Underground eXperts United File 392

eZine lover (@eZine)

Published in 

Underground eXperts United

 · 5 years ago

  

 
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                         Underground eXperts United 

                                 Presents... 

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        [ It Is Not Obvious That A Machine Can Think ] [ By The GNN ] 

 
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                   IT IS NOT OBVIOUS THAT A MACHINE CAN THINK 
                        by THE GNN/DualCrew-Shining/uXu 

 
It is popular for AI-researchers to claim that a mere computer program can 
simulate human thinking. The argument is quite easy to understand: since the 
mind is nothing more than the human brain, and the human brain is nothing 
more than cells, and cells are nothing more... etc., we need only copy the 
data of the smallest parts into a computer program and thus gain a 
fully-working model of the human brain. 
   If we conceptually connect 'intelligence' with 'thinking' there is no 
problem. A pocket calculator 'thinks' within this definition. However, if we 
connect 'thinking' with 'consciousness', we enter a different realm. A pocket 
calculator has no consciousness; it has no concept about its own thinking. 
   Can we gain the same sort of consciousness that we will find in a human 
being by merely copying the data of the brain into a computer program? Yes, 
some say - and repeat: since the consciousness is built upon the construction 
of the brain, we need only to copy the smallest parts into the program and 
so-and-so... we will get something that is identical to the human mind. 
   But unfortunately, this is not a fact. If we want a consciousness that is 
like the human brain, a computer program will not do. The reason why the 
scientists believe this is because there is an inherent ambiguity in the very 
argument about identity that they use. 
   To see this, let us distinguish between two different kinds of identity: 

A-identity:   The color of yellow requires the chemical constitution ABC. 
              I.e., if we mix A, B and C we get a yellow paint. However, we 
              can obtain the same kind of yellow color by mixing G, N, and Q. 
              ABC and GNQ are two different sorts of chemical constructions 
              but gives us the same kind of yellow. They are A-identical. 

B-identity:   Say that I enter a machine that scans my physical constitution, 
              and constructs a copy of me with the help of the same sorts of 
              particles. The person that I would meet after the copying would 
              be exactly like me. We would be B-identical, our chemical 
              particles would be of the same sort, but it would of course not 
              be the same particles (I mean, I use them myself!). 

It is obvious that A-identity and B-identity are not of the same kind. It 
would be wrong to claim that ABC and GNQ are the same sort of chemical 
constitution: it is a contradiction in terms. 
   But me and my copy are of the same chemical constitution. We _are_ of the 
same kind, contrary to the two yellow colors that merely _look_ like as if 
they were of the same kind. 
   When one copies 'the data of a human brain into a computer program' one 
gains A-identity, not B-identity. Because a computer program is not like the 
human brain in its physical constitution, which is a fact. However, the 
AI-scientists seems to believe that A-identity and B-identity is virtually 
the same thing. They mix their very way of gaining A-identity with the way 
one gains B-identity. 
   All properties that belong to me as a person are in the copy of me if and 
only if we are B-identical. If we are merely A-identical, this is not the 
case. Now, some might say that the whole problem is trivial. Of course, the 
computer program will not be exactly like a human mind. It is, after all, not 
a brain but a program! 
   But has the program a special sort of consciousness that need not be like 
the human mind, but alike? This is not obviously so (but then, it is not 
impossible either). Only because we have an A-identity between x and y, 
whereas x has the property p, it does not automatically (or conceptually) 
follow that y has, by necessity, this property too. Therefore, it is not 
correct to suppose that a mere computer program that simulates the human 
brain has consciousness. 
   Something that would follow quite naturally from the above is a clear 
definition of what a 'consciousness' is - but that I do not have. 
   But on the other hand, that is a completely different question. 

 

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