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Computer Undergroud Digest Vol. 10 Issue 07
Computer underground Digest Wed Jan 28, 1998 Volume 10 : Issue 07
ISSN 1004-042X
Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
CONTENTS, #10.07 (Wed, Jan 28, 1998)
File 1--FC: Student expelled for writing hacking article, from Netly News
File 2--Hacking article case -- circuit court decision
File 3--EFF Appointments to CEO & President
File 4--"Come to Grief", Dick Francis
File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 1998 10:49:17 -0800 (PST)
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
Subject: File 1--FC: Student expelled for writing hacking article, from Netly News
The "So You Want To Be A Hacker" article in question:
http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/editorial/019821.html
-Declan
******
http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1699,00.html
The Netly News (http://netlynews.com/)
January 21, 1998
Hacking 101
by Declan McCullagh (declan@well.com)
The end of senior year for most high school students is a time
for college decisions, vacation planning and beer-tinged teenage
revelry. Not so for Justin Boucher.
Today the Milwaukee, Wisconsin-area native will be expelled from
Greenfield High School because of an article he wrote entitled "So You
Want To Be A Hacker." Published under a pseudonym in an unofficial
student newspaper, it described in colorful (and sometimes profane)
language how enterprising snoops could break into the high school's
computer network.
The advice ranged from the glaringly obvious ("Some commonly used
passwords at very stupid schools are...") to the Hacker Code of Ethics
("Never harm, alter or damage any computers"). The finer points of
hacker morality and teenage toomfoolery, however, were lost on irate
school officials, who expelled Boucher for one year.
[...]
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 21 Jan 1998 16:10:16 -0500
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
Subject: File 2--Hacking article case -- circuit court decision
Here's the relevant portion of the 7th Circuit's decision vacating the
preliminary injunction. --Declan
********
JUSTIN J. BOUCHER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF
THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF GREENFIELD, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 97-3433
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
December 10, 1997, Argued
January 9, 1998, * Decided
* This opinion is being released in typescript. A printed
version will follow.
PRIOR HISTORY: [*1]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin. No. 97-C-915. John W. Reynolds, Judge.
DISPOSITION: Preliminary injunction VACATED.
COUNSEL: For JUSTIN J. BOUCHER, Plaintiff - Appellee: Peter Koneazny, AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTY UNION OF WISCONSIN, Milwaukee, WI USA. F. Thomas Olson, HALL,
PATTERSON & CHARNE, USA.
For SCHOOL BOARD OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF GREENFIELD, Defendant -
Appellant: K.
Michael Cooley, WHYTE, HIRSCHBOECK & DUDEK, Milwaukee, WI USA.
JUDGES: Before CUDAHY, FLAUM, AND MANION, Circuit Judges.
OPINIONBY: CUDAHY
[snip -dnm]
We derive our jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal from 28 U.S.C. @
1292(a)(1). Our review of the grant of a preliminary injunction is confined to
"whether the issuance of the injunction, in light of the applicable standard,
constituted an abuse of discretion." Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922,
932, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648, 95 S. Ct. 2561 (1975); see also University of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 393, 68 L. Ed. 2d 175, 101 S. Ct. 1830 (1981)
(indicating applicable standard supplied by reviewing-circuit precedent). A
district court abuses its discretion when it grants an injunction because
of "an
erroneous view of the law or . . . a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 L. Ed. 2d
359, 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990); see also Vencor, 33 F.3d at 844.
The district court made its decision on the basis of stipulated facts, the
parties' briefs and oral argument. The [*9] stipulations included the
transcript of the expulsion hearing and the administration's exhibits filed in
that proceeding.
At the expulsion proceeding, after hearing testimony by Greenfield's
principal, its technology support specialist, the plaintiff and a technology
consultant speaking at the plaintiff's request and reviewing the exhibits
(including Boucher's article), the Board concluded that the article "provided
instruction to the public and unauthorized persons on how to access the school
district computer programs and disclosed restricted access information to the
school district's computers" in violation of Wisconsin's computer crimes law,
Wis. Stat. @ 943.70(2); n3 the Board policy on the use of Greenfield's
computers, computer network and the Internet; and "general school rules for
behavior and communications by its students with its computers." The Board
found
that "Justin wrote the article outside the school" and it "then appeared with
his knowledge . . . for distribution at school," and that this endangered
school
property. The Board resolved that this conduct demanded the ultimate school
sanction: expulsion.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n3 The law provides, in relevant part:
Offenses against computer data and programs. (a) Whoever wilfully,
knowingly and
without authorization does any of the following may be penalized as provided in
par. (b): . . . (6) Discloses restricted access codes or other restricted
information to unauthorized persons.
(b) Whoever violates this section is guilty of: 1. A Class A misdemeanor unless
subd. 2., 3, or 4 applies. . . .
Wis. Stat. @ 943.70(2).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*10]
In support of the motion for a preliminary injunction, Boucher argued
that he
had a reasonable probability of succeeding on the merits, that he would suffer
irreparable and incalculable harm from being prohibited from attending
Greenfield and graduating with his class and that permitting him to begin his
senior year pending a decision on the merits would impose only a slight burden
on the Board. In handicapping his own chances on the merits, Boucher argued
that
his article was "mere advocacy," which was protected under the First
Amendment. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430, 89 S.
Ct. 1827 (1969) (per curiam). He noted that the Supreme Court has reiterated
that the First Amendment (via the Fourteenth Amendment) applies to students in
public schools:
Students in the public schools do not "shed the constitutional rights to
freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." They cannot be punished
merely
for expressing their personal views on the school premises--"whether in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized
hours"--unless the authorities have reason to believe that such expression will
"substantially interfere with the work of [*11] the school or impinge upon
the rights of other students."
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 98 L. Ed. 2d 592, 108 S.
Ct. 562 (1988) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393
U.S. 503, 506, 509, 512-13, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969)) (internal
citations omitted). Boucher maintained that his conduct did not violate
Greenfield's policies regarding student use of its computer resources, because
those policies only concerned actual tampering with and misuse of school
computers; he had not been charged with improper use of the computers. He
denied
that he disclosed restricted access codes, and indicated that, although the
Board had referred his case to the police, no criminal proceedings had been
brought against him.
In opposing the injunction before the district court, the Board argued that
Boucher had no reasonable likelihood of succeeding on the merits: the article
was not shielded by the First Amendment because it disclosed restricted access
codes in violation of Wisconsin's computer crimes law. The Board also contended
that Boucher's conduct created a reasonable perception of the threat of
hacking,
having the potential for unauthorized access to confidential school
information.
During [*12] the expulsion hearing, Greenfield's technology specialist
testified that someone following the article's instructions could view (and
alter) students' grades and any disciplinary information entered by individual
teachers. According to the Board, writing the article therefore violated
Greenfield's computer policies even if it were not a criminal act.
The Board also contested Boucher's claim that he would suffer irreparable
harm without the injunction, suggesting temporary alternative schooling in
private schools, nearby public high schools, home schooling or schooling
via the
Internet. The Board claimed that it would be harmed by the injunction by being
"forced . . . to endure a demonstrably disruptive student" whose "prior
retaliatory motivations against the school have likely only escalated" and
would
also suffer "intangible harm" because the injunction would "jeopardize the
school's authority to control this type of . . . conduct," Tr. Prelim. Inj.
Hr'g
at 28.
The district court indicated that its decision on the injunction motion
would
be based on 1) whether Boucher had some likelihood of success at a trial on the
merits, 2) whether Boucher had an adequate remedy at law or would [*13]
suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, 3) whether the irreparable harm
the expulsion order would cause Boucher outweighed the irreparable harm the
injunction would cause the Board, and 4) the public interest in the
outcome. See
TMT North America, Inc. v. Magic Touch GmbH, 124 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 1997).
The district court concluded that Boucher had "some likelihood" of
prevailing
on the merits. The court observed that Boucher had not been charged with a
computer crime and did not appear to have violated the statute since some
of the
passwords he mentioned were apparently inactive and he may have guessed the
others. Therefore, according to the court, any disclosure of restricted access
codes had not been shown to be wilful and knowing, a required element of the
alleged computer crime. The district court was not persuaded that Boucher had
violated Greenfield's computer policies: "The policies deal with computer use;
the hearing testimony was that there was no indication that Boucher had
actually
performed any of the procedures discussed in the Article, and he was being
suspended only for authoring the Article."
Citing Ayres v. City of Chicago, 125 F.3d 1010, [*14] 1013 (7th Cir.
1997), the court correctly observed that "even if Boucher does not have a very
high probability of prevailing on the merits, if he would suffer extensive
irreparable harm and the Board little harm (and no third parties would be
harmed), he is entitled to a preliminary injunction." The district court agreed
with Boucher that he would suffer irreparable harm because expulsion for a year
"would have negative implications which cannot be seriously challenged."
Turning
to the potential harm to the Board from granting the injunction, the district
court declared that its "review of the record finds no support for the
conclusory assertion" that an injunction would force Greenfield to "'endure a
demonstrably disruptive student'" bent on retaliating against the school. The
district court mentioned without analysis or findings the Board's concern that
an injunction would undermine its disciplinary authority and pose a risk to the
security of its computer system. Finally, the district court decided to grant
the motion because
under the circumstances, the one-year expulsion is an extreme response. The
Board has not established that any harm it will suffer if Boucher attends
[*15] school outweighs the harm to Boucher from being denied attendance
at his
senior year of high school.
The district court apparently concluded that the injunction would not
significantly affect the public interest. Neither party addressed the public
interest, although the Board now argues that the public interest coincides with
its interest. n4
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n4 The Board's brief notes that "the text of the [district court's] opinion
is entirely devoid of any consideration as to how entry of the injunction would
affect the public interest. . . ." Br. & App. of Appellant at 22. This
observation, however, applies equally to the Board's brief to the district
court.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Although the court's order of September 19, 1997, is not entirely clear, the
court seemed to conclude that the Board would suffer only negligible harm from
the injunction. Perhaps the court simply meant that the Board's harm with the
injunction does not outweigh the injury to Boucher without one. n5 Or the court
may have meant to assess the balance of harms [*16] as adjusted for the
respective odds of winning on the merits. From the judge's citation of
authorities and remarks in court, we believe he concluded that, even if the
expulsion order's injury to Boucher were discounted significantly by an
apparently modest chance of success on the merits, the discounted harm still
outweighed the insignificant harm that an injunction would impose on the Board.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n5 Although we think that this interpretation is incorrect, if the district
court did mean only a weighing of the undiscounted harms, the granting of the
injunction would have been an abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances of
this case, it would have been an error of law for the district court to weigh
the parties' harms without taking into account the likely victor on the merits,
see Vencor, 33 F.3d at 845. A movant's mere showing of a non-negligible chance
of success (which is all the district court recognized), together with a
potential injury that does not substantially exceed the injury caused to the
nonmovant by an injunction, would not support an injunction in this circuit or
in any other. In those circuits, such as this one, that do not require the
movant to establish that success on the merits is more likely than not, the
movant must compensate for the lesser likelihood of prevailing by showing the
balance of harms tips decidedly in favor of the movant. See e.g., Ayres, 125
F.3d at 1014; compare, e.g., Sweeney v. Bane, 996 F.2d 1384, 1388 (2d Cir.
1993)
("A party seeking preliminary injunctive relief must establish: (a) irreparable
injury and (b) either (i) a likelihood of success on the merits of the
underlying claim or (ii) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of
the claim as to make it a fair grounds for litigation and a balance of the
harms
tipping decidedly toward the movant."); Eng v. Smith, 849 F.2d 80, 81 (2d Cir.
1998) (noting that in Second Circuit "likelihood of success" alternative
requires showing probability of prevailing on merits exceeds fifty
percent); see
generally 13 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice @ 65.05 (3d ed. 1997)
(surveying circuit standards for granting preliminary injunctions); Joseph T.
McLaughlin & Harmeet K. Dhillon, Preliminary Injunctive Relief in the Federal
Courts, 540 PLI/Lit 503 (1996) (same).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*17]
While the district court's statement that a year's expulsion is extreme is
understandable, we cannot accept the conclusion that the harm the injunction
imposes on the Board is insignificant. As the district court recognized in the
October 1 hearing, see Br. & App. of Appellant at App. 31, an injunction could
remain in force through the remainder of Justin Boucher's tenure at Greenfield,
at which point the issue of punishment would be moot. n6 Under the
circumstances, we think the Board is correct in characterizing the
injunction as
undermining the authority of the Board to take disciplinary action for what it
believed to be a serious threat to school property. Boucher argues that the
Board has failed to present evidence that enjoining his expulsion
undermines its
authority, "save the unsupported conjecture in the District Superintendent's
affidavit." Br. of Pl.-Appellee at 16. But the potential harm to the Board's
authority "cannot seriously be challenged." The utter defeat of the Board's
disciplinary efforts when confronted by a self-proclaimed "hacker" is clearly a
substantial harm. Yet the district court failed to articulate a reason for
discounting this injury to the Board. [*18] It never addressed the
issue. We
do not believe that the district court, with its somewhat dismissive view
of the
Board's injury, could have struck a correct balance. Under the district court's
analysis, a school often would be powerless to expel a student able to mount a
nonfrivolous legal challenge to the expulsion, unless the school could prove
that the student's continued attendance actually presents a current threat of
tangible injury. The Supreme Court "has emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the
schools." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. "Without first establishing discipline and
maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students." New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) (Powell,
J., concurring). We think that, in this procedural posture, it is enough to
show
that school discipline, undertaken reasonably and in good faith to protect the
school's vital interest, is being undermined.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n6 A preliminary injunction that would give the movant substantially all the
relief he seeks is disfavored, and courts have imposed a higher burden on a
movant in such cases. See Selchow & Righter Co. v. Western Printing and
Lithographing Co., 112 F.2d 430, 431 (7th Cir. 1940); Phillip v. Fairfield
University, 118 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1997); SCFCILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc.,
936 F.2d 1096, 1098-99 (10th Cir. 1991); Dakota Indus., Inc. v. Ever Best Ltd,
944 F.2d 438, 440 (8th Cir. 1991); Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316
F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1963). Of course, whether the expulsion order becomes
part of the student's record may be an issue of some importance even if an
injunction prevents the school from its enforcement through the remainder
of the
student's high school career. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 575, 42 L.
Ed. 2d
725, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
[*19]
Further, although the point is not essential to our decision, in our
judgment
the district court's statement that there is no evidence in support of the
other, tangible harm asserted by the Board--having to endure a "demonstrably
disruptive student"--is untenable. At the expulsion hearing, Greenfield's
technology expert testified that after the article appeared the school
called in
computer experts to conduct four hours of diagnostic tests on the computer
system. The school changed all of the passwords mentioned in the article. (The
diagnostic tests revealed signs of tampering, although the tampering could not
be tied to the article.) This is, at a minimum, some evidence of past
disruption, which would support an inference of potential future
disruption--especially in light of the article's promise to "teach you more."
Returning, however, to the undermining of discipline, the district court's
failure to credit the injunction's harm to the Board's disciplinary authority
might not be decisive if Boucher were likely to win the trial on the merits.
Although we need not question the district court's conclusion that Boucher has
"some likelihood" of winning on the merits, on the record [*20] before us it
seems more likely than not that the Board will prevail.
The Supreme Court has determined that "the First Amendment rights of
students
in the public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings and must be applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment." Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266
(internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). The Court has indicated that in the
case
of student expression. the relevant test is whether school authorities "have
reason to believe" that the expression will be disruptive. See id. (emphasis
added); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (indicating standard was the existence
of "facts which might reasonably have led school authorities to forecast
substantial disruption . . . or material interference with school activities").
Boucher claims that a "reason to believe" or "reasonable forecast" standard
applies only in prior-restraint cases, and is "irrelevant to punishing
disruption that never occurred." He suggests that, except in a prior-restraint
case, the appropriate criterion is actual harm. But this court, sitting en
banc,
has applied the reasonable forecast [*21] standard to punishment after
publication. See Scoville v. Board of Educ. of Joliet Township High Sch. Dist.
204, 425 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1970) (en banc) (describing standard as "a
reasonable forecast of a substantial disruption of school activity"). Although
in Scoville the court's judgment would have been the same if it had applied an
"actual disruption" standard instead of a "reasonable forecast" standard--a
distinction Boucher in any event ignores--on the record before us we are not
persuaded that Scoville is distinguishable. Further, the principal case
cited by
Boucher for confining the reasonable forecast standard to prior restraint
cases,
Shanley v. Northeast Indiana School District, 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972),
concludes that the appropriate standard for analyzing the propriety of
suspensions imposed after distribution of an underground student newspaper is
whether "disruption actually occurred or was reasonably foreseeable under the
circumstances." Id. at 975 (emphasis added); see also id. at 970. Remarkably,
however, Boucher does not even argue to this court that disruption was not
reasonably foreseeable. Under existing case law, on the record [*22] before
us, a reasonable forecast of disruption is all that would be required of the
Board.
The article is neither an essay on computers in the abstract nor a mere
hostile critique of Greenfield High School. Instead, it purports to be a
blueprint for the invasion of Greenfield's computer system along with
encouragement to do just that. n7 It is a call to action detrimental to the
tangible interests of the school. Although we express no judgment on the
ultimate merits of the case, see Doran, 422 U.S. at 934, on the basis of the
current record it appears that Greenfield was justified to interpret the
article
as what it purported to be. Boucher does not contend that the article was
intended merely as some sort of parody of anarchist high school hackers n8 -- a
defense that might have been more promising than the ones offered. Instead,
spiced with warnings, emphasizing stealth, the article's agenda is palpably
transgressive. At the expulsion hearing, Boucher testified that his motive in
writing the article was to increase computer literacy among students so that
when, in the future, something went awry on Greenfield's computer network, the
pool of suspects would be expanded beyond [*23] a very narrow one that
included Boucher. If the information in the article were truly innocuous and
easily perceived as such, however, it is hard to see how its dissemination
could
deflect attention from the usual suspects. The district court found that the
article "does encourage activity which could be invasive and destructive to the
School's computer system and the information on it." It is largely irrelevant
that the article may not have actually (and in hindsight) provided as valuable
advice as purported or that the information disclosed may not have been as
secret as represented; on the facts before us a reader might reasonably
take the
article at face value.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n7 Persons who are not students at Greenfield may consult the full text of
the article in the appendix.
n8 For a discussion of possible meanings of the term "hacker," see United
States v. Riggs, 739 F. Supp. 414, 423-24 (N. D. Ill. 1990).
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Finally, Boucher argues that school officials' authority over off-campus
expression is much more [*24] limited than it is over expression on school
grounds. Based on the record developed so far, however, the cases cited for
this
proposition, Bystrom by Bystrom v. Fridley High School Independent School
District, 822 F.2d 747, 751 (8th Cir. 1978) and Thomas v. Board of Education of
Granville Central School District, 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979), do not
appear relevant. Thomas involved off-campus distribution of an underground
newspaper containing allegedly indecent material. The Second Circuit concluded
that the expression lacked the potential to disrupt school activities. See
Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1052 n. 17; id. at 1054 n.2 (Newman, J., concurring in the
result). The statement in Bystrom is merely dictum distinguishing Thomas on the
grounds that in Bystrom an underground newspaper was distributed on school
grounds. As might be expected with an underground newspaper, The Last is not
sponsored by Greenfield, but the parties have stipulated that the article was
distributed on campus. Boucher suggests that the Board's arguments, as a matter
of logic, would have to be the same if the article had not been distributed on
school grounds, and thus the [*25] legal analysis should also be the same.
Since the article was in fact distributed on campus, however, we need not reach
that issue--particularly at this stage in the case. In addition, the district
court found that the article advocates on-campus activity. Thus, on the record
before us, it appears the case law applicable to student expression will apply,
making it unnecessary to consider the application of the test of Brandenburg,
395 U.S. at 447 ("The constitutional guarantees of free speech and free
press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action.") (footnote
omitted).
The preliminary injunction is VACATED. The mandate shall issue seven days
after the date this opinion is issued. The filing of a petition for rehearing
within seven days after the filing of this opinion will stay the mandate until
disposition of the petition. If the petition is denied, the mandate shall issue
immediately or, if later, after the end of the seven-day period following the
issuance of this opinion, unless the time is enlarged [*26] by subsequent
order of this court. See Fed. R. App. P. 35(c), 40(a), 41(a).
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 24 Jan 1998 07:42:00 -0800 (PST)
From: Mike Godwin (mnemonic@well.com) Tue 13 Jan 98 10:40
Subject: File 3--EFF Appointments to CEO & President
For Immediate Release
EFF Announces Appointment of Barry Steinhardt as President and
CEO, and Election of Lori Fena as Chairman
SAN FRANCISCO, January 12, 1998 -- The Electronic Frontier
Foundation (EFF) today announced that its Board of Directors has
appointed Barry Steinhardt to President and Chief Executive
Officer. Steinhardt is currently the Associate Director of the
American Civil Liberties Union. The appointment was made at an
EFF Board meeting held today in San Francisco.
He replaces Lori Fena, who has been elected Chairman of the
Board of EFF. Resigning Chairman Esther Dyson remains an
active, enthusiastic member of the Board.
"We are very pleased to appoint Barry Steinhardt as our new
President," said Esther Dyson, former Chairman of the EFF Board
of Directors. "Steinhardt has a wealth of experience with both
our issues and the operation of non-profit organizations."
"Barry's background is exactly what we were looking for," Dyson
continued. "We expect him to be able to help us continue to
build EFF as a premier organization that can take on the
daunting challenge of defending and defining civil liberties and
structures to protect them in the electronic world."
As Associate Director of the ACLU, Steinhardt formed and chaired
its Cyber-liberties Task Force, which coordinates the ACLU's
extensive program on information technology issues. He was a
co-founder of the Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC), the
world's first international coalition of on-line rights groups
and one of the originators of the Internet Free Expression
Alliance (IFEA), which was recently formed to monitor issues
related to Internet content rating and filtering. Steinhardt has
spoken and written widely on cyber-liberties issues.
Most recently he was the co-author of "Fahrenheit 451.2 - Is
Cyberspace Burning?", the ACLU White paper on Internet content
rating and blocking. He is currently at work on the ACLU
handbook on "The Rights of Persons On-line."
In addition to his cyber-liberties work, Steinhardt has
coordinated the ACLU policy development process and efforts to
strengthen structure and management of the ACLU's 53 state
affiliates. He has been with the ACLU for 17 years and
previously served as Executive Director of its Pennsylvania and
Vermont affiliates.
"This is a tremendous opportunity for Barry, who has shown
talent and imagination in the cyber-liberties arena," said ACLU
Executive Director Ira Glasser. "It is also an opportunity for
the ACLU to work even more closely than we have with EFF on many
issues where we share common goals and values."
Steinhardt succeeds outgoing EFF Executive Director Lori Fena,
who will become Chairman of EFF's Board of Directors, and will
resume her career in private industry as a venture investment
advisor and consultant.
"Lori Fena has done a superb job of building EFF over the past
two years," Dyson said. "She demonstrated great vision in her
stewardship of TRUSTe and a host of other projects and is an
excellent choice as incoming Chairman. The Board of Directors
is very grateful for her leadership and looks forward to working
with Lori in her new capacity," Dyson concluded.
EFF appointment
Fena noted that EFF and ACLU have a long history of cooperative
action that has ranged from the successful challenge to the
Communications Decency Act in the 1997 Supreme Court decision in
Reno v. ACLU, to ongoing efforts to promote the privacy of
communications through the use of strong encryption.
Most recently, the two organizations joined together to support
legislation to remove the restrictions on the use of encryption.
They also have cooperated in Bernstein v. Department of State, in
which EFF is challenging the constitutionality of the US
Government's restrictions on the export of encryption technology.
Fena further noted that EFF and ACLU have been regular coalition
partners, including common membership in the GILC and IFEA
coalitions.
"Hiring Barry is a natural step for EFF," Fena said. "It will
strengthen the bond between two dedicated civil liberties
organizations. We expect the two groups to work together even
more closely to leverage our respective strengths to protect free
speech and privacy in the information age."
Steinhardt said he is "grateful for the opportunity to play a
leadership role in the next phase of EFF's development."
"EFF was the pioneer defender of the rights of on-line users," he
continued. "With the explosive growth of the Internet and other
information technologies, the need for a strong and vibrant EFF
is greater than ever."
Steinhardt said that he expected to concentrate his efforts on
expanding EFF's membership and financial resources, maximizing
EFF's already strong public presence, organizing grassroots
support for cyber rights, enlarging EFF's role in the global
movement for on-line rights and providing support for EFF's
pioneering work to adapt traditional concepts of civil liberties
for new mediums.
Steinhardt will formally assume his new role on February 2.
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (http://www.eff.org/) is a
non-profit civil liberties organization working in the public
interest to promote privacy, free expression, and social
responsibility in new media.
For further information please contact:
Barry Steinhardt
barrys@aclu.org
(212)549-2508
Lori Fena
lori@eff.org
(415)436-9333
Esther Dyson
edyson@edventure.com
(212)924-8800
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 15 Jan 1998 08:32:15 -0800
From: "Rob Slade......." <Rob.Slade@sprint.ca>
Subject: File 4--"Come to Grief", Dick Francis
BKCM2GRF.RVW 971003
"Come to Grief", Dick Francis, 1995, 0-515-11952-0, U$6.99
%A Dick Francis
%C 200 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
%D 1995
%G 0-515-11952-0
%I Ace/Berkley/Boulevard/Charter/Diamond/Jove Books
%O U$6.99 +1-800-788-6262 http://www.berkley.com/berkley
%P 368
%T "Come to Grief"
OK, I've already admitted that I like Dick Francis, OK? But I *do*
have a reason for reviewing this one as well as "Driving Force" (cf.
BKDRVFRC.RVW). Yes, a *technical* reason. Two or three, actually.
First, this book involves the use of cell phones, and the interception
of cell phone conversations. As in "Driving Force", Francis'
technical details are a mixture of good and bad. It is good to see
that he is making the public more aware of the vulnerability in using
cellular phones to conduct confidential or private business. (Or, as
Prince Charles found out to his chagrin, pleasure.) However, in this
story, the lead character is told that getting a digital cell phone,
as opposed to analogue, is an automatic guarantee of security.
Granted, a digital scanner is a lot harder to build than an analogue
one but without the use of spread spectrum or encryption, or both,
digital communications alone cannot ensure security.
Second, the main character admits that he is not keen on computers,
and uses them as little as is consitent with his business. Fair
enough. We can, though, therefore rule out the possibility that his
home computer is even moderately sophisticated, let alone running a
multiuser operating system. In fact, we can probably assume that,
like most people, he turns the computer off when he is not using it.
So how come he can call up his home computer from the office of the
bad guys, and transfer files from theirs to his? (In fact, given the
lengths to which they have gone in order to secure and hide their
machine, how come it even has a modem?)
OK, as long as we're here, how about one more? You know how in all
the movies, when the good guys get into the bad guys'
office/hideout/headquarters, and they discover the secret
files/computer, that as soon as they put the disk with the secret data
into the floppy drive the prompt "PASSWORD" appears on the screen?
Yup, you guessed it ...
copyright Robert M. Slade, 1997 BKCM2GRF.RVW 971003
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 7 May 1997 22:51:01 CST
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
Subject: File 5--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 May, 1997)
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End of Computer Underground Digest #10.07
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