Copy Link
Add to Bookmark
Report
Greeny World Domination 094
GwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwD
T h e G R E E N Y w o r l d D o m i n a t i o n T a s k F o r c e ,
I n c o r p o r a t e d
Presents:
__ __ 999999999 444
_____ ____ _| |__| |_ 9999 9999 44 44
// | \ |_ __ _| 999 999 44 44
|| ____ | || | | | | | 9999 9999 44444444444
|| || \ / | || | _| |__| |_ 9999999999 44
\\___// \/\/ |____/ |_ __ _| 999 44
|__| |__| 999 44
999 4444
"Evaluating Some Premises of Hill's Argument in 'Self-Regarding Suicide'"
by Otis
----- GwD: The American Dream with a Twist -- of Lime ***** Issue #94 -----
----- release date: 01-03-01 ***** ISSN 1523-1585 -----
Evaluating Some Premises of Hill's Argument in "Self-Regarding Suicide"
Sketching arguments for or against specific moral practices typically proves
a difficult affair, given, if conclusions are sought in the manner of logical
deductions, the need to assert premises. These premises themselves often take
the form of unjustified presumptions, taken as "obvious" or "self-evident" when
in fact they are not. If not, then it often occurs that the justifications upon
which these premises are based are themselves problematic, unjustified, or even
unjustifiable. Once the truth of the premises is questioned, the utility of the
logical implication from them to the conclusions in establishing truth will also
come under suspicion.
In "Self-Regarding Suicide: A Modified Kantian View," Thomas E. Hill
attempts to construct an argument against the practice of suicide using Kantian
claims as premises. Yet, upon reflection, it is not at all certain that his
premises are true and would imply the conclusion. In establishing the truth of
a conditional statement, two tests must be performed: the first checks the
soundness of the implication on logical grounds, demonstrating that if the
premises were true, the conclusion would also be true, thus creating a
theoretically true conditional statement; the second test verifies the empirical
truth of the premises, creating a conditional statement that is true not merely
theoretically but empirically. Thus, my project herein is to assail the
empirical truth of the premises, not the logical truth of the argument itself,
whereby I hope to block the application of the implication to the world
understood empirically. However, this distinction in focus should not lead one
to assume that I have accepted the logical merits of the argument. Rather, I
have simply chosen to attack the premises because of their potential application
in manifold arguments; essentially, my aim herein is to assail the foundations
of Kantian ethical argument through an investigation of two of Hill's premises
in "Self-Regarding Suicide: A Modified Kantian View." Hill maintains as
critical to demonstrating the moral wrongness of suicide the following Kantian
position: "An essential feature of our humanity is that we are rational agents
with autonomy of the will."
Curzer already observes the problematic nature of the use of the term
"essence" in his brief response to this premise, and, I see no need to attack
the notion of essence here, though again this should not be interpreted as
tacit acceptance.
Allowing that our "humanity" can have any "essential" features, why should
the fact that "we are rational agents with autonomy of the will" be one of them?
Why should reason enter essentially into the determination of a human being? If
a man happens to lose his ability to reason through some accident, does he cease
thereby to be a human being? If he does, this event is no mere metaphysical
distinction, no simple nomenclatorial change. He, upon forfeiture of his
humanity, further forfeits everything to which he possessed a claim by means of
that humanity. For example, if he ceased to be human, he would as a consequence
lose the right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" in the eyes of
American law, for such rights are commonly denied non-humans such as animals.
Yet, we do not allow the unpunished killing of mental patients who appear to
have lost a capacity for reasoning; thus, we still allow them the right to life,
though we place restrictions on other rights to protect them and others from
them, and in this way we reaffirm their humanity in spite of their deficiencies.
I have no qualms with considering reason to be the mark of a normal human being
and to treat those without reason as deficient human beings, so long as those
without reason remain human beings, albeit deficient ones. To employ another
instance, consider newborn human children, whose ability to reason is
significantly less than that of many advanced primates. At this point, should
they not be considered human, since they lack the "essential" component of
reason? But if they are not human, why should we provide them with the same
sorts of rights that we provide adult humans under the aegis of "human rights"?
Therefore, I do not see why being "rational" should be or is an "essential"
feature of humanity, though I of course leave open the possibility that it could
be. I am merely insisting that it is not self-evident or grounded on the
empirical attitudes of society that reasoning should be used to distinguish
human beings from non-human beings. Hill also holds that human beings are
"agents with autonomy of the will." The notions of "agency" and "autonomy of
the will" presuppose that we are free in a meaningful sense of that rather
difficult word.
However, in a deterministic universe, such as that envisioned by the Stoics,
no such "agency" or "autonomy" would be possible, unless mental acts are being
considered. This vision of the universe, though it might lead to complacency
or the inability to hold others responsible for malicious actions, might
nevertheless obtain. Sure, we conceive of ourselves as making choices all the
time, but might we not be deluded as to that freedom by something akin to the
Cartesian demon? Perhaps every "choice" we make, we were obliged or "destined"
to make by something beyond ourselves. Such a view is not as radical as it
might at first appear. It is common to hear, especially in religious discourse,
that certain things were "meant to be" or that a tragic loss was part of a
"divine plan." In traditional Christian doctrine, God, as omniscient, knows
both the past and the future; thus, in some sense, we are not free to choose our
future, since the future is already determined in the mind of God. Furthermore,
legal discourse often supports a deterministic account of an event over a more
mainstream intentionalist account; such accounts occur in insanity defenses as
well as when courts use provocation as a mitigating factor in homicides. If
"autonomy of the will" were an essential feature of humanity, then if at any
moment we ceased to be autonomous, we would no longer be human; therefore, if we
commit an action that was beyond our control not to commit (evidencing a lack of
autonomy, however temporary), we cannot be held legally responsible for that
action, since human law seemingly does not apply to non-humans. Therefore, I
can neither confirm nor repudiate the essentialist claim that Hill/Kant makes,
since it remains possible despite my skepticism, though, because of that very
skepticism, I cannot endorse it as unjustified empirical truth. Before deducing
the moral wrongness of suicide from Kantian principles, Hill states the
following Kantian premise:
A fundamental moral principle, one to which any rational being with
autonomy would commit himself, is: always act so that you treat humanity
(that is, autonomy and rationality) never simply as a means, but always
as an end in itself (that is, as something with "unconditional and
incomparable worth"). (1)
I do not believe that it is true that any "rational being with autonomy" would
place humanity above all else; I think that rational, autonomous people might
choose, after deliberation made freely, to forfeit reason and autonomy in return
for an infinite amount of pleasurable sensation. Furthermore, it seems people
commonly use their humanity as a means to obtain other things; for example, the
Dedclaration of Independence allows Americans to use their humanity to garner
certain "inalienable rights." Oppressed groups, particularly in our country,
have appealed to their humanity to gain possession of other goods, such as
freedom and suffrage.
Additionally, it must be asked if rationality and autonomy are worthwhile in
themselves. Why would someone want reason, if not that it might allow him to
enjoy what Mill calls the "higher pleasures" of contemplation and knowledge?
Perhaps only the most obstinate of philosophers would want reason for its own
sake and not for the pleasures that can be gained by it. What is the value of
being free if not to be free to pursue happiness? I would think most rational
people would assent to being under the dominion of another rather than retain
absolute freedom. In fact, Hobbes thinks that if everyone lived in complete
freedom from one another, their lives would be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short" (2). In order to be able to enjoy a life free from constant worry
about the actions of others, it was found necessary, according to Hobbes and the
"social contract" philosophers, for man to give up a portion of his freedom to
act as he will to a sovereign body in exchange for protection against others.
Thus, the ability to enjoy a secure existence, which makes possible the
sustained experience of pleasure, seems to be more valuable than freedom, since
it appears evident that most rational beings would exchange absolute freedom for
a more limited but secure one. Thus, it is dubious as to whether the above-
cited principle is indeed "fundamental" in any meaningful sense of that term or
that anyone would "commit" himself to following it. I do not deny that a
rational being may choose to act on that principle when so doing would benefit
him, but I doubt that anyone would "commit" himself to following that principle
despite the greater appeal of pleasure.
Herein I have tried merely to cast doubt on a pair of Kantian principles
that Thomas E. Hill uses to demonstrate the moral wrongness of suicide. I do
not assert that he, and Kant for that matter, might not be right, but rather the
weaker claim that they could very well be wrong and need to produce greater
empirical support to garner my philosophical assent.
-----
-=[Footnotes]=-
1. For the purposes of the argument, Hill presupposes that we are free
physically.
2. Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Trans. A.T.A.B., Amsterdam, 1667. 89.
-----------------------------<GwD Command Centers>------------------------------
GwDweb: http://www.GREENY.org/
GwD Publications: http://gwd.mit.edu/
ftp://ftp.GREENY.org/gwd/
GwD BBSes: C.H.A.O.S. - http://chaos.GREENY.org/
Snake's Den - http://www.snakeden.org/
E-Mail: gwd@GREENY.org
* GwD, Inc. - P.O. Box 16038 - Lubbock, Texas 79490 *
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Don't throw in the towel cuz your life ain't shit, no take the towel and hang
yourself with it." - Bloodhound Gang, "Lift Your Head Up High and Blow Your
Brains Out"
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-+- F Y M -+-
GR33NY LIK3S mash3d p0tat03s
MORE THAN FIVE YEARS of ABSOLUTE CRAP! /---------------\
copyright (c) MM Otis/GwD Publications :SHIT YOUR PANTS:
copyright (c) MM GwD, Inc. : GwD :
All rights reserved \---------------/
GwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwDGwD94
