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AIList Digest Volume 5 Issue 012
AIList Digest Thursday, 22 Jan 1987 Volume 5 : Issue 12
Today's Topics:
Query - Antiquity of AI,
Discussion Lists - X windows and Lisp,
Conference - University Demos at AAAI,
Philosophy - Consciousness
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Date: Tue, 20 Jan 87 17:23 EDT
From: STANKULI%cs.umass.edu@RELAY.CS.NET
Subject: Antiquity of AI
THE ANTIQUITY OF AI
As we are all probably aware, the term 'robot' was coined by Carel Kapek
(circa 1930's AD), but the concept of manufacturing intelligent, speaking,
humanoid, machines for labor dates back into antiquity. I have come upon
the following passage in Homer's Iliad (circa 725 BC). I would like to
know if anyone could send me other passages related to AI which predate the
Renaissance (circa 1500's AD). Particularly, is this the earliest known
reference to artificial intelligence?
To set the scene, Hephaistos is working in his laboratory when he
receives an unexpected visit from Thetis. (English translation will
follow.)
E KAI AP' AKMOTHETOIO PELOR AIETON ANESTE CHOLEUON;
HYPO DE KNEMAI ROONTO ARAIAI.
PHYSAS MEN RH' APANEUTHE TITHEI PUROS,
HOPLA TE PANTA LARNAK' ES ARGUREEN SULLEXATO, TOIS EPONEITO.
SPONGO D'AMPHI PROSOPA KAI AMPHO CHEIR' APOMORGNU
AUCHENA TE STIBARON KAI STETHEA LACHNEENTA.
DU DE CHITON',
HELLE DE SKEPTRON PACHU,
BE DE THYRAZE CHOLEUON.
HYPO D'AMPHIPOLOI RHOONTO ANAKTI
CHRUSEIAI,
ZOESI NEENISIN EIOIKUIAI.
TES EN MEN NOOS ESTI META PHRESIN,
EN DE KAI AUDE KAI STHENOS,
ATHANATON DE THEON APO ERGA ISASIN.
HAI MEN HYPAITHA ANAKTOS EPOIPNUON;
AUTAR HO ERRON PLESION, ENTHA THETIS PER,
EPI THRONMOU HIZE PHAEINOU.
EN T'ARA HOI PHU CHERI,
EPOS T'EPHAT EK T'ONOMAZE,
"TIPTE, THETI, TANUPEPLE,
HIKANEIS HEMETERON DO?"
HE SPOKE, AND TOOK THE HUGE BLOWER OFF THE ANVIL, LIMPING;
BENEATH HIM, SHRUNKEN LEGS MOVED LIGHTLY.
HE SET THE BELLOWS AWAY FROM THE FIRE,
GATHERED ALL THE TOOLS IN A SILVER STRONGBOX, WITH WHICH HE WORKED.
WITH A SPONGE HE WIPED HIS FOREHEAD AND BOTH HANDS,
HIS MASSIVE NECK AND HAIRY CHEST,
PUT ON A TUNIC,
TOOK UP A HEAVY STICK,
WENT TO THE DOORWAY, LIMPING.
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MASTER MOVED HIS ATTENDENTS.
THESE ARE GOLDEN,
IN APPEARANCE LIKE LIVING YOUNG WOMEN.
AND THERE IS INTELLIGENCE IN THEIR HEARTS,
AND THERE IS SPEECH IN THEM AND STRENGTH,
FROM THE GODS THEY HAVE LEARNED HOW TO DO THINGS.
THESE STIRRED NIMBLY IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MASTER,
MOVING NEAR TO WHERE THETIS SAT
IN HER SHINING CHAIR,
AND TAKING HER BY THE HAND,
CALLED HER BY NAME AND SPOKE A WORD TO HER:
"WHY IS IT, THETIS OF THE LIGHT ROBES,
YOU HAVE COME TO OUR HOUSE NOW?"
I know the Romans used intricate machinations in their circuses and
theatricals, but I have found no reference of them ever being imagined as
anything other than amusing gear boxes. I have found nothing of the
Egyptians ever considering a device more complicated than a hand tool. Yet
Homer seems to have most of the essentials of AI described quite clearly.
Well, perhaps the earliest inference engine was the scales on which Thoth
weighed the human heart against the feather of truth.
stan
[Actually, "robot" was coined by Josef Capek in his story Opilec
(Drunkard) in 1917, rather than by Carel Capek in his 1920 R.U.R.
It apparently comes from the Czech word for "unpleasant work",
rather than the oft-cited "worker". -- KIL ]
------------------------------
Date: Wed 21 Jan 87 13:10:32-PST
From: Mark Richer <RICHER@SUMEX-AIM.STANFORD.EDU>
Subject: X windows & Lisp
There is a mailing list on commonlisp windows that discusses issues
such as the ones you raise and a bunch of people that use or are interestsed
in X windows are on the list. I have remailed your message, perhaps you will
get a response from someone there. It would be appropriate if this
discussion moved there.
The list is cl-windows@sail.stanford.edu To get on send a request to
cl-windows-request@sail.stanford.edu.
There is also a list on X called xpert@athena.mit.edu. Send to xpert-request
to get on that one.
Mark
------------------------------
Date: Wed 21 Jan 87 11:50:25-PST
From: AAAI <AAAI-OFFICE@SUMEX-AIM.STANFORD.EDU>
Subject: University Demos
ANNOUNCEMENT
University and research institutes are invited to participate in the
1987 Exhibit Program at the National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence. Booth space is free, and equipment vendors will loan
hardware for your demonstrations.
Last year the AAAI introduced this innovation and it was considered
one of the highlights of the conference.
For more information, please contact:
Mr. Steve Taglio
AAAI
445 Burgess Drive
Menlo Park, CA 94025-3496
AAAI-office@sumex-aim.arpa
------------------------------
Date: 21 Jan 87 07:13:00 EST
From: "CUGINI, JOHN" <cugini@icst-ecf>
Reply-to: "CUGINI, JOHN" <cugini@icst-ecf>
Subject: consciousness as a non-superfluous concept
In general, I quite agree with most of Harnad's comments contra
Minsky, but he and others keep asking a question which deserves
a response - namely why do we NEED the concept of consciousness
to explain anything:
> Harnad:
>
> It's a useful constraint to observe the following dichotomy (which
> corresponds roughly to the objective/subjective dichotomy): Keep
> behavioral performance and the processes that generate it on the
> objective side (O) of the ledger, and leave them uninterpreted. On the
> subjective (S) side, place conscious experience (1st order and
> higher-order) and its contents, such as they are; these are of course
> necessarily interpreted. You now need an argument for interpreting any
> theory of O in terms of S. In particular, you must show why the
> uninterpreted O story ALONE will not work (i.e., why ALL the processes
> you posit cannot be completely unconscious). [The history of the
> mind/body problem to date -- in my view, at least -- is that no one
> has yet managed to do the latter in any remotely rigorous or
> convincing way.]
But elsewhere:
> I also agree, of course, that conscious experiences (both C-1 and C-2)
> involve illusions, ...But one thing's no illusion, and
> that's the fact THAT we're having an experience. The toothache I feel
> I'm having right now may in fact have its causal origin in a tooth
> injury that happened 90 seconds ago, or a brain event that happened 30
> milliseconds ago, but what I'm feeling when I feel it is a
> here-and-now toothache, and that's real. It's even real if there's no
> tooth injury at all.
Hmmm...so the toothache is "real" but "subjective" - well OK, we need some
terminology to distinguish the class of inner/experiential/subjective/
conscious/private events vs. external/public..etc.
But the point is, if we believe in the existence of both classes, if
both are real, then we know why we need consciousness as a concept-
because without it we cannot explain/talk about the former class of
events - even if the latter class is entirely explicable in its own
terms. Ie, why should we demand of consciousness that it have
explanatory power for objective events? It's like demanding that
magnetism be acoustically detectible before we accept it as a valid
concept.
I can well understand how those who deny the reality of experiences
(eg, toothaches) would then insist on the superfluousness of the
concept of consciousness - but Harnad clearly is not one such.
So...we need consciousness, not to explain public, objective events,
such as neural activity, but to explain, or at least discuss, private
subjective events. If it be objected that the latter are outside the
proper realm of science, so be it, call it schmience or philosophy or
whatever you like. - but surely anything that is REAL, even if subjective,
can be the proper object for some sort of rational study, no?
John Cugini <Cugini@icst-ecf>
------------------------------
Date: 20 Jan 87 13:29:05 PST (Tue)
From: Tom Hester <hester%ai.cel.fmc.com@RELAY.CS.NET>
Subject: Re: AIList Digest V5 #9
In response to: berke@locus.ucla.edu on inten(s/t)ion, introspection
Intension comes from the same Greek root as the English word intense
(meanings are more intens(iv)e in intensions), and the distinction
between intension and extension goes all the way back to Aristotle.
Anybody really interested in Aristotle's characterization of the
distinction can send me an E-mail message and I will be glad to reply.
Furthermore, semanticists have argued for many years that intensions and
intentions are related. See the work of B.C. Van Fraassen for example.
Finally, R.J. Faichney is absolutely correct. It was not Freud that
side tracked psychology from introspection. Rather it was the "dust
bowl empiricists" that rode behaviorism to fame and fortune that did it.
"Don't touch that! When you are this far inside the human brain, you
don't know what it might be connected to." B. Bonzai
Tom Hester
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 1987 23:53 EST
From: MINSKY%OZ.AI.MIT.EDU@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU
Subject: AIList Digest V5 #11
Steve Harnad says:
Note: Everyone who is not in the grip of some theoretical
position knows EXACTLY what I mean by the above, and I use
the example of having a current toothache merely as a standard
illustration.
I like this because it is so EXACTLY the opposite of what I think,
namely, that unless a person IS in the grip of some "theoretical
position" - that is, some system of ideas, however inconsistent, they
can't "know" what anything "means"
The distinction between C-1 and C-2 is often formulated as the
distinction between "aware of something" (say, having a
toothache) and "being aware of being aware of something"
(including, say, remembering, thinking about or talking about
having a toothache, or about what it's like to have a toothache).
But note that Steve included "say, remembering..." My point was that
you can't think about, talk about, or remember anything that leaves no
temporary trace in some part of your mind. In other words, I agree
that you can't have C-2 without C-1 - but you can't have think, say,
or remember that you have C-1 without C-2! So, assuming that I know
EXACTLY what he means, I understand PERFECTLY that that meaning is
vacuous.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 22 Jan 87 00:06:21 est
From: Stevan Harnad <princeton!mind!harnad@seismo.CSS.GOV>
Subject: No C-2 without C-1
Ken Laws <Laws@SRI-STRIPE.ARPA> wrote in mod.ai:
> A quibble: It would be possible to remember having a toothache
> without actually having one. It is also possible, as Minsky seems
> to suggest, that my entire conscious perception of a current toothache
> is an "illusory pain" based on the memory of a neural signal
> of a moment ago. These views do not solve the problem, of course;
> the C-2 consciousness must be explained even if the C-1 experience
> was an illusion. My conscious memory of the event is more than
> just an uninterpreted memory of a memory of a memory ...
There is still no C-2 without C-1. For accompanying every C-2 episode
is a C-1 as substrate. Not only is there something it's like to have a
toothache (C-1), but there's also something it's like to REMEMBER
having a toothache (likewise C-1). The experience of remembering is a
qualitative experience too. The toothache may never actually have
happened. You may not even have a tooth. But the qualitative sense of
remembering it has the "phenomenological validity" that I claimed all
1st order conscious experience does. For if the C-2 episode is not a
qualitative experience, what qualifies it as conscious at all?
My point is subtle, but valid. I advise the perplexed to reread the
definitions of C-1 and C-2. Ken Laws's example of an "illusory" C-1
trades on the ambiguity between (a) the causal and temporal reality (i.e,
when, whether and why the tooth injury and neural events actually happened
in real time) of the CONTENTS of a conscious experience and (b) their
phenomenological validity (i.e., what you experienced them AS). The
memory of my toothache may be illusory in relation to the toothache I
never in reality had, but it is no illusion that I am having such a
memory now -- and that experience is the ineluctible C-1 substrate on
which any C-2 or higher must piggy-back. (And there's no point doing
another deferred-temporal number on THAT experience, analogous to the
one on the toothache -- misremembering remembering, or some such --
because it only leads to infinite regress, and still logically
requires an ongoing C-1 to justify calling it conscious.) No C-2
without an underlying C-1 too.
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End of AIList Digest
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