CERT Advisory 007

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CERT Advisory

 · 4 years ago

  

 
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CA-89:06 
                              CERT Advisory Update 
                                October 18, 1989 
                             DEC/Ultrix 3.0 Systems 
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This is a repost of the Ultrix 3.0 advisory.  We have received the sum 
output for DECstations. 
============================================================================= 

Recently, the CERT/CC has been working with several Unix sites that have 
experienced breakins.  Running tftpd, accounts with guessable passwords 
or no passwords, and known security holes not being patched have been the 
bulk of the problems. 

The intruder, once in, gains root access and replaces key programs 
with ones that create log files which contain accounts and passwords in 
clear text.  The intruder then returns and collects the file.  By using 
accounts which are trusted on other systems the intruder then installs 
replacement programs which start logging. 

There have been many postings about the problem from several other net 
users.  In addition to looking for setuid root programs in users' home 
directories, hidden directories '..  ' (dot dot space space), and a modified 
telnet program, we have received two reports from Ultrix 3.0 sites that 
the intruders are replacing the /usr/bin/login program.  The Ultrix security 
hole being used in these attacks is only found in Ultrix 3.0. 

Suggested steps: 
	1) Check for a bogus /usr/bin/login.  The sum program should report 
	   the following for the DEC supplied login program. 
		27379    67	for VAXstation Ultrix 3.0 
        	35559   116     for DECstation Ultrix 3.0 

	2) Check for a bogus /usr/etc/telnetd.  The sum program should report 
	   the following for the DEC supplied telnetd program. 
		23552    47	for VAXstation Ultrix 3.0 
        	45355    84     for DECstation Ultrix 3.0 

	3) Look for .savacct in either /usr/etc or in users' directories. 
	   This may be the file that the new login program creates.  It 
	   could have a different name on your system. 

	4) Upgrade to Ultrix 3.1 ASAP. 

	5) Monitor accounts for users having passwords that can be found in 
	   the /usr/dict/words file or have simple passwords like a persons 
	   name or their account name. 

	6) Search through the file system for programs that are setuid root. 

	7) Disable or modify the tftpd program so that anonymous access to 
	   the file system is prevented. 

If you find that a system that has been broken into,  changing the password 
on the compromised account is not sufficient.  The intruders do remove copies 
of the /etc/passwd file in order to break the remaining passwords.  It is best 
to change all of the passwords at one time.  This will prevent the intruders 
from using another account. 

Please alert CERT if you do find a problem. 

Thank you, 
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Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
Software Engineering Institute 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 

Internet: cert@cert.org 
Telephone: 412-268-7090 24-hour hotline: CERT personnel answer 
           7:30a.m.-6:00p.m. EST, on call for 
           emergencies other hours. 

Past advisories and other information are available for anonymous ftp 
from cert.org (192.88.209.5). 

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