15 - The Power Behind McKinley
The Republocrats, Part 15:
The Power Behind McKinley
By Vince Copeland
The 1896 defeat of the Democrat William Jennings Bryan had its lessons, as did the victory of the Republican William McKinley (1897-1901). But they were different lessons.
By 1896 both the national government and the Republican Party had evolved a little further, although not yet into a smoothly running machine. The government was run more efficiently, however, with the new civil service system, such as it was, beginning to take effect and the party leaders settling into positions more manageable by big business.
At the same time, however, the direct personal intervention of big business was being stepped up. The division of labor between politician and businessperson was eroding a little.
The frock coat and shoe-string necktie of the professional politician was still a common sight in Washington, but so was the diamond stick-pin. And this was not just the costume of the lobbyists.
Did this mean that politics was now cruder or that the multimillionaires in Washington were less skilled than the traditional politicians? In some cases, yes. But certain U.S. Senators and Cabinet appointees showed great skill, as we have explained.
THE RULERS ARE NOT THE RULING CLASS
Since humanity became divided into rich and poor in the period of civilization, there has never been a society without a division of labor between the rulers and the ruling class as a whole--that is, no really "participatory democracy" has ever prevailed as a method of class rule.
The exception of the New England town meeting may come to mind. But even this, insofar as it was real, was not very extensive. And the much-vaunted Greek democracy of several centuries BC was interspersed with dictators--appropriately named "tyrannos"--who were either elected or took power by coup. Most important, the democracy itself was exercised by only about one-sixth or one-seventh of the male population. The rest were slaves.
Representative government is almost by definition a matter of division of labor and specialization. Dictatorial governments, on the other hand, whether of kings, queens, generals, or civilians of the right or left, tend to embody the art of statecraft in one person.
Even instances of one-person rule usually rely on a surprising number of lesser-known figures who have to learn the politician's trade. One of their most obvious but less appreciated functions is that of lightning rod, so to speak, to take the heat off the big leaders and lead it harmlessly into the ground as people get dissatisfied with the "politicians" and disregard the faults of the real oppressors behind them.
However, it is significant that from 1860 to 1884 the politicians were the exclusive leaders of the U.S. government. Big business had to operate from the outside rather than the inside of government.
Regardless of all the corruption on the national level and even the bold takeover of some state legislatures by corporate bribery, there was no one in this period who even attempted to play the role William Whitney later did in the national government.
MORE IMPORTANT TO MAKE MONEY
On the one hand, this may be said to be the "progressive" period of U.S. capitalism--that is, progressive in the sense that it was expanding and booming and optimistic. It hadn't yet shut out small entrepreneurs and it was developing the means of production at home without having to exploit other countries--always excepting the super-oppression of its own semi-colony in the South.
On the other hand, the biggest figures in the ruling class itself wanted to give their undivided attention to making money. And the times were so competitive, the competition so dangerous if one lost and so rewarding if one was victorious, that government was not a profession that multimillionaires usually wanted to absorb themselves in. This is probably the secret reason for the relative lack of top Wall Street figures in the Cabinets at that time.
The U.S. Senate was an important exception. But in those days even the Senate was generally composed of less wealthy individuals who then made their million or two while in "public service." Nelson Aldrich, probably the star performer in that respect, had built a fortune of $50,000 as a wholesale grocer in Rhode Island. He came out of the U.S. Senate 30 years later with $12 million.
By 1885, however, Wall Street had moved into the Cabinet. William Whitney (Secretary of the Navy, 1885-89) began to play a central role that would last until 1897, while Levi P. Morton, the country's second biggest banker, could become vice president (1889-93), although not in quite the role of Whitney, to be sure. There would seem to be some more fundamental explanation than just individual energy, ambition or caprice.
A NEW STAR WAS RISING
What makes this question the more crucial is the fact that while Whitney was at his peak with the Democrats, a new star of the same type was rising among the Republicans. This was Mark Hanna of Cleveland. Just as Grover Cleveland was Whitney's protege, so William McKinley was Mark Hanna's.
Whitney was in the Rockefeller political stable and tied to the Rockefellers by the massive Standard Oil fortune of his wife's family (the Paynes). He had big financial ventures of his own with loose ties to some J.P. Morgan interests. It is possible that his king-making job was made easier and his maneuvers less penetrable because he was a Democrat and the Democrats were not generally identified as the Wall Street party.
Mark Hanna, however, was almost a caricature of a Republican businessman--swaggering, paunchy, bullying. Cartoonists loved to portray him with dollar signs all over his suit. He was also known as a Rockefeller man, but like Whitney he was wise enough (or maybe he did it instinctively) to look after the interests of the whole of big business rather than just those of the Rockefeller group. While he of course did not neglect them, he was no mere messenger of the Rockefellers but a big operator on his own.
There is no question that his motivation was definitely to become top political leader and king-maker. He did not become a U.S. Senator himself until 1897, the year McKinley took office. Hanna finally bought his membership from the all too willing Ohio state legislature.
He was well trained, having mainly schooled himself in the intricacies of politics. He founded the Ohio Republican Businessman's Clubs as early as 1880; these were copied throughout the country. His acquaintance with the wheelers and dealers of local politics stemmed from an early date when he was involved in the streetcar and surface railway business.
For example, he outmaneuvered another streetcar capitalist named Tom Johnson. Johnson, a radical follower of Henry George, had been elected mayor of Cleveland whereupon he reduced the fare for Cleveland streetcars from five to three cents, proving that a fare cut was possible. But Hanna, through judicious bribery and well-planned publicity, was able to get the City Council to negate all Johnson had done and monopolize the street car business himself.
The voters could hardly be blamed for stupidity here. They elected Johnson not once but twice, but they were helpless against the machinations of the other politicians in the city who were in the pay of or under obligation to Mark Hanna and his gang.
EMPIRE OF BIG CAPITAL
Hanna was also the owner of a whole fleet of Great Lakes ore boats and wheat boats. He had a chain of iron and steel plants, several coal mines and was also president of a bank. All this gave him entree to the offices of a large section of the aristocracy of big business.
In addition to all this, he did not hesitate to use his money with the most telling effectiveness. He said to a group of fellow plunderers--shocking them somewhat with his frankness--"All questions of government in a democracy are questions of money." (Thomas Beer, "Hanna," 1929, p. 168)
This might be called ordinary street wisdom today and be regarded merely as an excess of cynicism. But a hundred years ago this king-maker saw the power of money in elections and law-making and shared his insight with his friends. "He believed in monopoly more honestly than most men believe in religion," says historian F.C. Howe. ("Confessions of a Reformer," p. 151)
HANNA MEETS MCKINLEY
Hanna first became acquainted with McKinley when the latter was still a member of the House of Representatives and Hanna was supporting Joseph P. Foraker for governor of Ohio, grooming him for president. Hanna had a falling out with Foraker and latched onto McKinley as the better of the two politicians.
For one thing, McKinley was a passionate devotee of the high tariff so beloved by big business and its Republican supporters at that time. He defended and rationalized it better than most people and even most Republican politicians.
After failing by a hair's breadth to get his man in as Speaker of the House, Hanna was instrumental (putting it politely) in getting McKinley appointed chairman of the strategic House Ways and Means Committee. He later spearheaded McKinley's campaign for governor of Ohio. Everybody at the time understood that Hanna was behind McKinley's victory.
As a senator, McKinley made more friends and was careful for some time not to antagonize the free silver people. But he finally, at the beginning of his presidential campaign, took a clear and definite position supporting gold alone as the standard for U.S. currency.
HOW HANNA SEWED IT UP
Hanna sewed up the Republican convention for McKinley by purchasing the votes of the Black Southern delegates (who now had practically no other political function than to give or sell their support to Republican presidential candidates at conventions). He did this long before the convention and before McKinley's factional rivals were awake to what was happening.
He also rounded up the white delegates of several Western states in similar fashion. And this, too, was long before the actual convention date. (Primaries did not then exist on any real scale.) His machine was efficient, smooth and effective. The "professional" politicians were dumbfounded.
The majority of the Wall Street crew had wanted to put the banker Levi Morton in the presidency. Under the conditions prevailing in 1896, this would not have been such a smart move, since the opposition to Wall Street was so intense.
After the convention, however, all the barons of high finance got behind McKinley. The threat of Bryanism was a very real one and the struggle was one for the supremacy of big capital. True, Bryan would not have led a socialist revolution. Nor would any of the big fortunes have been really shaved down, at least not immediately. But a Bryan victory would have been a real setback for big business.
Accordingly, Hanna was able to collect what was a staggering sum in those days--at least $16 million. He got it mainly by assessing every Wall Street business a percentage of its profits for the year. If nothing else was revolutionary in the 1896 election, that was.
(Copyright Workers World Service: Permission to reprint granted if source is cited. For more info contact Workers World,46 W. 21 St., New York, NY 10010; "workers@mcimail.com".)
