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Neuron Digest Volume 06 Number 23
Neuron Digest Friday, 30 Mar 1990 Volume 6 : Issue 23
Today's Topics:
Re: sensory input vs. memory
Re: sensory input vs. memory
Re: sensory input vs. memory
Back propagation parameters
aphasia references
Technical reports available
Call for Papers (Third ISAI in Mexico)
YOUR LAST CHANCE!!
Send submissions, questions, address maintenance and requests for old issues to
"neuron-request@hplabs.hp.com" or "{any backbone,uunet}!hplabs!neuron-request"
Use "ftp" to get old issues from hplpm.hpl.hp.com (15.255.176.205).
------------------------------------------------------------
Subject: Re: sensory input vs. memory
From: dank@moc.Jpl.Nasa.Gov (Dan Kegel)
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 90 12:07:11 -0800
Stephen Smoliar asks "... can a phenotype born without any sensory input
possibly have any memory?" and argues that the answer is NO, because
"Without sensation and the ability to process sensation, there can be no
memory."
At least in Gedanken experiments, connecting an organism's sensory inputs
is not the only way of obtaining these memories. In particular, you
could design a new organism, let it evolve and live in simulation, and
then dump the memory of the simulated organism into the memory of the
first copy of the organism you actually build. To the degree that the
simulation was accurate, the new copy would behave indistinguishably from
an organism that had evolved in reality instead of simulation.
- Dan Kegel
------------------------------
Subject: Re: sensory input vs. memory
From: Stephen Smoliar <smoliar@vaxa.isi.edu>
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 90 17:24:36 -0800
Dan Kegel summaries the story thus far:
[[ ..in the previous message... ]]
While it is certainly true that you can do anything you want in a
GEDANKEN experiment, it tends to be useful to have some reflection of
biological reality. The critical assumption here is that memory is some
kind of an object which can be readily cut from one place and pasted into
another. This assumption is certainly consistent with Newell's Knowledge
Level Hypothesis, but it is not universally accepted. Gerald Edelman is
a good example of a biologist who has rejected it. The primary front for
his rejection is the argument that memory is a PROCESS, as opposed to any
configuration of "bits." Specifically, it is a process of
"recategorization;" and much of THE REMEMBERED PRESENT is devoted to
making sense out of this view of memory. The secondary front is based on
the nature of human biology; and it is the observation that no two
nervous systems are "wired up" exactly the same way. In other words at
the lowest structural level, every individual has his own idiosyncratic
architectural implementation. Thus, for any location you choose to carve
out a chunk of brain from subject A, with the intention of transferring
it to subject B, you are likely to find that the connections required by
the A piece will not be consistent with those required by the B piece.
(WARNING! DO NOT TRY THIS AT HOME!)
------------------------------
Subject: Re: sensory input vs. memory
From: dank@moc.Jpl.Nasa.Gov (Dan Kegel)
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 90 18:56:50 -0800
Stephen Solimar writes:
> The critical assumption here is that memory is some kind of
> an object which can be readily cut from one place and pasted into another.
> ... Gerald Edelman rejected this. He argued first that memory is a PROCESS,
> as opposed to any configuration of "bits" ... and second that
> no two nervous systems are "wired up" exactly the same way.
Since I'm assuming we can build organisms from scratch, we can presumably
arrange for them to be wired up in the same manner.
Even if memory is a process, this does not preclude it being represented
by a configuration of bits. One can imagine a computer program which
simulates the memory process at the detailed physical level (ion
channels, enzymes, etc). This program and its data are certainly a
configuration of bits which represent the memory process, and embody a
particular implementation thereof.
If memory is nothing but bits, and if memory is all one needs to think,
there's nothing stopping a computer from thinking (even if it goes insane
in 72 hours from sensory deprivation :-).
- Dan Kegel
------------------------------
Subject: Back propagation parameters
From: NeuralNetworkDevelopment CMI <nn@eik.II.UIB.NO>
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 90 16:54:33 +0200
Hi there !
We have experimented with a back propagation network, and have had
certain difficulties concerning the values of the gain and momentum
terms, and the number of nodes in the hidden layers (we are using two
hidden layers). We suppose that others have encountered the problem of
giving these parameters an optimal value for fast conver- gence.
Also, the initial (random) values of the weights have proved to be quite
important for the results and the speed of convergence.
Could anyone help us with references to work done in this field ?
Nils Chr. Hertzberg (nilsch@eik.ii.uib.no)
Arne Olav Morken (arnemo@eik.ii.uib.no)
------------------------------
Subject: aphasia references
From: Elizabeth Bates <bates@amos.ucsd.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 90 09:12:48 -0800
[[ Editor's note: A heated discussion on brain localization and
connectionist theory centered around aphasia and copmuter models of
aphasia as relevant processes to explore the characteristics of
distributed systems. There are several conncetionist models of dyslexia
and brain lesions (some cited below). This is another example of
attempting to make articifical neural networks physiologically and
psychologically valid. -PM ]]
SOME OF THE RELEVANT REFERENCES FROM THE RECENT DEBATE ON APHASIA
ON [[ANOTHER MAILING LIST]] WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:
I. Some of the cross-language studies of aphasia from our laboratories:
Bates, E. & Wulfeck, B. (1989).
Comparative aphasiology: a cross-linguistic
approach to language breakdown. Aphasiology, 3, 111-142.
Review of the cross-language work.
Bates, E. & Wulfeck, B. (1989). Cross-linguistic studies of aphasia.
In B. MacWhinney & E. Bates (Eds.), The cross-linguistic study of
sentence processing.
New York, Cambridge University Press.
Another review, nested within a volume summarizing our
cross-language work with normals as well.
Bates, E., Friederici, A., & Wulfeck, B. (1987a).
Comprehension in aphasia:
a cross-linguistic study. Brain & Language, 32, 19-67.
Among other things, this study shows that "receptive agrammatism" (i.e.
partial loss of sensitivity to closed class elements,
albeit to a different
degree in each language) occurs not only in Broca's, but in Wernicke's,
anomics, and in many neurological and non-neurological patients without
focal brain injury. In other words, receptive agrammatism may occur
in response to generalized stress!!
Bates, E., Friederici, A., & Wulfeck, B. (1987b).
Grammatical morphology
in aphasia: evidence from three languages. Cortex, 23, 545-574.
One of the studies that best illustrates how patients
use their preserved knowledge to "shape" closed class
omission and other typical symptoms.
II. A few references from other laboratories on the
"new look" in aphasia research:
Basso, A., Capitani, E., Laiacona, M. & Luzzatti, C. (1980).
Factors influencing type and severity of aphasia.
Cortex, 16, 631 - 636 (an archival review
of MRI and CT data showing how often the classical teaching re lesion
site and aphasia type is violated).
Baum, S. (1989). On-line sensitivity to local and long-distance
dependencies in Broca's aphasia. Brain & Language, 37, 327-338.
Damasio, H. & Damasio, A. (1989). Lesion analysis in neuropsychology.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Also documents a few of the surprises
in brain-behavior mapping.
Friederici, A. & Kilborn, K. (1989). Temporal constraints on language
processing in Broca's aphasia.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 1, 262-272.
A study showing "grammatical priming" in Broca's aphasics.
Linebarger, M., Schwartz, M. & Saffran, E. (1983). Sensitivity to
grammatical structure in so-called agrammatic aphasics. Cognition, 13,
361-392.
The first of what are now many papers demonstrating preservation
of grammaticality judgments in "agrammatic" patients.
Lukatela, G., Crain, S. & Shankwweiler, D. (1988). Sensitivity to
inflectional morphology in agrammatism: investigation of a highly
inflected language. Brain & Language, 33, 1 - 15.
Miceli, G., Silveri, M., Romani, C. & Caramazza, A. (1989). Variation
in the pattern of omissions and substitutions of grammatical morphemes
in the spontaneous speech of so-called agrammatic aphasics. Brain &
Language, 36, 447-492. This study goes too far in trying to claim
that "everything dissociations from everything else", violating a lot
of statistical assumptions in the process. Nevertheless, it clearly
shows just how much variation can occur among patients from the "same"
clinical category, and it also shows that "agrammatic" symptoms are
quite common in patients with posterior as opposed to anterior lesions.
Milberg, W. & Blumstein, S. (1981).
Lexical decision and aphasia: evidence
for semantic processing. Brain & Language, 14, 371-385. This is among
the first of a series of papers from this laboratory trying to recast
the Broca/Wernicke contrast in processing rather than content terms.
Ostrin, R. & Schwartz, M. (1986). Reconstructing from a degraded trace:
a study of sentence repetition in agrammatism.
Brain & Language, 28, 328-345.
Similar line of argument to Milberg & Blumstein, although it differs in
detail.
Shankweiler, D., Crain, S. Gorrell, P. & Tuller, B. (1989). Reception
of language in Broca's aphasia.
Language and Cognitive Processes, 4, 1 - 33.
Still more evidence for preserved grammar in Broca's aphasia.
Swinney, D., Zurif, E., Rosenberg, B. & Nicol, J. Modularity and
information access in the lexicon: evidence from aphasia. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience. Sorry I don't have a more specific reference.
This paper tries to salvage modularity in aphasia, showing that semantic
priming occurs in both Broca's and Wernicke's aphasia, but in slightly
different forms. In fact, the paper makes a strong case that aphasic
deficits are based on access problems across a preserved knowledge base.
Tyler, L. (1989). Syntactic deficits and the
construction of local phrases
in spoken language comprehension.
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 6, 333 - 356.
Yet another attempt to rewrite the nature of processing deficits in
aphasia, demonstrating that the basic organization of language is
preserved.
III. Some papers that are relevant to the argument although
they do not present new data on aphasic patients.
Hinton, G. & Shallice, T. (1989). Lesioning a connectionist network:
investigations of acquired dyslexia.
(Tech. rep. CRG-TR-89-30. University
of Toronto). Funny things can happen when a language net is randomly
lesioned -- things that old-style aphasiologists might typically explain
with the logic of localization if the same symptoms were observed in
a brain-damaged patient.
Kutas, M. & Van Petten, C. (1988). Event-related brain potential
studies of language. In P.K. Ackles, J. R. Jennings & M. G. H.
Coles (Eds.), Advances in psychophysiology, Vol. III. Greenwich,
Connecticut, JAI Press, 139 - 187.
Posner, M. Petersen, S., Fox, P. & Raichle, M. (1988). Localization of
cognitive operations in the human brain. Science, 240, 1627 - 1631.
a "new look" at localization based on PET scan data, arguing that
components of attention are localized but linguistic content is not.
Seidenberg, M., McClelland, J. & Patterson, K. (1987). A distributed
developmental model of visual word recognition, naming and dyslexia.
Symposium on Connectionism, Annual Meeting of the Experimental
Psychological Society (U.K.), Oxford. There is probably a more
recent, published version of this reference but I don't have it.
Shows how "dyslexic-like" symptoms can arise from random
lesions (i.e. non-localized) to a connectionist net.
hope these are useful. -liz bates
------------------------------
Subject: Technical reports available
From: David Chalmers <dave@cogsci.indiana.edu>
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 90 15:43:56 -0500
The following two technical reports are now available from the Center for
Research on Concepts and Cognition at Indiana University.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SYNTACTIC TRANSFORMATIONS ON DISTRIBUTED REPRESENTATIONS
David J. Chalmers
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition
Indiana University
CRCC-TR-40
There has been much interest in the possibility of connectionist models
whose representations can be endowed with compositional structure, and a
variety of such models have been proposed. These models typically use
distributed representations which arise from the functional composition
of constituent parts. Functional composition and decomposition alone,
however, yield only an implementation of classical symbolic theories.
This paper explores the possibility of moving beyond implementation by
exploiting holistic structure-sensitive operations on distributed
representations. An experiment is performed using Pollack's Recursive
Auto-Associative Memory. RAAM is used to construct distributed
representations of syntactically structured sentences. A feed-forward
network is then trained to operate directly on these representations,
modeling syntactic transformations of the represented sentences.
Successful training and generalization is obtained, demonstrating that
the implicit structure present in these representations can be used for a
kind of structure-sensitive processing unique to the connectionist
domain.
This paper is to appear in CONNECTION SCIENCE.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
WHY FODOR AND PYLYSHYN WERE WRONG:
THE SIMPLEST REFUTATION
David J. Chalmers
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition
Indiana University
CRCC-TR-41
This paper offers both a theoretical and an experimental perspective on
the relationship between connectionist and Classical (symbol-processing)
models. Firstly, a serious flaw in Fodor and Pylyshyn's argument against
connectionism is pointed out: if, in fact, a part of their argument is
valid, then it establishes a conclusion quite different from that which
they intend, a conclusion which is demonstrably false. The source of
this flaw is traced to an underestimation of the differences between
localist and distributed representation. It has been claimed that
distributed representations cannot support systematic operations, or that
if they can, then they will be mere implementations of traditional ideas.
This paper presents experimental evidence against this conclusion:
distributed representations can be used to support direct
structure-sensitive operations, in a manner quite unlike the Classical
approach. Finally, it is argued that even if Fodor and Pylyshyn's
argument that connectionist models of compositionality must be mere
implementations were correct, then this would still not be a serious
argument against connectionism as a theory of mind.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To obtain a copy of either of these papers, send e-mail to
dave@cogsci.indiana.edu.
------------------------------
Subject: Call for Papers (Third ISAI in Mexico)
From: "Centro de Inteligencia Artificial(ITESM)" <ISAI@TECMTYVM.MTY.ITESM.MX>
Organization: Instituto Tecnologico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey
Date: Tue, 20 Mar 90 12:20:36 -0600
To whom it may concern:
Here you will find the information concerning the "CALL
FOR PAPERS" invitation.
Please display it in your bulletin board. In case you find
it very long, you may remove all the people's names shown in
this document.
Thank you very much in advance.
Sincerely,
The Symposium Publicity Committee.
Call for Papers
Third International Symposium on
Artificial Intelligence:
Applications of Engineering Design, Manufacturing & Management in
Industrialized and Developing Countries
October 22-26, 1990
ITESM, MEXICO
The Third International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence will
be held in Monterrey, N.L. Mexico on October 22-26, 1990.
The Symposium is sponsored by the ITESM (Instituto Tecnologico y
de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey) in cooperation with the
International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Inc.,
the American Association for Artificial Intelligence, the Sociedad
Mexicana de Inteligencia Artificial and IBM of Mexico.
Papers from all countries are sought that (1) present innovative
applications of artificial intelligence technology to the solution
of industrial problems in engineering design, manufacturing and
management; (2) explore its relevance for developing countries;
and (3) describe research on techniques to accomplish such
applications.
AREAS OF APPLICATION include but are not limited to:
* Production planning,* resource management, * quality management,
* automated assembly, * machine loads, * inventory control,
* computer aided product design, *computer aided product manufacturing
* human resources management, * forecasting, *client/customer support,
* process control and ES, * automatic process inspection, * use of
industrial robots, * market and competition analysis, * strategic
planning of manufacturing, * technology management and social impact
of AI technology in industrial environments.
AI TECHNIQUES include but are not limited to:
* Knowledge acquisition and representation, * natural language
processing, * robotics , * speech recognition, * computer vision,
* neural networks and genetic algorithms, * parallel architectures,
* automatec learning, * automated reasoning, * search and problem
solving, * knowledge engineering tools and methodologies,
* uncertainty management and AI programming languages.
Persons wishing to submit a paper should send five copies written
in english to:
HUGO TERASHIMA
PROGRAM CHAIR
CENTRO DE INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL, ITESM
SUCURSAL DE CORREOS "J", C.P. 64849
MONTERREY, N.L. MEXICO
The paper should identify the area and technique to which it belongs.
Extended abstract is not required.Use font similar to "times",size 12
single-spaced, with a maximum of 10 pages. No papers will be accepted
by electronic means.
IMPORTANT DATES:
Papers must be received by April 30, 1990.Papers received after the
deadline will be returned unopened. Authors will be notified by
June 30, 1990. A final copy of each accepted paper, camera ready
for inclusion in the Symposium proceedings will be due by July 30,
1990.
INFORMATION.-
CENTRO DE INTELIGENCIA ARTIFICIAL, ITESM.
SUC. DE CORREOS "J", C.P. 64849 MONTERREY, N.L. MEXICO.
TEL (52-83) 58-20-00 EXT.5134.
TELEFAX (52-83) 58-07-71, (52-83) 58-89-31,
NET ADDRESS:
ISAI AT TECMTYVM.BITNET
ISAI AT TECMTYVM.MTY.ITESM.MX
GENERAL CHAIR:
Francisco J. Cantu-Ortiz, ITESM, Mexico
ADVISORY BOARD:
Saul Amarel, Rutgers University, USA
Woodrow Bledsoe, U. OF Texas at Austin, USA
Randolph Goabel, University of Alberta, CANADA
Adolfo Guzman, International Software Systems, USA
Raj Reddy, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Donald Walker, Bellcore, USA
PROGRAM CHAIRS:
Jose Luis Aguirre, ITESM, Mexico
Rocio Guillen, ITESM, Mexico
Hugo Terashima, ITESM, Mexico
PROGRAM COMMITTEE:
Rene Banares, UNAM, Mexico
Ramon Brena, ITESM, Mexico
Ofelia Cervantes, U.Americas, Mexico
Francisco Cervantes, UNAM, Mexico
John Debenham, U.Technology, Sidney Australia
Gerhard Fischer, University of Colorado, USA
Mark Fox, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
David Fuller, U.Catolica de Chile
Eugenio Garcia, ITESM, Mexico
Jose Luis Gonzalez, ITESM, Mexico
Ignacio Grossman, Carnegie Mellon University
STeffen Hoeldobler, Technische Hochschule Darmstadt, FRG
Heinz Ulrich Hoppe, GMD-IPSI, Germany
S.Lakshmivarahan, University of Oklahoma, USA
Fernando Lara, ITESO, Mexico
Christian Lemaitre, UNAM, Mexico
Lori Levin, Carnegie Mellon University
Jay Liebowitz, George Washington University, USA
Ramon Lopez-Mantaras, Blanes, Spain
Guillermo Morales, I.Politecnico Nacional, Mexico
Judea Pearl, UCLA, USA
Jorge Phillips, Stanford University, USA
S.Ramani, National Centre for Software Tech, India
Francois Rechenmann, INRIA, Grenoble, France
Daniel Rehak, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Richard Stern, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Sarosh Talukdar, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Masaru Tomita, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
John Trujillo, EAFIT, Colombia
Manuel Valenzuela, ITESM, Mexico
Carlos Zozaya, CONDUMEX, Mexico
Publicity and Tutorial Chair:
Moraima Campbell, ITESM, Mexico
Local Arrangement Chair:
Leticia Rodriguez, ITESM, Mexico
Exhibits Chair:
Lucila Pena, ITESM, Mexico
------------------------------
Subject: YOUR LAST CHANCE!!
From: Turing Conference <turing%ctcs.leeds.ac.uk@NSFNET-RELAY.AC.UK>
Date: Thu, 29 Mar 90 13:25:39 +0100
___________________________________________________________________________
Computer Studies and Philosophy,
University of Leeds,
LEEDS, LS2 9JT
Friday, 23rd March 1990
TURING 1990 - FINAL REMINDER
I would be very grateful if you could bring this notice to the
attention of the relevant academic staff and postgraduates in your
department, as soon as possible. It concerns a major conference which is
taking place in Sussex University the week after next (starting on Tuesday
3rd April), and for which a limited number of places are still available.
Because of the uniqueness of the Conference, and its magnificent range of
speakers, we are taking the unusual step of providing a last-minute
"reminder" for anyone who may have either failed to see our previous
notices, or forgotten to register in time. We are keen to provide a final
opportunity for British academics and postgraduates who are interested in
computers and their philosophical significance, since it is very unlikely
that such an impressive list of speakers in this subject area will be
assembled on this side of the Atlantic for a long time to come (see below).
Yours sincerely, and with many thanks,
Peter Millican
___________________________________________________________________________
INVITED GUEST SPEAKERS
ANDREW HODGES, author of the much-acclaimed biography Alan Turing: the
Enigma of Intelligence, will give the opening address at the Conference.
DONALD MICHIE and ROBIN GANDY, both of whom knew Turing personally, will
present the first and last major papers. Gandy is a prominent mathematical
logician, while Michie is very well known in artificial intelligence
circles, as well as being chief scientist at Glasgow's Turing Institute.
The two other invited British speakers are CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE, Waynflete
Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, and J.R. LUCAS, who will be speaking on
the topic of his famous and controversial paper "Minds, Machines and Godel"
in front of an audience which will include some of his fiercest critics!
One of these, DOUGLAS HOFSTADTER (Indiana), achieved fame with his Pulitzer
Prize winning book Godel, Escher, Bach, which did much to provoke general
interest in artificial intelligence. Other major American visitors include
PAUL CHURCHLAND (California), perhaps the best known connectionist opponent
of folk-psychology; JOSEPH FORD (Georgia), a prominent advocate of the new
and exciting theory of chaos; CLARK GLYMOUR (Carnegie-Mellon), a notable
philosopher of science, and last, but certainly not least, HERBERT SIMON
(Carnegie-Mellon), one of the founding fathers of the science of artificial
intelligence, and a Nobel laureate in 1978.
OTHER CONTRIBUTORS
Authors of the other 18 contributions include many well-known computer
scientists, artificial intelligence researchers, and philosophers from
America, Australia and Europe as well as from Britain. Their names, and
the titles of their papers, are listed in the programme which follows.
___________________________________________________________________________
TURING 1990 - LATE REGISTRATION INFORMATION
VENUE
The Conference takes place at the University of Sussex, Falmer, which is
about 4 miles from Brighton (the frequent trains take about 8 minutes, and
the campus is barely 100 yards from Falmer station). Registration is from
11 a.m. until 2 p.m. on Tuesday 3rd April at NORWICH HOUSE, which is where
most delegates will be accommodated. Those arriving late should ask the
porter at Norwich House for registration materials unless they arrive after
he has gone off duty, in which case registration materials, keys etc. can
be collected from the permanent duty porter at the adjacent YORK HOUSE.
FIRST AND LAST AFTERNOONS
The Conference opens at 2 p.m. on Tuesday, with a lecture by Andrew Hodges
in ARTS A2. This will be followed by coffee at 3.00, and a paper by Donald
Michie (also in Arts A2) at 3.30. Dinner is from 5.00 until 6.30 in the
Refectory, Level 2, with a wine reception in the Grapevine Bar (Refectory
building) from 6.00 until 8.00, when Clark Glymour will speak in Arts A2.
On Friday 6th April, Lunch is from 12.00 p.m. until 2.00, when Robin Gandy
will give the closing speech. Coffee at 3.30 marks the official end of the
Conference, although at 4.00 Douglas Hofstadter will give an additional
open lecture entitled "Hiroshima Ma Mignonne". Dinner on Friday evening is
available for those who require it (at a cost of #6.00).
REGISTRATION AND ACCOMMODATION COSTS
For members of the Mind Association or the Aristotelian Society, and also
subscribers to Analysis or Philosophical Quarterly, the registration fee is
only #30, thanks to the generous support which we are receiving from these
bodies. The registration fee for students is likewise #30. For other
academics the fee is #50, while for non-academics the fee is #80.
Full board including bed, breakfast and all meals (with the exception of
Thursday evening) from Dinner on Tuesday to Lunch on Friday, costs #84.
For those wanting these meals alone (and not bed and breakfast), the cost
is #33. On Thursday evening the Conference Banquet takes place at the
Royal Pavilion in Brighton (for which we charge only the marginal cost of
#25), but for those not attending the Banquet, dinner is available in the
University at a cost of #6. Please note that places at the Banquet are
strictly limited, and will be filled on a first come-first served basis.
HOW TO REGISTER LATE
Those who wish to book accommodation for the Conference should ring Judith
Dennison at Sussex University (0273-678379) immediately, and if she is not
available, should leave on her answerphone full details of their meal and
accommodation requirements, together with A TELEPHONE NUMBER AT WHICH THEY
CAN BE CONTACTED. Those who telephone by 2.00 p.m. ON FRIDAY 30th MARCH
can probably be guaranteed accommodation within the University (though not
necessarily in Norwich House), and you are asked to meet this deadline if
at all possible (assuming that you are able to catch the Friday postal
collection, please also send your cheque and written requirements, by first
class mail, to the address below). During the following weekend Andy Clark
(0273-722942) will be able to provide some information on the number of
places remaining, and on Monday Judith Dennison will do her best to fit in
those who have left their name in the meantime. Those who arrive on
Tuesday without having booked do so, of course, at their own risk!
CHEQUES AND WRITTEN REQUIREMENTS TO: Judith Dennison, School of Cognitive
and Computing Sciences, University of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9QN (please use
first class post, and do not include cheques if posted after 30th March).
PJRM/23rd March 1990
____________________________________________________________________________
TURING 1990 COLLOQUIUM
At the University of Sussex, Brighton, England
3rd - 6th April 1990
PROGRAMME OF SPEAKERS AND GENERAL INFORMATION
____________________________________________________________________________
INVITED SPEAKERS
Paul CHURCHLAND (Philosophy, University of California at San Diego)
FURTHER THOUGHTS ON LEARNING AND CONCEPTUAL CHANGE
Joseph FORD (Physics, Georgia Institute of Technology)
CHAOS : ITS PAST, ITS PRESENT, BUT MOSTLY ITS FUTURE
Robin GANDY (Mathematical Institute, Oxford)
HUMAN VERSUS MECHANICAL INTELLIGENCE
Clark GLYMOUR (Philosophy, Carnegie-Mellon)
COMPUTABILITY, CONCEPTUAL REVOLUTIONS AND THE LOGIC OF DISCOVERY
Andrew HODGES (Oxford, author of "Alan Turing: the enigma of intelligence")
BACK TO THE FUTURE : ALAN TURING IN 1950
Douglas HOFSTADTER (Computer Science, Indiana)
MENTAL FLUIDITY AND CREATIVITY
J.R. LUCAS (Merton College, Oxford)
MINDS, MACHINES AND GODEL : A RETROSPECT
Donald MICHIE (Turing Institute, Glasgow)
MACHINE INTELLIGENCE - TURING AND AFTER
Christopher PEACOCKE (Magdalen College, Oxford)
PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF CONCEPTS
Herbert SIMON (Computer Science and Psychology, Carnegie-Mellon)
MACHINE AS MIND
____________________________________________________________________________
OTHER SPEAKERS
Most of the papers to be given at the Colloquium are interdisciplinary, and
should hold considerable interest for those working in any area of Cognitive
Science or related disciplines. However the papers below will be presented
in paired parallel sessions, which have been arranged as far as possible to
minimise clashes of subject area, so that those who have predominantly
formal interests, for example, will be able to attend all of the papers
which are most relevant to their work, and a similar point applies for those
with mainly philosophical, psychological, or purely computational interests.
Jonathan Cohen (The Queen's College, Oxford)
"Does Belief Exist?"
Mario Compiani (ENIDATA, Bologna, Italy)
"Remarks on the Paradigms of Connectionism"
Martin Davies (Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London)
"Facing up to Eliminativism"
Chris Fields (Computing Research Laboratory, New Mexico)
"Measurement and Computational Description"
Robert French (Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana)
"Subcognition and the Limits of the Turing Test"
Beatrice de Gelder (Psychology and Philosophy, Tilburg, Netherlands)
"Cognitive Science is Philosophy of Science Writ Small"
Peter Mott (Computer Studies and Philosophy, Leeds)
"A Grammar Based Approach to Commonsense Reasoning"
Aaron Sloman (Cognitive and Computing Sciences, Sussex)
"Beyond Turing Equivalence"
Antony Galton (Computer Science, Exeter)
"The Church-Turing Thesis: its Nature and Status"
Ajit Narayanan (Computer Science, Exeter)
"The Intentional Stance and the Imitation Game"
Jon Oberlander and Peter Dayan (Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh)
"Altered States and Virtual Beliefs"
Philip Pettit and Frank Jackson (Social Sciences Research, ANU, Canberra)
"Causation in the Philosophy of Mind"
Ian Pratt (Computer Science, Manchester)
"Encoding Psychological Knowledge"
Joop Schopman and Aziz Shawky (Philosophy, Utrecht, Netherlands)
"Remarks on the Impact of Connectionism on our Thinking about Concepts"
Murray Shanahan (Computing, Imperial College London)
"Folk Psychology and Naive Physics"
Iain Stewart (Computing Laboratory, Newcastle)
"The Demise of the Turing Machine in Complexity Theory"
Chris Thornton (Artificial Intelligence, Edinburgh)
"Why Concept Learning is a Good Idea"
Blay Whitby (Cognitive and Computing Sciences, Sussex)
"The Turing Test: AI's Biggest Blind Alley?"
____________________________________________________________________________
TURING 1990 COLLOQUIUM
At the University of Sussex, Brighton, England
3rd - 6th April 1990
This Conference commemorates the 40th anniversary of the publication in Mind
of Alan Turing's influential paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence".
It is hosted by the School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences at the
University of Sussex and held under the auspices of the Mind Association.
Additional support has been received from the Analysis Committee, the
Aristotelian Society, The British Logic Colloquium, The International Union
of History and Philosophy of Science, POPLOG, Philosophical Quarterly, and
the SERC Logic for IT Initiative.
The aim of the Conference is to draw together people working in Philosophy,
Logic, Computer Science, Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science and
related fields, in order to celebrate the intellectual and technological
developments which owe so much to Turing's seminal thought. Papers will be
presented on the following themes: Alan Turing and the emergence of
Artificial Intelligence, Logic and the Theory of Computation, The Church-
Turing Thesis, The Turing Test, Connectionism, Mind and Content, Philosophy
and Methodology of Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. Invited
talks will be given by Paul Churchland, Joseph Ford, Robin Gandy, Clark
Glymour, Andrew Hodges, Douglas Hofstadter, J.R. Lucas, Donald Michie,
Christopher Peacocke and Herbert Simon, and there are many other prominent
contributors, whose names and papers are listed above.
The conference will start after lunch on Tuesday 3rd April 1990, and it
will end on Friday 6th April after tea. ANYONE WISHING TO REGISTER FOR
THIS CONFERENCE SHOULD SEE THE LATE REGISTRATION INFORMATION ABOVE.
Conference Organizing Committee
Andy Clark (Cognitive and Computing Sciences, Sussex University)
David Holdcroft (Philosophy, Leeds University)
Peter Millican (Computer Studies and Philosophy, Leeds University)
Steve Torrance (Information Systems, Middlesex Polytechnic)
___________________________________________________________________________
PLEASE SEND ON THIS NOTICE to any researchers, lecturers or students in the
fields of Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science, Computer Science,
Logic, Mathematics, Philosophy or Psychology, in Britain or abroad, and to
ANY APPROPRIATE BULLETIN BOARDS which have not previously displayed it.
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End of Neuron Digest [Volume 6 Issue 23]
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