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Underground eXperts United File 219
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Underground eXperts United
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[ The Voter's Paradox ] [ By Leon Felkins ]
____________________________________________________________________
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6330 words
First Serial Rights
(c) Leon Felkins, 1994
THE VOTER'S PARADOX
(The Conflict of Group Interest and Individual Rationality)
by
Leon Felkins
leonf@nancy.msfc.nasa.gov
Version: 6/18/94
[Note, this is an abbreviated version of a work now in
progress to be published in the near future.]
Introduction
Diabolical Choices of the Individual in a
Group
Related Philosophical Dilemmas
Definition of the Paradox
Exploring all sides of the issue
Public Vs Private Solutions
The Paradox in other Dimensions
Time
Looking out for Future Generations
The Classic Definition
The Extended Definition
Rational Behavior
The Rationale for being Rational
"Rational Behavior" defined
Limited Resources and Tradeoffs
Internal Programming
The Perceived Environment
Good feelings
Is it a good thing?
My Reputation
The Motivating Forces behind Good
Feelings
The Programming - Genes and
Memes
The Current Environment
Our Perceptions
Ignorance ("extra rational")
Detailed Analysis
The Net Return
BG
Community Center built from
Volunteer Contributions
Volunteers save the Town by
Sandbagging the Levee
BI
Contribution to Public
Television
C
The "Holistic" effects
Impact of Infinite Vs Finite payoff
The impact of Discreet results
"But my vote might break the tie"
The Wasted Vote Myth
The Impact of Large size with some
randomness
A change so small it cannot be detected
Impact of group size
The Size of the Group
Anonymity
The Psychological
Cost/Benefits
Behavior and the size of the
group
Freeloaders
But what if everyone did that?
Examples
Cutting off my nose to spite my face
Ramifications
Crime
Social acceptability of criminal
activity
Decrease in expected punishment
Reduced expectation of actually being
punished
Sex
Politics
Government
Ways to Remove the Paradox
Directly tying the return to the cost
Small Groups
Coercion and other outside inducements
Using the Government to do your dirty
work
Environmental Groups
Funding of the arts
Summary
Societal Problems resulting from the VP
Many do cooperate and that is enough for
success in many situations
References
I. Introduction
A. Diabolical Choices of the Individual in a Group
When an individual has reason to contribute to what is
basically a group activity in which the benefits of the
group activity are shared by the group, certain puzzling
phenomena are evident that can only be described as
"diabolical". While there is no generally accepted
terminology for these phenomena, various manifestations are
often referred to as the "Voter's Paradox", the "Volunteer's
Paradox", the "Tragedy of the Commons", and similar terms.
The definition for "paradox" used in this essay is "a
person, situation, act, etc. that seems to have
contradictory or inconsistent qualities" from Webster's
dictionary. Basically, what we have is two apparently
contradictory truths in the same phenomena.
Strangely, the "Voter's Paradox" manifestation seems to
be a double paradox. The first can be expressed as, "while
it is true that a particular endeavor would return a benefit
to all members of the group where each individual would
receive rewards that more than compensate for each
individual's contribution, it is also true that any
particular individual would receive an even greater net
return by not contributing anything". I will call this the
"freerider" aspect.
The second paradox is that, "while it is true that the
outcome of a group effort is made up of the sum of the
individual efforts, in many cases a particular individual's
contribution makes no significant and/or measurable impact
on the outcome". I will call this the "my vote doesn't
count" aspect.
Let us make sure we have a clear understanding of what
we are talking about as the insinuation that a paradox
exists is a serious assertion. Utmost precision is required
to insure that we are not just experiencing a problem of
sloppy thinking here.
The claim is that a situation can exist such that: (1);
while everyone would be better off if everyone contributed
(cooperating), a particular individual is always better off
not contributing (defecting) and (2); the individual's
contribution will not effect the outcome anyway. The reader
should not be too quick to cynically regard this assertion
as some academic pathological construct. On the contrary, I
will attempt to show in this essay that the situation
described is extremely common by providing examples
occurring in all walks of life.
B. Related Philosophical Dilemmas
Some logical philosophers claim that the Voter's
Paradox is a special case of another well known peculiar
situation called the "Prisoner's Dilemma". In the Prisoner's
Dilemma, a situation is described in which rewards are in
amounts such that it would be in the long term best
interests of the participants to cooperate but the short
term best interests of an individual is to defect. That is,
if you played the game over and over and you added up
everyone's score, the total would be a maximum if everyone
cooperated all the time. Yet a logical player is presented a
payoff matrix that pays most for defection in every single
play. The situation we want to discuss here, "The Voter's
Paradox", is similar in the conflict in payoffs but
otherwise is much different from "The Prisoner's Dilemma" -
and is much more common in the real world.
II. Definition of the Paradox
A. Exploring all sides of the issue
It is the rule rather than the exception that the
contribution a person would make to some group activity will
exceed the benefit that individual might receive in return
from being a member of the group. The voting example is a
particularly good example of this phenomena in that it can
easily be shown that one vote is highly unlikely to do any
good whatsoever while there is cost to the person making the
vote (admittedly small, usually).
The good news is that people do not always act
"rationally" - in the sense just described. In fact, most of
the time, enough people cooperate in these situations of
public good such that the collective effort does not fail.
In this article I will try to comprehensively explore
these conflicts between the interests of the individual and
the group. I will examine the question of why, in situations
in which collective action is involved, do people cooperate
when it is often not it their best interests to do so.
Actually it is more difficult to explain why people
cooperate rather than not.
My attempt in this essay is to define the phenomena of
the so-called "Voter's Paradox" (which I will abbreviate to
"VP" for convenience) and related phenomena as clearly as
possible. While it is recognized that the impact of the VP
on our daily lives is enormous1. the primary purpose of this
essay is to present the paradox itself in enough detail such
that the phenomena can be clearly understood and evaluated.
When the VP is presented to most people, the typical
response is "But what if everyone did that"? Upon the most
casual examination, the question turns out to be quite
ridiculous. If everyone chose not to vote then the election
would fail. That's the answer, but it has nothing to do with
the VP.
Let us examine the two cases:
1. Everyone behaves as usual. Result: my
choice to not vote has no impact.
2. Everyone chooses not to vote. Result: my
choice to not vote still doesn't do anything
(Strangely, if I chose to vote, my vote might
now be significant!)
Is there a problem of my action of not voting
influencing others to do the same? Not very likely. It is
very difficult for the private citizen to influence others
even if he or she tried. Practically speaking, my actions in
any group large enough for anonymity, are not likely to have
any impact on what others do.
1. Public Vs Private Solutions2
Many people that have the means to do so, accepting
that an individual investment into the solution to a public
problem nets a very minuscule return, take the matter in
their own hands and sponsor a private solution. For example,
if the community's public water supply is running low,
rather than contributing to the public fund, a person may
elect to put in his own pump.
2. The Paradox in other Dimensions
a) Time
The VP can be displayed in time as well as space. For
example, in a long project in which the end date is subject
to significant variability, what difference would taking a
day off make?
Most likely, it would make no difference at all. Most
large projects have definate break points in time for the
major milestones. If you miss the due date, the impact could
be severe. But if you are early, a day one way or the other
will make no difference in the final outcome.
But what if I take lots of days off? There you go
again. That is still a meaningless question since we were
only talking about one day's impact on the final result.
b) Looking out for Future Generations
Why should I make significant sacrifices for the
benefit of those yet to come? Even if I consume a great part
of the Earth's resources and just leave garbage and
contamination, I will likely not live to see the
consequences. It is difficult for a rational person to give
up very much for the generations that come after his or her
death.
There is the possibility that our actions today may
spell the end of humanity. What if our selfish actions today
results in the destruction of the survival resources of the
earth? What if the war machines we build create a very high
probability that the Earth will be destroyed? Should I
sacrifice my safety and immediate financial rewards?
Here we have a double whammy of the VP. First, will
anything I do as an individual affect what the mass of
humanity receives in rewards? No. Second will anything I do
affect future generations to come? Possibly, but I will not
be here.
B. The Classic Definition
Consider a group with two or more members and a
situation in which the group as a whole would benefit from
certain actions of the individuals in the group. While it is
not necessary that the benefits be shared equally, we will
assume that all members get some portion of the benefits and
that a portion received by a member is not dependent on
his/her contribution. The contribution of the individual is
voluntary.
Under these conditions, so common to modern society,
the payoff to the individual (share of group benefit minus
his/her cost) is usually optimum when the individual does
nothing at all!
Further, we can assume that if all or most of the
members of the group contribute, all members of the group
would benefit more than they would if there was not
cooperation. That is, if most or all would contribute, the
return for each individual is greater than it would be if
each kept his or her contribution and proceeded alone. A
valid assumption since otherwise there would be little
reason to cooperate in the first place.
In summary, in this classic "individuals may volunteer
but everyone benefits" scenario, it is evident that the
decision to do nothing is always the best strategy
regardless of what the rest of the group does since the
individual partakes of the benefits whether he or she
contributes or not.
C. The Extended Definition
The classic definition, as described above, suffers
from the criticisms that it is too general, leaves out some
additional complicating details, and does not include real
world secondary reactions that would impact a "rational"
person's reasoning. An example of "complicating details" is
the binary nature of elections. And many will suggest that
secondary effects such as a person's reputation may
completely override such "rational" decisions to be
uncooperative.
I will try to examine these additional details by
extending the definition in several ways.
D. Rational Behavior
1. The Rationale for being Rational
The theme of this essay is based on the concept that a
person should be rational. Rather complex philosophical
arguments can be made that this may not always be the case.
Some would argue that ignorance is best for most of humanity
and evidence from recent history would seem to support this
in that it appears that for much of the world, the loss of
innocence seems to be closely correlated with diminished
happiness.
These arguments lead in to philosophical morass that
any study of would be far outside of the scope of this
article. Therefore, in this essay, we will assume that it is
in the best interests of an individual to be rational.
2. "Rational Behavior" defined
To make any progress in the study of this apparent
dilemma, the concept of "rational behavior" has to be
carefully defined. Unfortunately, that is extremely
difficult. Reviewing references in support of this essay
revealed that most authors avoid the subject alltogether.
This essay places much emphasis on rational behavior.
In particular, statements are made that supporting the
group's interest over the individual's interest is most
likely not "rational". So, when we say a person acts
irrationally, what do we mean? Do we mean that the person
had good information but ignored it or that the person had
bad information,thought it was correct, and acted logically
based on that information?
For the purposes of this analaysis, "rational behavior"
means that behavior that would actually provide a good
return for the person's contribution - based on the
currently available information whether that information is
correct or not (an action can be rational even if the
information available is faulty or erroneous). This does not
require optimality but does require that the return to the
individual be at least equal to the cost to the individual.
When there are alternate paths to take and a choice must be
made, a rational choice would be the one that would provide
the best actual return to the individual making the choice
(assuming correct information).
It comes as no surprise that a person's perceptions
and/or a person's internal programming can cause irrational
behavior - based on the above definition.
3. Limited Resources and Tradeoffs
The person having unlimited resources is a rarity. By
far, most of us are burdened by the fact that every
contribution of time and/or resource to any particular
action is at the cost to all other actions we might take
with that time and/or resource. That is, when we ponder
whether we can contribute $10 to some particular activity
that would result is some reward, a rational person must
consider the impact of the loss of that ten bucks to all
other potentially rewarding activities.
4. Internal Programming
How a person reacts to the environment is determined by
that person's internal programming. For the purpose of this
analysis, that programming is considered to consist of two
categories: genes and memes. An excellent discussion on both
of these forces is contained in Dr. Dawkin's book, The
Selfish Gene3. Also, see the essay by Henson4. For our
purposes here it should be sufficient to say that "memes"
are those psychological forces that become instilled in a
person from learning and societal influences.
5. The Perceived Environment
The individual must act in any situation on his or her
perception of the environment and the expected results of
whatever action might be taken. That these perceptions are
likely to be in serious error in many situations, is no
surprise to anyone. The available data is almost always
incomplete and often contaminated by others who wish to
control the individual's action. Further, the analysis of
this data by the individual is usually flawed due to the
confused and improper internal programming of the individual
making the analysis.
Of course, people don't act on just material rewards
alone. The benefits that a person receives come in many
forms, but the most common non-material benefit is likely to
be "good feelings".
a) Good feelings
The good feelings that many get from making a
contribution to the public welfare may be substantial and
may exceed the cost considerably.
(1) Is it a good thing?
Many people are motivated to contribute to a group
activity if they believe that the activity is honest and
useful.
(2) My Reputation
"How will I be regarded by the rest of the community
for the action I am about to take?" is a very powerful
consideration for most people. Note, however, this powerful
influence fades away when the community is large and my
actions are unknown.
b) The Motivating Forces behind Good Feelings
(1) The Programming - Genes and Memes
The good feeling we get from doing any particular thing
comes from our programming by our genes and memes.
(2) The Current Environment
The psychological environment that a person is subject
to has a great impact on the feelings that a person has
about doing or not doing a specific act. For example, in
World War II, a group of soldiers boarding a landing boat in
preparation to attack a beach, knowing that there is little
chance of survival, still do it. That is because that action
is the only acceptable action in that current environment.
But times change; in more recent wars, soldiers have refused
to fight because the pressure to do so was not so great.
(3) Our Perceptions
Whether we take a particular action or not is
determined by what we believe the values of the variables in
the cost-return equation to be - not what they might
actually turn out to be. Our beliefs can change the
perceived values of these factors enormously.
Much cooperative activity that would be deemed as
irrational if all facts were known may be still carried out
if the future result is not known for certain but only as a
probability. While a person would most likely not bother to
vote if he or she knew that the potential winner was
thousands of votes ahead and he/she was the only one left to
vote, that person would still vote if the election details
were still unknown or in the future even though there was
reliable information that one of the candidates is expected
to win by thousands of votes. For much of the population,
"as long as there is some chance" that their vote will
"count", they vote without regard for the incredibly small
probabilities involved.
Some people apparently believe that their actions will
encourage others to do the same. This belief greatly impacts
the perceived value of the group benefit.
c) Ignorance ("extra rational")
If cooperating is more beneficial to the group, but
cooperating is irrational for the individual, then ignorance
can actually be best for the group - a concept well known by
governments and religions.
E. Detailed Analysis
If we hope to understand this apparent paradox, we must
examine each of its components very carefully. While the end
result appears to be paradoxical, each component, under
careful consideration, is quite straightforward.
1. The Net Return
Let us define a few symbols to make the reasoning more
concise and precise.
Let
C = The direct personal cost or
contribution
BG = Benefit derived from being a member
of the group
BI = Benefit derived directly to the
individual
R = Net return
Then for any action taken,
R = BG + BI - C
Again, I must emphasize that the most important fact to
recognize in understanding the VP is that the components of
R can be, and usually are, quite independent. I believe that
a misunderstanding of this fact is the reason that many
people have a hard time accepting and understanding the VP.
Further, since a person must act now on the basis of a
future return, these variables represent perceived not
actual values. Obviously, the individual acts on what he or
she perceives the costs and benefits to be, not what they
actually are. This is very significant and will be discussed
further in the following pages.
a) BG
BG is the benefit to the individual derived from being
a member of the group and the result of this particular
action. BG could be a function of C but this article's
purpose is to examine the case in which it is independent or
nearly so. Societal benefits generally accrue to the
individual whether the individual makes a contribution or
not (unless no one or an insufficient number contributes).
More examples will be presented in detail later but for now
a couple will be provided to illustrate the independence.
(1) Community Center built from Volunteer
Contributions
Our community wants to build a Community Center and to
do it from contributions. I can contribute or not but in
either case I still get to use the Center. Unless, of
course, no one contributes (more precisely, the
contributions are below some minimum value), in which case
the community center will not be built.
(2) Volunteers save the Town by Sandbagging the
Levee
I may volunteer or not but in either case, my home will
be saved just like everyone else's.
b) BI
BI is the benefit that the individual receives directly
from his action without regard to the group benefit. An
example follows.
(1) Contribution to Public Television
A public spirited individual contributes $25 to Public
Television and receives a Viewer's guide. The guide is an
immediate and significant benefit above and independent of
the group benefits received from being able to watch the
station.
c) C
C is the cost to the individual for performing a
particular action. For example, C would include the cost of
driving to the polling booth for the voter. C can be quite
small or even zero. Again, I must emphasize that BG usually
has little or no dependence on C.
C should always be evaluated in a marginal sense. That
is, what additional return will I get for this additional
contribution? For example, a minimum contribution of $25 may
get me coverage from the local volunteer fire department -
an excellent investment. An additional $25 contribution may
provide for a very slight improvement to service but the
return on this marginal investment is very poor.
2. The "Holistic" effects
An aspect of the extended VP, more common than not, is
the situation in which the return to the group exceeds the
contribution of the sum of the individuals. Of course, this
is the basis for the overwhelming desire of most responsible
citizens to have individuals contribute to the common good.
The return we get from everyone or nearly everyone voting
far exceeds the cost of the sum of the individual efforts.
So, while group efforts can and often do result in a
return less than the investment, most reasonable group
efforts are characterized by the holistic effect, creating
the diabolical condition of the VP.
3. Impact of Infinite Vs Finite payoff
Cooperative efforts can be classified into two distinct
types: those that have finite return and therefore the
return to an individual is diminished by the return given to
other individuals and those in which the return to the
individual is the same regardless of the benefits it
provides to other individuals. And example of this type of
reward would be the repair of the levee that saves the town.
That my neighbor's house is saved does not impact my benefit
of having my house saved.
This is of significance since in the "infinite payoff"
case, freeloaders present no cost to the contributors. If
you contribute to Public Radio, it doesn't cost you anymore
if I, a non-contributor, also listen to it.
However, whether the payoff is infinite or not does not
change the basic paradox. The contributor is still presented
with the problem that the contribution exceeds the return.
4. The impact of Discreet results
Many phenomena such as elections have a result that is
binary in nature. The result is either true or false
depending on a value reaching a minimum value. A politician
is elected only if he receives a majority of the votes. This
has particular impact on the phenomena of the VP in that it
is highly unlikely that one vote will have any effect on the
outcome. In fact, the number of votes can vary over a wide
range without changing the outcome.
This situation is best illustrated by a simple
experiment. Suppose that you had a balance scale with the
balance pans filled with marbles with a sensitivity such
that a one marble difference caused the scale indicator to
go against its stop. If an equal number of marbles is in
each pan, then the scale indicator is at center. Otherwise,
the pointer is either at the left or right stop.
Suppose there are a few more marbles in one pan than
the other (few being more than 2). I can remove a marble
from either pan and nothing happens. Or I can transfer a
marble from one pan to the other and still nothing happens.
This example perfectly illustrates the VP for the situation
where the results are binary.
a) "But my vote might break the tie"
It is difficult for people to understand what an
incredibly small chance there is of a major election ending
in a tie.5
The probability of a tie in a state election is
infinitesimally small. And, if the election ends in a near
tie, a recount will be called for anyway! National elections
do not end in ties.
b) The Wasted Vote Myth
A better understanding of the VP might put to bed the
specious argument heard so often in the last election that,
"I really would like to vote for Perot, but I realize that
my vote would be wasted (since he is not likely to get
enough votes to win) so I will vote for Clinton". This bit
of choice reasoning, apparently used by millions of voters,
likely made a major impact on the vote count in the last
election. Note the fallacies: (1) Since no particular
individual's vote will impact the election results, that
individual would receive greater satisfaction by voting
their "conscience". (2) The fact that many people considered
a vote for Perot as being wasted and therefore switched
their vote to another candidate significantly impacted the
vote count for Perot and conceivably caused him to lose. We
will never know.
5. The Impact of Large size with some randomness
In the real world, randomness is the rule rather than
the exception. When the number of things in a collection is
very large, the addition or removal of one of these things
may be less than the random variation of the quantity. This
would make it undetectable.
There are situations in which the impact of one event
is just insignificant compared to the normal random
variations. The amount of water I use to take a shower is
less than the normal variations of the volume of water in
the reservoir. Therefore, my taking of a shower,
practically, has no impact on the water situation.
6. A change so small it cannot be detected
While random variations can make detection impossible
for one event, another factor is involved in the detection:
the sensitivity of the detector. Even if there was no random
variation of the water volume in the reservoir, no means of
measuring the volume is sensitive enough to detect the usage
of one shower by one individual.
But we are not in general talking about some device
that does detection - we are talking about human beings. If
the event is not detectable by humans, then it is likely of
no practical significance. The rock star on the stage cannot
detect whether I clap or not. Most humans cannot detect if I
say "aye" or nothing in a voice vote of 50 or so people.
7. Impact of group size
The Voter's Paradox seems to mostly occur when there
are large numbers of anonymous members in a group. Those two
factors -group size and anonymity - need to be examined more
carefully.
a) The Size of the Group
A thoughtful person upon first examining the VP might
speculate that the paradox results from the sheer size of
the group. "My vote doesn't count because there are so many
voters, the situation makes my vote insignificant".
So, how many votes does it take to make your vote
insignificant?
Regardless of how small the number, your vote only
counts when there is a tie, plus or minus one vote. Consider
that there are 4 voters and you are one of them. If you did
not vote and A got 2 votes and B got 1 then your vote could
have caused a tie if you voted for B or done no good if you
voted for A. If you didn't vote at all, then A wins.
Regardless of the number of votes, this situation obviously
prevails.
b) Anonymity
(1) The Psychological Cost/Benefits
BI, the direct benefit to the individual and C, the
cost to the individual contain components that we will call
"psychological rewards" (BIP) or punishment (CP). For most
individuals, BIP and/or CP are very powerful components in
the cost/benefit equation. In fact, the factors account for
most of the "irrational" but good behavior that civilization
depends upon to exist!
Let's look at an example. Suppose your church wants to
add a new audio/video room that will provide free access to
educational materials. They wish to do this by means of
contributions. How do you think the results would compare
between allowing the members to contribute anonymously or to
contribute to a basket being passed while all are sitting in
their pews? I'm afraid anonymous contributions would not do
very well at all.
Given that there are enormous social pressures to "do
the right thing", what is the effect of anonymity in the
group? It practically nullifies any "do-good" activity. If I
contribute to a cause and the contribution is anonymous,
then these psychological forces are not at play. Other
factors, particularly guilt must account for this behavior.
(2) Behavior and the size of the group
The understanding that anonymity nullifies the
psychological pressures to "do the right thing", then
explains why people in small towns act in socially desirable
ways and people in big cities typically do not. As long as
most people in your group are fully aware of your actions,
you will most likely act responsibly with regard to both
personal and group activities.6
(3) Freeloaders
If the logic presented so far in this essay is sound -
especially the fact that a single individual's actions are
of no consequence to the outcome and there is anonymity -
then society will most likely have a problem with "free
riders". And of course it does with enormous costs in money,
time and security.
While some actions are more sinister than others, we
all freeload to some extent. We cheat Sears by taking back a
product for exchange or refund when we did the damage. Why
not? Sears is a big corporation and one return will not make
any difference. Besides, they don't know me from Adam. Of
course, I wouldn't even think of doing this to someone that
knows me personally.
We cheat the insurance companies and the health plans
that our dollars collectively support.
We take advantage of every benefit from the government
that we can whether we are justified or not.
In the view of some, more sinister examples are the
cheating on welfare and the wasting of public funds and the
goofing off by government employees.
Freeriding is a rational action when the "benefit-cost"
value is positive. Public programs provided by the
government, insurance companies and health plans provide
great benefits compared to the cost to the free rider.
Society can increase the cost to the potential freerider by
changing the mental make-up of the individuals or by
increased controls and punishments. It is most important to
realize that these increased costs to the freerider usually
also greatly increase the cost of the benefits to everyone
else.
An interesting aspect of the freeloader phenomena is
that the freeloader can not exist without the contributions
of those who do not freeload. The hippie living on welfare
and using the public medical facilities depends on the
existence of the straight people that they hold in contempt.
That is, "without the host, the parasite dies".
8. But what if everyone did that?
When most people hear the argument for the VP the first
time, the most common reaction is, "But what if everyone did
that?". Obviously, if everyone declined to vote, democracy
would fail. Still the argument is specious. The impact of
"everyone doing it" would radically change the analysis of
any logical discussion. What if everyone decided to withdrew
their money from the bank? What if everyone decided to quit
buying new cars? What if everyone decided to not go to work
tomorrow? What if everyone decided to read this article?
Thousands of examples can be given in which a certain
action is harmless when committed by you and me but becomes
a disaster if "everyone does it". Like I said, a specious
argument.
Consider another case: let us say the Red Cross
broadcasts a mass appeal for more blood as a result of needs
coming from some disaster. What if you didn't feel quite up
to giving blood at this time? Would their appeal fail? Of
course not. But what if everyone followed your example?
While most people clearly understand the above
arguments for the cases presented, they seem to have
difficulty understanding the ramifications of other problems
that are characterized by the same phenomena - the classic
example being voting in a national election. Your vote in a
national election has even less impact on the results of
that election than the sale of one share of IBM stock would
have on the price of IBM stock! And far less impact than
your withholding of a pint of blood from the Red Cross.
III. Examples
A. Cutting off my nose to spite my face
Should I refuse to buy shoes made in China that I can
get much cheaper than USA manufactured shoes even though I
dislike China's human rights policy? Should I avoid buying
Willie Nelson's albums because he is an alleged tax cheat
even though I really like his music? Should I avoid buying
products at Walmart's, that save me a lot of money, because
some clerk got nasty with me once?
To take any of these actions causes me to lose the
direct and substantial benefits while having no significant
impact on the problems I dislike.
I will keep buying Willie's albums.
IV. Ramifications
What are the consequences of the VP? How does it impact
our daily lives? The impact is enormous.
A. Crime
If you have followed the above arguments and accept the
logic, you should have no problem accepting the conclusion
that most crime is a result of the VP as defined in this
essay. That is, crime is usually committed based on the
individual's assessment that the benefit will exceed the
cost. It would seem reasonable that crime will increase if
either the benefit is increased or the cost is decreased.
Most likely, the large increase in crime our society is now
experiencing is a result of the decrease in cost to the
criminal. Some examples of the decreased cost are:
1. Social acceptability of criminal activity
In the last few decades, in many communities, crime has
become more socially acceptable - even "cool". As we have
discussed earlier, social psychological pressures are very
powerful (enough to cause a person to sacrifice their life
rather than be seen as a coward, for instance). This
psychological good feeling of being looked up to by the
individual's peers far outweighs the potential future
destruction to the community that all will suffer from -
including the perpetrator.
2. Decrease in expected punishment
3. Reduced expectation of actually being punished
B. Sex
Socially unacceptable sexual activity is on the
increase in spite of the widening of the definition of what
is acceptable. In particular, sexual activity by the young
and others in which the results present a burden to society
are on the increase. Much of this is a result of the VP
phenomena.
C. Politics
Politicians generally do what is in their own best
interests with often disastrous impacts on society in
general - even though they are a member of that society.
D. Government
Government burden and suppression of individual rights
continues to increase since it benefits a few. Yet, we all
suffer from these infringements, including those that
benefit from it. Unfortunately, their direct reward exceeds
their losses from being a member of society.
V. Ways to Remove the Paradox
A. Directly tying the return to the cost
The paradox goes away when a person is directly
rewarded or punished by their actions. For example, if a
device was placed on the water meter that would report any
use of the water during the times such use is prohibited,
then that individual could be punished.
B. Small Groups
As discussed above, we have few problems with the
freerider aspect of the VP when everyone in the group knows
each other.
C. Coercion and other outside inducements
1. Using the Government to do your dirty work
Most activist groups use the government to enforce
cooperation when it is obvious that voluntary cooperation
will not do the job.
a) Environmental Groups
Environmental groups know that there is little chance
of successful environmental voluntary action by the
population due to the problem of the VP. So they have the
government enforce their philosophy.
b) Funding of the arts
Those that would provide culture to the masses know
that the masses would not support this by any voluntary
sacrifice. So they use the force of law to give the masses
what they "need".
VI. Summary
In this article, the phenomena of the so-called
"Voter's Paradox" has been examined in detail. There are two
major aspects to this paradox, both of which present
enormous difficulties for a society based on social
interaction. First there is the problem that it seems to be
quite evident that certain scenarios requiring the
cooperation of all or most of the individuals in a group
would provide benefits for everyone far in excess of what
they would be able to do privately. Good examples are
elections, roads, water supplies, river levees and other
large investments. Yet, at the same time, it is obvious that
for a particular individual, his or her maximum return is
obtained by making no contribution - that is, freeriding.
For example, if the levee could possibly break, the
individual would be best served by not contributing to the
sandbagging at the main levee but instead working on
defenses around his own home.
The second major component of the "Voter's Paradox" is
that the contribution of the individual in large groups may
be absolutely or practically of no significance. On a
national election, one vote cannot possibly determine the
outcome of the election. If the levee broke because it was
shy 100 sandbags and I could only do 50, then my effort was
useless. If it didn't break because it had at least 50 more
than it needed, my contribution was useless.
A. Societal Problems resulting from the VP
Most of the major problems facing large societies can
be traced to the VP. Massive non-cooperation results in a
breakdown of many group activities that would be useful. The
massive growth of the welfare roles, crime, government
spending, government waste, and etc. are examples of
individuals maximizing their own return at the expense of
the group. The paradox is that they are acting rationally!
Solutions to these problems are difficult but possible.
However, solutions are beyond the scope of this article
which is devoted to explaining the theory of the paradox.
B. Many do cooperate and that is enough for success
in many situations
That society functions at all is a testimony to the
fact that a large part of society does "cooperate".
According to Hardin7, some experimental data indicates that
about one half of the participants cooperate. I suspect that
more cooperated in the past and less will in the future.
Another dilemma for society is that people are more
likely to cooperate and not do what is in their personal
best interest if they are ignorant and/or living lives
controlled by myths. An educated person is more likely to be
cognizant of the tradeoffs between self interest and group
interest.
Fortunately, it does not require 100 percent
cooperation for most group efforts to succeed. Many public
projects function with only a small percentage contributing.
Voting is a good example.
Success can also be achieved for group activities that
would fail if based on voluntary cooperation by invoking the
force of law. Environment groups have made much use of this
approach.
VII. References
Hardin, Garrett, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science,
162:1243-1248, 1968
Hardin, Russell, Collective Action, Johns Hopkins University
Press, Baltimore, 1982.
Dawkins, Richard; The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1976.
Axelrod, Robert; The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books,
New York, 1984.
Glance, Natalie and Huberman, Bernardo; Dynamics of social
dilemmas. Scientific American. March, 1994
Diekmann, Andreas and Mitter, Petter, Editors; Paradoxical
Effects of Social Behavior - Essays in Honor of Anatol
Rapoport. Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg, 1986.
Poundstone, William; Prisoner's Dilemma.Doubleday, New York,
1992
Glance, Natalie S.; Dynamics with Expectations , Doctoral
Dissertation at Stanford University, June 1993. This paper
and others related are located at the Internet site,
parc.xerox.com.
_______________________________
1A discussion on the impact of the VP on society will
be contained in another paper by this author, now in
preparation.
2Hardin, Russell; Collective Action, John Hopkins
University Press, Baltimore, 1982, Page 75
3Dawkins, Richard; The Selfish Gene. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1976.
4Henson, H. Keith; "Memes Meta-Memes and Politics", (An
article available on the Internet. Use Archie to find.)
5Hardin, Russell, Page 60
6There are several papers located at the Internet site,
parc.xerox.com by Dr. Benardo Huberman and Dr. Natalie
Glance that discuss the effect of keeping organizational
size small to improve cooperation.
7Hardin, Russell, Page 29
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