Copy Link
Add to Bookmark
Report
AIList Digest Volume 1 Issue 078
AIList Digest Saturday, 15 Oct 1983 Volume 1 : Issue 78
Today's Topics:
Philosophy - Dedekind & Introspection,
Rational Psychology - Conectionist Models,
Creativity - Intuition in Physics,
Conference - Forth,
Seminar - IUS Presentation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: 10 Oct 83 11:54:07-PDT (Mon)
From: decvax!duke!unc!mcnc!ncsu!uvacs!mac @ Ucb-Vax
Subject: consciousness, loops, halting problem
Article-I.D.: uvacs.983
With regard to loops and consciousness, consider Theorem 66 of Dedekind's
book on the foundations of mathematics, "Essays on the Theory of Numbers",
translated 1901. This is the book where the Dedekind Cut is invented to
characterize irrational numbers.
64. Definition. A system S is said to be infinite when it
is similar to a proper part of itself; in the contrary case
S is said to be a finite system.
66. Theorem. There exist infinite systems. Proof. My own
realm of thoughts, i.e. the totality S of all things, which
can be objects of my thought, is infinite. For if s
signifies an element of S, then is the thought s', that s
can be object of my thought, itself an element of S. If we
regard this as transform phi(s) of the element s then has
the transformation phi of S, thus determined, the property
that the transform S' is part of S; and S' is certainly
proper part of S, because there are elements of S (e.g. my
own ego) which are different from such thought s' and
therefore are not contained in S'. Finally it is clear that
if a, b are different elements of S, their transformation
phi is a distinct (similar) transformation. Hence S is
infinite, which was to be proved.
For that matter, net.math seems to be in a loop. They were discussing the
Banach-Tarski paradox about a year ago.
Alex Colvin
ARPA: mac.uvacs@UDel-Relay CS: mac@virginia USE: ...uvacs!mac
------------------------------
Date: 8 Oct 83 13:53:38-PDT (Sat)
From: hplabs!hao!seismo!rochester!blenko @ Ucb-Vax
Subject: Re: life is but a dream
Article-I.D.: rocheste.3318
The statement that consciousness is an illusion does not mean it does
not or cannot have a concrete realization. I took the remarks to mean
simply that the entire mental machinery is not available for
introspection, and in its place some top-level "picture" of the process
is made available. The picture need not reflect the details of internal
processing, in the same way that most people's view of a car does not
bear much resemblance to its actual mechanistic internals.
For those who may not already be aware, the proposal is not a new one.
I find it rather attractive, admitting my own favorable
predisposition towards the proposition that mental processing is
computational.
I still think this newsgroup would be more worthwhile if readers
adopted a more tolerant attitude. It seems to be the case that there is
nearly always a silly interpretation of someone's contribution;
discovering that interpretation doesn't seem to be a very challenging
task.
Tom Blenko
blenko@rochester
decvax!seismo!rochester!blenko
allegra!rochester!blenko
------------------------------
Date: 11 Oct 83 9:37:52-PDT (Tue)
From: hplabs!hao!seismo!rochester!gary @ Ucb-Vax
Subject: Re: "Rational Psychology"
Article-I.D.: rocheste.3352
This is in response to John Black's comments, to wit:
> Having a theoretical (or "rational" -- terrible name with all the wrong
> connotations) psychology is certainly desirable, but it does have to make
> some contact with the field it is a theory of. One of the problems here is
> that the "calculus" of psychology has yet to be invented, so we don't have
> the tools we need for the "Newtonian mechanics" of psychology. The latest
> mathematical candidate was catastrophe theory, but it turned out to be a
> catastrophe when applied to human behavior. Perhaps Periera and Doyle have
> a "calculus" to offer.
This is an issue I (and I think many AI'ers) are particularly interested in,
that is, the correspondence between our programs and the actual workings of
the mind. I believe that an *explanatory* theory of behavior will not be at
the functional level of correspondence with human behavior. Theories which are
at the functional level are important for pinpointing *what* it is that people
do, but they don't get a handle on *how* they do it. And, I think there are
side-effects of the architecture of the brain on behavior that do not show up
in functional level models.
This is why I favor (my favorite model!) connectionist models as being a
possible "calculus of Psychology". Connectionist models, for those unfamiliar
with the term, are a version of neural network models developed here at
Rochester (with related models at UCSD and CMU) that attempts to bring the
basic model unit into line with our current understanding of the information
processing capabilities of neurons. The units themselves are relatively stupid
and slow, but have state, and can compute simple functions (not restricted to
linear). The simplicity of the functions is limited only by "gentleman's
agreement", as we still really have no idea of the upper limit of neuronal
capabilities, and we are guided by what we seem to need in order to accomplish
whatever task we set them to. The payoff is that they are highly connected to
one another, and can compute in parallel. They are not allowed to pass symbol
structures around, and have their output restricted to values in the range
1..10. Thus we feel that they are most likely to match the brain in power.
The problem is how to compute with the things! We regard the outcome of a
computation to be a "stable coalition", a set of units which mutually
reinforce one another. We use units themselves to represent values of
parameters of interest, so that mutually compatible values reinforce one
another, and mutually exclusive values inhibit one another. These could
be the senses of the words in a sentence, the color of a patch in the
visual field, or the direction of intended eye movement. The result is
something that looks a lot like constraint relaxation.
Anyway, I don't want to go on forever. If this sparks discussion or interest
references are available from the U. of R. CS Dept. Rochester, NY 14627.
(the biblio. is a TR called "the Rochester Connectionist Papers").
gary cottrell (allegra or seismo)!rochester!gary or gary@rochester
------------------------------
Date: 10 Oct 83 8:00:59-PDT (Mon)
From: harpo!eagle!mhuxi!mhuxj!mhuxl!mhuxm!pyuxi!pyuxn!rlr @ Ucb-Vax
Subject: Re: RE: Intuition in Physics
Article-I.D.: pyuxn.289
> I presume that at birth, ones mind is not predisposed to one or another
> of several possible theories of heavy molecule collision (for example.)
> Further, I think it unlikely that personal or emotional interaction in
> one "pre-analytic" stage (see anything about developmental psych.) is
> is likely to bear upon ones opinions about those molecules. In fact I
> find it hard to believe that anything BUT technical learning is likely
> to bear on ones intuition about the molecules. One might want to argue
> that ones personality might force you to lean towards "aggressive" or
> overly complex theories, but I doubt that such effects will lead to
> the creation of a theory. Only a rather mild predisposition at best.
> In psychology it is entirely different. A person who is agresive has
> lots of reasons to assume everyone else is as well. Or paranoid, or
> that rote learning is esp good or bad, or that large dogs are dangerous
> or a number of other things that bear directly on ones theories of the
> mind. And these biases are aquired from the process of living and are
> quite un-avoidable.
The author believes that, though behavior patterns and experiences in a
person's life may affect their viewpoint in psychological studies, this
does not apply in "technical sciences" (not the author's phrasing, and not
mine either---I just can't think of another term) like physics. It would
seem that flashes of "insight" obtained by anyone in a field involving
discovery have to be based on both the technical knowledge that the person
already has AND the entire life experience up to that point. To oversimplify,
if one has never seen a specific living entity (a flower, a specific animal)
or witnessed a physical event, or participated in a particular human
interaction, one cannot base a proposed scientific model on these things, and
these flashes are often based on such analogies to reality.
------------------------------
Date: 9 Oct 83 14:38:45-PDT (Sun)
From: decvax!genrad!security!linus!utzoo!utcsrgv!utcsstat!laura @
Ucb-Vax
Subject: Re: RE: Intuition in Physics
Article-I.D.: utcsstat.1251
Gary,
I don't know about why you think about physics, but I know something about
why *I* think about physics. You see, i have this deep fondness for
"continuous creation" as opposed to "the big bang". This is too bad for me,
since "big bang" appears to be correct, or at any rate, "continuous
creation" appears to be *wrong*. Perhaps what it more correct is
"bang! sproiinngg.... bang!" or a series of bangs, but this is not
the issue.
these days, if you ask me to explain the origins of the universe, from
a physical point of veiw I am going to discuss "big bang". I can do this.
It just does not have the same emotional satisfaction to me as "c c"
but that is too bad for me, I do not go around spreading antiquidated
theories to people who ask me in good faith for information.
But what if the evidence were not all in yet? What if there were an
equal number of reasons to believe one or the other? What would I be
doing? talking about continuous creation. i might add a footnote that
there was "this other theory ... the big bang theory" but I would not
discuss it much. I have that strong an emotional attatchment to
"continuous creation".
You can also read that other great issues in physics and astronomy had
their great believers -- there were the great "wave versus particle"
theories of light, and The Tycho Brahe cosmology versus the Kepler
cosmology, and these days you get similar arguments ...
In 50 years, we may all look back and say, well, how silly, everyone
should have seen that X, since X is now patently obvious. This will
explain why people believe X now, but not why people believed X then,
or why people DIDN'T believe X then.
Why didn't Tycho Brahe come up with Kepler's theories? It wasn't
that Kepler was a better experiementer, for Kepler himself admits
that he was a lousy experimenter and Brahe was reknowned for having
the best instraments in the world, and being the most painstaking
in measurements. it wasn't that they did not know each other, for
Kepler worked with Brahe, and replaced him as Royal Astronomer, and
was familiar with his work before he ever met Brahe...
It wasn't that Brahe was religious and Kepler was not, for it was
Kepler that was almost made a minister and studied very hard in Church
schools (which literally brought him out of peasantry into the middle
class) while Brahe, the rich nobleman, could get away with acts that
the church frowned upon (to put if mildly).
Yet Kepler was able to think in terms of Heliocentric, while Brahe,
who came so...so..close balked at the idea and put the sun circling
the earth while all the other planets circled the sun. Absolutely
astonishing!
I do not know where these differences came from. However, I have a
pretty good idea why continuous creation is more emotionally satisfying
for me than "big bang" (though these days I am getting to like
"bang! sproing! bang!" as well.) As a child, i ran across the "c c"
theory at the same time as i ran across all sorts of the things that
interest me to this day. In particular, I recall reading it at the
same time that I was doing a long study of myths, or creation myths
in particular. Certain myths appealed to me, and certain ones did not.
In particular, the myths that centred around the Judeao-Christian
tradition (the one god created the world -- boom!) had almost no
appeal to me those days, since I had utter and extreme loathing for
the god in question. (this in turn was based on the discovery that
this same wonderful god was the one that tortured and burned millions
in his name for the great sin of heresy.) And thus, "big bang"
which smacked of "poof! god created" was much less favoured by me
at age 8 than continuous creation (no creator necessary).
Now that I am older, I have a lot more tolerance for Yaveh, and
I do not find it intollerable to believe in the Big Bang. However,
it is not as satisfying. Thus I know that some of my beliefs
which in another time could have been essential to my scientific
theories and inspirations, are based on an 8-year-old me reading
about the witchcraft trials.
It seems likely that somebody out there is furthering science by
discovering new theories based on ideas which are equally scientific.
Laura Creighton
utzoo!utcsstat!laura
------------------------------
Date: Fri 14 Oct 83 10:50:52-PDT
From: WYLAND@SRI-KL.ARPA
Subject: FORTH CONVENTION ANNOUNCEMENT
5TH ANNUAL FORTH NATIONAL CONVENTION
October 14-15, 1983
Hyatt Palo Alto
4920 El Camino real
Palo Alto, CA 94306
Friday 10/14: 12:00-5:00 Conference and Exhibits
Saturday 10/15: 9:00-5:00 Conference and Exhibits
7:00 Banquet and Speakers
This FORTH convention includes sessions on:
Relational Data Base Software - an implementation
FORTH Based Instruments - implementations
FORTH Based Expert Systems - GE DELTA system
FORTH Based CAD system - an implementation
FORTH Machines - hardware implementations of FORTH
Pattern Recognition Based Programming System - implementation
Robotics Uses - Androbot
There are also introductory sessions and sessions on
various standards. Entry fee is $5.00 for the sessions and
exhibits. The banquet features Tom Frisna, president of
Androbot, as the speaker (fee is $25.00).
------------------------------
Date: 13 Oct 1983 1441:02-EDT
From: Sylvia Brahm <BRAHM@CMU-CS-C.ARPA>
Subject: IUS Presentation
[Reprinted from the CMU-C bboard.]
George Sperling from NYU and Bell Laboratories will give a talk
on Monday, October 17, 3:30 to 5:00 in Wean Hall 5409.
Title will be Image Processing and the Logic of Perception.
This talk is not a unification but merely the temporal juxta-
position of two lines of research. The logic of perception
invoves using unreliable, ambiguous information to arrive at
a categorical decision. Critical phenomena are multiple stable
states (in response to the same external stimulus) and path
dependence (hysteresis): the description is potential theory.
Neural models with local inhibitory interaction are the ante-
cedents of contemporary relaxation methods. New (and old)
examples are provided from binocular vision and depth perception,
including a polemical demonstration of how the perceptual decision
of 3D structure in a 2D display can be dominated by an irrelevant
brightness cue.
Image processing will deal with the practical problem of squeezing
American Sign Language (ASL) through the telephone network.
Historically, an image (e.g., TV @4MHz) has been valued at more
than 10@+(3) speech tokens (e.g., telephone @3kHz). With image-
processed ASL, the ratio is shown to be approaching unity.
Movies to illustrate both themes will be shown. Appointments to
speak with Dr. Sperling can be made by calling x3802.
------------------------------
End of AIList Digest
********************
