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AIList Digest Volume 8 Issue 022

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 · 1 year ago

AIList Digest            Sunday, 24 Jul 1988       Volume 8 : Issue 22 

Today's Topics:

Free Will:

How to dispose of naive science types (short)
Carlos Castaneda
Goedel's Theorem

----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: 18 Jul 88 10:43:22 GMT
From: mcvax!ukc!strath-cs!glasgow!gilbert@uunet.uu.net (Gilbert
Cockton)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of naive science types (short)

In article <442@ns.ns.com> logajan@ns.ns.com (John Logajan x3118) writes:
>My point is that unproveable theories aren't very useful.

a) most of your theories of interpersonal interaction, which
you use whenever you interact with someone, will be unproven,
and unproveable, if only for practical reasons.

b) as a lapsed historian, may I recommend that you study the
history of ideas and religion. You will find that scientific
theories, sanctified by science's notions of "proof" don't
even account for 1% of the "theories" which have driven
historical changes.

I don't know what you mean by "useful", and suspect that you have not
spent too long worrying about it either. I suggest you reflect over
your last few days and list the decisions you have made as a result of
scientific theory, and the decisions which you've had to make by magic
because the scientists have not sorted out all the world for you yet. I
think most of your decisions will fall into the non-scientific,
unproveable category. Now are the theories which are guiding you each
day really that useless?
--
Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science, The University, Glasgow
gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs <europe>!ukc!glasgow!gilbert

The proper object of the study of humanity is humans, not machines

------------------------------

Date: 18 Jul 88 23:07:32 GMT
From: pur-ee!mendozag@uunet.UU.NET (Grado)
Reply-to: pur-ee!mendozag@uunet.UU.NET (Victor M Grado)
Subject: Re: Carlos Castaneda


>In a previous article, James J. Lippard writes:
>> <caution words (and references) in reading Castan~eda's books>

>>And then Jeff Hartung adds:
>I noticed that the most recent Casteneda book in the series, "The Fire From
>Within,"
was published as a work of fiction, unlike the previous six books. I
>took this to be a confession that the works were largely fictitous even prior
>to it. Furthermore, the later books state that what Casteneda believed to be
>a Yaqui philosophy initially was in fact a view belonging to a small cult of
>"sorcerers" and not to the Yaqui in general, even if you *do* believe the
>assertion that the first six books make of being non-fiction.

I think that the last book is "The Power of Silence" (which I have not read).
Anyway, thanks to Mr. Lippard for posting the controversy references.
Having grown up in the Valley Yaqui and heard many sorcery stories,
I always took the Castan~eda's books with a grain of salt. It was not until
I read a Stanford CS Memo by Avron Barr (1977, MetaCognition or some such),
giving as reference "Tales of Power", that I tried to go back to those books.
Although my views about these books were always the ones reflected in the last
sentence Jeff wrote above, I found "The Teachings of Don Juan" to be very
believable (I need to read the posted references). On the other hand,
the fact that the last books are published as fiction (although in "The Fire
From Within"
Foreword Castaneda asserts that he "had no other choice but to
render his teachings [Don Juan's] in the form of a narrative, a narrative of
what happened, as it happened."
) does not imply a confession that the
previous books were fiction (although it could be fraud). Castaneda is a
prolific writer but he might be using a Sly Stallone tactic to keep his income
secure.

Maybe next time I go back to the Yaqui Valley I go look for a sorcerer
teacher :-). At least I will finish reading those books and the references.

Victor M. Grado

------------------------------

Date: 20 Jul 88 09:41:03 GMT
From: mailrus!uflorida!novavax!proxftl!bill@husc6.harvard.edu (T.
William Wells)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)

In article <11906@agate.BERKELEY.EDU> Gene W. Smith writes:
> In article <445@proxftl.UUCP>, bill@proxftl (T. William Wells) writes:
>
> >Pick your favorite definition of free will. Unless it is one
> >where the "free will" has no causal relationship with the rest
> >of the world (but then why does it matter?), the existence or
> >lack of existence of free will will have measurable consequences.
>
> Having a causal connection to the rest of the world is not the
> same as having measurable consequences, so this argument won't
> work.

This may be true in general, however, it is not relevant to the
issue at hand. Should something which affects ourselves be not
measurable, by what means can we assert that it be causal?

> One possible definition of free will (with problems, but
> don't let that worry us) is that there is no function (from
> possible internal+external states to behavior, say) which
> determines what the free will agent will do.

That does not agree to my idea of `causally related'. In fact,
I could almost use your phrase as a description of `causally
unrelated'.

---

I think that I shall bow out of the debate on free will. My
original intent was to inject a few ideas which I had not seen
discussed before and to see what was done with them, not to
debate my own view on the subject. I do not really have the time
for that.

Worse, I find that I have the choice between spouting vague
generalities and making definite assertions based on my own
philosophy. Since my philosophy is derived from Objectivism my
doing the latter is guaranteed to generate lots of smoke and very
little light.

For example, ddb@ns.ns.com (David Dyer-Bennet) writes:

> Yep, that's what you'd need to have to take the debate out of the
>religious and into the practical. Not meaning to sound sarcastic, but
>this is a monumental philosophical breathrough. But could you exhibit
>some of the difficult pieces of this theory; in particular, what is
>the measurable difference between an action taken freely, and one that
>was pre-determined by other forces?

Should I answer him in vague generalities? To do so would not be
responsive. Should I give him my views? Should I suggest that
there is an invalid premise in the way that his question is
phrased? (It seems that he would like me to show what the
difference is in the action, but the difference is not in the
action but in the cause.) If I do so without explaining the
philosophical positions on which they are based, I'll fail to
demonstrate my point. If I do try to explain my philosophy,
we'll get completely off the subject.

So, bye for now and happy debating!

------------------------------

Date: 20 Jul 88 14:10:01 GMT
From: icc!dswinney@afit-ab.arpa (David V. Swinney)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue

In article <407@ns.ns.com> logajan@ns.ns.com (John Logajan x3118) writes:
>
>The no-free-will theory is untestable.
>The free-will theory is like-wise untestable.
>When the no-free-will theorists are not thinking about their lack of free will
>they invariably adopt free-will outlooks.
>So go with the flow, why fight your natural instincts to believe in that which
>is un-provable. If you must choose between un-provable beliefs, take the one
>that requires the least effort.
>
I contend that the use of the phrase "free will" is misleading. No one
(at least no one I know of) believes in *FREE* will.
The real question is "To what extent is the universe deterministic?".

We all (?) believe that our decisions are based on our past experience
and our personality (read genetics or spirit depending on where you are
arguing from). Thus the question is *not* whther or not we make choices,
but rather whether or not our decision is partially or completely
determined by our prior training and nature.

The "free-will" theorists hold that are choices are only partially
deterministic and partially random.

The "no-free-will" theorists hold that are choices are completely
deterministic with no random component.

The shadings along the way tell you whether to punish crime (add negative
experiences to change behavior) or to ignore it completely (past input
makes no difference to a fully free will).

As I said before, I know no one who believes in completely free will
but the previous example indicates that the question can not be eliminated
by pretending that only two sides of the argument exist.



The opinions I express are my own...unless they prove to be wrong (in which
case I didn't really write this.)
D.V.Swinney dswinney@galaxy.afit.af.mil

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 20 Jul 88 11:02 EST
From: <PGOETZ%LOYVAX.BITNET@mitvma.mit.edu>
Subject: Goedel's Theorem

Shame on you, professor! Goedel's Theorem showed that you WILL have an
unbounded number of axioms following the method you propose. That is why most
mathematicians consider it an important theorem - it states you can never have
an axiomatic system "as complex as"
arithmetic without having true statements which are unprovable.

Phil Goetz
PGOETZ@LOYVAX.bitnet

------------------------------

Date: 22 Jul 88 16:02:20 GMT
From: ns!logajan@umn-cs.arpa (John Logajan x3118)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of naive science types (short)

gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes:
> logajan@ns.UUCP (John Logajan x3118) writes:
> >unproveable theories aren't very useful.

> most of your theories [...] will be unproven,
> and unproveable, if only for practical reasons.

Theories that are by their nature unproveable are completely different from
theories that are as of yet unproven. Unproveable theories are rather
special in that they usually only occur to philosophers, and have little to
do with day to day life. You went on and on about unproven theories but failed
to deal with the actual subject, namely unproveable theories.

Please explain to me how an unproveable theory (one that makes no unique
predictions) can be useful?

- John M. Logajan @ Network Systems; 7600 Boone Ave; Brooklyn Park, MN 55428 -
- {...rutgers!dayton, ...amdahl!ems, ...uunet!rosevax} !umn-cs!ns!logajan -

------------------------------

Date: 23 Jul 88 17:43:44 GMT
From: uflorida!novavax!maddoxt@gatech.edu (Thomas Maddox)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of naive science types (short)

In article <531@ns.UUCP> logajan@ns.UUCP (John Logajan x3118) writes:
>gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes:
>> logajan@ns.UUCP (John Logajan x3118) writes:
[Cockton]
>> most of your theories [...] will be unproven,
>> and unproveable, if only for practical reasons.
[Logajan]
>Theories that are by their nature unproveable are completely different from
>theories that are as of yet unproven.

I believe that Gilbert Cockton is not discriminating between
assumptions (and their close relatives, hypotheses) and theories,
proven or otherwise. John Loganjan's comment comes in at a higher
conceptual level where one presumes the assumption/theory distinction
has been made.

------------------------------

Date: 23 Jul 88 18:46:25 GMT
From: bunny!rjb1@husc6.harvard.edu (Richard J. Brandau)
Subject: Re: How to dispose of naive science types (short)

> gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes:
> Please explain to me how an unproveable theory (one that makes no unique
> predictions) can be useful?

Perhaps you mean a NONDISPROVABLE theory. An "unproveable" theory is
a very special thing, often much harder to find than a "proveable"
theory. If you can show that a theory is unprovable (in some axiom
set), you've done a good day's science.

No theories make "unique predictions" about the real, (empirical)
world. Are quarks the ONLY way to explain the proliferation of
subnuclear particles? Perhaps a god of the cyclotron made them
appear. The difference between the scientific and religious theories
is that the scientific one can be DISproven: it makes predictions that
can be TESTED.

You may, if you like, apply this distiction to the beliefs that
determine your behavior. Since you can't disprove the existence of
God, you may choose to chuck out all religion. Since you CAN think of
ways to disprove f=ma, you may avoid being run over by a bus.

-- Rich Brandau

| I take no responsiblity for the words or deeds of my employer, and
| vice versa. Symbolics is a trademark of Symbolics, Inc. UNIX is a
| trademark of AT&T. Edsel is a trademark of the Ford Motor Company.

------------------------------

End of AIList Digest
********************

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