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The WorldView Volume 02 Issue 02
Der Weltanschauung (The WorldView) Origin: HOUSTON, TEXAS USA
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% Editor: The Desert Fox * FTP: chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu %
% Co-Editor: Cyndre The Grey * pub/cud/worldview %
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% T H E W O R L D V I E W M A G A Z I N E %
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March 6, 1992 Volume 2, Issue 1 Distributed In O'er 90 Countries
(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)(*)
Material Written By Computer And Telecommunications Hobbyists World Wide
Promoting the publication of Features, Editorials, and Anything Else....
To submit material, or to subscribe to the magazine contact one of the
following net addresses...
"Let us arise, let us arise against the oppressors of humanity; all kings,
emperors, presidents of republics, priests of all religions are the true
enemies of the people; let us destroy along with them all juridical, political,
civil and religious institutions."
-Manifesto of anarchists in the Romagna, 1878
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The World View Staff: InterNet Address:
The Desert Fox [Editor] dfox@taronga.com
Cyndre The Grey [CoEditor] cyndre@taronga.com
Rev. Scott Free scotfree@taronga.com
Bryan O' Blivion blivion@taronga.com
Modok Tarleton rperkins@taronga.com
The Sorcerer (REV) sorcerer@taronga.com
Brain On A Stick
brain@taronga.com
WORLD VIEW NEWSGROUP: wv@taronga.com
FTP Site: chsun1.spc.uchicago.edu
directory: /pub/cud/worldview
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1) Notices/Updates/News/Etc.............................Editors
2) Teen Curfews [Part 2 of 3]...........................Harvard Law Review
3) PSI - Global Dialup Services....
.....................John Eldredge
4) Who Pays For FTP (Reprint From EFF110)...............Dan Kenny
5) Michelangelo Virus...................................NasaMail
6) Special Internet Connections.........................Scott Yanoff
7) Eniac................................................Unknown
8) The Challenger Transcript............................Freelance Journalist
9) Dutch Police Arrest Hackers..........................Hac-Tic Magazine
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Notices/Updates/News/Etc...
Thanks to all the people who are requesting all back issues of our
publication! Due to the numerous requests, we are no longer fulfilling
back issue requests...except in certain cases. From now on, all issues
will be available via ANON. FTP from: CHSUN1.SPC.UCHICAGO.EDU
The directory that the Worldview is in will be: PUB/CUD/WORLDVIEW
If you do not have access to FTP, let us know. We will try to help.
I'v
e had some complaints about the linefeeds in our mag. I am sorry.
It is not us! The ones who are having the problem are a select few.
I hope the problem ceases soon. We have no control.
Ed...
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[Part 2 of 3] This is the second part of a three part series on teen
curfews.
By: The Harvard Law Review
B. The Proper Level of Scrutiny for Children's Rights
Under traditional constitutional analysis, a statute that infringes
fundamental rights can survive judicial scrutiny only if the government
can show that the statute is both necessary and narrowly drawn to serve
a compelling state interest (33). Given that children are persons under
the Constitution, logic would seem to demand such strict scrutiny for
infringements not only of adults' rights, but of children's rights as
well. Yet courts, pointing to the unique developmental traits of
childre
n, have afforded minors' rights a level of protection lower than
that secured by traditional strict scrutiny (34). Thus, in one
relatively recent case, the Supreme Court suggested that an infringement
of minors' fundamental rights need only serve a "significant state
interest... not present in the case of an adult" (35). Although the
Court has declined to apply consistently either this standard or any
other, the Court's decisions reflect both a persistent unwillingness to
engage in traditional st
rict scrutiny analysis and a continuing
recognition that children's rights deserve considerably more protection
than that offered by the rational relation test applied in Bykofsky.
The lack of any developed framework for analyzing children's rights
was highlighted in the recent case of H.L. v. Matheson (36), in which
the Court, addressing the constitutionality of a statute requiring that
parents be notified of a minor's decision to undergo an abortion,
divided on the issue of the proper leve
l of scrutiny in challenges to
differential state treatment of children and adults. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, upheld the statute on the ground that
it served "important state interests" and was "narrowly drawn to protect
only those interests" (37). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment
on the basis of his characterization of the state interests as
"fundamental and substantial" (38). Although dissenting from the
Court's judgment, Justice Marshall implicitly expressed sup
port for some
variant of a significant-state-interest test and noted that validating a
statute under such a test indicated not that minors' rights are less
fundamental than adults' but only that special state interests justify
infringement of those rights (39).
The Court's confusion over the proper formulation of the standard
of review results from the tension caused by the recognition that, while
children are persons for constitutional purposes, they are
simultaneously the subject of speci
al state concern. Yet in many cases
this tension may be illusory: a careful analysis of the state's alleged
special interests in infringing minors' rights may reveal that such
interests are not at stake in a particular situation or will not be
furthered by a specific restriction. In such cases, there is no
justification for affording less protection to the rights of minor
citizens than to the rights of adults. This conclusion is implicit in
the wording of the "significant state interest not prese
nt in the case
of an adult" standard. Because the state must present an interest that
pertains uniquely to children before treating them differently from
adults, it follows that, absent a significant difference between
children and adults, the state must treat the two groups identically
(40). But a lower standard of review, if applied in all cases involving
infringement of children's fundamental rights, would lead courts
automatically to afford less protection to those rights even in cases in
whi
ch there was no justification for doing so. Thus, children's
fundamental rights should be presumptively equal to those of adults, and
violations of such rights should merit strict scrutiny (41). Only if
courts respect this initial presumption can they properly protect the
fundamental rights of children when there is no basis for treating those
rights differently (42).
Statements that children possess fundamental rights but may be more
restricted than adults in the exercise of those rights r
epresent a
belief that, although children's abstract rights are identical to those
of adults, their concrete rights are not. Because a person's status as
a child is not always relevant to her competence to exercise her rights,
however, children's concrete rights should also be presumed equal to
those of adults. The state should be able to rebut this presumption by
demonstrating the relevance of childhood in a particular case. Under
the proposed approach, however, courts would not merely apply st
rict
scrutiny to infringements of the rights of children while recognizing
special state interests regarding children, for such a procedure,
according to traditional strict scrutiny analysis, would be
self-contradictory.
The principle of strict scrutiny for infringements of fundamental
rights presupposes a universe of citizens equal under the Constitution;
what qualifies as a compelling state interest does not ordinarily vary
depending on which citizens are affected (43). Singling out a gro
up of
adult citizens and affording less protection to their fundamental rights
solely because of their membership in the group would cut at the very
heart of the equal protection principle. Thus, to recognize special
interests surrounding one unique class of citizens -- children -- is to
recognize the need for a unique form of strict scrutiny. Such a form of
review would acknowledge compelling state interests that pertain only to
children. Interests that the courts deem compelling under traditio
nal
strict scrutiny analysis would, of course, also suffice to justify
infringements of children's fundamental rights; such interests would
constitute a subset of the acceptable state interests recognized by this
new analysis. The only additional compelling interests that the
proposed form of strict scrutiny would recognize would be those based on
the unique developmental traits of children -- interests that might be
called "compelling for children" (44). Under such a test, the rights of
childre
n would not be coextensive with those of adults, for the universe
of state interests sufficient to justify the infringement of children's
rights would be broader. When a law affecting children -- for example,
a curfew ordinance -- would not, if applied to adults, survive
traditional strict scrutiny, the only possible justification would be a
"compelling for children" interest.
Courts should therefore require the state to demonstrate that,
because of the unique developmental traits of minors
, unrestricted
exercise of a particular right in the situation in question would create
significant (to merely possible or imaginable) dangers of physical or
emotional harm to the minors or to others. Thus, the state's power to
act in furtherance of its special interests regarding children would not
be plenary; rather, the state would have to show not simply that a
restriction affected only children, but also that concerns unique to
children and relevant to the specific situation in question legit
imated
the restriction. If such a "compelling for children" interest were
present, the statute would be upheld, provided that it was narrowly
drawn to protect that interest. If it did not serve an interest
"compelling for children," a statute that differentially affected the
fundamental rights of children and those of adults would be struck down.
C. What Constitutes a "Compelling for Children" Interest
As noted above, the assumption that children are particularly
vulnerable to c
ertain forms of emotional trauma and are unable to
exercise their rights in an informed, rational, and safe manner forms
the basis for finding a "compelling for children" interest in
legislation restricting children's rights (45). The Supreme Court
seemed to be operating under such an assumption in Bellotti v. Baird
(46), which struck down a statute that placed various restrictions on
the ability of minors to obtain abortions. In Bellotti, a four-Justice
plurality set forth three factors that are
generally found to justify
differential treatment of the constitutional rights of minors. These
factors, each of which reflects a different aspect of the assumption
that children are not fully competent to exercise their rights, are (1)
the peculiar vulnerability of children, (2) the inability of children to
make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner, and (3) the need
to ensure that parents are able to play a central role in their
children's upbringing (47).
Although Justice Po
well's opinion for the Court was joined by only
a plurality of the Justices, those who wrote separately did not dispute
the preliminary section of the opinion, which articulated the factors
relevant to an inquiry into differential treatment of children's rights.
The three factors thus provide a framework within which the unique
traits of children may be analyzed in accordance with Supreme Court
precedent. These three factors form a useful framework for assessing
government interests served by a giv
en restriction on the rights of
minors (48). Under the proposed analysis, a restriction serves an
interest "compelling for children" only if the restriction is narrowly
drawn and only if one of the three factors justifies it. In the
following Part, each factor is examined more fully in connection with
its application to the question of the validity of juvenile curfew
ordinances.
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PSI - Global D
ialup Services
By: John Eldredge
CONTACT:
John T. Eldredge
Performance Systems International, Inc.
11800 Sunrise Valley Drive
Suite 1100
Reston, VA 22091
Phone: 1 800.82PSI82
+1 703.620.6651
Fax: +1 703.620.4586
Email: info@psi.com
PSI introduces Global Dialup Service (GDS) to provide individuals inexpensive
telnet/rlogin access to Internet host computers around the clock through local
dialups availab
le on a national basis.
Reston, Virginia - September 4, 1991 - John T. Eldredge, Director of Sales and
Marketing, Performance Systems International, Inc. (PSI) today announced a
new, simple means to access tens of thousands of Internet host computers
called Global Dialup Service (GDS). GDS provides a commonly-available way
for individuals to access their accounts on Internet host computers, at
any hour of the day or night, through the popular telnet or rlogin protocols.
This service only require
s a personal computer or terminal, basic
communications software and a modem set at 300, 1200, or 2400 baud. Dialup
points are available locally in major cities throughout the continental
US, as well as internationally, through locally available X.25 PADS.
Eldredge commented, "The demand for simple access to the thousands of
Internet hosts for traveling professionals and remote organizational
offices, independent of local times, continues to grow. GDS inexpensively
meets this basic need for tho
usands of individuals."
The PSI Global Dialup Service is currently served in over 20 cities across the
country, with additional cities being added each month. GDS is available
seven days per week, 24 hours per day, and costs just $39 per month. There is
a one-time registration fee of $39.
PSI, headquartered in Reston, Virginia, is a value-added internetworking
services provider with a wide spectrum of services for the individual and
corporate user of electronic information. Services range fr
om electronic mail
products to turnkey integration of local area networks into the PSINet wide
area network system and the Internet.
Through the Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX), which PSI co-founded, all
commercial US internetworking service providers are interconnected, providing
commercial companies on PSINet with no government restrictions on usage
to other commercial companies participating in CIX-connected network service
providers.
Personal internetworking made simple for individuals
with PSI's newest
turnkey software and service: PSILink(SM)
Reston, Virginia - September 24, 1991 - Performance Systems
International, Inc. (PSI) today unveiled PSILink(SM) to make personal
Internet access and electronic correspondence simple and inexpensive.
PSILink(SM) is a turnkey service package which enables the individual
in business, academia, government, and even home enterprise to
communicate with the world through electronic mail and other services.
Its ease of use makes it attractive
to thousands of professionals,
teachers and students previously reluctant to harness the complexities
of valuable Internet access.
"It has never been easier to communicate electronically," said William
L. Schrader, PSI's President and Chief Executive Officer. "The
Internet community is estimated at over 30 million users. PSILink(SM)
uses software developed by PSI for the common PC that is easy to
install, easy to set up and easy to use."
Local dialup points are available in major cities thr
oughout the
continental United States for the PSILink(SM) service.
PSILink(SM) will be demonstrated at Interop '91, in San Jose, October
9-11. PSI, along with additional companies, will be announcing
service and software enhancements of the technology at a press
conference during Interop at 8:00 A.M. PST on Tuesday, October 8.
Additional on-line information about PSILink(SM) is available by
sending e-mail to psilink-info@psi.com; an automatic computer
generated information response will be re
turned to your mailbox.
PSI, headquartered in Reston, Virginia, is a value-added
internetworking services provider with a wide spectrum of services for
the individual and corporate user of electronic information. Services
range from electronic mail products to turnkey integration of local
area networks into the PSINet(R) wide area network system and the
Internet.
PSILink - Personal Networking for Internet Access
Internet access is an important facet of all higher education institutions,
an
d most corporations throughout the US, Western Europe and the Pacific
Basin. It is also important for small organizations and individuals, yet
both the cost and usability have been barriers. The PSILink service is
designed to remove these barriers.
PSI provides local dialups throughout the US to provide PSILink service
and provide access to the 25+ million people available through the
Internet and electronic mail networks.
The PSILink service today provides unlimited electronic messaging at
a flat monthly cost:
$35 one time
$19/month
billed on a monthly basis to your MasterCard/Visa, or quarterly by check.
Soon to be released under PSILink will be USENET/NEWS and anonymous FTP
access.
PSI provides the necessary software for MSDOS based PC's to use this service
at no additional cost. Even the smallest PC with a Hayes compatible modem
can use PSILink. This software is available via anonymous ftp on
ftp.psi.com in the "psilink" directory and is available when you register
on
a 3.5" 1.44Mbyte floppy.
Additional information can be had from our on-line brochure and user's
guide which is available by sending email to
psilink-guide@psi.com
A PostScript document will be automatically mailed to you. This document
should be printable on any PostScript printer; however, it must be printed
on legal size paper.
If you want to register for this service send email to
psilink-registration@psi.com
A PostScript registration information will be automatically mailed to y
ou.
If you can't print these PostScript documents sene complete contact information
including postal address, name, and phone number to:
psilink-order@psi.com
You will receive materials via the Postal system.
Copyright 1991 Performance Systems International Inc. All rights reserved.
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Who Pays for FTP?
From: netspec@zeus.unomaha.edu
(Dan Kenny, Network Specialist/ U of N-Omaha)
In a previous article, tld@cosmos.bae.bellcore.com
(Terry Davidson) writes:
"One question: I've asked this before, and have received no response.
Who pays for ftp? Some uploads/downloads can take a *VERY* large amount of
time; and this has to cost someone some hard cash - but who? Is the login
used to send bills to the company from where the call originated (some ftp
may be anonymous, but modern UNIX systems darned well get the info anyway,
including the actual line/port/phone of the originati
ng machine).
I'd like answers to these questions, simply because (1) I have
approximately 5 MB of shareware (DOS) utilities to upload to an ftp
site for propagation, and (2) there are some GIF files out on the ftp
sites I would like to ftp in. Whether or not I actually do this depends
on how ftp is billed.
Terry,
FTP (the file transfer protocol), NNTP (the protocol for the news
service you are reading), TELNET (the remote login protocol), SMTP
(the mail protocol you receive Internet mail
through), and other
protocol services in the TCP/IP specification are made available to
you courtesy of the educational system in America.
Individual colleges, military sites, organizations and commercial
sites wire up their machines as a campus network. These networks join
a consortium of regional networks (like MIDnet for the Midwest
colleges, MILnet for the military, etc) for a fee and if they are an
educational institution, also receive subsidization on the cost of
connecting their campus ne
tworks to the regional network through the
National Science Foundation. Additionally, the NSF foots the bill for
the long-haul national network connecting the regional networks in one
giant internetwork. This long-haul network is built upon the work of
the military's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPAnet) in
the 1970's and 1980's.
These resources are provided to the average Internet user virtually
for free, and are done so in the spirit of research and cooperation.
Not everyone in t
he world ascribes to the philosophy of the
"bottom-line" business mentality, and they recognize the value of open
access to educational resources in the quest for enhancing
communication between educators, researchers, students, businesses,
organizations, and the community.
So to answer your question, we all pay - just like we all pay for open
and public access to the nation's highways, the open and public access
to community libraries, the open and public access to secondary
schools, and the op
en and public access to the state universities.
Individual sites on the Internet make services and resources available
(like disk space for anonymous FTP or the ARCHIE database service) out
of the spirit of this cooperation and belief that the greater benefit
of increased communication outweighs the per-unit-cost of a megabyte
of disk storage or a packet of network bandwidth. Usenet news feeds
are traditionally provided as a courtesy between educational
institutions in this spirit also.
If you
believe your 5 megs of utilities have educational value, by all
means upload them to an appropriate FTP site. If you believe that
files you find on an anonymous FTP will enhance your education,
download them. Realize that the mere act of communicating with someone
on the Internet and exploring available services has educational value.
Speaking as a student majoring in one of those science/technical and
engineering fields (Computer Science) that people keep worrying about
due to growing lack of i
nterest from our youth, I can assure you that
the educational benefit I have received through the cooperation of the
Internet community has been tremendous. Innovation is not dead in
America, at least not yet. We just need to properly recognize the
value of long-term investment and commitment to cooperation (whether
that be in basic research & development, educating ourselves, or in
laying fiber to every household like Japan is doing), regardless of
short-term cost (or lack of profit). Remember the
technological
fallout from the Apollo Moon program? We -all- foot the bill for it,
and we -all- (consumers, industry, education, military, and our
general competitiveness in the world) benefited from the cooperation
and technology-sharing of that national project.
Think of the Internet in the same fashion. I do.
Just my opinions,
Dan Kenny, Network Specialist : University of Nebraska-Omaha
netspec@zeus.unomaha.edu
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The following messages were received from NASA Mail
From: ADMIN/NASA
To: NASA
Subj: Virus Early Warning
This is a Product Assurance and Security Office (PASO) Virus Early
Warning. The PC (not MAC) virus "Michelangelo" has started spreading in
the U.S. very fast. This virus has a "trigger" date of March 6 where it
will attempt to overwrite vital areas on the PC hard disk. Please make
sure that you have a current copy of Virusafe 4.5 installed in your
computer. Virusafe is able to
detect and remove the mentioned virus.
Some other antiviral programs may detect "Michelangelo" but not be able
to remove it. If you don't have Virusafe installed, contact your Code
AIS representative or call the PASO Virus Prevention Team at XXX-XXXX.
Attached is the Virus-L (Internet) message received from A. Padgett
Peterson.
Subject: WARNING - Michelangelo Virus (PC)
THIS VIRUS IS SCHEDULED TO EXECUTE ON MARCH 6, 1992
>From all reports this destructive virus is spreading world-wide very
rap
idly. Unlike the DataCrime "fizzle" in 1989 which contained similar
destructive capability but never spread, the Michelangelo appears to
have become "common" in just ten months following detection. I have
encountered three cases locally in just the last few weeks.
Three factors make this virus particularly dangerous:
1) The virus uses similar techniques as the "STONED" virus which
while first identifies in early 1988 remains the most common virus
currently reported. Since the virus infect
s only the Master Boot
Record on hard disks and the boot record of floppy disks, viral
detection techniques that rely on alteration of DOS executable files
will not detect the virus. Similarly, techniques that monitor the
status of the MBR may only provide users with a single warning that,
if execution is permitted to continue, may not be repeated.
2) Michelangelo was first discovered in Europe in mid-1991 consequently
many virus scanners in use today will not pick up the virus
unless
more recent updates have been obtained.
3) Unlike the Stoned and Jerusalem (the most common viruses in the
past) which are more annoying than dangerous, the Michelangelo virus
will, on its trigger date of March 6th, attempt to overwrite vital
areas of the hard disk rendering it unreadable by DOS. Further,
since the FATs (file allocation tables) may be damaged, unless
backups are available recovery will be very difficult and require
someone who is able to rebuild
a corrupt FAT (also a very
time-consuming process).
Fortunately, the Michelangelo virus is also very easy to detect: when
resident in a PC, the CHKDSK (included with MS-DOS (Microsoft), PC-DOS
(IBM), and DR-DOS (Digital Research) {all names are registered by their
owners}) program will return a "total bytes memory" value 2048 bytes
lower than normal. This means that a 640k PC which normally returns
655,360 "total bytes memory" will report 653,312. While a low value
will not necessarily m
ean that Michelangelo or any other virus is
present, the PC should be examined by someone familiar with viral
activity to determine the reason.
If the Michelangelo virus is found, the PC should be turned off until
disinfected properly. All floppy disks and other machines in the area
should then also be examined since the Michelangelo virus is spread i2n
the boot record (executable area found on all floppy disks including
data-only disks).
Padge
tt Peterson
Internet: padgett%tccslr.dnet@mmc.com
Note: the opinions expressed are my own and not necessarily those of my
employer. Comments refer only to the specific example of the virus that
I have examined. Other strains may exist.
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Special Internet Connections
By: Scott Yanoff
* SPECIAL INTERNET CONNECTIONS: Last Update: 10/13/91 *
* Compiled By: Scott Yanoff - yanoff@csd4.csd.uwm.edu *
* A + by an entry designates new entries to the list (since last update). *
+Archie telnet quiche.cs.mcgill.ca or 132.206.2.3 (Can./USA)
telnet nic.funet.fi or 128.214.6.100 (Finland)
telnet rana.cc.deakin.oz.au or 128.184.1.4 (Aussie/NZ)
offers: Internet anonymous FTP database. (Login: archie)
-CARL telnet pac.carl.org or 192.54.81.128
offers: Online database, book reviews, magazine fax delivery service.
-Cleveland Freenet telnet freenet-in-a.cwru.edu or 129.22.8.82
offers: USA Today Headline News, Sports, etc...
+C64 Archive Server mail twtick@corral.uwyo.edu
Subject: Mail-Archive-Request Body-of-letter: help (hit return) end
-Dante Project telnet eleazar.dartmouth.edu or 129.170.16.2
offers: Divine Comedy and reviews. (Login: ddpfrnet password: freenet)
-Distance Educat. Data telnet sun.nsf.ac.uk or telnet 128.86.8.7
(Login: janet Hostname: uk.ac.ope
n.acs.vax Username: icdl)
+FTP Mail ftpmail@decwrl.dec.com
Subject: (hit return) Body-of-letter: help (return) quit Offers: ftp via email
-Geographic Name Server telnet martini.eecs.umich.edu 3000 or 141.212.100.9
offers: Info by city or area code (Population, Lat./Long., Elevation, etc).
-Gopher telnet consultant.micro.umn.edu or 128.101.95.23
Access to: UPI News, weather forecasts, interet games, library (Login:gohper)
-Ham Radio Callbook telnet marvin.cs.buffalo.edu 2000
or 128.205.32.4
offers: National ham radio call-sign callbook.
-Internet Resrce Guide ftp nnsc.nsf.net
offers: compressed/tar'd list of net resources in /resource-guide.txt.tar.Z
-IRC Telnet Client telnet bradenville.andrew.cmu.edu or 128.2.54.2
offers: Internet Relay Chat access.
-Library of Congress telnet dra.com or 192.65.218.43
offers: COPY of Library of Congress (Assumes terminal is emulating a vt100).
-List of Lists ftp ftp.nisc.sri.com or ftp 192.33.33.22
offers: List of interest groups/email lists in /netinfo/interest-groups.
-Lyric Server ftp vacs.uwp.edu
offers: Lyrics in text file format for anonymous ftp downloading.
-Mail Server/Usr Lookup mail mail-server@pit-manager.mit.edu
usage: in body of mail message: send usenet-addresses/[name searching for]
-NASA SpaceLink telnet spacelink.msfc.nasa.gov or 128.158.13.250
offers: Latest NASA news, including shuttle launches and satellite updates.
-NED telnet ip
ac.caltech.edu or telnet 131.215.139.35
offers: NASA Extragalactic Database. (Login: ned)
-Oceanic Info. Center telnet delocn.udel.edu or telnet 128.175.24.1
(Login: info)
-Oracle mail oracle@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu
offers: The Usenet Oracle! Mail with subject as "help" for more info.
-PENpages telnet psupen.psu.edu or telnet 128.118.36.5
offers: Agricultural info (livestock reports, etc.) (Login: PNOTPA)
-SDDAS telnet espsun.space.swri.edu 540
offers: SW Research Dat
a Display & Analysis Center. Or telnet 129.162.150.99
-STIS telnet stis.nsf.gov or 128.150.195.40
offers: Science & Technology Information System. (Login: public)
-Usenet News MailServer mail [newsgroup]@ucbvax.berkeley.edu
Allows you to post to a Usenet newsgroup via email. Useful if you have read-
only access to Usenet news. Note: .'s become -'s Ex. alt.test -> alt-test
-UNC BBS telnet samba.acs.unc.edu or 128.109.157.30
offers: Access to Library of Congress and nationwide
libraries (Login: bbs)
-WAIStation telnet hub.nnsc.nsf.net
SWAIS telnet quake.think.com (different than hub... above)
offers: Wide Area Info. Service. (Login: wais) FTP think.com for more info.
-Weather Service telnet madlab.sprl.umich.edu 3000 or 141.212.196.79
offers: Forecast for any city, current weather for any state, etc.
-Webster (Temp. down?) telnet decoy.cc.uoregon.edu 2627
offers: Dictionary, Thesaurus, Spelling checker. Type 'HELP' when online!
(May no
t support non-UNIX machines?)
* NOTE: NO LOGIN NAMES OR PASSWORDS ARE REQUIRED UNLESS STATED OTHERWISE! *
If it prompts you for a login name, you did something wrong, or are not
running on a machine that the system you telnetted to supports!
* PLEASE email me if you have any additional info/corrections/comments! *
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ENIAC
By: Unknown
In the beginning there was ENI
AC.
And the ENIAC was without language or form.
And so was created Machine Code. And it was Good.
On the second day, Hex was created. And it was good.
On the third day, Assembly Language was created. And it was good.
On the fourth day, Fortran was created and it was good.
On the fifth day, man programmed in Fortran. And it was very good.
And it was spoken: "Though may program in any of these, but the tree of
COBOL thou shall not partake for thou shalt surely pay for thine
transgresssions."
But, there was a hacker in the woods who took the form of a mini and
spake to the man and said "Thou shalt not pay for thine transgressions,
for he knoweth that if thou partakest, thou shall have power to program
large and wonderful things that shall be readable by others!"
So, the man partook of COBOL.
And it was spoken: "Thou hast partaken of the tree of COBOL:
Thou art doomed to write hundred thousand line programs,
be enslaved by IBM, and not have other good programming options for years
."
And it was so. Many years passed. IBM dominated. Programs grew larger and
larger.
BASIC, Pascal, SNOBOL, PLI, Ada and many others came and went.
IBM dominated. And COBOL programs grew.
Then, as implied, a program came out of the telephone.
It spread to the universities who took it on and made it grow.
IBM tried to kill it many times, but after the PC was introduced,
it was inevitable. First, A. Written in Assembly, not COBOL.
Then B which was better that A.
Then finally C took full
form and shape.
With UNIX, it launched into the market seemingly impervious to
COBOL's domination.
IBM tried again to kill it. Through security holes, and portability, and
unreadability IBM tried.
But C could not be quashed.
The implied savior of programming everywhere had come!
And the great COBOL could finally start to be removed.
Open systems and high capacity graphic's aided and spurred C on until there
was C for DOS, C++, and finally, C for the IBM series 3090.
And it was very good.
(
to be continued ... maybe)
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For Those Who Haven't Heard: The Challenger Transcript
DISCLAIMER: This info was submitted by an unknown freelance journalist.
The World View Magazine And It's Editors Claim No Responsibility For The
Creation Of This Document. We Have No Ties To NASA, Or Any Other
Government Organization. The Transcript Follows The Audio Tape Which
Was Released To The Public By NASA. As Journali
sts, We Chose To Publish
The Document, Because We Feel The American People Have A Right To Hear
All Opinions Regarding This Issue. The World View Does Not Condone Nor
Do We Necessarily Agree With The "Cover-Up" Theory Related To This
Incident. As Far As We Know, This Information Is Public Domain.
--==(*)==--
A secret NASA tape reveals that the crew of the shuttle Challenger not only
survived the explosion that ripped the vessel apart; they screamed, cried,
curse
d and prayed for three hellish minutes before they slammed into the
Atlantic and perished on January 28, 1986.
The tape is said to begin with a startled crewman screaming,"What happened?
What happened? Oh God - No!" Screams and curses are heard- several crewmen
begin to weep- and then others bid their families farewell.
Two minutes forty-five seconds later the tape ends. That's when the shuttles
crew compartment, which remained intact after the vessel exploded over the
Atlantic, hit the oc
ean at over 2,000 miles per hour, instantly killing the
crew.
" Cover up? Of course there was a coverup, " declared Robert Hotz, a member
of the Presidential commission that investigated the disaster. " NASA can't
face the fact that they put these astronauts in a situation where they didn't
have adequate equipment to survive. NASA doesn't give a damn about anything
but covering it's ass, " he said.
The official account released by NASA ends with shuttle pilot Michael Smith
saying, " Uh-oh!
" Some NASA employees have evidently heard more-much more.
And they provided the rest of the account based on what they've discussed
within NASA in the last five years. The astronauts had time and realized
something was happening after the shuttle broke up.
" All shuttle astronauts carry personal recorders and the tape in question
apparently came from Christa's (McAuliffe), which was recovered after the
shuttle disaster, " said Hotz. Jarvis was sitting beside her, and when he
figured out what wa
s happening he said, " Give me your hand. "
" NASA insists there's nothing like that on tape but they're talking about
the mission tape, not Christa's. So they're not lying, but they're not telling
the truth, either. "
A journalist with close ties to NASA was even more emphatic, " There are
persistent rumors, dating back to the disaster, that this tape is absolutely
bone-chilling. "
The following transcript begins two seconds after NASA's official version
ends, with pilot Michael Smit
h saying, " Uh-oh! " Times from the moment of
takeoff are shown in minutes and seconds and are approximate. The sex of the
speaker is indicated by M or F.
T+1:15 (M) What happened? What happened? Oh God, no - no!
T+1:17 (F) Oh dear God.
T+1:18 (M) Turn on your air pack! Turn on your air...
T+1:20 (M) Can't breathe... choking...
T+1:21 (M) Lift up your visor!
T+1:22 (M/F) (Screams.) It's hot. (Sobs.) I can't. Don't tell me... God!
Do it...now...
T+1:24
(M) I told them... I told them... Dammit! Resnik don't...
T+1:27 (M) Take it easy! Move (unintelligible)...
T+1:28 (F) Don't let me die like this. Not now. Not here...
T+1:31 (M) Your arm... no... I (extended garble, static)
T+1:36 (F) I'm... passing... out...
T+1:37 (M) We're not dead yet.
T+1:40 (M) If you ever wanted (unintelligible) me a miracle...
(unintelligible)... (screams)
T+1:41 (M) She's... she's... (garble) ... damn!
T+1:50 (M) Can
't breathe...
T+1:51 (M/F) (screams) Jesus Christ! No!
T+1:54 (M) She's out.
T+1:55 (M) Lucky... (unintelligible).
T+1:56 (M) God. The water... we're dead! (screams)
T+2:00 (F) Goodbye (sobs)... I love you, I love you...
T+2:03 (M) Loosen up... loosen up...
T+2:07 (M) It'll just be like a ditch landing...
T+2:09 (M) That's right, think positive.
T+2:11 (M) Ditch procedure...
T+2:14 (M) No way!
T+2:17 (M) Give me your hand...
T+2:19 (M
) You awake in there? I... I...
T+2:29 (M) Our Father... (unintelligible)...
T+2:42 (M) ...hallowed be Thy name... (unintelligible).
T+2:57 (M) You...over there?
T+2:58 (M) The Lord is my shepherd, I shall...not want. He maketh me to
lie down in green pastures... though I walk through the
valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil... I will
dwell in the house...
T+3:15 to end. None. Static, silence.
Serpentin
e Light Chicago Helvetica r det slut
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DUTCH POLICE ARRESTS HACKERS
The facts:
At 10.30 Monday morning, 27 January 1992, Dutch police searched the
homes of two hackers. In the city of Roermond, the parental home of
the 21-year old student H.W. was searched and in Nuenen the same
happened to the parental home of R.N., a Computer Science engineer,
age 25. Both were arrested and taken into custody
. At both sites,
members of the Amsterdam Police Pilot Team for computer crime were
present, alongside local police officers and representatives of the
national organization CRI (Criminal Investigations Agency). Both
suspects were transported to Amsterdam. The brother of one of the
suspects was told the suspects could receive no visits or mail. All
of this has happened more than one week ago and the two are still in jail
as we write this.
The charges:
A break-in supposedly occurred at the bro
nto.geo.vu.nl site at the VU
University in Amsterdam. This UNIX system running on a SUN station (IP
130.37.64.3) has been taken off the net at least for the duration of
the investigation. What happened to the actual hardware is unknown at
this time.
The formal charges are: forgery, racketeering and vandalism. The
police justify the forgery part by claiming that files on the system
have been changed. The vandalism charge is valid because the system
had to be taken off the net for a period of time
to investigate the
extent of the damage. By pretending to be regular users or even
system management the hackers committed racketeering, the police says.
Both suspects, according to the Dutch police, have made a full
statement. According to a police spokesman the motive was "fanatical
hobbyism". Spokesperson Slort for the CRI speaks of the "kick of
seeing how far you can get".
Damages:
According to J. Renkema, head of the geo-physics faculty at the VU,
the university is considering fili
ng a civil lawsuit against the
suspects. "The system was contaminated because of their doing and had
to be cleaned out. This cost months of labour and 50.000 guilders
(about US$ 30,000). Registered users pay for access to the system and
these hackers did not. Result: tens of thousands of guilders in
damages." Renkema also speaks of a 'moral disadvantage': The
university lost trust from other sites on the network. Renkema claims
the university runs the risk of being expelled from some networks.
Renkema also claims the hackers were discovered almost immediately
after the break-in and were monitored at all times. This means all the
damages had occurred under the watchful eyes of the supervisors. All
this time, no action was taken to kick the hackers off the system.
According to Renkema all systems at the VU were protected according to
guidelines as laid down by CERT and SurfNet BV (SurfNet is the company
that runs most of the inter-university data-traffic in The
Netherlands).
What real
ly happened?
The charge of 'adapting system-software' could mean that the hackers
installed back-doors to secure access to the system or to the root
level, even if passwords were changed. New versions of telnet, ftp,
rlogin and other programs could have been compiled to log access to
the networks.
What really happened is anybody's guess. One point is that even the
CRI acknowledges that there were no 'bad' intentions on the part of
the hackers. They were there to look around and play with the
networks.
About hacking in general:
In the past we have warned that new laws against computer crime can
only be used against hackers which are harmless. Against the real
computer criminals a law is useless because they will probably remain
untraceable. The CRI regularly goes on the record to say that hackers
are not the top priority in computer crime investigation. It seems
that hackers are an easy target when 'something has to be done'.
And 'something had to be done': The pressure from esp
ecially the U.S.
to do something about the 'hacking problem' was so huge that it would
have been almost humiliating for the Dutch not to respond. It seems as
if the arrests are mainly meant to ease the American fear of the
overseas hacker-paradise.
A closer look at the charges and damages:
The VU has launched the idea that system security on their system was
only needed because of these two hackers. All costs made in relation
to system security are billed to the two people that just happened t
o
get in. For people that like to see hacking in terms of analogies: It
is like walking into a building full of students, fooling around and
then getting the bill for the new alarm-system that they had to
install just for you.
Systems security is a normal part of the daily task of every system-
adminstrator. Not just because the system has to be protected from
break-ins from the outside, but also because the users themselves need
to be protected from each other. The 'bronto' management has negle
cted
some of their duties, and now they still have to secure their system.
This is not damages done, it's work long overdue.
If restoring back-ups costs tens of thousands of guilders, something
is terribly wrong at the VU. Every system manager that uses a legal
copy of the operating system has a distribution version within easy
reach.
'Month of tedious labour following the hackers around in the system'.
It would have been much easier and cheaper to deny the hackers access
to the system direct
ly after they had been discovered. 'Moral damages'
by break-ins in other systems would have been small. The VU chose to
call the police and trace the hackers. The costs of such an operation
cannot be billed to the hackers.
Using forgery and racketeering makes one wonder if the OvJ (the
District Attorney here) can come up with a better motive than 'they
did it for kicks'. If there is no monetary or material gain involved,
it is questionable at best if these allegations will stand up in
court.
As far as the vandalism goes: there have been numerous cases of system
management overreacting in a case like this. A well trained
system-manager can protect a system without making it inaccessible to
normal users. Again: the hackers have to pay for the apparent
incompetence of system management.
This does not mean that having hackers on your system can not be a
pain. The Internet is a public network and if you cannot protect a
system, you should not be on it. This is not just our statement, it
is
the written policy of many networking organizations. One more
metaphor: It's like installing a new phone-switch that allows direct
dial to all employees. If you get such a system, you will need to tell
your employees not to be overly loose-lipped to strangers. It is not
the callers fault if some people can be 'hacked'. If you tie a cord to
the lock and hang it out the mail-slot, people will pull it. If these
people do damages, you should prosecute them, but not for the costs of
walking after
them and doing your security right.
Consequences of a conviction:
If these suspects are convicted, the VU makes a good chance of winning
the civil case. Furthermore, this case is of interest to all other
hackers in Holland. Their hobby is suddenly a crime and many hackers
will cease to hack. Others will go 'underground', which is not
beneficial to the positive interaction between hackers and system
management or the relative openness in the Dutch computer security
world.
Public systems:
If you are not a student at some big university or work for a large
corporation, there is no real way for you to get on the Internet. As
long as there is no way for some people to connect to the net, there
will be people that hack their way in. Whether this is good or bad is
besides the point. If there is no freedom to explore, some hackers
will become the criminals that government wants them to be.
"Our system is perfectly secure !"
(and if you prove it's not, we'll ha
ve you put in jail)
Felipe Rodriquez (felipe@hacktic.nl) & Rop Gonggrijp (rop@hacktic.nl)
Rop Gonggrijp (rop@hacktic.nl), editor of | fax: +31 20 6900968
Hack-Tic Magazine (only on paper, only in Dutch) | VMB: +31 20 6001480
the best magazine for staying in touch with the | snail: Postbus 22953,
the Techno-Underground. Mail to info@hacktic.nl | 1100 DL Amsterdam
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