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AIList Digest Volume 2 Issue 087
AIList Digest Wednesday, 11 Jul 1984 Volume 2 : Issue 87
Today's Topics:
Applications - Quantum Logic,
AI Tools - OPS5 Under Unix & LISP Implementations,
Brain Theory - Electrical Stimulation,
Linguistics & Philosophy - Use of "if" in Natural Language,
Expert Systems - Diagnostic Systems References,
AI Culture - Cultural Premises,
Linguistics - New CSLI Reports,
Commonsense Reasoning - Discussion,
Turing Test - Discussion
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Mon, 9 Jul 84 09:25 EDT
From: D E Stevenson <dsteven%clemson.csnet@csnet-relay.arpa>
Subject: Implementations of quantum logic?
Does anyone out there have an interest in quantum logic?
Has any sort of implementation of a "theorem prover" ever
been attempted? I would be interested in any experience, thoughts
etc. on this subject.
"Steve" Stevenson
dsteven@clemson
------------------------------
Date: 29 Jun 84 6:18:55-PDT (Fri)
From: hplabs!kaist!kiet!aitool @ Ucb-Vax.arpa
Subject: OPS5 Under Unix
Article-I.D.: kiet.196
Where and How can I get the Ops5 on Unix (4.1bsd or others).
Please inform to me if you know. I also want information about other
knowledge engineering tools on Unix.
address: ..!hplabs!kaist!kiet!dhshin
Dongha Shin
Comuter Research Div.
K.I.E.T
P.O. Box 31, Kumi
Republic of Korea
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 9 Jul 84 14:37:10 cdt
From: archebio!bantz%uiuc.csnet@csnet-relay.arpa
Subject: LISP on microcomputers
cf. BYTE, July '84, pp. 281ff: review of MuLisp and IQLISP
cf. full page ad in latest AI Magazine for Golden Common Lisp
------------------------------
Date: 3 Jul 1984 10:43:37-EDT (Tuesday)
From: Mark N. Wegman <WEGMAN.YKTVMX%ibm-sj.csnet@csnet-relay.arpa>
Subject: LISP release at IBM
[Forwarded to the Rutgers bboard by Ryder@Rutgers.]
[Forwarded from the Rutgers bboard by Tyson@SRI-AI.]
Could you pass this on to whoever might be interested?
IBMIBMIB IBMIBMIB MIBMIBMIBMI IBMIBMIBMIBMI
IBMIBMIB IBMIBMIB IBMIBMIBMIBMIBM IBMIBMIBMIBMIBM
MIBM MIBM IBMI MIBM MIBM BMIBM
MIBM MIBM MIBMI MIBM BMIB
MIBM MIBM BMIBMIB MIBMIBMIBM
MIBM IBMI MIBM MIBMI MIBM
MIBM IBMI MIBM IBMI MIBM MIBM
IBMIBMIBMIBMIBMI IBMIBMIB IBMIBMIBMIBMIBM IBMIBMIB
IBMIBMIBMIBMIBMI IBMIBMIB MIBMIBMIBMI IBMIBMIB
Today IBM announces the availability of LISP/VM.
With thanks to the many people who helped make this possible.
--- Cyril Alberga, (914) 945-1776 (ALBERGA.YKTVMX@IBM)
Martin Mikelsons, (914) 945-1343 (MIKELSN.YTKVMX@IBM)
Mary Van Deusen, (914) 945-2394 (MAIDA.YKTVMX@IBM)
Mark Wegman, (914) 945-1327 (WEGMAN.YKTVMX@IBM)
[At last, LISP is legitimate! -- KIL]
------------------------------
Date: 9 Jul 84 08:23 PDT (Monday)
From: DMRussell.PA@XEROX.ARPA
Subject: Electrical Stimulation Studies
From pur-ee!uiucdcs!convex!graham @ Ucb-Vax.arpa
"... I have heard (but have no reference document to cite) that neuro-surgeons
have demonstrated that stimulation (i.e, contact with) certain parts of the
brain can produce complete recall of all sensory input from a past event,
even of details not originally "noticed". ...."
Electrical stimulation studies were originated by Wilder Penfield at
the Univ. of Montreal. During neurosurgery, he would drop on a few
electrodes onto the brain surface (with ground at base of spine) and
stimulate away. His subjects reported all sorts of sensory phenomena
including taste, sounds, lights, stars, and (apparently) memory
awareness. One subject reported hearing a particular song being
performed by a specific orchestra. As these things go, people later
decided that he was using far too much current, and apparently had no
control over exactly how much brain he was stimulating. Thus, his
conclusions about locality wrt electrical stimulation are suspect.
Similar arguments are made about how to interpret the sensory
phenomena he elicited. [As for references, almost any beginning
neuropsych textbook will have them, but here's one: W. Penfield and P.
Perot "The Brain's Record of Auditory and Visual Experience", Brain,
(1963), v. 86, pp 595-696]
Nowadays, electrical stimulation mapping has vastly improved. Small
amounts of current are used, and people have some idea about what
exactly is being hit. There is some good stuff done by Whitaker and
Ojemann on what happens to the a subject's ability to use and
understand language during electrical stimulation. [somewhere in the
journal Brain & Language, within the past 4 years]
Something to keep in mind, however, is that almost all brain
stimulation is done to people that have their skulls open for a very
serious reason. (Generally, the patients are being treated for severe
eplilepsy.) Drawing conclusions about the functioning of normal
brains on the basis of a few tests performed on severely epileptic
brains leaves me wondering.
-- Daniel Russell --
------------------------------
Date: 6 Jul 84 09:50:33 PDT (Friday)
From: McNelly.ES@XEROX.ARPA
Subject: Re: Use of if in natural language
I thought the following message raised some points that might be of
interest to the general readership...
-- John
Date: 6 Jul 84 09:31:00 PDT (Friday)
Subject: Re: Use of if in natural language
In-reply-to: McNelly's message of 6 Jul 84 07:58:19 PDT (Friday)
John,
Thank you for forwarding that wonderful message. I'd have to agree
with most of it on a preliminary basis but some points deserve a bit
more thorough examination. For instance, I must take issue with the
statement: "In the philosophical literature questions about the validity
of contraposition ... are generally asked under the headings
'Subjunctive Conditionals', 'Counterfactuals' or 'Contrary-to-fact
Conditionals'". I think the author has inadvertently or otherwise
forgotten the most important heading "Inferential Counter-positive
Conditionals". This category, as we know, contains the first two
sub-headings mentioned along with an abstract grouping of
uncategorizable subclasses of separate but still readily identifiable
conditionals. By this time, we are all well aware that the infinite
group of non-identifiable conditionals is gathered together under the
single heading "Unrecognizable Categorical Implications" and that this
category is itself what has come to be known in recent literature as a
"non-group" (i.e., one that is not generally associated with the other
"real" groups when discussing conditionals). However to retrace that
tangent to the main thread of circular focus, one must begin to grasp
the full implications of the inferential counter-positives. As an
example, when one says, "I have seen the daybreak and it is dawn," the
preferred "quasi-logical" response on the counter-positive heirarchical
level would not directly ask of night. A question of night would fall
under a "contrary-to-fact" heading, most likely the "positive
post-reality" subclass, although this stands to be debated. In any
case, I would like to hear if anyone else felt the same strong
motivation to disbelieve the original message and if so, what points in
particular did you find to be the greatest source of misinformation.
-- Fungi
------------------------------
Date: 7 Jul 84 03:03:50 EDT (Sat)
From: Dana S. Nau <dsn@umcp-cs.arpa>
Subject: Re: Use of if in natural language
Your description sounds like it may relate to the difference between
deductive and abductive inference. Jim Reggia and I have been doing
some research on this at the University of Maryland; the following is
a partial list of references (given in "refer" format).
%A J. A. Reggia
%A B. Perricone
%A D. S. Nau
%A Y. Peng
%T Answer Justification in Abductive Expert Systems for
Diagnostic Problem Solving
%D 1984
%R submitted for publication
%A D. S. Nau
%A J. A. Reggia
%T Relationships between Abductive and
Deductive Inference in Knowledge-Based Diagnostic Problem Solving
%R submitted for publication
%D 1984
%A J. A. Reggia
%A D. S. Nau
%A P. Y. Wang
%T Diagnostic Expert Systems Based on a Set Covering Model
%D Nov. 1983
%P 437-460
%J International Journal of Man-Machine Studies
%A J. A. Reggia
%A D. S. Nau
%A P. Y. Wang
%T A Theory of Abductive Inference in Diagnostic Expert Systems
%D Dec. 1983
%R Tech. Report TR-1338, Computer Sci. Dept., Univ. of Maryland
%C College Park, MD
%A J. A. Reggia
%A P. Y. Wang
%A D. S. Nau
%T Minimal Set Covers as a Model for Diagnostic Problem Solving
%J Proc. First IEEE Computer Society Internat.
Conf. on Medical Computer Sci./Computational Medicine
%D Sept. 1982
%A D. S. Nau
%A J. A. Reggia
%A P. Y. Wang
%T Knowledge-Based Problem Solving Without Production Rules
%J Proc. IEEE 1983 Trends and Applications Conference
%C Gaithersburg, MD
%D May 1983
%P 105-108
%A J. A. Reggia
%A D. S. Nau
%A P. Y. Wang
%T A New Inference Method for Frame-Based Expert Systems
%J Proc. Annual National Conference on Artificial Intelligence
%C Washington, DC
%P 333-337
%D Aug. 1983
------------------------------
Date: 5 Jul 84 8:17:05-PDT (Thu)
From: hplabs!sdcrdcf!sdcsvax!akgua!mcnc!duke!mgv @ Ucb-Vax.arpa
Subject: A Report on the Cultural Premises of the AI Community
Article-I.D.: duke.4495
I would like to point out the existence of a "pilot survey"
on the "cultural premises of [the] artificial intelligence com-
munity." The survey was carried out during IJCAI-8 in Karlsruhe
by Massimo Negrotti, a sociologist with the University of Genoa,
Italy. The research was sponsored by the Italian National
Research Council (CNR), and I think that you can obtain a copy of
the report by writing to Massimo Negrotti, Chair of Sociology of
Knowledge, University of Genoa, Genova, Italy.
Within its limitations (e.g., small sample size), the survey
shows that AI researchers from different geographical areas have
different views of the world. For example, "human understanding"
is most often defined as "reduction to familiar terms" by British
researchers, but as "general representation of facts" by Con-
tinental Europeans.
It may be interesting to note that almost 60% of the inter-
viewed researchers answered "yes" to the following question:
"From your point of view, is it plausible a pure A.I. theory
[sic] without references to the philosophical tradition?", but
that this percentage was as high as 67.8 for Continental Europe-
ans, and as low as 37.8 for USA researchers.
Marco Valtorta
(duke!mgv)
------------------------------
Date: Sat 7 Jul 84 09:36:02-PDT
From: Dikran Karagueuzian <DIKRAN@SU-CSLI.ARPA>
Subject: New CSLI Reports
[Forwarded from the CSLI Newsletter by Laws@SRI-AI.]
N E W C S L I R E P O R T S
Limited editions of three new Reports (Nos. CSLI-8-84, CSLI-9-84, and
CSLI-10-84) have just been published. Copies may be obtained by writing
to Dikran Karagueuzian at the Center. The reports are:
Reflection and Semantics in LISP by Brian Cantwell Smith.
Report No. CSLI--84--8, July, 1984.
The Implementation of Procedurally Reflective Languages by
Jim des Rivieres and Brian Cantwell Smith.
Report No. CSLI--84--9, July, 1984.
Morphological Constraints on Scandinavian Tone Accent by
Meg Withgott and Per-Kristian Halvorsen.
Report No. CSLI--84--11, July, 1984.
------------------------------
Date: 30 Jun 84 0:13:42-PDT (Sat)
From: ucbcad!tektronix!orca!shark!brianp @ Ucb-Vax.arpa
Subject: Re: Commonsense Reasoning?
Article-I.D.: shark.861
the computer could do the temperature conversion without blinking
an led, if it knows that this here's a mapping, (not a monkey and
banana to simulate), and its one of those easy linear jobs, and
if it knows how to read and can figure out the question.
(no fair writing a temperature conversion (or any give-it-some-numbers
interpolation/extrapolation) program. you have to write a run of the mill
common sense reasoning program, and send it through elementary school.
or hire a tutor. little kids can tease new types of people real bad.
wouldn't want our program to have emotional problems, would we? :-)
Brian Peterson
...!ucbvax!tektronix!shark!brianp
------------------------------
Date: 5 Jul 84 9:37:29-PDT (Thu)
From: pur-ee!CS-Mordred!Pucc-H.Pucc-I.ags @ Ucb-Vax.arpa
Subject: Re: The Turing Test (reply to Col. Sicherman)
Article-I.D.: pucc-i.338
> Is it coincidence that the computer declines
> to write a sonnet and accepts the other challenges? A real human, trying
> to prove that he is not a computer program, would probably welcome the
> opportunity to offer a poem.
Yes, I believe it is a coincidence. Another conversation from the Turing
article demonstrates that he did not mean to exclude the possibility of
a sonnet-writing machine:
Interrogator: In the first line of your sonnet which reads
'Shall I compare thee to a summer's day,' would not 'a spring
day' do as well or better?
Witness: It wouldn't scan.
Interrogator: How about 'a winter's day.' That would scan all
right.
Witness: Yes, but nobody wants to be compared to a winter's
day.
Interrogator: Yet Christmas is a winter's day, and I do not
think Mr. Pickwick would mind the comparison.
Witness: I don't think you're serious. By a winter's day one
means a typical winter's day, rather than a special one like
Christmas.
And so on [Turing continues]. What would Professor Jefferson say if
the sonnet-writing machine was able to answer like this in the viva voce?
---------------------------------------------------------------
> My attack was not against the details of the conversation (for that
> matter, the third problem is ambiguous), but the premise of the Test.
Yes, the third problem was ambiguous. I thought it was also rather
clever:
Q: I have K at my K1, and no other pieces. You have only K
at K6 and R at R1. It is your move. What do you play?
A: (After a pause of 15 seconds) R-R8 mate.
A machine might be expected to ask whether the rook is at QR1 or KR1,
not realizing that it is irrelevant. The answer "R-R8 mate" is
correct in either case. Was this a trap laid by the questioner?
You say you object to the premise of the test. The reason for that
becomes apparent in your next comment:
> You may remember that Turing called it a "Game" rather than a "Test." This
> sort of situation arises _only_ as a game; if you really want to know
> whether somebody is a person or a computer, you just look at him/it.
Where does Turing say or imply that being able to tell a person from a
computer is of any importance? The question is merely, "Can a machine
think?" Unless you believe that "having a human form" is a prerequisite for
thinking, physical appearance means nothing. Is your objection of the form,
1. The Turing "imitation game" is not an adequate test of a machine's
ability to think? [If not, why not?]
2. It is of no importance to decide whether machines can think, and
therefore the Turing "imitation game" has no value? [If this is
your position, then I think we have nothing more to discuss.]
> I should think that ELIZA has laid to rest the myth that a program's
> "humanity" has anything to do with its intelligence. ELIZA's intel-
> ligence was low, but she was a very human source of comfort to many
> people who talked with her.
I don't think the imitation game is (or was intended to be) a test of
"humanity." Since ELIZA cannot come close to performing well in the
imitation game, she has no relevance to the validity of the test.
Yes, I am aware that ELIZA has fooled people, but this happened under
circumstances that are very different from the imitation game.
Dave Seaman "My hovercraft is full of eels."
..!pur-ee!pucc-i:ags
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End of AIList Digest
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