Chapter 11. Quest for the Tibet's solution

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Tibet: Proving Truth from Facts

Content

1. Status of Tibet
2. Invasion and illegal annexation of Tibet
3. National Uprising
4. Traditional Tibetan society
5. Human Rights
6. Socio-economic conditions and colonialism
7. Religion and national identity
8. Population transfer and control
9. State of Tibet's environment
10. Militarisation and regional peace
11. Quest for solution

Introduction

From 1959 until 1979 the Tibetan Government-in-Exile and the Chinese Government had no contact. However, throughout this period the Dalai Lama retained his hope of finding a peaceful solution to the problem of Tibet through contact and dialogue with the Chinese Government. Soon after coming to India, the Dalai Lama issued a press statement in Mussoorie on 20 June 1959, wherein he said:

Although recent actions and policies of the Chinese authorities in Tibet have created strong feelings of bitterness and resentment against the Government of China, we, Tibetans, lay and monk alike, do not cherish any feelings of enmity and hatred against the great Chinese people. ... We must also insist on the creation of a favourable climate by the immediate adoption of the essential measures as a condition precedent to negotiations for a peaceful settlement.

In the light of political changes in China, the Dalai Lama, in his 10 March statement to the Tibetan people in 1978, said:

(T)he Chinese should allow the Tibetans in Tibet to visit their parents and relatives now in exile. ...Similar opportunity should be given to the Tibetans in exile. Under such an arrangement we can be confident of knowing the true situation inside Tibet.

Toward the end of 1978, Mr Gyalo Thondup (one of the elder brothers of the Dalai Lama) was contacted by Mr Li Juisin, director of Xinhua News Agency, in Hong Kong, through a common friend. A meeting was arranged in January 1979 during which Mr Li extended Mr Deng Xiaoping's invitation to Mr Thondup to visit Beijing to discuss the Tibet problem. With the approval of the Dalai Lama, Mr Thondup made a private visit to Beijing in late February 1979.

Mr Thondup met with leading Chinese officials in Beijing. They told him that under the "Gang of Four" China had suffered great instability, affecting its development in the fields of industry and agriculture. Tibet also suffered as a result of this, they said, and added that the 1959 uprising in Tibet was inspired by a number of factors for which the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan people could not be blamed.

Mr Deng Xiaoping said during his meeting with Mr Thondup that as it is better to see things once with one's own eyes than to hear a hundred times, he would invite exile Tibetans of all ages to visit Tibet and see the actual situation for themselves. Mr Deng went on to say that China was willing to discuss and resolve with Tibetans all issues other than complete independence of Tibet.

The Dalai Lama and his Government responded by sending three fact-finding delegations to Tibet in 1979 and 1980. The fourth delegation, consisting of 16 members representing various Tibetan Buddhist schools and people from other walks of life, was also arranged. However, on 6 August 1980, China expressed its inability to receive this delegation on the ground that it would not be able to accord the delegates proper reception as "the weather in Tibet was going to be cold, and also because some development work was in progress". So, this visit did not come through. After repeated reminders to the Chinese Government of Deng Xiaoping's invitation, the fourth delegation, led by former Kalon W.G. Kundeling, was allowed to visit only north-eastern part of Tibet in July 1985. At the end of the visit, the delegation told the Chinese government about the problems they observed in Tibet and asked them to rectify them. Since then, no delegation has been allowed to visit Tibet.

However, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government continued to make sincere efforts to develop closer contact and better understanding with the Chinese Government. The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government took several confidence-building steps and other initiatives.

On 21 July 1980, it was suggested that travel restrictions on Tibetans wishing to visit their relatives in and outside Tibet should be eased. This was rejected. The background of Tibetans wishing to visit their relatives outside Tibet are thoroughly scrutinised, and in most cases, they are also required to leave members of their families behind as hostages. Similarly, exile Tibetans wishing to visit Tibet are required to take Chinese- issued travel documents describing them as "Overseas Chinese".

In September 1980, the Exile Government offered to send about 50 trained Tibetan teachers to help in Tibet. In response, China first parried the matter by stating that since these Tibetan youths were brought up and educated in India with good facilities, they would face difficulties in adjusting to the poor living conditions in Tibet. Instead, they proposed that the teachers should first be sent to teach in several Nationalities Schools within China. The Exile Tibetan Government replied that the Tibetan volunteers were fully aware of the poor facilities in Tibet. Left with no valid reasons to deny permission, the Chinese Government put forward unacceptable pre-conditions by suggesting that the Tibetan teachers must first accept Chinese nationality.

Around the same time the Tibetan suggestion to open a liaison office in Beijing to foster closer contacts was also turned down.

On 14 December 1980, the Government-in-Exile asked the Chinese authorities to allow 11 Tibetan scholars, living in Tibet, to attend a conference of Tibetologists. This met with an outright rejection.

On 13 March 1981, the Dalai Lama wrote a letter to Deng Xiaoping, in which, amongst other things, he stated:

The time has come to apply our common wisdom in a spirit of tolerance and broad-mindedness to achieve genuine happiness for the Tibetan people with renewed urgency. On my part, I remain committed to contribute to the welfare of all human beings and, in particular, the poor and weak, to the best of my ability, without making any discrimination based on nationalities. I hope you will let me know your views on the foregoing points.

There was no reply to this letter. Instead, on 28 July 1981, General Secretary Hu Yaobang gave Mr Gyalo Thondup a document, entitled "Five-point Policy Towards the Dalai Lama", which reduced the issue to that of the personal status of the Dalai Lama.

Since the real issue is the future well-being of the Tibetan people, the Dalai Lama, in April 1982, sent a three-member high-level delegation to Beijing to have exploratory talks with the Chinese leadership. This delegation put forward a number of broad proposals for the consideration of the Chinese leaders.

In February 1983, the Dalai Lama expressed his desire to visit Tibet around 1985. In the meantime, under the so-called Anti-pollution Campaign, a new phase of political repression was unleashed in Tibet, leading to the arrest and imprisonment of a number of persons.

In October 1984, another three-member high-level delegation was sent to Beijing to ask the Chinese Government to end its latest political repression in Tibet, discuss arrangements for the possible visit of the Dalai Lama, and to explore possibilities for further talks. The Chinese responses to all these overtures were negative. Contrary to the understanding of keeping these bi- lateral discussions confidential, the Chinese Government chose to make its rejection public through its media.

It is clear from the above facts that the Dalai Lama and his Government did try to initiate meaningful direct, bi-lateral dialogues with the Chinese Government. When all these attempts failed the Dalai Lama was left with no alternative, but to make his position public and appeal for international support.

Addressing the United States Congress' Human Rights Caucus on 21 September 1987, the Dalai Lama proposed a Five-Point Peace Plan. The five points are:

• Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace;
• Abandonment of China's population transfer policy which threatens the very existence of the Tibetans as a people;
• Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic freedoms;
• Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons and dumping of nuclear waste;
• Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples.

Rejecting this proposal on 17 October 1987, the Chinese leadership accused the Dalai Lama of widening the gulf between him and their Government. Despite the rude response, the Dalai Lama made an earnest effort to clarify the Tibetan position in a detailed 14-point note, conveyed to the Chinese Government on 17 December 1987.

On 15 June 1988, at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the Dalai Lama made another detailed proposal, which elaborated the last point of the Five-point Peace Plan for negotiations. An advance copy of the text of this speech was given to the Chinese Government through its Embassy in New Delhi. Subsequently, the Dalai Lama's Representative in New Delhi met the Chinese Charg_ d'Affaires in New Delhi on 22 and 29 August to clarify some of the misgivings the Chinese Government had raised through various press statements. Amongst other things, the Representative emphasised that the Strasbourg proposal was very much within the context of Deng Xiaoping's statement to Gyalo Thondup in 1979, when he said that everything, except the question of complete independence, could be discussed. In the Strasbourg proposal, the Dalai Lama had put forward the notion of association rather than separation. On 21 September 1988, the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi informed a senior official of the Dalai Lama that its Government was willing to have talks with the representative of the Dalai Lama at the venue and time of the latter's choice.

Welcoming the Chinese announcement, the Kashag, on 23 September 1988, said: "We hope this positive response to our suggestion is an indication that the Chinese sincerely wish to deal with the issue this time."

On 25 October 1988, the Chinese Government was informed through its New Delhi Embassy that the venue for talks should be Geneva which is the most convenient and neutral place and that the talks should begin in January 1989.

In early November 1988, Mr Yang Min-fu, head of the United Front, told Mr Gyalo Thondup that although they differed in thinking over some points of the Strasbourg proposal, these could be discussed and resolved.

However, on 18 November 1988, the Chinese Government, through its New Delhi Embassy, put forward the following pre-conditions for the talks:

The Chinese Government disapprove of the way the venue and date for the proposed talks were publicly announced. The most suitable venue for talks is Beijing.

The six-member negotiating team appointed by the Dalai Lama is not acceptable as all of them have always engaged in splittist activities. Neither is the Dutch lawyer acceptable as this talk deals with internal matters only.

The Chinese Government would like to have direct talks with the Dalai Lama. However, it is also willing to accept a trusted representative of the Dalai Lama, like Gyalo Thondup.

The Strasbourg proposal cannot be the basis for talks. The pre-conditions for holding the talks is to accept and support the unity of the "Motherland".

The Tibetan Government was naturally disappointed by this communication as it was inconsistent with the earlier public statements and official communications received from the Chinese Government. On 5 December 1988, the Tibetan Government responded to the Chinese communication and said:

Since the Chinese Government left the choice of venue and date for talks to the Dalai Lama, he responded in good faith by proposing Geneva as the venue and January 1989 as the date for starting the negotiations.

On numerous occasions, the Chinese Government stated publicly as well as through messages conveyed to the Tibetan Government that it was willing to meet and negotiate with any persons appointed by the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan Government, therefore, fails to understand the Chinese refusal to accept the delegation appointed by the DalaiLama. It should be the prerogative of the Dalai Lama to appoint whomsoever he chooses to negotiate on his behalf. Dr Michael van Walt van Praag is not a member of the negotiating team. He is only a legal advisor.

As suggested by the Chinese Government, Mr Gyalo Thondup will be associated with the talks as an advisor of the Tibetan team.

Fair and meaningful negotiations on the future of Tibet can only take place without the imposition of pre-conditions by either side. The proposals contained in the Strasbourg statement provide the most reasonable and realistic basis for such discussions.

In February 1989, when the Panchen Lama passed away in Tibet, the Dalai Lama proposed to send a ten-member Tibetan religious delegation to Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse and other areas in Tibet, such as Lhasa, Kubum and Tashi-kyil, for the purpose of offering prayers and performing kalachakra ceremony for the late Panchen Lama. China rejected the request and stated that there was no precedence for prayers of this scale and that it could not accept two leaders of the delegation who, they said, were officials of the Kashag. The Tibetan Government agreed to withdraw them and approached the Chinese Government, once again.

On 17 March 1989, the reply came through the Chinese Embassy. China agreed to receive only two or three lamas as representatives of the Dalai Lama. But the lamas must go only to Tashilhunpo, that too via Beijing, and must return to India immediately after offering the prayers. In the same message, the Chinese Government accused the Tibetan Government-in-Exile of having plotted the "troubles" in Lhasa, and criticised the Dalai Lama for appealing to world leaders for help in getting the martial law in Tibet lifted.

On 23 March 1989 the Tibetan Government gave the following reply to the Chinese Embassy:

Refusal to allow the proposed religious delegation to visit Tibet to make religious offerings and perform a special Kalachakra Prayer Ceremony for the late Panchen Rinpoche, even after we agreed to make some changes in the members of the delegation and explained the requirement of the minimum number of monks we had suggested for performing the Kalachakra Prayer Ceremony, is yet another disappointing experience for us. Obviously there is no point in sending two or three monks.

We wish to deny categorically, once again, the allegation that we were behind the recent troubles in Tibet and that we are engaging in some kind of terrorist activities by smuggling into Tibet trained persons and arms. We would like the Government to produce substantive evidence to support these serious allegations and also allow an independent international commission to visit Tibet to determine the real causes of the trouble in Tibet.

It is within the right of any person to appeal for help when faced with a desperate situation. In order to avoid further bloodshed and repression, His Holiness the Dalai lama appealed to various world leaders, including Chairman Deng Xiaoping. His Holiness' consistent effort for direct dialogue and peaceful resolution of the problem is well known.

We, once again, urge the Government of the PRC to commence the proposed negotiations soon. Any attempt to delay it on one excuse or the other will not be helpful. His Holiness made the proposal last June and suggested the commencement of the talks in January this year. Since December 5, 1988 we had both in writing and messages through the Embassy in New Delhi conveyed our sincere clarifications to the doubts and objections raised by your Government. The latest accusation against us for spoiling the atmosphere and blaming us for the delay in starting talks is unfair.

Judging by our experience so far, we feel that the Government of the PRC still has not given up its authoritarian attitude and bullying tactics. If this continues there will be the need of the presence of a third party in our proposed negotiations to ensure that there are no further accusations and intimidations.

Even after the imposition of martial law in Tibet, the Dalai Lama offered to send some representatives to Hong Kong to have preparatory meetings with the representatives of the Chinese Government. In order to create a conducive atmosphere for dialogues, the Dalai lama requested an early withdrawal of the martial law.

In a reply, received through the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on 17 May 1989, the Chinese Government justified the imposition of the martial law "to deal with a handful of criminals indulging in beating, robbery and banditry", and stated that appealing for its withdrawal was tantamount to supporting the "criminals". The reply further stated that the Dalai Lama's proposal for turning the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace would never be accepted by the Chinese Government. It did not say anything about the Tibetan proposal for preliminary talks in Hong Kong.

The Dalai Lama waited for two years for a positive response from the Chinese side to his proposal for negotiations. Then, in 1991, during his 10 March Speech, the Dalai Lama warned that unless the Chinese Government responded positively to his proposal without further delays, he would consider himself free from any obligations to abide by the concessions he had made in the Strasbourg proposal.

On 25 March 1991, the Chinese Government was informed through its New Delhi Embassy, that the Dalai Lama wished to assist in the search for the authentic reincarnation of the late Panchen Lama. To facilitate this, the Chinese Government was informed that the Dalai Lama wished to send a delegation of high lamas and abbots to Lhamoi Latso, the sacred lake near Lhasa, to pray and observe prophetic visions in the lake which would guide them to the genuine reincarnation. After more than three months, the Chinese Government replied, saying that there was no need for outside interference in this matter and that the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama would be found by the responsible officials of Tashilhunpo Monastery.

Notwithstanding these frustrating and disappointing experiences, the Dalai Lama did not want the situation to remain stalemated. In his address at the Yale University in October 1991, the Dalai Lama made a fresh overture to the Chinese Government by suggesting a personal visit to Tibet, in the accompaniment of some senior Chinese leaders, to make an on-the-spot assessment of the actual situation in Tibet.

In the same spirit, the Dalai Lama sought a meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister, Li Peng, during the latter's visit to India in December 1991. These positive and constructive initiatives were also rejected.

In view of these facts, the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, on 23 January 1992, passed a resolution stating that the Tibetan Exile Government should not initiate any new move for negotiations with China unless there was a positive change in the attitude of the Chinese leadership. The resolution, however, noted that the Tibetan Government would have no objection to negotiations if the overture came from the Chinese Government, either directly or through a third party.

In June 1992, the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi called on Mr Gyalo Thondup and told him that the Chinese Government's position in the past had been "conservative", but that it was willing to be "flexible" if the Tibetans were prepared to be "realistic". He, therefore, invited Mr Thondup to visit China. In July Mr Thondup went to Beijing with the approval of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.

On his return, he reported to the Dalai Lama and the Kashag of his meetings with Chinese officials. The report was discussed by the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies during its third session. Contrary to what the Chinese Ambassador had told Mr Thondup, there was no indication of flexibility in the Chinese Government's attitude. As a matter of fact, very serious accusations were made against the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile. It was, therefore, found necessary to send a delegation to China, led by Mr Thondup, to explain and clarify the Exile Government's views on the points raised by the Chinese Government. The delegation was also to carry a personal letter and a detailed note from the Dalai Lama to Chinese leaders Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. A three-member delegation was appointed, and they met Mr Li Guang-hui, the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, on 17 September 1992 to discuss the arrangements.

The response of the Chinese Government is still awaited.

The Dalai Lama and the Tibetan Government firmly believe that the only way to start negotiations for the peaceful solution of the Tibet problem is without preconditions from either side. It is encouraging to find that many Governments have supported this position.