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Computer Undergroud Digest Vol. 08 Issue 67
Computer underground Digest Sun Sep 22, 1996 Volume 8 : Issue 67
ISSN 1004-042X
Editor: Jim Thomas (cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu)
News Editor: Gordon Meyer (gmeyer@sun.soci.niu.edu)
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Shadow Master: Stanton McCandlish
Field Agent Extraordinaire: David Smith
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Cu Digest Homepage: http://www.soci.niu.edu/~cudigest
CONTENTS, #8.67 (Sun, Sep 22, 1996)
File 1--Hackers on Net and BBC-ISP's "morality button," from FinTimes
File 2--More on hackers and CIA web page
File 3--official statement from Lexis-Nexis about P-Trak (fwd)
File 4--Tim O'Reilly Comments in Re DOJ's Investigation of Microsoft
File 5--Condat denies the Crypt Newsletter's editor accusations
File 6--CERT Advisory CA-96.20 - Sendmail Vulnerabilities (fwd)
File 7--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 Apr, 1996)
CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION ApPEARS IN
THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Fri, 20 Sep 1996 22:36:11 -0500 (CDT)
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
Subject: File 1--Hackers on Net and BBC-ISP's "morality button," from FinTimes
Financial Times
Concern at attacks by hackers on Internet sites
Wednesday September 18 1996
By Louise Kehoe in San Francisco
A rash of hacker attacks on commercial Internet sites - including one
in which the services of Panix, a New York-based Internet access
provider, were seriously disrupted - has raised new concerns about the
security and reliability of the worldwide computer network.
In these "denial of service" attacks, hackers have flooded Internet
sites with false requests for information sent from fake addresses,
tying up the computers and preventing access by legitimate users.
In addition to the Panix attack, at least one large information
technology company, which declined to be identified, has suffered a
similar attack.
Attacks have been "isolated incidents", said Mr Pete Solvik,
vice-president of information systems at Cisco Systems, the leading
manufacturer of routing equipment for the Internet. The company,
however, is concerned that the problem could spread, disrupting
Internet service for millions of users and effectively closing down
large commercial sites on the Internet.
With many banks and retailers now planning Internet services, the
potential for financial losses as a result of such attacks is rising.
Disruption of Internet service can also be a serious problem for the
tens of thousands of businesses that now rely on electronic mail and
sites on the World Wide Web to communicate with their partners and
[...]
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's New York Computer Investigations
Threat Assessment Center is understood to be investigating the attack
on Panix. Computer Emergency Response Teams, a US organisation that
collates information about security and technical problems on the
Internet, are looking into the incident.
###
Financial Times
BBC to enter Internet market
Thursday September 19 1996
By Alan Cane and Raymond Snoddy in London
The BBC plans to launch a service on the Internet which could promote
greater acceptance of the global computer network in the same way that
the BBC Computer popularised computing in the 1980s.
Contracts have been signed between BBC Worldwide, the public
broadcaster's commercial arm, and the multimedia division of ICL, the
UK computer group owned by Fujitsu of Japan, to design and run the
service.
BBC Worldwide will announce the service within the next two weeks. It
will feature news, weather and travel information as well as
educational and entertainment material. It is expected to go live in
the early part of 1997.
[...]
The main selling points will be speed - compared with the frequent
delays experienced by users - and ease of use. There will also be a
"morality button" to reassure parents who might fear their children
could use the service to view pornography and other unsuitable
material available on the Internet.
ICL declined to comment last night.
------------------------------
From: Declan McCullagh <declan@well.com>
To: fight-censorship@vorlon.mit.edu
Subject: File 2--More on hackers and CIA web page
The web pages are at:
http://titus.is.co.za/mikev/cia_hack/
http://www.skeeve.net/cia/
Looks like the hackers tipped off CNN, which has been running video clips.
Reuters also picked this up.
-Declan
*********
HACKERS VANDALIZE CIA HOME PAGE
No security breach of private files, agency says
September 19, 1996
Web posted at: 10:00 a.m. EDT (1400 GMT)
By Wayne B. Drash and Jim B. Morris
ATLANTA (CNN) -- Hackers broke into the CIA's World Wide Web home
page (http://www.odci.gov/cia/) Thursday morning, altered it, added
obscenities and changed the agency's name on the page to the
"Central Stupidity Agency."
The CIA, which took down the site shortly after 7:30 a.m. EDT, said
the hackers did not gain access to the agency's private files. "This
(the publicly available CIA Web site) is on an entirely different
circuit from everyone else at the CIA," agency spokesman Rick Oborn
He said the CIA did not know who was responsible for the hacking or
when the page would be restored. "A team is being pulled together to
assess how many layers (of the site) were affected and how we can
get it back on line," Oborn said.
Anonymous call
An anonymous phone caller tipped CNN Interactive to the break-in,
saying Swedish hackers were responsible.
The phone call was received about 5:45 a.m. EDT. When asked what the
hackers had done to the page, the man said, "I think you should just
take a look at it."
He then hung up without further comment. He did not leave his name
or identify a specific group.
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 21:21:14 -0400 (EDT)
From: Noah <noah@enabled.com>
Subject: File 3--official statement from Lexis-Nexis about P-Trak (fwd)
From -Noah
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date--Wed, 18 Sep 1996 21:21:14 -0400 (EDT)
From--Maura Kearns <zippy@mcfeely.bsfs.org>
Here's the real info on the Lexis thing:
This statement was issued today:
--------
STATEMENT FROM LEXIS-NEXIS 9/18/96
Incorrect information is being distributed on Internet newsgroups regarding
the data displayed in LEXIS-NEXIS' P-TRAK file. P-TRAK is like an
electronic "white pages." The only information displayed is the name of the
individual, current address and up to two previous addresses and telephone
number. In some cases, the individual's maiden name may appear and as well
as the month and year of birth. That is the ONLY information displayed in
the P-TRAK file.
Contrary to some messages that have been posted to some Internet discussion
and news groups, the P-TRAK file DOES NOT contain any credit histories, bank
account information, personal financial data, mother's maiden name or
medical histories. This misinformation has been posted over and over again
to various news groups.
An example of a record appears below:
Name: DOE, JOHN E
Current Address: 1066 Anywhere Drive, Dayton, OH 95454
Previous Address: 106 Somewhere Drive, Dayton, OH 92454
Birthdate: 9/1965
Telephone Number: 555-1212
On File Since: 6/1/1994
The information displayed in the P-TRAK file is the type of information
readily available from public information sources such as telephone
directories (in print and CD-ROM format) and public records maintained by
government agencies.
LEXIS-NEXIS markets the P-TRAK file to the legal community for use by
general legal practitioners, litigators and public attorneys, as well as law
enforcement agencies and police departments. These professionals use the
P-TRAK file to assist in locating litigants, witnesses, shareholders,
debtors, heirs and beneficiaries.
LEXIS-NEXIS is aware of the sensitivities regarding the potential misuse of
information. Business competitors of LEXIS-NEXIS have for some time made
Social Security numbers available to users of their services. In addition,
Social Security Numbers and other information are available on the Internet
from a number of sources. Despite this wide availability of Social Security
numbers in the market place, LEXIS-NEXIS discontinued the display of Social
Security numbers in the P-TRAK file as of June 11, 1996, eleven days after
the product was introduced.
Through its actions, LEXIS-NEXIS is balancing the privacy concerns of the
public with the legitimate needs of legal, business and government
professionals for access to accurate sources of publicly available
information. By discontinuing the display of Social Security numbers in
P-TRAK and only providing information that is already available to the
public from other sources, LEXIS-NEXIS believes it has responsibly met the
expressed concerns of the public.
Individuals interested in having their names removed from the P-TRAK file
can e-mail their full name and complete address to:
p-trak@prod.lexis-nexis.com or mail this information to ATTN: P-TRAK, P. O.
Box 933, Dayton, OH 45401.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 19 Sep 1996 19:00:41 -0700
From: Ellen Elias <elias@ora.com>
Subject: File 4--Tim O'Reilly Comments in Re DOJ's Investigation of Microsoft
For Immediate Release
Further Information Contact
Ellen Elias
(707)829-0515 ext. 322
elias@ora.com
STATEMENT OF TIM O'REILLY, PRESIDENT OF O'REILLY & ASSOCIATES, IN
RESPONSE TO CONFIRMATION OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S INVESTIGATION OF
MICROSOFT
September 19, 1996, Sebastopol, CA--Tim O'Reilly, upon learning of the
confirmed investigation of Microsoft by the federal Department of
Justice, called for Microsoft to cease its anti-competitive behavior.
Mr. O'Reilly made the following comments:
"I'm delighted to hear about the Department of Justice
investigation. We don't know what they'll find, but we do know
that Microsoft's recent practices have been bad for users, and
they have demonstrated a pattern of anti-competitive behavior.
The fact of this investigation will further alert people to
Microsoft's activities. I believe in the marketplace, and think
that there can be a healthy impact on the marketplace from the
DOJ investigation.
"Each time O'Reilly & Associates has brought a particular fact about
Microsoft into the public eye, the response from Microsoft has been
deceptive and confusing. In July, 1996, we complained publicly about
their 10-connection limit on Windows NT Workstation. In response,
Microsoft removed the 10-connection limit from the code, but then kept
it in the user license. Further, Microsoft made extravagant claims that
they were doing this for users: they claimed that NT Workstation was
just not suitable as a Web server platform. That claim inspired our
Senior Editor Andrew Schulman's investigation into the actual
differences between NT Workstation and NT Server. He found that,
indeed, at the core, they are not very different at all.
"Microsoft doesn't need to win every battle to stifle innovation. As
powerful as they are, they can determine the terms under which software
development happens, and they can seriously limit important development
by their anti-competitive behavior. Here's an example: when O'Reilly &
Associates first developed and marketed WebSite(TM), Microsoft patted
us on the back, because we were legitimizing NT as a Web server
platform. But when Microsoft decided they wanted the Web server market
for themselves, they used their restrictive NT 4.0 Workstation user
license as a tool to frighten users against using any competitors' Web
servers on that platform. Microsoft's actions have made it difficult
for us, as well as all other server vendors, to compete. So what kind
of industry does that create?
"Netscape has claimed that many people have been afraid to speak in
fear of retribution from Microsoft. Netscape has said that now, these
people will feel free to speak publicly, and I think that should prove
very enlightening. I hope the Department of Justice will vigorously
pursue this investigation. I also hope the public will hold Microsoft
to the same high standard of business practices to which our entire
industry should adhere."
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 15:12:31 +0100
From: Jean-Bernard Condat <jeanbc@INFORMIX.COM>
Subject: File 5--Condat denies the Crypt Newsletter's editor accusations
This morning, I receive the Cu Digest #8.66 and carefully read the
file 3 with a complete surprise. I never send any article related to
computer viruses troubles during the US Army's Bosnian deployment
plagiarizing the well-knowned Crypt Newsletter.
After my publication of the Mark A. Ludwig's book "The Little Black
Book of Computer Viruses" with Addison-Wesley France ("Naissance
d'un virus" for the first volume and "Mutation d'un virus" for the
second one), I have had a lot of problems: night & day phone calls,
injures, public critics on French TV and/or magazines, etc. I stop
the crazy rumors immediately. I don't writte any more computer
virus' articles; I don't participate to any security events; I don't
collaborate to any craking/phreaking/swapping actions. For example,
I don't participate to the French 2600 meeting in Porte d'Italie in
Paris last week.
As my understanding, this previous email under my name was send to
CuD editors from and unauthorized source. As some of you know, I
have been having problems with the secret services in the past and I
got into a large battle with was France Telecom -vs- Me. It is
stupid to get into an argument with that kind of corporation, and a
few words and threats were thrown, they locked all my phone
accounts. I wrote a letter in response of that and they proceded to
harass my company that put me immediately out. Also some lamers
posted some hoax letters in the French news groups and whatever.
They eventually decided to charge me and whatever, and to save me
time outta the Paris courts and crap like that I made an apology for
the threats, seeing that they could incriminate me. France Telecom
has done wrong and I probably won't be seeing alot of apologies
coming my way. If they didn't have certain info about me... they
could have me very well laughing at them but that is not the case.
At this time, I have some crazy guys that don't hesitate to put all
the scripts of my TV shows
(http://www.magic.be/InterieurNuit/SiteMars/Condat.html), or to put
my picture (http://www.condat.de/condat/jean-b/). Yesterday, I lost
my job of senior consultant in the Smart Card Business Unit of
Informix because Mr. Tariq Krim of the ENST in Paris don't hesitate
to call all my chiefs with some kind words on my life. In France,
this type of action permit to put me out the company some seconds
after.
"Information wants to be free" is false. I have to many subjects to
writte on that to plagiarized Crypt News will be a "sincerest form
of flattery", like George Smith writte. But I prefer the unpolically
correct French-style-approach, the savoir-vivre of Paris. Accept all
my real excuses for all the French guy like Krim that prefer to
crash my career for having the pleasure to be the best! I read Crypt
News with pleasure and always respect the international copyright
notices.
Apologetically,
\\\|///
| ~ ~ |
(- 0 0 -)
+--------------------.oOOo-(_)-oOOo.-------------------------+
| Jean-Bernard Condat |
| 47 rue des rosiers, 93400 Saint-Ouen France |
| Phone: +33 1 40100357, fax: 1 46963765, Itineris: 07238628 |
| Email: condat@atelier.fr, PGP Key Id: C8F5D50D |
| Oooo. |
+--------------------.oooO-----( )--------------------------+
( ) ) /
\ ( (_/
\_)
------------------------------
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 1996 10:40:07 -0400
From: Noah <noah@enabled.com>
Subject: File 6--CERT Advisory CA-96.20 - Sendmail Vulnerabilities (fwd)
From -Noah
---------- Forwarded message ----------
Date--Wed, 18 Sep 1996 10:40:07 -0400
From--CERT Advisory <cert-advisory@cert.org>
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
=============================================================================
CERT(sm) Advisory CA-96.20
Original issue date: September 18, 1996
Last revised: --
Topic: Sendmail Vulnerabilities
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
*** This advisory supersedes CA-95:05 ***
The CERT Coordination Center has received reports of two security problems in
sendmail that affect all versions up to and including 8.7.5. By exploiting
the first of these vulnerabilities, users who have local accounts can gain
access to the default user, which is often daemon. By exploiting the second
vulnerability, any local user can gain root access.
The CERT/CC team recommends installing vendor patches or upgrading to the
current version of sendmail (8.7.6). Until you can do so, we urge you to
apply the workaround provided in Sec. III.C. In all cases, be sure to take
the extra precautions listed in Sec. III.D.
For beta testers of sendmail 8.8: The vulnerabilities described in this
advisory have been fixed in the beta version.
We will update this advisory as we receive additional information. Please
check advisory files regularly for updates that relate to your site. In
addition, you can check ftp://info.cert.org/pub/latest_sw_versions/sendmail
to identify the most current version of sendmail.
- -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Description
There are two vulnerabilities in all versions of sendmail up to and
including sendmail 8.7.5. The first vulnerability is a resource starvation
problem and the second is a buffer overflow problem.
Resource Starvation
-------------------
When email is forwarded to a program using a .forward file or an :include:
statement within a .forward or alias file, that program is executed as the
owner of the .forward file or the file referenced by the :include:
statement. Similarly, if email is forwarded to a file, that file is
opened as the owner of the .forward file or the file referenced by the
:include: statement. The file owner is called the "controlling user."
If the message cannot be delivered immediately, the name of the
controlling user is written into the queue file along with the other
delivery information so that the appropriate permissions can be acquired
when the mail queue is processed.
Only the name of the controlling user is written in the queue file. This
name is derived by calling the system routine getpwuid(3) on the user id
of the file owner. If getpwuid fails, the sendmail default user (defined
by the DefaultUser option in 8.7 and by the "u" and "g" options in older
releases) is assumed.
In some cases, the system can be forced into resource starvation, thus
forcing getpwuid(3) to fail even though an entry exists in /etc/passwd
corresponding to that uid. Since getpwuid has no way of portably
returning an error meaning "resource failure" as distinct from "user id
not found," sendmail has no way of distinguishing between these cases; it
assumes that the uid is unknown and falls back to the default user.
By starving sendmail of specific resources, sendmail will create files
owned by the default user. Once created, these files can be used to
access other files owned by the default user. In addition, these files
owned by the default user can be used to leverage access to other
privileged users on the system.
Buffer Overflows
----------------
There are several buffer overflows present in sendmail version 8.7.5 and
earlier. Some of the buffer overflows could result in local users gaining
unauthorized root access.
Significant work has been done on sendmail version 8.8 (now in beta
test) to eliminate the problem, and the code changes originally planned
for 8.8 have been backported to 8.7.6 to address these vulnerabilities.
II. Impact
Resource Starvation
-------------------
Anyone with access to an account on the system can run programs or write
files as the default user. The danger of compromising the default user
depends primarily on the other files in your system owned by that user.
For example, on many systems the line printer spool directory (e.g.,
/var/spool/lpd) is owned by daemon; because the line printer subsystem
runs setuid root, it may be possible to gain additional privileges.
However, some other systems have no files owned by user daemon on the
default system, and the only files owned by group daemon are not
writable by that group; hence, the danger is minimal.
Buffer Overflows
----------------
Anyone with access to an account on the system can gain root access.
III. Solution
Install a patch from your vendor if one is available (Sec. A) or upgrade
to the current version of sendmail (Sec. B). Until you can take one of
those actions, we recommend applying the workaround described in Sec. C.
This workaround addresses the resource starvation problem but not buffer
overflows.
In all cases, you should take the precautions listed in Sec. D.
Note to beta testers of sendmail 8.8: The vulnerabilities described in
this advisory have been fixed in the beta version of 8.8.
A. Install a vendor patch.
Below is a list of the vendors who have provided information about
sendmail. Details are in Appendix A of this advisory; we will update
the appendix as we receive more information. If your vendor's name
is not on this list, please contact the vendor directly.
Digital Equipment Corporation
Hewlett-Packard Company
IBM Corporation
Linux
Open Software Foundation
The Santa Cruz Operation
Silicon Graphics Inc.
Sun Microsystems, Inc.
B. Upgrade to the current version of sendmail.
Install sendmail 8.7.6. This version is a "drop in" replacement for
8.7.x. There is no patch for 8.6.x. If you are using version 8.6 or
earlier, you need to upgrade to the current version and rebuild your
sendmail.cf files. Upgrading to version 8.7.6 addresses both
vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
Sendmail 8.7.6 is available from
ftp://ftp.sendmail.org/ucb/src/sendmail/sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz
ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/sendmail/sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz
ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/sendmail/sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz
MD5 (sendmail.8.7.6.tar.gz) = 4a1f2179c53c9106bc8d7738f4d55667
Also in that directory are .Z and .sig files. The .Z file contains the
same bits as the .gz file, but is compressed using UNIX compress
instead of gzip. The .sig is Eric Allman's PGP signature for the
uncompressed tar file. The key fingerprint is
Type bits/keyID Date User ID
pub 1024/BF7BA421 1995/02/23 Eric P. Allman <eric@CS.Berkeley.EDU>
Key fingerprint = C0 28 E6 7B 13 5B 29 02 6F 7E 43 3A 48 4F 45 29
Eric P. Allman <eric@Reference.COM>
Eric P. Allman <eric@Usenix.ORG>
Eric P. Allman <eric@Sendmail.ORG>
Eric P. Allman <eric@CS.Berkeley.EDU>
We strongly recommend that when you change to a new version of sendmail
you also change to the configuration files that are provided with that
version.
Significant work has been done to make this task easier. It is now
possible to build a sendmail configuration file (sendmail.cf) using the
configuration files provided with the sendmail release. Consult the
cf/README file for a more complete explanation. Creating your
configuration files using this method makes it easier to incorporate
future changes to sendmail into your configuration files.
Finally, for Sun users, a paper is available to help you convert your
sendmail configuration files from the Sun version of sendmail to one
that works with sendmail version 8.7.x. The paper is entitled
"Converting Standard Sun Config Files to Sendmail Version 8" and was
written by Rick McCarty of Texas Instruments Inc. It is included in
the distribution and is located in contrib/converting.sun.configs.
C. Apply a workaround.
Resource Starvation
-------------------
Eric Allman, the author of sendmail, has provided the following
workaround to the resource starvation vulnerability.
Using smrsh as "prog" mailer limits the programs that can be run as
the default user. Smrsh does not limit the files that can be written,
but less damage can be done by writing files directly.
The damage can be almost entirely constrained by ensuring that the
default user is an innocuous one. Sendmail defaults to 1:1 (daemon)
only because that is reasonably portable. A special "mailnull"
account that is used only for this purpose would be better. This user
should own no files and should have neither a real home directory nor
a real shell. A sample password entry might be:
mailnull:*:32765:32765:Sendmail Default User:/no/such/dir:/dev/null
A corresponding entry should be made in /etc/group:
mailnull:*:32765:
These assume that there are no other users or groups with id = 32765
on your system; if there are, pick some other unique value. After
creating this user, change the line in /etc/sendmail.cf reading
O DefaultUser=1:1
to read
O DefaultUser=mailnull
If you are running 8.6.*, you will have to change the lines reading
Ou1
Og1
to read
Ou32765
Og32765
Finally, if you are using the m4(1)-based sendmail configuration scheme
provided with sendmail 8.7.*, you should add the following line to the
m4 input file, usually named sendmail.mc:
define(`confDEF_USER_ID', 32765:32765)
The actual values should, of course, match those in the passwd file.
Buffer Overflows
----------------
There is no workaround for the buffer overflow problem. To address this
problem, you must apply your vendor's patches or upgrade to the current
version of sendmail (version 8.7.6).
D. Take additional precautions.
Regardless of which solution you apply, you should take these extra
precautions to protect your systems.
* Use the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh)
With *all* versions of sendmail, use the sendmail restricted shell
program (smrsh). You should do this whether you use vendor-supplied
sendmail or install sendmail yourself. Using smrsh gives you improved
administrative control over the programs sendmail executes on behalf of
users.
A number of sites have reported some confusion about the need to continue
using the sendmail restricted shell program (smrsh) when they install a
vendor patch or upgrade to a new version of sendmail. You should always
use the smrsh program.
smrsh is included in the sendmail distribution in the subdirectory
smrsh. See the RELEASE_NOTES file for a description of how to integrate
smrsh into your sendmail configuration file.
smrsh is also distributed with some operating systems.
* Use mail.local
If you run /bin/mail based on BSD 4.3 UNIX, replace /bin/mail with
mail.local, which is included in the sendmail distribution. It is also
included with some other operating systems distributions, such as
FreeBSD.
Although the current version of mail.local is not a perfect solution, it
is important to use it because it addresses vulnerabilities that are
being exploited. For more details, see CERT advisory CA-95:02.
Note that as of Solaris 2.5 and beyond, mail.local is included with the
standard distribution. To use mail.local, replace all references to
/bin/mail with /usr/lib/mail.local. If you are using the M4(1)-based
configuration scheme provided with sendmail 8.X, add the following to
your configuration file:
define(`LOCAL_MAILER_PATH', /usr/lib/mail.local)
* WARNING: Check for executable copies of old versions of mail programs
If you leave executable copies of older versions of sendmail installed
in /usr/lib (on some systems, it may be installed elsewhere), the
vulnerabilities in those versions could be exploited if an intruder
gains access to your system. This applies to sendmail.mx as well as
other sendmail programs. Either delete these versions or change the
protections on them to be non-executable.
Similarly, if you replace /bin/mail with mail.local, remember to remove
old copies of /bin/mail or make them non-executable.
<snip>
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 21 Mar 1996 22:51:01 CST
From: CuD Moderators <cudigest@sun.soci.niu.edu>
Subject: File 7--Cu Digest Header Info (unchanged since 7 Apr, 1996)
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End of Computer Underground Digest #8.67
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