biep@cs.vu.nl>
Subject: Re: Natural Languages: They're about the World
In article <2152@hoptoad.uucp> laura@hoptoad.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes:
>In article <4568@milano.UUCP> wex@milano.UUCP writes:
>>I agree that there are certain classes of thoughts I have (call them I)
>>which are about what might be called "imaginary" things. [...]
>>
>>However, there is another class of thoughts (call them R) which are about
>>what might be called "real" things. [...]
(answer about how thoughts can conflict with reality)
>(Plus the existence of 2 classes of objects offends me. My thoughts
>are my thoughts.)
>
>Laura
>--
I think you are right, but miss something from wex' definition: I-class
thoughts are meant to be thoughts *labelled* with the notion that they do not
refer to the real world. Conceps of real things are needed to explain
unexpected happenings, but that doesn't mean thoughts about them are the same
as thoughts about I-class objects. It vaguely reminds me of the ontologic
existence-proof of God.
Biep. (biep@cs.vu.nl via mcvax)
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 26 May 87 15:28 EDT
From: wex@milano.UUCP
Subject: Re: Natural Languages: They're about the World
In article <2160@hoptoad.uucp>, laura@hoptoad.uucp (Laura Creighton) writes:
> I understand you, I just don't agree. Suppose I think about a horse.
> Not any particular horse, just a horse. Is the intentionality of the
> thought the class of all horses?
If you "think about a horse" you are visualizing one. The intentionality of
your thought is directed at that visualization, not at the class of all
horses. However, it is possible to have thoughts about the class of all
horses, in which case the class-of-all-horses is the intention of your
thought.
If I read you right, you and I agree so far. Where we disagree is on
thoughts about a particular horse ("that horse"). In this case, I
(following Brentano) maintain that the intention of your thought is just
the horse. You seem to be claiming it is some mental model you have of
that horse, no?
--
Alan Wexelblat
ARPA: WEX@MCC.COM
UUCP: {seismo, harvard, gatech, pyramid, &c.}!sally!im4u!milano!wex
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 26 May 87 15:53 EDT
From: wex@milano.UUCP
Subject: Re: Natural Languages: They're about the World
In article <36@thirdi.UUCP>, sarge@thirdi.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:
> I think you haven't fully answered Laura's point on the
> indistinguishability of I-class thoughts and R-class thoughts
The simplest way of stating the distinction is that R-class thoughts are
directed at objects which the thinker beleives (at the time of thinking) to
be real (in the sense of having a physical incarnation). I-class thoughts
are not.
> You state:
>
> > My point is about the intentionality of thoughts. Example:
> > Laura is hit on the head by a falling pine cone, but thinks
> > it is a snowball.
> > Nothing wrong here. My point is that your thought about the
> > thing-that-hit-your-head was directed at the thing itself, not at some
> > mental representation of it. You were mistaken about the nature of the
> > thing (thought it was a snowball), but the intentionality of the thought is
> > still directed at the object.
>
> The point where I lose you is where you talk about "the thing itself", a very
> un-phenomenological concept, if I'm not mistaken.
I don't think so. The "object itself" is that physical thing we think is
present in the real world. We may be mistaken about it (as in the snowball
example) or it may fail to exist altogether. However, these are things we
discover afterward. At the time of thinking, we suppose the object to be.
> ...I'm not sure what, if anything, it adds to say that ideas "refer" to
> something.
It is not just ideas that refer. Most speech refers. It may be supposed
(as I do) that the reference of speech is a reflection of the reference of
thought (which is how I got into this discussion).
> ... I agree with Anders Weinstein's position that ideas need not "refer".
Correct me if I am wrong - I thought his position was that mental concepts
need not refer. In particular, I can form a concept such as "the class of
horses" without worrying whether it refers to anything in the world.
> One other point about "indefinite regresses" of ideas of ideas. I agree
> that there are a limited number of levels of reference that one can keep
> track of at one time. However, one can be "subliminally aware" (to use
> Michael Polanyi's term) of a great many layers or ideas, while being
> "focally aware" of only a few. In fact, in doing something like driving a
> car, one takes account of a large number of factors without being aware of
> doing so. The same is evidently true of ideas, in that our concepts are
> built up of other concepts, which, in turn, are built up of others,
> etc. etc., yet somehow we can live and (usually) not go crazy.
I am hesitant to make any commitment to a structure or hierarchy of
concepts. It seems to be the case that some of our concepts are composed
from others and clearly we maintain relationships of some kinds among
concepts we know. However, I'm not sure this is related to the
self-referential levels of intentionality. That is, I can think about
thinking about something. I can think about that (3 levels) as I'm doing
it. However, there does not seem to be any compression or composition of
these intentions.
Similarly, I am not "subliminally aware" of these levels at all times - I
must actively think of them. It is only the act of thinking-about
thinking-about thinking-about X which has these three levels. Ordinary
thinking-about X has only one level.
Note that this is related to awareness in that it would be very strange for
me to say "I was not aware that I was thinking about X". However,
intentionality is not awareness.
--
Alan Wexelblat
ARPA: WEX@MCC.COM
UUCP: {seismo, harvard, gatech, pyramid, &c.}!sally!im4u!milano!wex
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 26 May 87 23:34 EDT
From: Charley Wingate <mangoe@mimsy.UUCP>
Subject: Re: Natural Languages: They're about the World
Alan Wexelblat writes:
>> I understand you, I just don't agree. Suppose I think about a horse.
>> Not any particular horse, just a horse. Is the intentionality of the
>> thought the class of all horses?
>If you "think about a horse" you are visualizing one. The intentionality of
>your thought is directed at that visualization, not at the class of all
>horses. However, it is possible to have thoughts about the class of all
>horses, in which case the class-of-all-horses is the intention of your
>thought.
I hate to throw a monkey wrench into this, but the "single horse" case is, I
think, a little more complicated that this. Let me take CS Lewis's example:
he wrote that whenever he thought of London he tended to have an image of
Euston Station. In the sense that one can think anything about London, it
is rather unlikely to be true in relationship to an image of London as
Euston Station. In this wise, it is hard for me to agree that the
intentionality of Lewis's thoughts about London were directed at the image
of the station.
I think that an image of a "no-horse-in-particular" horse is therefore not
the target of intentionality; if it becomes the target, it is really now a
particular imaginary horse. My feeling is that, if it avoids this, the
image is the objectification of "horseness", or if you prefer, the
objectification of what the commonality is in the class of horses.
C. Wingate
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 27 May 87 02:10 EDT
From: Laura Creighton <laura@hoptoad.uucp>
Subject: Re: Natural Languages: They're about the World
In article <4597@milano.UUCP> wex@milano.UUCP writes:
>
>I am hesitant to make any commitment to a structure or hierarchy of
>concepts. It seems to be the case that some of our concepts are composed
>from others and clearly we maintain relationships of some kinds among
>concepts we know. However, I'm not sure this is related to the
>self-referential levels of intentionality. That is, I can think about
>thinking about something. I can think about that (3 levels) as I'm doing
>it. However, there does not seem to be any compression or composition of
>these intentions.
What do you mean by ``self-referential levels of intentionality''?
Can a thought refer to itself?
--
(C) Copyright 1987 Laura Creighton - you may redistribute only if your
recipients may.
Laura Creighton
ihnp4!hoptoad!laura utzoo!hoptoad!laura sun!hoptoad!laura
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End of NL-KR Digest
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