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AIList Digest Volume 6 Issue 023
AIList Digest Monday, 1 Feb 1988 Volume 6 : Issue 23
Today's Topics:
History - Newton and Fame,
Nanotechnology - Metadiscussion,
Philosophy - Worth & AI Encroachment
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Date: Fri, 29 Jan 88 12:23:26 PDT
From: ladkin@kestrel.ARPA (Peter Ladkin)
Subject: another wonderful comment
I read the following in the ailist today:
> The point is of course, that while Newton originated Newtonian physics,
> and thus it is right to expect all references to this field to lead
> back to him, at the time he did his research he was a nobody just
> like Eric Drexler.
A cursory survey of history would show this is a much mistaken view
of Newton. I think he was Lucasian Professor of Mathematics when he
did the physics. His reputation was well established.
The basic point being made is that every important researcher has a
first work. This is true. But it doesn't help to mix it up in
false history.
peter ladkin
ladkin@kestrel.arpa
------------------------------
Date: 29 Jan 88 11:44 PST
From: hayes.pa@Xerox.COM
Subject: Re: Newton and fame
Look, it doesnt really MATTER, but since you raise the subject you ought to get
it right. At the time Newton did his research he wasnt a `nobody'. He was a
famous and respected professor of mathematics, and had been internationally
noted since his teens, having been a remarkable prodigy ( his professor of
mathematics resigned to give his chair to Newton because he considered him so
superior in ability ). At the time his work was published ( in the form of
`Principia' ) he was a senior member of the Royal Society and had been famous
for many years. Far from having a hard time propogating his ideas, Newton was
careless about writing them down and only did so when urged and nagged by his
friends, such as Sir Christopher Wren and a couple of other nobodies, and when
he thought there was a danger that Descartes might get some of the credit. His
work was an immediate sellout all over the Western civilised world, went through
many editions, making a fortune for his publisher, and instantly became the
accepted perspective on understanding cosmology and mechanics. Sermons were
preached about his ideas in St. Pauls cathedral within weeks of them appearing.
Speeches were made at meetings of the Royal Society about what an incredible
breakthrough this all was, the King gave Newton a medal, and so on. The only
comparable fuss in our time is probably that made over Einstein when the eclipse
observations of the transit of Mercury confirmed general relativity.
I am sure there are examples which make Levys point about new ideas having a
hard time ( how about haloid-process copying ? ) but Newton isnt one of them.
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 88 12:21:15 PST
From: larry@VLSI.JPL.NASA.GOV
Subject: Feynman & Nanotechnology
--
Actually, Drexler credits a 1959 lecture (also published in a journal)
by Richard Feynman, Nobel prize-winner in physics, as one of the first
to look at the idea of molecular engineering with some rigor. The idea
itself has been around a good deal longer than that. For instance,
Robert Heinlein's 1945-1955 Future History series included "molar
mechanics" as an important field of science and engineering.
Larry @ jpl-vlsi
------------------------------
Date: 30 Jan 88 06:42:42 GMT
From: jbn@glacier.STANFORD.EDU (John B. Nagle)
Reply-to: jbn@glacier.UUCP (John B. Nagle)
Subject: Re: disregard and abuse of Nano-engineering (V6#17)
Nanotechnology isn't a silly idea, but it's very difficult to
see how to get started on working at the molecular level. Drexler's
popular books don't offer too much insight on what to do first, but
they give some idea of what can be accomplished, and what to worry
about, if it starts to work. Neither physics nor biochemistry seem
to forbid much of what Drexler proposes.
Nanotechnology is more of an engineering problem than is AI.
We really have no idea what a general-purpose artificial intelligence
would look like, what its components would be, or even roughly what
its complexity would be. We cannot today draw a block diagram of
an artificial intelligence with any confidence that a system built
to that diagram would work.
Nanotechnology is different. We could begin to design
nanomachines today, and Drexler has indeed roughed out some designs.
But our manfacturing technology is not equal to the task of building them.
This is classically the sort of problem that will yield to money
and determination. Like the original Manhattan Project and the Apollo
program, much research and massive engineering efforts will be necessary.
To justify such an effort, it will be necessary to demonstrate that
something can be accomplished with this technology.
I therefore put the question "what nanomachine can we build first?"
What can we build with current bioengineering technology? Can some
simple mechanical component be fabricated? It need not be useful.
It need not be very complex. But if one part can be fabricated,
a beginning will have been made. And other work will follow. Rapidly.
John Nagle
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 30 Jan 88 08:18:40 CST
From: smu!lewis@uunet.UU.NET (Eve Lewis)
Subject: Intelligent Nanocomputers
Re: Godden's review of >Engines of Creation< by K. Eric Drexler
> Drexler makes the fascinating claim (no doubt many will vehemently
> disagree) that to create a true artificial intelligence it is not
> necessary to first understand intelligence. All one has to do is
> simulate the brain, which can be done given nanotechnology. He
> suggests that a complete hardware simulation of the brain can be
> done, synapse-for-synapse and dendrite-for-dendrite, in the space
> of one cubic centimeter (this figure is backed up in the notes).
> Such a machine could then just be allowed to run and should be
> able to accomplish a man-year of work in ten seconds. The unstated
> assumption is that a computer that is isomorphic to the human
> brain will ipso facto be intelligent, and presumably will be able
> to construct its own 'mental' models once power is supplied. No
> need to supply it with software.
Perhaps we can suggest an approach to dovetail with, and enhance,
Drexler's. One supposes that the structure of the brain is alright,
as far as it goes. It's even been referred to as "Nature's
Masterpiece." Nonetheless, it's important to understand that the
human brain per se, is a product of the structural genes, to wit:
the respected exons. I say the following:
1) Get an advance copy of that gene map of the entire human genome,
a project now underway. (Be apprised that the human genome is the
nanocomputer to end all nanocomputers, and anything else that comes
along can only be second-best.)
2) Discard the real junk, the exon sequences.
3) Retain the alleged "junk," the intron sequences. Design a program
to look for matches between two stores of complex data. Feed all the
intron "junk" (one store of complex data) into the program. Accumu-
late from all cultures, but particularly from Western "civ," a
plethora of human thought fossils, i.e., Edward O. Wilson's cultur-
gens (the second store of complex data), and feed the stuff into the
program. Set the program going, to look for "matches," and voila!
There you have it. A functional facsimile of the code underlying
human thought processes.
> The unstated assumption is that a computer that is isomorphic to
> the human brain will ipso facto be intelligent, and presumably
> will be able to construct its own 'mental' models once power is
> supplied. No need to supply it with software.
4) The structure of the human brain is an excellent starting point,
and I wouldn't neglect it entirely, "form following function," and
all that sort of thing. Nonetheless, when push comes to shove,
molecular biology is really where it's at. I mean, there are degrees
of fidelity, when it comes to isomorphism. Besides, what A.I. really
needs, is isofunctionalism. For example:
One could construct a life-sized metal and plastic model of the
human brain, even one good enough, in terms of isomorphism, for
teaching purposes in a neuroanatomy class. Even one that could be
taken apart, and put back together, with the nuclei properly enscon-
sed, and the tracts properly aligned.
If one then put clock innards inside, and supplied electrical power,
would it "think"? We know that it would not. Indeed, if we imbedded
a small clock face, with hands and numerals, in Broca's speech area,
it would give us excellent time, just like any old Westclox!!! If we
put in one of those talking mechanisms, Broca's speech area would
TELL us the time. But our poor isomorphic brain, here, would not
come up with Einstein's Theory of Relativity, or anything like it.
And that's really what we're after, isn't it?
5) Now, what kind of a mind would we really like in our A.I.
act-alike? Do we want the mind of a conformist? Or do we want the
mind of a meshuggener? No, on both counts. We want the mind of a
quality Zeitgeist smasher. So we have to discern the in vivo
give-and-take of the repressors and enhancers, as well as the coding
sequences themselves, and work that into any program, along with the
base pair sequences that determine the culturgens. ("This one's no
good," "That one's terrific," "Maybe we can use that one another
time," etc.) We may even be able to avail ourselves of binary
simplicity by equating the purine bases with 1, and the pyrimidine
bases with 0. The entire thing is degenerate, anyway, and could do
with some streamlining.
6) Some closing comments: Don't get hung up on morphology; it's a
Linnaean trap, set for the sentimental. There isn't creature, a
physiological structure, neurons included, or a neurotransmitter,
that doesn't owe its life to several strings of base pairs. Really,
it isn't the brain that thinks, or the neuron(s) that think; it's
the differentially-expressed genome in the neuron(s) that thinks.
In regard to the disdained pseudogenes, referred to as "junk" DNA,
and believed to be "silent," which like Rodney Dangerfield, "Don't
get no respect," perhaps like Alexander Fleming's penicillin mold,
they could be the "bluebird of artificial/natural intelligence,
right in our own DNA," and so, worthy of attention.
It holds true for natural intelligence, artificial intelligence, and
impressive isomorphs: "You can lead a 'mind' to information, but you
can't make it think."
And finally, hopefully there are no male chauvinists among the
readers of, and contributors to, this net. If so, let me warn you
that any aspirant to the Holy Grail, i.e., the comprehension of in-
ternal rep, is doomed from the start if he overlooks the "junk" DNA
in the maternally-inherited mitochondrial genome.
- Eve Lewis
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 29 Jan 88 09:45 EST
From: GODDEN%gmr.com@RELAY.CS.NET
Subject: RE: RE: Nano-engineering
Since I brought this topic up a short while ago, let me comment on
David Smith's reply (following:)
>Date: Fri, 22 Jan 88 14:21:05 est
>From: Mr. David Smith <dsmith@gelac.arpa>
>Subject: Nano-engineering
>
>... [deleted quote] ...
>
>Some time ago, I asked a net question about nano-engineering and all roads
>led to Eric Drexler. Frankly, I was pleased to see this net mail putting
>such activities into perspective. At the risk of sounding Pharisaic, I
>believe that the cause of "serious AI" is seriously hindered by such blatant
>blather. This has to be the only forum in the civilized world which allows
>such claims to be perpetrated without receiving equal portions of ridicule
>and abuse. Can it not be stopped?
Obviously, ailist IS a forum where ridicule and abuse is permitted.
Interestingly, in his book Drexler calls for setting up public forums
where ideas of alleged scientific merit can be scrutinized openly and
subjected to ridicule if such is deemed appropriate.
-Kurt Godden
godden@gmr.com
------------------------------
Date: 28 Jan 88 08:53:14 GMT
From: mcvax!varol@uunet.uu.net (Varol Akman)
Subject: Re: Philosophy is a futile game...
In article <2638@calmasd.GE.COM> wlp@calmasd.GE.COM (Walter Peterson) writes:
>
>For an excellent explanation as to why philosophy is NOT futile and why
>everyone NEEDS philosophy, see
>
> "Philosophy: Who Needs It" By Ayn Rand
>
I don't much care about Rand but a really good reference is
Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein
Another excellent book by Wittgenstein is Zettel.
Needless to say, Wittgenstein was an extraordinary mathematician too.
These books also show why you shouldn't call every mental activity
philosophy and set a standard (very difficult to reach though).
------------------------------
Date: 28 Jan 88 13:48:59 GMT
From: mcvax!ukc!its63b!hwcs!hci!gilbert@uunet.uu.net (Gilbert
Cockton)
Subject: Re: words order in English and Japanese
In article <3532@bcsaic.UUCP> rwojcik@bcsaic.UUCP (Rick Wojcik) writes:
>Finally, this topic really belongs in sci.lang. It has little to do with AI.
If every topic raised in AI was restricted to its proper discipline,
this news group would be empty. Personally, I would rather see the
computational paradigm properly distributed through the disciplines,
rather than left to the intellectual margins and scholarly wastelands
of AI. However, given that AI exists, takes funding and pushes itself
onto the popular consciousness as a valid contribution to the
understanding of humanity, it is far more sensible for disciplined and
informed discussion to keep pushing into comp.ai. AI workers complain
regularly about the oppressiveness of other disciplines when trying to
develop a computational view of human nature. Lets keep up the oppression :-)
--
Gilbert Cockton, Scottish HCI Centre, Heriot-Watt University, Chambers St.,
Edinburgh, EH1 1HX. JANET: gilbert@uk.ac.hw.hci
ARPA: gilbert%hci.hw.ac.uk@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ..{backbone}!mcvax!ukc!hci!gilbert
------------------------------
Date: 29 Jan 88 13:54:13 GMT
From: mcvax!ukc!its63b!hwcs!hci!gilbert@uunet.uu.net (Gilbert
Cockton)
Subject: Re: Philosophy - not a pejorative (Re: time for sci.psych???)
In article <4222@utai.UUCP> tjhorton@ai.UUCP (Timothy J. Horton) writes:
>>...People who flounder hopelessly are probably short on their
>>philosophical training.
>
>Not true. Realize, also, that there are conceptual chasms between fields.
>
>Philosophical arguments about computational models of intelligence, for
>instance, among those without comprehensive conceptual bases in computer
>science, often seem to reduce to expressions of superstition and ignorance,
>at least among the vocal.
On conceptual chasms, what - philosophical analysis apart - can bridge them?
On ignorance of computability in 'philosophical' arguments on natural
and artificial intelligence, perhaps the Theory of Computation needs
to be as much a part of a proper philosophical training as
linguistic analysis and formal logic. Some people in AI could do with
it as well (i.e. those who don't have it).
As for reduction to superstition, isn't this the outcome for an
analysis of many 'natural truths'. On the existence of objects,
nothing is 'proven', but nevertheless, we find no reason for rejecting
the natural truth of their existence. Arguments based on ignorance
must be discounted, but are we not left with the case that we still
have no reason for rejecting the natural truth that human and machine
intelligence are different? Not only is the case for the equivalence
of human and machine intelligence not proven, no analysis exists, to my
knowledge, which points to a way of establishing the equivalence. This
leaves AI as a piece of very expensive speculation based on beliefs
which insult our higher views of ourselves. Superstition no doubt, but
a dominant and moral superstition which needs to command some respect.
Vocal polemic is as much a reaction to the arrogant unreasonableness of
some major AI pundits, as it is a reflection of the incompetence of the
advocate. The debate has been fair on neither side, and the ability
of AI pundits to stand their ground is due to their social marginality
as round-the-clock scientists and their cultural marginality as workers
outwith a proper discipline (look up Sociology of Deviance). People
who live in bunkers don't get hit by stones ;-) The big AI pundits
just remind me of Skinner.
BTW: NOT(AI pundit = AI worker) - most AI workers know their systems
aren't working (yet?) and do leave their bunkers to mingle :-)
>I suggest, in balance, Russell's "The Cult of Common Usage," for instance.
Great - keep balancing, more competent philosophy for the reading list.
>Experience would seem to indicate that a few vocal individuals may press
>their arguments on the entire network, rather than delivering ambivalent
>analysis or investigating before disseminating.
Sounds like a netiquette proposal which I thoroughly endorse. Whilst
guilty of advocacy on occasions, I think that everyone should strive for
an ambivalent analysis in this sort of public forum, and leave people to make
their own minds up. Sounds like good philosophy to me. However,
ambivalence cannot be expected in response to imcompetence, however candid.
Witness the current debate on economic structure and diachronic syntax. Nor,
as with tolerance of the intolerant, I can't be ambivalent about dogmatists.
--
Gilbert Cockton, Scottish HCI Centre, Heriot-Watt University, Chambers St.,
Edinburgh, EH1 1HX. JANET: gilbert@uk.ac.hw.hci
ARPA: gilbert%hci.hw.ac.uk@cs.ucl.ac.uk UUCP: ..{backbone}!mcvax!ukc!hci!gilbert
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End of AIList Digest
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