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AIList Digest Volume 7 Issue 005
AIList Digest Wednesday, 25 May 1988 Volume 7 : Issue 5
Today's Topics:
Philosophy - More Free Will
(Second of at least three digests on this topic)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon 9 May 88 23:41:40-PDT
From: Ken Laws <LAWS@IU.AI.SRI.COM>
Subject: A BDI Approach to Free Will
I am not trained in philosophy, but the following points seem reasonable:
Let my current beliefs, desires, and intentions be called my BDI state.
It may be a fuzzy state, an algorithm, whatever. Let the continuous set
of all such states from conception to the present be called my BDI history.
(I gather that these are the situated automata assumptions. Fine;
I'm willing to view myself as a Markov process. I just hope I'm not
abusing a standardized vocabulary.)
Are my actions fully determined by external context, my BDI state,
and perhaps some random variables? Yes, of course -- what else is there?
This follows almost directly from my definition of BDI state.
I suppose there could be influence from non-BDI variables
(e.g., from my BDI history, which is not itself a belief, desire,
or intention), but I could fix that by positing a more elaborate
state vector that includes all such influences.
Is my BDI history fully determined by genetics, external context,
and perhaps some random variables? Yes, of course -- since I'm not
a mind/body dualist. The dualist position seems to require
a spiritual-domain context, BDI state, and history -- but
that just bumps the problem up one level instead of solving it.
Are my actions predictable? No. My BDI history is chaotic and
possibly stochastic, and my BDI state is unknowable. Even I can't
predict my actions in complete detail, although I can predict dominant
characteristics in familiar situations.
Do I have free will? What does that mean? It can't mean that I will
my actions to contradict my BDI state, since that intention would
itself be part of my BDI state. It can't mean that I ignore
my BDI state and take random actions, since that surrenders will
to chance. (The act of surrender is controlled by my BDI state, and
is separate from any random acts that later occur. It might be an
act of free will, if we can pin down what that means.)
Free will must mean the ability to follow actions dictated by my
BDI state, if it means anything. Yet that is only the freedom
to follow a program, the antithesis of free will. So the term itself
is a contradiction, and the discussion is meaningless. I do what
I do because I am what I am, and the current "I" has no control
over what I am at this moment.
There is one aspect I haven't covered. Because my BDI states are
recursive, my current actions (including thoughts and other mental
actions) influence my future BDI states. I can shape my own
character and destiny, although my actions in this regard are still
determined by my BDI state. I can lock in specific goals, then
work toward changing my BDI state to achieve them. Success may
be almost instantaneous, or may be as difficult as quitting smoking
or losing weight. It is in these processes that the illusion of
free will is strongest, but it is still an illusion (of the sort
pointed out by Drew McDermott.) It is also in these processes
that we most sense our lack of free will when we fail to achieve
the internal states necessary for our chosen goals.
I see no reason why we can't build machines with similar mental
architectures, at least in principle. They will necessarily
experience free will, although they may or may not believe that
they have it. We can also believe as we will, but that will is
no more free for us than for the machines.
-- Ken Laws
------------------------------
Date: 10 May 88 08:42:21 GMT
From: otter!cwp@hplabs.hp.com (Chris Preist)
Subject: Re: Re: Free Will and Self-Awareness
It is depressing to see that people are unable to accept that the problem
of determinism is a METAPHYSICAL problem, which cannot be solved purely
by philosophical debate, introspection, etc etc. It is NOT self-contradictory
to assume that the world is determined, and the freedom we percieve is
subjective. Nor is it self-contradictory to assume that we are free through
some form of mind-body dualism (As soon as you bring in 'I','free choices',etc,
this is what you are opting for). However, it is self-contradictory to assume
that what you assume is necessarily correct! Some people in the debate
obviously have not understood the determinist/compatiblist argument. For a
short and lucid explanation, may I recommend the relevant chapter in Ayer's
'Problems of Philosophy'.
By the principle of Occam's Razor (i.e. disguard all unnecessary assumptions),
I personally would choose to work assuming the determinist approach. However,
the fact that the universe is determined is subjectively irrelevant to our
experiences - the freedom we experience (and thus the moral responsibility,
etc) is as exciting as ever.
Chris
------------------------------
Date: 10 May 88 13:44:44 GMT
From: hpscad.dec.com!verma@decwrl.dec.com (Virendra Verma, DTN
297-5510, MRO1-3/E99)
Subject: RE: Free Will & Self-Awareness
>Consider a vending machine that for $.50 vends pepsi, coke or oj. After
>inserting the money you make a selection and get it. You are happy.
>Now consider a vending machine that has choices pepsi, coke and oj, but
>always gives you only oj for $.50. After inserting the money you make
>a selection, but irrespective of your selection you get oj. You may feel
>cheated.
>Thus, the willed result through exercise of freedom of choice may not be
>related to the actual result. The basic question of freewill is -
>"Is it enough to maintain an illusion of freedom of choice, or should
>the willed results be made effective?". The latter, I suppose.
>Further consider the first (good) vending machine. While it was being
>built, the designer really had 5 brands, but chose (freely, for whatever
>reasons) to vend only the three mentioned. As long as I (as a user of the
>vending machine) don't know of my unavailable choice space, I have the
>illusion of a full freedom of choice. This is where awareness comes in.
>Awareness expands my choices, or equivalently, lack of awareness creates
>an illusion of freewill (since you cannot choose that which you do not
>know of). Note that the designer of the vending machine controls the
>freewill of the user.
>Akash
It seems to me that you are mixing "free will" and "outcome". I think
"free will" is probabilitically related to the "outcome". Isn't the
essence of "law of karma" when Krashna mentions that you are free
to exercise your will (i.e., the act of doing something which is
karma element, "insertion of coins" is an act of free will in your
example"). You have no control over the "results" element of your
free will? The "awareness" element simply improves the probablity
of the "outcome". Even in your first example with good machine, you
may not get what you want because there may be a power failure
right after you insert the coin!!
- Virendra
------------------------------
Date: 10 May 88 15:29:35 GMT
From: trwrb!aero!venera.isi.edu!smoliar@bloom-beacon.MIT.EDU
(Stephen Smoliar)
Subject: control of one's thoughts
In article <8805092354.AA05852@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD.EDU
(Eyal Mozes) writes:
>In article <796@hydra.riacs.edu>, nienart@turing.arc.nasa.gov (john nienart)
>writes:
>
>>Maybe its just me, but I find rather frequently that I'm thinking about
>>something that I'm _sure_ I'd rather not think about (or humming a trashy
>>pop song I hate, etc.). It certainly feels at these times that I don't have
>>complete control over that upon which my consciousness is focussed.
>
>Are you saying that, at those times, you are making a deliberate,
>conscious effort to turn your thoughts to something else, and this
>effort fails? If so then, yes, it is just you; all the evidence I'm
>familiar with points to the fact that it's always possible for a human
>being to control his thoughts by a conscious effort.
>
There is an old joke that may serve as a valuable counterexample here:
Try consciously NOT to think of an elephant for exactly the next five
minutes and then think of a baby elephant as soon as those five minutes
have elapsed.
------------------------------
Date: 10 May 88 16:25:58 GMT
From: krulwich-bruce@yale-zoo.arpa (Bruce Krulwich)
Subject: Acting irrationally (was Re: Free Will & Self Awareness)
In article <31024@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Barry Kort) writes:
>It is not uncommon for a child to "spank" a machine which misbehaves.
>But as adults, we know that when a machine fails to carry out its
>function, it needs to be repaired or possibly redesigned. But we
>do not punish the machine or incarcerate it.
>
>Why then, when a human engages in undesirable behavior, do we resort
>to such unenlightened corrective measures as yelling, hitting, or
>deprivation of life-affirming resources?
This can be explained easily in light of AI theories of the roles of
expectations in cognition and learning. Your example could be
explained as follows:
1. Yelling at and hitting a person because of something he's done
is irrational
2. People have the expectation that other people act rationally
3. When someone yells at you, it triggers a failure of this
expectation
4. So, the person being yelled at or hit tries to explain this
expectation failure, hopefully concluding that he did
something that the other person feels strongly about
5. Thus he learns that the other person feels strongly about
something, which most of the time is the goal that the yeller
or hitter had in the first place
Bruce Krulwich
------------------------------
Date: 10 May 88 20:40:20 GMT
From: bwk@mitre-bedford.arpa (Barry W. Kort)
Subject: Re: Free Will and Self-Awareness
Eyal Mozes writes:
> ... all the evidence I'm familiar with points to the fact
>that it's always possible for a human being to control his
>thoughts by a conscious effort.
Our thoughts are at least partly influenced by information received
through our senses. People who have witnessed a disturbing event
in their lives may have trouble getting it off their minds. I think
most psychologists would agree that at least some portion of the
population is susceptible to unwanted thoughts. Perhaps these
victims haven't discovered how to engage the conscious mind to
override the invasions of the nonconscious mind. (By the way, I'm
one of the victims, so I'd be grateful for any guidance Eyal can give me.)
--Barry Kort
------------------------------
Date: 11 May 88 15:04:06 GMT
From: bwk@mitre-bedford.arpa (Barry W. Kort)
Subject: Re: Acting irrationally (was Re: Free Will & Self Awareness)
I appreciated Bruce Krulwich's analysis of the cognitive chain
initiated by a yelling/hitting episode. The fifth (and last)
link in the chain of reasoning, is that the target of the verbal
abuse draws a conclusion about the abuser:
> 5. Thus he learns that the other person feels strongly about
> something, which most of the time is the goal that the yeller
> or hitter had in the first place
Wouldn't it have been easier if the yeller had simply disclosed his/her
value system in the first place? Or do I have an unrealistic expectation
that the yeller is in fact able to articulate his/her value system to an
inquiring mind?
--Barry Kort
------------------------------
Date: 11 May 88 15:21:39 GMT
From: bwk@mitre-bedford.arpa (Barry W. Kort)
Subject: Re: Free Will & Self Awareness
I appreciated Richard O'Keefe's suggestion that free will is intimately
related to the freedom to learn. This idea is consistent with the
notion that one cannot create a sentient being without free will.
Moreover, it is evidently unpredictable what a sentient being will
in fact discover and learn in his/her/its lifetime.
--Barry Kort
------------------------------
Date: 11 May 88 15:52:09 GMT
From: bwk@mitre-bedford.arpa (Barry W. Kort)
Subject: Re: Free Will & Self Awareness
Stephen Smoliar seems frustrated at the drift of the discussion.
He writes:
>This discussion seems to be drifting from the issue of intelligence to that
>of aggression. I do not know whether or not such theses have gone out of
>fashion, but I still subscribe to the hypothesis that aggression is "natural"
>to almost all animal life forms, including man. Is your adult self so
>rational and mature that you have not so much as banged your fist on the
>table when your software does something which particularly frustrates you
>(or do you feel that adults also transcend frustration)?
It is not clear to me whether aggression is instinctive (wired-in)
behavior or learned behavior. I think the pschological jury is
still out on this question. It is certainly true that aggressive
and non-aggressive behaviors can be learned. (Personally, I feel
that assertive behavior is preferrable to aggressive, and tactful
behavior is preferable to assertive. But tactful behavior is harder
to learn.)
As to your question about my personal habits when frustrated, I do
not bang my fist on the table. Rather, I clench my teeth. And
I do believe it is possible (though difficult) to transcend frustration.
--Barry Kort
------------------------------
Date: 11 May 88 16:32:18 GMT
From: ssc-vax!bcsaic!rwojcik@beaver.cs.washington.edu (Rick Wojcik)
Subject: Re: Free Will
In article <28705@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> dvm@yale.UUCP (Drew Mcdermott) writes:
DM> Hence any system that is sophisticated enough to model situations that its
DM> own physical realization takes part in must flag the symbol describing that
DM> realization as a singularity with respect to causality. There is simply
DM> no point in trying to think about that part of the universe using causal
DM> models...
I like your metaphor of 'a singularity with respect to causality'. It
neatly captures the concept of the Agent case role in linguistic theory.
But it goes beyond modelling one's own physical realization. Chuck
Fillmore used to teach (in the heyday of Case Grammar) that simple clause
structure only admits to two overtly marked causers--the Agent and the
Instrument. This is a fairly universal fact about language (the only
exception being languages with 'double agent' verbs, where the verb stem
can have an affix denoting indirect causation). Agents refer to verbal
arguments that are 'ultimate causers' and Instruments refer to those that
are 'immediate causers'. He has always been quite explicit in his belief
that the human mind imposes a kind of filter on the way we can view chains
of causally related events--at least when we try to express them in
language. One of the practical side effects of the belief in free will
is that it provides us with a means of chunking chains of causation up
into conceptual units.
--
Rick Wojcik csnet: rwojcik@boeing.com
uucp: uw-beaver!ssc-vax!bcsaic!rwojcik
address: P.O. Box 24346, MS 7L-64, Seattle, WA 98124-0346
phone: 206-865-3844
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 11 May 88 13:34:09 EDT
From: Thanasis Kehagias <ST401843%BROWNVM.BITNET@MITVMA.MIT.EDU>
Subject: AI is about Death
here is my two bits on the free-will argument. it is highly speculative
not scientific. but with the debate being at its present level, i think
it will fit well with the rest.
1st METAQUESTION: why do people argue so vehemently about free will? not
only now in this list, but also through the centuries, free will has
been a touchy subject.
2nd METAQUESTION: why has AI been such a controversial subject, since it
became a possibly real possibility (around the mid-forties) ?
SUGGESTED ANSWER: if AI is possible, then it is possible to create
intelligence. all it takes is the know-how and the hardware. also, the
following inference is not farfetched: intelligence -> life. so if AI
is possible, it is possible to give life to a piece of hardware. no ghost
in the machine. no soul. call this the FRANKENSTEIN HYPOTHESIS, or, for
short, the FH (it's just a name, folks!).
this is where the action starts. there is a pessimistic interpretation
of FH and an optimistic interpretation of the FH. i suggest that the
AI opponents (broadly speaking, this would include people who claim
that the "hard" sciences and mathematics cannot capture the human
element) see the pessimistic interpretation and the AI proponents see
the optimistic interpretation. of course, in making these suggestions i
may be mistaken, especially since they are very broad generalizations.
i may also make lots of people on both sides angry.
what is the pessimistic interpretation? if there is no ghost in the
machine, when the machine breaks down, the intelligence disappears.
DEATH. if this holds for an AI, it is not unlikely that it holds
for Natural Intelligence as well. in short, it is a threatening
suggestion: when we die we die and nothing is left of us. no
afterlife. no reincarnation. nothing. just death. very frightening
for most of us. that is why we need to claim some special status
for humans, claim that we are different from a machine. here is
where free will comes in very handy.
now for the optimistic interpretation. the intelligence does not
really reside in the hardware. it could in fact be, to a very great
extent, independent of any type of specific hardware, and certainly
is independent from any specific instance of the hardware. the intelli-
gence really resides in the information that was used to "construct"
the hardware. this suggests the following program for AI:
(1) create AI.
(2) (before or after (1)?) map the correspondence between the hardware
and the AI ( = reasoning, memories, emotions etc.).
(3) same as (2) but for a Natural Intelligence. get the blueprints for
(say) a human intelligence.
(4) implement the blueprints of (3) on some kind of hardware.
Step (4) gives us virtual immortality, since whenever our current
intelligence-carrying hardware (human body? computer? etc.) is about to
give up (because of a disease, old age ...) we can transfer the
intelligence to another piece of hardware. there are some more delicate
problems here, but you get the idea.
(PLEASE NOTE: i, personally am not saying that this program can be
carried out. neither am i saying it cannot be carried out. i am not saying
that this is what AI researchers are striving for. i am simply
SPECULATING that it may be the motivation that resides in some dark,
unexplored Freudian corner of their mind.)
and so, gentle readers, this might be the explanation why people
get so heated up when they discuss free will and AI. just speculating,
of course.
Thanasis Kehagias
------------------------------
Date: 11 May 88 21:41:59 GMT
From: oodis01!uplherc!sp7040!obie!wsccs!dharvey@tis.llnl.gov (David
Harvey)
Subject: Re: AIList V6 #86 - Philosophy
In article <3200016@uiucdcsm>, channic@uiucdcsm.cs.uiuc.edu writes:
>
> In his article Brian Yamuchi (yamauchi@speech2.cs.cmu.edu) writes:
> Do you believe your career was merely the result of some bizarre genetic
> combination or pure chance?
>
People like you need to watch "Being There" at least 10 times. The fact
that I was born to a lower class family shouldn't have any effect on my
career choice vs. the ones made by young Ron Reagan should it? And I
can imagine that the poor starving Ethiopians have just as much a chance
of becoming a Computer Scientist as I do. Chance has much more of an
impact than many want to admit in determining what we do. I can also
imagine the great fame and glory that I will achieve for a great
scientific discovery since it will happen just because I will it! Never
mind the fact that my IQ is not even close to Albert Einstein's! Also,
genetic structure has a very significant impact on how we live our
lives. Even a casual perusal of the studies of identical twins
separated at birth will produce an uncanny amount of similarities, and
this also includes IQ levels, even when the social environments are
radically different. You dismiss these factors as if they are
insignificant and trivial.
>
> The attack is over. The following is a plea to all AI researchers. Please
> do not try to persuade anyone, especially impressionable students, that s\he
> does not have free will. Everyone has the ability to choose to bring peace
> to his or her own life and to the rest of society, and has the ability to
> MAKE A DIFFERENCE in the world. Free will should not be compromised for the
> mere prospect of creating an intelligent machine.
>
I am student (perhaps more depressable than impressable) and haven't
noticed anyone persuading me in any way. A lot have tried to convince
me that I have free will, but for some reason I always get lost in the
quagmire of linguistic semantics which makes the term almost impossible
to define clearly. You must understand that I have read much of the
works of modern philosophers (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Berkeley,
Hume, and Kant among them) and the whole issue remains unresolved for
me. I tend to lean toward the AI perspective, but....
The only thing you can know for sure is
That you can't know anything for sure! (-:
dharvey @ wsccs
Nobody represents me, and I represent Nobody.
------------------------------
Date: 12 May 88 07:14:05 GMT
From: TAURUS.BITNET!shani@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Subject: Re: Free Will & Self-Awareness
In article <415@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.BITNET writes:
>
> I do believe you. But I'd still like to know how I can write moral
> programs in Basic, or even ones that have my value system.
>
Whell, I said this only as a figure of speech, but still, if, for inctance,
you write a video-game or some thing like that, you may encounter some points,
in which you have to decide what the program will do, on a 'value' basis
(balancing difficlty, bonous points, things like that...). This is, more or
less, what I ment...
O.S.
------------------------------
Date: 12 May 88 14:31:41 GMT
From: trwrb!aero!venera.isi.edu!smoliar@bloom-beacon.MIT.EDU
(Stephen Smoliar)
Subject: Re: Acting irrationally (was Re: Free Will & Self Awareness)
In article <31570@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix (Barry Kort) writes:
>I appreciated Bruce Krulwich's analysis of the cognitive chain
>initiated by a yelling/hitting episode. The fifth (and last)
>link in the chain of reasoning, is that the target of the verbal
>abuse draws a conclusion about the abuser:
>
>> 5. Thus he learns that the other person feels strongly about
>> something, which most of the time is the goal that the yeller
>> or hitter had in the first place
>
>Wouldn't it have been easier if the yeller had simply disclosed his/her
>value system in the first place? Or do I have an unrealistic expectation
>that the yeller is in fact able to articulate his/her value system to an
>inquiring mind?
>
As long as the agents we are talking about are "all-too-human" (as Nietzsche
put it), your expectation is quite unrealistic. I think you are overlooking
how great an extent we rely on implict assumptions in any intercourse. If
we had to articulate everything explicitly, we would probably never get around
to discussing what we really wanted to discuss. The problem comes in deciding
WHAT needs to be explicitly articulated and what can be left in the "implicit
background." That is a problem which we, as humans, seem to deal with rather
poorly, which is why there is so much yeeling and hitting in the world.
------------------------------
Date: 12 May 88 15:18:37 GMT
From: esosun!jackson@seismo.css.gov (Jerry Jackson)
Subject: Re: More Free Will
>If so, no one can be held responsible or need to feel responsible for his/her
>actions. I cannot accept that.
>> }The attack is over. The following is a plea to all AI researchers. Please
>> }do not try to persuade anyone, especially impressionable students, that s\he
>> }does not have free will. Everyone has the ability to choose to bring peace
>> }to his or her own life and to the rest of society, and has the ability to
>> }MAKE A DIFFERENCE in the world. Free will should not be compromised for the
>> }mere prospect of creating an intelligent machine.
>>
>> Believe it or not, Minsky makes a similar plea in his discussion of free will
>> in _The Society of Mind_. He says that we may not be able to figure out where
>> free will comes from, but it is so deeply ingrained in us that we cannot deny
>> it or ignore it.
>
>Since it can't be denied, let's go one step further. Free will has created
>civilization as we know it. People, using their individual free wills,
>chose to make the world the way it is. Minsky chose to write his book,
Is this intended to be a convincing argument? The fact that you cannot
accept something is hardly a valid reason for me to reject it. Saying
it's so doesn't make it so. I agree that if free will is unreal, the
foundations of our society in terms of laws, praise, blame and responsibility
in general fall apart... This seems to me (initially anyway) to be a bad
thing. That's not, however, a good reason to ignore the problem. I think
it is clear that within the standard causal model of the world that most
science-oriented folks have adopted, there is no room for free will. Sure,
one can introduce "quantum uncertainty" into the picture, but I don't think
having a decision made by a sub-atomic event is really what people like to
think of as "free will"...
If events actually do have causes (What a novel idea!), then free will must
somehow come from outside the causal stream (from some *non-physical* realm?).
So, I contend, belief in free will constitutes belief in some sort of
non-physical entity interacting with the physical body. I'm certainly not
about to say this is wrong; I just wish the free will proponents would admit
where they are coming from.
On a different note, consider what is meant by making a 'choice'..
I submit that when the options presented to a 'chooser' differ greatly in
value, there is really no choice to be made -- it makes itself. However,
when the options are very close in value, the choice becomes difficult
(exactly when it makes the least difference). In fact, the most difficult
choices occur when the options at hand are virtually equal in value. At that
point one might as well roll the dice anyway.
Finally, to be honest, I think the question of free will/determinism is
illusory. It pre-supposes a rigid separation between the 'actor' and the
'outside world'. Within a causal framework, the only 'entity' that can
possibly act on its own is the universe itself (of which we are not so
separate parts). So, to really experience free will, try to identify with
a greater and greater piece of the whole pie, instead of some arbitrary
individual.
--Jerry Jackson
------------------------------
Date: 12 May 88 18:14:12 GMT
From: bwk@mitre-bedford.arpa (Barry W. Kort)
Subject: Re: Free Will & Self-Awareness
I was glad to see John Nagle bring up Asimov's 3 moral laws of robots.
Perhaps the time has come to refine these just a bit, with the intent
of shaping them into a more implementable rule-base.
I propose the following variation on Asimov:
I. A robot may not harm a human or other sentient being,
or by inaction permit one to come to harm.
II. A robot may respond to requests from human beings,
or other sentient beings, unless this conflicts with
the First Law.
III. A robot may act to protect its own existence, unless this
conflicts with the First Law."
IV. A robot may act to expand its powers of observation and
cognition, and may enlarge its knowledge base without limit.
Can anyone propose a further refinement to the above?
--Barry Kort
------------------------------
Date: 12 May 88 19:08:58 GMT
From: bbn.com!pineapple.bbn.com!barr@bbn.com (Hunter Barr)
Subject: Re: More Free Will
In article <3200017@uiucdcsm> channic@uiucdcsm.cs.uiuc.edu writes:
>"How do I know?" is as old a question as western philosophy if not all
>philosophy. The reason the question is that old is because subjective
>personal experience is undeniable. I know I have free will because that
>is my experience.
You have seen optical illusions where a straight line is made to
appear curved. No-one doubts that your subjective experience tells
you that the line is curved. In fact, because all humans are built
the same in certain respects (at least those who are able to see and
thus can experience optical illusions), all humans will have that same
subjective experience when they look at that straight line. The same
is true of many other optical illusions, auditory illusions, and,
naturally, the illusion that we call free will. No-one says we do not
experience it, only that we *mis-understand* what we experience.
After I have taken a straight-edge to determine that the line is
straight, I may still "feel" that I am looking at a curved line, but I
now believe the drawing's caption, which calls it a straight line.
No-one has yet defined free-will so that a straight-edge can be found
for it. But many humans activities have been shown to be less
voluntary than they appear subjectively. For expample:
As a child, I thought that I chose what I wanted to eat, and I felt I
had completely free will in this matter. I noticed that I always
chose the M&Ms over the spinach (no matter what Popeye said), but I
still felt that my choice was completely free. Now I know a little
about the human digestive track, body-chemistry, and psychology; I can
see that these played a big part in my "choices". Such a big part
that I now think they completely determined my choices. So it seems
useless to talk about free will in this case. Any child will make
similar choices, most the exact same ones, because that is how
children are built. Only external factors will change the child's
choices, such as reward/punishment for choosing one food over another.
(I consider learning about the real world to be a form of external
reward/punishment. For example, I learned that a steady diet of M&Ms
could lead to a scary visit to the Dentist.)
Choices we make as adults seem much the same, probably depending on
factors we do not yet comprehend, just as we did not comprehend the
factors which led us to choose M&Ms as children. As I said, no-one
has yet provided a reliable straight-edge for us to use on the free
will experience (a definition of free will would help.) But each
experience with a choice which we *do* understand (like M&Ms over
spinach) provides one little peice of that straight edge. All the
little peices in my experience look like they will fit a straight-edge
called " determinism." When we learn more about the factors which
influence our choices, we will develop more or less confidence in this
hypothetical straight-edge. But until we understand most of these
factors, we cannot claim to have this ill-defined "free will",
whatever our subjective experience.
This puts me in agreemnet with someone you quoted who said:
>> No one denies that we humans experience free will. But that
>> experience says nothing about its nature; at least, nothing ruling
>> out determinism and chance.
I think this gives me an answer to your question:
>From where does this tendency to IGNORE subjective experience when discussing
>SUBJECTIVE PHENOMENA originate? My own (and your own) experience of free will
>tells me (and you) a great deal about its nature. In fact, this experience is
>the most reliable source of information regarding free will. And the
>experience is neither deterministic or random. No matter what decision I make,
>whether choosing a political candidate, a career, or a flavor of ice cream,
>I experience neither that my choice is determined, nor random, NOR some
>nebulous combination of the two.
I answer that this discussion itself is proof that we do not ignore
subjective experience. It does indeed tell us a great deal, and
provides essential insight, but it is by no stretch of the imagination
our most reliable source of information. Try to adapt your reasoning
to the straight line illusion. Following your reasoning, I should not
bother to rummage around in my desk for a straight-edge; nor should I
doubt in any way my subjective experience that it is curved. Why, you
don't want me to think about things at all! You just want me to sit
there and "experience" that the line is curved, as if that experience
matched reality. What if my ability to better understand reality
makes me able to help people? What if my ability to distinguish germ
theory from superstition enables me to wipe out smallpox? What if my
ability to distinguish straight lines from curved ones enables me to
build safer cars? Then maybe my ability to distinguish demermined
behaviour from this nebulous "free will" will enable me to wipe out a
mental disease. Whatever turns out to be the root our "free will"
experience, we will not learn to understand it merely by sitting here
and experiencing it subjectively.
>Free will explained as an additive blend of determinism and chance
>directly attacks the concept of individual responsibility. Can any
>machine, based on this theory of free will, possibly benefit society
>enough to counteract the detrimental effect of a philosophy which
>implies that we aren't accountable for our choices?
We say, "A tornado was responsible for destroying my house," and,
"John's dog is responisble for this scar on my leg." If we could stop
the tornado from touching down elsewhere, we would. Under most
circumstances we actually do prevent John's dog from biting anyone
else, either by incarcerating it or killing it. The same will always
be true of people. Where we can stop them from repeating their
offenses, we will. What about one-time offenders? Say someone kills
her husband and we don't think she'll do it again. Punish her on the
basis of how likely it is that she will commit the same crime again?
No. This would produce the damage you fear. For the prevention of
crime it is important that punishment be applied predictably and
evenly, with as few exceptions as possible. This means we should keep
the current idea of responsibility around in Law to do the job it has
always done-- support prevention by making sure a crime is punished
predictably. This may mean a stricter interpretation of "Ignorance of
the Law is no excuse." Yours is an excellent argument against
treating insane offenders differently from sane ones. It is too easy
to say that anyone who commits a crime has demonstrated mental illness
by committing the crime. But if in fact determinism turns out to be
true, then we will want to convert AILIST
BABYL
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