Copy Link
Add to Bookmark
Report
Greeny World Domination 096
GwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwD
T h e G R E E N Y w o r l d D o m i n a t i o n T a s k F o r c e ,
I n c o r p o r a t e d
Presents:
__ __ 999999999 666
_____ ____ _| |__| |_ 9999 9999 666
// | \ |_ __ _| 999 999 666
|| ____ | || | | | | | 9999 9999 6666666666
|| || \ / | || | _| |__| |_ 9999999999 6666 6666
\\___// \/\/ |____/ |_ __ _| 999 666 666
|__| |__| 999 6666 6666
999 666666666
"A Look at Hardin's Attack on Contemporary Theories of Color" by Otis
----- GwD: The American Dream with a Twist -- of Lime ***** Issue #96 -----
----- release date: 01-03-01 ***** ISSN 1523-1585 -----
C.L. Hardin attacks several current theories of color in "Color and
Illusion" that attempt to explain color in physical terms, including a purely
physical account that depends on wavelength to determine color, promulgated by
Armstrong, a dispositionalist account that utilizes the concepts of "normal
observer" and "standard conditions," and an account that uses spectral
reflectances to arrive at an explanation of color phenomenon. I will examine
each in turn, though I have little to say about Hardin's treatment of the
wavelength theory of color.
I. Hardin's Attack on the Wavelength Theory of Color
The wavelength theory of color, promulgated by Armstrong, appears to have
been supplanted by the more sophisticated reflectivist theory of Averill and
Hilbert. Hardin's arguments against this theory are devastating, given what we
now know about the connection between wavelengths and actual visual appearance.
To attack this theory, which appears antiquated, seems to be much like beating
a dead horse, if I might be appropriate this apropos proverb; consequently, I
find this section of "Color and Illusion" to be of little interest.
II. Hardin's Problem with Dispositionalism
After discoursing on the seemingly fatal flaws of Armstrong's physicalist
reduction of color to wavelengths, Hardin next considers dispositionalism as
endorsed by J.J.C. Smart and David Lewis. Hardin does not appear to be at odds
with the eponymous idea of dispositionalism, namely that objects possess
dispositions to appear as certain colors, as his concentration in this portion
of the essay is directed elsewhere. However, this idea is not the terminal
point of the dispositionalist account, and it is the concluding concept that
Hardin finds sufficiently problematic for investigation, if not utterly
erroneous. These dispositions that produce color "cause us to be in particular
perceptual states under particular circumstances," (1) where "particular
circumstances" are typically assumed to be constituted of a "normal observer" in
"standard conditions." Hardin undermines these latter components of the
dispositionalist account insofar as they cannot be upheld under the scrutiny of
philosophical observation.
Hardin produces an elaborate defense of this assault on the basis of the
phenomenon of metamerism and the problem of actually determining a "normal
observer" and "standard" set of viewing conditions. His main contention rests
on the inability to justify a choice of these latter elements, which is required
given that a viable set does not emerge from experience without difficulty and
without alternative.
Before doing so, however, Hardin does maintain that a "normal observer" and
"standard" set of viewing conditions can be justifiably produced for pragmatic
purposes in color science. Why, then, cannot the same be done outside the realm
of colorimetry, where it then appears to be valid? Why must a "set of conditions
for determining the 'true' or 'real' colors of objects...[not be] construed non-
pragmatically and in more than a rough-and-ready sense" (2)? If such a method
has practical application, though a single set of viewing conditions does not
enter into the picture, what is the basis for rejecting it? Many philosophical
claims that are found to be practically useful are accepted without a complete
verification of their truthfulness, which may not even be possible; in fact,
both Peirce and James promoted a theory of truth that depended essentially on
pragmatism. Thus, pragmatic concerns should not be ruled out outright in
determining the validity of a concept. Furthermore, why must a single set of
viewing conditions that can be applied universally be the only possibility for
the dispositionalists? Though it is clear that this application would represent
a greater achievement than to relegate color to quasi-relativism, it is not at
all clear whether or not this is even possible.
At this point, Hardin seems to contradict his own philosophical strategy
throughout the article, that of questioning the foundation of beliefs. While
demanding a justification for a choice of "normal observer" and "standard
conditions," he has no qualms about rejecting the set of viewing conditions
employed by colorimetry, though valid and useful by his own admission, to meet
the needs of the dispositionalist without justification of his own. Perhaps
making a claim of this sort would be acceptable given a claim's immediate
obviousness, but that quality seems highly doubtful in this case. The entirety
of his following argument against dispositionalism rests on the inadequacy of
the colorimetric methodology for dispositionalism, but an account as to the
reason for labeling the methodology as inadequate is never provided. Thus, his
attack against dispositionalism can be redirected as an attack against his own
position.
His criticisms regarding the search for a "normal observer" and "standard
conditions" are compelling and plentiful, though they possess force only if his
assumption concerning the inability of colorimetry to provide general sets of
viewing conditions for dispositionalism is correct.
III. Hardin's Criticism of the Spectral Reflectance Theory of Color
The definition of color as a disjunction of the spectral reflectances that
the surfaces of objects possess is a physicalist approach updated from the more
primitive Armstrong approach and has been put forth by Edward W. Averill and D.
Hilbert. Hardin admits the merits of this way of viewing the problem of color,
though he recognizes "two tasks that remain to be carried out by the
reflectivist before he can claim that his is an adequate theory of color" (3).
Hardin maintains that the first component of this "adequacy" is that the
theory must "cover chromatic physical phenomena that do not depend upon the
reflection of light" (4). The obvious question, considering the thrust of my
attack on Hardin, is this: why must an adequate theory of color cover sources of
color not dependent on light? What special authority does Hardin possess that
enables him to determine what a theory of color needs to have to be adequate?
To use his words, "by virtue of what principle does one" (5) say what a theory
of color does or does not need? Thus, according to some criteria, the
reflectivist theory is adequate, while according to other criteria, it is not.
Who is to choose between the two criteria? Hardin's second objection appears
preposterous on the face of it, though perhaps this apparent absurdity is the
result of a naive reading: "Surely he [the reflectivist] has not [given an
adequate theory of color] until he has told us about red, and green, and yellow,
and blue" (6). But has this aim not already been achieved by accepting colors
as being the disjunction of different spectral reflectances of objects that are
perceptually identical? When one asks the reflectivist what "red" means, he
will answer that it is the color one sees when viewing an object with spectral
reflectance s1, s2, etc., where sx is a spectral reflectance that perceptually
corresponds to the color of red. If one then inquires what "spectral
reflectance" means, a definition could be provided, satisfying the original
definition by not being indefinable and consequently having suitable explanatory
capacity. At first glance, the original definition appears circular, but I do
not think it is. If someone inquires further and asks for an illustration of
red, one of the objects that has one of the spectral reflectances that
compromises the disjunction that is red can be shown him. In this way, a link
between the definition and empirical evidence can be established and a circular,
uninformative definition can be avoided. In what other sense does the
reflectivist need to "[tell] us about red, and green, and yellow, and blue"(7)?
The first objection that I wish to make here is one that I have insisted on
throughout this work, namely that of Hardin's lack of justification. Who is
C.L. Hardin to determine when an adequate theory of color is reached? To
proceed with this line of attack further seems trivial, given its fuller
explication in its previous incarnations in this document. A further objection
is the conclusion drawn from the above illustration of the definitive capacity
of the reflectivist theory: does not the reflectivist theory define color? When
one asks what a car is, another could respond by saying that a car is a vehicle
comprised of such-and-such parts; further inquiry into the nature of these
components can be satisfied with their own appropriate definitions that can in
turn be defined, presumably as far as the minutest particles of the physical
world revealed by physics. Is this not an adequate definition for "car" and
parallel in structure to the definition provided for "red" under the
reflectivist theory? If the answer to this query is yes, then Hardin's second
objection to the current reflectivist account must be discounted.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Hardin's proposal for an adequate theory of color, though not explicitly
drawn out, occurs in the final pages of "Color and Illusion:"
Redness, greenness, yellowness, and blueness...depend upon quite a few
more variables than just their wavelength profile...the reflectivist
theory, like the wavelength theory, suffers from an irremediable
underdetermination: too many of the mechanisms essential to the
production of the colors that we see lie within the bodies of the
perceivers. (8)
To begin with, Hardin appears already to have gotten at the nature of color,
given the declaration made in the second half of the above statement: how does
he know that whatever mechanisms that aid in the production of colors are
essential to the production of color? It seems that the only way to determine
if mechanisms that "lie within the bodies of the perceivers" are essential to
the production of colors is to see if color remains after the removal of these
faculties. The obvious answer seems to be: well, close your eyes, and color
fades. But though you may no longer see color, it may in fact continue to exist
and consequently is not essentially bound to your visual capabilities. Thus,
even if all of humanity were to lose their visual capabilities, we would be at a
loss to know if color still existed or not, a determination which would further
require a definition of existence. By saying this, Hardin presumes to have
already determined the truth of the matter, which is in fact far from
determined.
In reference to the first half of the above quotation, how can one ever
determine when all the variables that enter into our perception of color have
been located? Even though a large number of variables have been discovered to
be at work in color perception, their existence does not rule out the existence
of other, undiscovered variables; nothing, it would seem, could do such a thing.
Furthermore, the reflectivist theory makes no claims as to being perfect, only
to being adequate. Hardin seems to suggest that the only theory of color that
he can countenance is one that takes into account the totality of the phenomenal
experience of seeing color, an account that may in fact be impossible. Though
the remarkable advances in science would seem to cut against this claim, it
remains a possibility that some of the components of the visual process may not
be ultimately explainable and end in a brute fact. Thus, can we not have a
theory of color until we have achieved a finished science of the visual process?
Again, who is to determine whether we can or not, and by virtue of what
principle?
Hardin's concluding comments suggest that color may in fact be an illusion,
a possibility that this reader is able to countenance. Then again, a
possibility it must remain in the absence of undeniable evidence in support of
it.
As to Hardin's position within the continuing realism/anti-realism debate,
he appears in the concluding paragraph of "Color and Illusion" to want to try
and hold both a realist and an anti-realist view of color. The realist
perspective manifests when Hardin alleges that the experience of color "depends
essentially upon processes that take place within the confines of the head...
[and] the stuffings of the head are, after all, material, and the whole process
of color perception is physical, determinate, and lawlike from beginning to
end" (9). Then, however, what Hardin wants to say acquires an anti-realist
dimension, when he claims that "physical objects need not have colors of their
own" and reduces color sensation to illusion, which, given the non-being of
illusion, is anti-realist.
-----
-=[Footnotes]=-
1. Hardin, C. L. "Color and Illusion." Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings.
Ed. Steven D. Hales. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company,
1999. 310.
2. Ibid. 310.
3. Ibid. 314.
4. Ibid. 314.
5. Ibid. 307.
6. Ibid. 314.
7. Ibid. 314.
8. Ibid. 315.
9. Ibid. 315.
-----------------------------<GwD Command Centers>------------------------------
GwDweb: http://www.GREENY.org/
GwD Publications: http://gwd.mit.edu/
ftp://ftp.GREENY.org/gwd/
GwD BBSes: C.H.A.O.S. - http://chaos.GREENY.org/
Snake's Den - http://www.snakeden.org/
E-Mail: gwd@GREENY.org
* GwD, Inc. - P.O. Box 16038 - Lubbock, Texas 79490 *
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"The pile of shit has a thousand eyes." - Corey Feldman's character
in _Stand By Me_
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-+- F Y M -+-
GR33NY LIK3S mash3d p0tat03s
MORE THAN FIVE YEARS of ABSOLUTE CRAP! /---------------\
copyright (c) MM Otis/GwD Publications :LICK MY ASSHOLE:
copyright (c) MM GwD, Inc. : GwD :
All rights reserved \---------------/
GwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwD96
