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AIList Digest Volume 1 Issue 100
AIList Digest Sunday, 20 Nov 1983 Volume 1 : Issue 100
Today's Topics:
Intelligence - Definition & Msc.,
Looping Problem - The Zahir,
Scientific Method - Psychology
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Date: Wed, 16 Nov 1983 10:48:34 EST
From: AXLER.Upenn-1100@Rand-Relay (David M. Axler - MSCF Applications Mgr.)
Subject: Intelligence and Categorization
I think Tom Portegys' comment in 1:98 is very true. Knowing whether or
not a thing is intelligent, has a soul, etc., is quite helpful in letting
us categorize it. And, without that categorization, we're unable to know
how to understand it. Two minor asides that might be relevant in this
regard:
1) There's a school of thought in the fields of linguistics, folklore,
anthropology, and folklore, which is based on the notion (admittedly arguable)
that the only way to truly understand a culture is to first record and
understand its native categories, as these structure both its language and its
thought, at many levels. (This ties in to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis that
language structures culture, not the reverse...) From what I've read in this
area, there is definite validity in this approach. So, if it's reasonable to
try and understand a culture in terms of its categories (which may or may not
be translatable into our own culture's categories, of course), then it's
equally reasonable for us to need to categorize new things so that we can
understand them within our existing framework.
2) Back in medieval times, there was a concept known as the "Great
Chain of Being", which essentially stated that everything had its place in
the scheme of things; at the bottom of the chain were inanimate things, at the
top was God, and the various flora and fauna were in-between. This set of
categories structured a lot of medieval thinking, and had major influences on
Western thought in general, including thought about the nature of intelligence.
Though the viewpoint implicit in this theory isn't widely held any more, it's
still around in other, more modern, theories, but at a "subconscious" level.
As a result, the notion of 'machine intelligence' can be a troubling one,
because it implies that the inanimate is being relocated in the chain to a
position nearly equal to that of man.
I'm ranging a bit far afield here, but this ought to provoke some discussion...
Dave Axler
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Date: 15 Nov 83 15:11:32-PST (Tue)
From: pur-ee!CS-Mordred!Pucc-H.Pucc-I.Pucc-K.ags @ Ucb-Vax
Subject: Re: Parallelism & Consciousness - (nf)
Article-I.D.: pucc-k.115
Faster = More Intelligent. Now there's an interesting premise...
According to relativity theory, clocks (and bodily processes, and everything
else) run faster at the top of a mountain or on a plane than they do at sea
level. This has been experimentally confirmed.
Thus it seems that one can become more intelligent merely by climbing a
mountain. Of course the effect is temporary...
Maybe this is why we always see cartoons about people climbing mountains to
inquire about "the meaning of life" (?)
Dave Seaman
..!pur-ee!pucc-k!ags
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Date: 17 Nov 83 16:38 EST
From: Jim Lynch <jimlynch@nswc-wo>
Subject: Continuing Debate (discussion) on intelligence.
I have enjoyed the continuing discussion concerning the definition of
intelligence and would only add a few thoughts.
1. I tend to agree with Minsky that intelligence is a social concept,
but I believe that it is probably even more of an emotional one. Intelligence
seems to fall in the same category with notions such as beauty, goodness,
pleasant, etc. These concepts are personal, intensely so, and difficult to
describe, especially in any sort of quantitative terms.
2. A good part of the difficulty with defining Artificial Intelligence is
due, no doubt, to a lack of a good definition for intelligence. We probablyy
cannot define AI until the psychologists define "I".
3. Continuing with 2, the definition probably should not worry us too much.
After all, do psychologists worry about "Natural Computation"? Let us let the
psychologists worry about what intelligence is, let us worry about how to make
it artificial!! (As has been pointed out many times, this is certainly an
iterative process and we can surely learn much from each other!).
4. The notion of intelligence seems to be a continuum; it is doubtful
that we can define a crisp and fine line dividing the intelligent from the
non-intelligent. The current debate has provided enough examples to make
this clear. Our job, therefore, is not to make computers intelligent, but
to make them more intelligent.
Thanks for the opportunity to comment,
Jim Lynch, Dahlgren, Virginia
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Date: Thu 17 Nov 83 16:07:41-PST
From: Ken Laws <Laws@SRI-AI.ARPA>
Subject: Intelligence
I had some difficultly refuting a friend's argument that intelligence
is "problem solving ability", and that deciding what problems to solve
is just one facet or level of intelligence. I realize that this is
a vague definition, but does anyone have a refutation?
I think we can take for granted that summing the same numbers over and
over is not more intelligent than summing them once. Discovering a
new method of summing them (e.g., finding a pattern and a formula for
taking advantage of it) is intelligent, however. To some extent,
then, the novelty of the problem and the methods used in its solution
must be taken into account.
Suppose that we define intelligence in terms of the problem-solving
techniques available in an entity's repertoire. A machine's intelligence
could be described much as a pocket calculator's capabilities are:
this one has modus ponens, that one can manipulate limits of series.
The partial ordering of such capabilities must necessarily be goal-
dependent and so should be left to the purchaser.
I agree with the AIList reader who defined an intelligent entity as
one that builds and refines knowledge structures representing its world.
Ability to manipulate and interconvert particular knowledge structures
fits well into the capability rating system above. Learning, or ability
to remember new techniques so that they need not be rederived, is
downplayed in this view of intelligence, although I am sure that it is
more than just an efficiency hack. Problem solving speed seems to be
orthogonal to the capability dimension, as does motivation to solve
problems.
-- Ken Laws
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Date: 16 Nov 83 4:21:55-PST (Wed)
From: harpo!seismo!philabs!linus!utzoo!utcsstat!laura @ Ucb-Vax
Subject: KILLING THINGS
Article-I.D.: utcsstat.1439
I think that one has to make a distinction between dolphins killing fish
to eat, and hypothetical turtles killing rabbits, not to eat, but because
they compete for the same land resources. To my mind they are different
sorts of killings (though from the point of veiw of the hapless rabbit
or fish they may be the same). Dolphins kill sharks that attack the school,
though -- I do not think that this 'self-defense' killing is the same as
the planned extermination of another species.
if you believe that planned extermination is the definition of intelligence
then I'll bet you are worried about SETI. On the other hand, I suppose you
must not believe that pacifist vegetarian monks qualify as intelligent.
Or is intelligence something posessed by a species rather than an individual?
Or perhaps you see that eating plants is indeed killing them. Now, we
have, defined all animals and plants like the venus fly-trap as intelligent
while most plants are not. All the protists that I can think of right now
would also be intelligent, though a euglena would be an interesting case.
I think that "killing things" is either too general or too specific
(depending on your definition of killing and which things you admit
to your list of "things") to be a useful guide for intelligence.
What about having fun? Perhaps the ability to laugh is the dividing point
between man (as a higher intelligence) and animals, who seem to have
some appreciation for pleasure (if not fun) as distinct from plants and
protists whose joy I have never seen measured. Dolphins seem to have
a sense of fun as well, which is (to my mind) a very good thing.
What this bodes for Mr. Spock, though, is not nice. And despite
megabytes of net.jokes, this 11/70 isn't chuckling. :-)
Laura Creighton
utzoo!utcsstat!laura
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Date: Sun 20 Nov 83 02:24:00-CST
From: Aaron Temin <CS.Temin@UTEXAS-20.ARPA>
Subject: Re: Artificial Humanity
I found these errors really interesting.
I would think a better rule for Eurisko to have used in the bounds
checking case would be to keep the bounds-checking code, but use it less
frequently, only when it was about to announce something as interesting,
for instance. Then it may have caught the flip-flop error itself, while
still gaining speed other times.
The "credit assignment bug" makes me think Eurisko is emulating some
professors I have heard of....
The person bug doesn't even have to be bug. The rule assumes that if a
person is around, then he or she will answer a question typed to a
console, perhaps? Rather it should state that if a person is around,
Eurisko should ask THAT person the question. Thus if Eurisko is a
person, it should have asked itself (not real useful, maybe, but less of
a bug, I think).
While computer enthusiasts like to speak of all programs in
anthropomorphic terms, Eurisko seems like one that might really deserve
that. Anyone know of any others?
-aaron
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Date: 13 Nov 83 10:58:40-PST (Sun)
From: ihnp4!houxm!hogpc!houti!ariel!vax135!cornell!uw-beaver!tektronix
!ucbcad!notes @ Ucb-Vax
Subject: Re: the halting problem in history - (nf)
Article-I.D.: ucbcad.775
Halting problem, lethal infinite loops in consciousness, and the Zahir:
Borges' "Zahir" story was interesting, but the above comment shows just
how successful Borges is in his stylistic approach: by overwhelming the
reader with historical references, he lends legitimacy to an idea that
might only be his own. Try tracking down some of his references some-
time--it's not easy! Many of them are simply made up.
Michael Turner (ucbvax!ucbesvax.turner)
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Date: 17 Nov 83 13:50:54-PST (Thu)
From: ihnp4!houxm!mhuxl!ulysses!unc!mcnc!ncsu!fostel @ Ucb-Vax
Subject: I recall Rational Psychology
Article-I.D.: ncsu.2407
First, let's not revive the Rational Psychology debate. It died of natural
causes, and we should not disturb its immortal soul. However, F Montalvo
has said something very unpleasant about me, and I'm not quite mature
enough to ignore it.
I was not making an idle attack, nor do I do so with superficial knowledge.
Further, I have made quite similar statements in the presence of the
enemy -- card carrying psychologists. Those psychologists whose egos are
secure often agree with the assesment. Proper scientific method is very
hard to apply in the face of stunning lack of understanding or hard,
testable theories. Most proper experiments are morally unacceptable in
the pschological arena. As it is, there are so many controls not done,
so many sources of artifact, so much use of statistics to try to ferret
out hoped-for correlations, so much unavoidable anthropomorphism. As with
scholars such as H. Dumpty, you can define "science" to mean what you like,
but I think most psychological work fails the test.
One more thing, It's pretty immature to assume that someone who disagrees
with you has only superficial knowledge of the subject. (See, I told you
I was not very mature ....)
----GaryFostel----
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End of AIList Digest
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