Network Information Access 66

eZine lover (@eZine)

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Network Information Access

 · 5 years ago

  

 
   Founded By:    |  _                        _______ 
 Guardian Of Time |  __      N.I.A.   _      ___   ___  Are you on any WAN? are 
   Judge Dredd    |  ____     ___    ___    ___     ___ you on Bitnet, Internet 
------------------+  _____    ___    ___    ___     ___  Compuserve, MCI Mail, 
  Ø           /      ___ ___  ___    ___    ___________  Sprintmail, Applelink, 
   +---------+       ___  ___ ___    ___    ___________    Easynet, MilNet, 
   | 14WED90 |       ___   ______    ___    ___     ___    FidoNet, et al.? 
   | File 66 |       ___    _____    ___    ___     ___ If so please drop us a 
   +---------+               ____     _     __      ___        line at 
                              ___           _       ___ elisem@nuchat.sccsi.com 
        Other World BBS        __ 
           Text Only            _    Network Information Access 
                                       Ignorance, There's No Excuse. 

                            CERT: VAX/VMS Break-Ins 
                                by Judge Dredd 

 
Sorry for being late, but i just got it from DDN.  My site has been down for 
the past week or so and I was not able to get it from CERT themselves. 
Enjoy. 

CA-90:09                    CERT Advisory 
                          November 8, 1990 
                          VAX/VMS Break-ins 

DESCRIPTION: 

     Several VAX/VMS systems are presently being subjected to 
intrusions by a persistent intruder(s).  The intruder utilizes DECnet, 
TCP/IP, and/or X25 access paths to gain unauthorized entry into 
accounts (privileged and non-privileged).  Once a privileged account 
is breached, the intruder disables auditing & accounting and installs 
a trojan horse image on the system.  In the most recent attacks, the 
intruder has installed the image VMSCRTL.EXE in SYS$LIBRARY.  (Note 
that VMSCRTL.EXE is not a vendor-supplied filename.) The command 
procedure DECW$INSTALL_LAT.COM is placed in SYS$STARTUP and installs 
the image.  Note that these images and command files are sufficiently 
camouflaged so as to appear to be valid VMS system files, even upon 
close inspection. 

     There is no evidence that the intruder is exploiting any system 
vulnerability to gain access to the affected systems.  The  intruder 
uses valid username/password combinations to gain access to accounts. 
The intruder most likely obtains these username/password combinations 
by systematically searching through text files on the user disks of 
penetrated systems for clear-text username/password pairs.  These 
username/password combinations are often valid on remote systems, 
which allows the intruder to access them as well.  Once a privileged 
account is accessed, the intruder will use the AUTHORIZE utility to 
detect and exploit dormant accounts (especially dormant privileged 
accounts).  The intruder has also assigned privileges to dormant 
non-privileged accounts. 

 
IMPACT: 

Unauthorized users who gain privileged and/or non-privileged system 
access might deliberately or inadvertently affect the integrity of 
system information and/or affect the integrity of the computing 
resource. 

 
SOLUTION: 

The following steps are recommended for detecting whether systems at 
your site have been compromised: 

     1.  Search for SYS$LIBRARY:VMSCRTL.EXE and 
SYS$STARTUP:DECW$INSTALL.COM.  (This can be done with the following 
DCL command: $ DIR device:[*...]/SINCE=date /MODIFIED).  Note that to 
call the command procedure which installs the image, the intruder will 
utilize SYSMAN to modify SYS$STARTUP:VMS$LAYERED.DAT.  Thus, there 
will be an unexplained modification to SYS$STARTUP:VMS$LAYERED.DAT. 
This may be the surest indication of an intrusion, since the intruder 
could easily change the names and locations of the trojan horse image 
and its accompanying command procedure. 

     2.  If you discover that auditing or accounting has been disabled 
for a period of time, go into AUTHORIZE and ensure that no password or 
other changes were made during that time.  Password changes while 
auditing and accounting have been disabled may indicate unauthorized 
access into your system. 

 
     The following pre-emptive actions are suggested: 

     1. DISUSER all dormant accounts, especially dormant privileged 
accounts. 

     2. Advise all users of the security problems inherent in placing 
username/password combinations in text files.  Consider searching your 
user disks for such occurrences. 

     3. Change all vendor-supplied default passwords (e.g., MAILER, 
DECNET, SYSTEM) and make sure all passwords are difficult to guess. 

     4. Make sure that all privileged users have only the minimum 
privileges that are REQUIRED to perform their current tasks. 

     5. Closely monitor all relevant audit trails. 

--- 

...if everything goes well look for text from Phrack Inc. soon (Nov-Dec) 
the date we got was Nov 17.