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Computer Undergroud Digest Vol. 06 Issue 35
Computer underground Digest Tue Apr 19, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 35
ISSN 1004-042X
Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Archivist Le Grande: Stanton McCandlish
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Suspercollater: Shrdlu Nooseman
CONTENTS, #6.35 (Apr 19, 1994)
File 1--Re: AA BBS Bust (press release)
File 2--Reply to Keith Henson's Letter (Amat. Action BBS News)
File 3--Re: AA BBS Bust (reply to gov motion)
File 4--CuD Source in Switzerland
File 5--Dutch Government wants to ban encryption!
File 6--Possible Skipjack algorithm leak
File 7--Clipper Satire
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----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 22 Mar 94 10:35:26 PST
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com (H Keith Henson)
Subject: File 1--Re: AA BBS Bust (press release)
((MODERATORS' NOTE: For those who missed the Government Press
release announcing the Amateur Action BBS bust, we reprint it below))
NEWS RELEASE S. F. NO. 94-11
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR IN CHARGE February 3, 1994
United States Postal Inspection Service
P.O. Box 88200
San Francisco, CA 94188-2000
415/550-5602
For Information Call
Frank L. Ducar
Postal Inspector
415/550-5707
Robert and Carleen Thomas of Milpitas California were arrested today
by United States Postal Inspectors. The Thomas's were arrested for
distribution of obscene material and receipt of child pornography.
The Thomas's were indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in the Western
District of Tennessee on January 25, 1994 on three counts of using a
common carrier to transport from California to the Western District of
Tennessee obscene video tapes in violation of Title 18, United States
Code, Section 1462.
The Thomas's were also indicted on six counts of transporting obscene
material, specifically computer generated images from California to
the Western District of Tennessee in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 1465. The Thomas's operated a computer bulletin
board service specializing In pornographic material enabling other
computer users throughout the country to receive pornographic material
via their computer.
Each count under these statutes, 18 USC 1465 and 18 USC 1462, carries
a penalty of not more than five years in prison or up to a $250,000
fine or both.
In addition, Robert Thomas was indicted for knowingly receiving child
pornography through the United States Mall in violation of Title 18
United States Code 2252 (a)(1), Violation of this statute is
punishable by not more than ten years in prison or up a $250,000 fine
or both.
((I can't resist adding that the document the postal inspector filled
out at the time of the search so he could get his kiddy porn back
stated that the material had been sent "without his (Robert Thomas')
knowledge." HKH]
This investigation was conducted by Postal Inspectors in response to
complaints from citizens in the Western District of Tennessee. The San
Jose Police Department High Tech Crimes Detail provided assistance
with the forensic examination of the Thomas computer system.
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 7 Apr 94 21:57:55 PDT
From: hkhenson@CUP.PORTAL.COM
Subject: File 2--Reply to Keith Henson's Letter (Amat. Action BBS News)
((MODERATORS' NOTE: Keith Henson has been keeping on top of the
Amateur Action BBS case, in which a sysop in Milpitas, Calif, was
busted by U.S. Postal authorities and indicted in Memphis, Tenn.,
where alleged "kiddie porn" files were downloaded. The following are
letters Keith exchanged with federal agencies regarding the
incident)).
H. Keith Henson
799 Coffey Ct.
San Jose, CA 95123
408-972-1132
K. J. Hunter
Chief Inspector--Postal Service
475 C'Enfant Plaza
Washington, DC 20260-2100
January 26, 1994
Dear Mr. Hunter:
I am writing to express my concern about one of your Postal
Inspectors, David H. Dirmeyer, from Memphis TN. Inspector
Dirmeyer made statements to me the morning of January 15th
which caused me a great deal of alarm. In conversation in
front of a San Jose Police officer, he stated that 1) sending
unsolicited child pornography to a person who operates a
computer bulletin board system and 2) executing a search
warrant of questionably legality within minutes of its
receipt is "normal investigative procedure."
I have a hand written and signed statement from Inspector
Dirmeyer in the form of a PERMISSION TO SEARCH document he
filled out to get his child pornography back.
In describing the property he wrote:
"namely priority mail package from Lance White sent without
his knowledge."
A comparison of the handwriting on this form and "Lance
White's" original application to sign up with the BBS
involved created a near certainty in my mind that inspector
Dirmeyer and the "Lance White" who sent the child pornography
to the system operator were the same person. A day after I
had reached this conclusion, I had opportunity to simply ask
Inspector Dirmeyer if he was also "Lance White." He admitted
it. I think a reasonable person presented with this
information would conclude that the above statement by
Dirmeyer/White constitutes a written admission of sending
unsolicited child pornography through the mail--seeming just
to terrify a law abiding recipient.
I would like to know if this behavior on the part of Postal
Inspectors really is "normal investigative procedure."
Sincerely,
H. Keith Henson
cc Judge Thelton E. Henderson
H. Keith Henson
799 Coffey Court
San Jose, CA 95123-3920
408-972-1132
===========================================================
March 22, 1994
Mr. H. Keith Henson
799 Coffey Court
San Jose, CA 95123-3920
Dear Mr. Henson:
Your letter to Chief Inspector Hunter in which you expressed
certain concerns regarding an investigation being conducted
by Inspector David H. Dirmeyer, has been referred to my office
for a response.
On January 10, 1994, a federal search and seizure warrant,
authorized by a United States Magistrate Court Judge based
upon an investigation conducted by the U.S. Postal Inspection
Service, was executed on the property belonging to Robert
and Carleen Thomas, in Milipitas, California. On January 25,
the Thomases were indicted by a federal grand jury in Memphis,
Tennessee, on charges relating to the distribution of obscene
matter. Robert Thomas was also charged with knowingly
receiving child pornography through the mail. This case
should be scheduled for trial in U.S. District Court, Western
District of Tennessee, at some time in the near future.
Until this matter is adjudicated, it would be inappropriate and
improper for me to comment any further on this case. It is my
understanding the Thomases have retained legal counsel. Any
specific concerns or issues regarding this investigation can be
raised by their attorney in a court of law.
Sincerely,
A. F. Lamden
Manager
Fraud and Prohiibited Mailings Group
==================================================================
April 5, 1994
A. F. Lamden, Manager
Fraud and Prohibited Mailings Group
Office of the Chief Postal Inspector
Washington, DC 20260-2100
Dear Mr. Lamden:
On March 22, 1994 you wrote in answer to my letter to Chief Inspector
Hunter of January 26 in which I expressed my concern about the actions
and statements of one of your postal inspectors. Incidentally, the
letter took 8 days to get here.
I understand that you have been given the thankless task of brushing
me off. Your second paragraph is a nice condensation of the Postal
Service's press release on the arrest. I will quote your third
paragraph:
"Until this matter is adjudicated, it would be inappropriate and
improper for me to comment any further on this case. It is my
understanding the Thomases have retained legal counsel. Any
specific concerns or issues regarding this investigation can be
raised by their attorney in a court of law."
However, I was NOT asking a question about the case. I expressed a
personal concern (shortened here):
"Inspector Dirmeyer made statements to me the morning of January 15th
which caused me a great deal of alarm. In conversation in front of a
San Jose Police officer, he stated that sending unsolicited child
pornography and executing a search warrant a few minutes after it was
received to "find" the porn is "normal investigative procedure."
And asked in my previous letter (again shortened):
******I want to know if this really is "normal investigative
procedure."*******
This question is not related to the case! It is a matter of Postal
Service policy and you should be able to answer it with a yes or no.
Sincerely,
H. Keith Henson
cc Usenet News groups (with readership in the 100,000 range)
Office of the Chief Postal Inspector
Washington, DC 20260-2100
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 11 Mar 94 23:48:58 PST
From: hkhenson@cup.portal.com (H Keith Henson)
Subject: File 3--Re: AA BBS Bust (reply to gov motion)
((MODERATORS' NOTE: Below is the motion filed by AA BBS's
defense attorney in response to the incident))
RICHARD D. WILLIAMS, APC
State Bar #92376
79 Divine St., Suite 101
San Jose, CA 95110
(408) 295-6336
Attorney for Defendants/Claimants
IN THE UNITES STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
IN THE MATTER OF THE ) NO.: CR 3-94-30005 WDB
SEARCH OF THE PREMISES )
KNOWN AS: ) RESPONSIVE SUPPLEMENTAL
) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
475 TRAMWAY DRIVE ) AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MILPITAS, CA 95035 ) MOTION TO RETURN PROPERTY
)
______________________________)______________________________
Comes now Richard D. Williams, attorney for the claimants who
responds to the United States' opposition to claimants' motions as
follows:
A. Jurisdiction
1. The US Attorney seems to argue that DiBella vs. United States
discourages the use of 41(e) motions in the district of seizure.
Dibella dealt mainly with the appealability of a ruling on a 41(e)
motion and stated in dictum that such motions were "discouraged."
The motion to return property is by rule, and I have seen no
authority to suggest that it is improper to bring such a motion in
the district where the property was seized pursuant to Rule 41(e).
I note also that DiBella vs. U.S. is a 1962 case which was before
Congress' revamping the rule in 1989.
2. Further, there exist no rule stating that a motion under 41(e)
cannot be brought post indictment (although it does say that if
brought post indictment in the trial court it shall be treated as
a motion under Rule 12).
3. In the present case, the Thomas's are entitled to the return
of their backup tapes, their UPS records (which are in danger of
being tampered with by agent Dirmeyer as the could contain evidence
of perjury by Agent Dirmeyer in his affidavit before Magistrate
Brazil), and any copies of the AABBS system information made by
Agent Dirmeyer and the San Jose "High Tech" unit. These were *not*
requested on the search warrant and contain member's names, and
passwords. They also contain all the electronic mail on the AABBS
system at the time of the seizure. Members of AABBS have been
complaining constantly since the seizure of unauthorized use of
their accounts on the system. It is apparent that a massive
release of member logon names and passwords has occurred, because
someone (and Agent Dirmeyer is the only one other than claimants
with member names and passwords) has been changing member's
passwords.
4. The United States Attorney also argues that this motion is not
timely since it was filed over thirty days after the seizure. I
attempted to obtain access to the file within 48 hours of the
seizure and was told that was no file because the U.S. Attorney had
it. I was told this while standing next to a sign on the wall
which states that it is a felony to remove files from the clerk's
office. I made another 50 mile trip in an attempt to find out what
was in the file about a week later, and at that point was told
again, by the clerks that they did not know where the file was,
though they thought the U.S. Attorney still had it. This time
Judge Brazil's secretary told me that the affidavit was sealed,
though in fact, U.S. Attorney's order sealed only the material
alleged to be obscene. (This incident is detailed below.)
5. The affidavit was unsealed by Magistrate Brazil's order on
January 27, one day after the indictment issued in Tennessee.
Thus my client and I were improperly denied access to the affidavit
which was essential to making a 41(e) motion. It was eventually
pried out of the clerks office by a series of phone calls to
Magistrate Brazil's office and a third 50 mile trip to the clerk's
office about February 7th to pick it up.
6. To put a time line on these events, of the seven weeks from
the search to the time this motion was filed, the US Attorney or
those acting under his direction caused four weeks of the delay he
is complaining about. This is not an isolated incident. I am
filing a motion herewith to relate this case to several others
before Judge Patel involving fraud and deception upon the court
where, as here, the government has falsified evidence, hidden court
files, manipulated judge's calendars in an effort to "Judge
Shop." It is my feeling that no one should be allowed to profit
from their wrong doing, and the U.S. Attorney's office should be
subject to that maxim of jurisprudence as well.
B. PRIVACY AND E-MAIL ISSUES
7. On page 9 of UNITED STATES' OPPOSITION MEMORANDUM at line 2,
Assistant United States Attorney Andrew M. Scoble states:
"The defendants here, in a warning to law enforcement
officers posted on their computer bulletin board, claim that
their board contained "work product material" and cite
Section 2000aa. The government contends, however, that the
material on the board is their pornographic inventory, which
should be considered merely a type of documentary material as
defined by the stature rather than an type of work product
protected by the Act, since work product, as stated in the
legislative history involves a creative, mental process which
is not evident here."
8. I simply disagree with Mr. Scoble. To support this position,
let us describe one of the processes whereby AABBS has
electronically published over 20,000 GIFs. Robert Thomas employs
models and takes photos of them, many of the not dissimilar to
those found in Playboy or Penthouse. He scans in the film, edits
the resultant image (much as Playboy airbrushes photographs) and
adds the copyright information identifying AABBS. He then writes
a description of the GIF, and then loads both the GIF and the
related description into the data base available for his paying
members. If this is not "a creative, mental process," we don't
know how the U.S. Attorney would describe one. This information
was available to Inspector Dirmeyer or if he had any doubts about
the matter, he could have asked. Many of these GIFs are of humorous
intent, which, like obscenity is in the eye of the beholder.
9. Arguing from Mr. Scobles' point of view, we could conceded
that the dozen GIFs and tapes sought under the warrant might be
considered obscene in Tennessee or other backwater parts of the
United States, and therefore these particular items might not be
under the protection of 2000aa in that location no matter how much
artistry was involved in making them. The GIFs in question are
considered silly or mildly amusing by most AABBS members. It
should be noted (though this is not a defense) that very similar or
even identical GIFs are common items in thousands or tens of
thousands of computer systems, including virtually all universities
and a number of adult BBSs in Tennessee. If Mr. Scoble considers
the tapes obscene by San Francisco standards, I am certain he could
be shown open sources of these tapes within a mile of the Federal
building.
10. However, by numeric count there are less then one in a
thousand were deemed obscene by inspector Dirmeyer. Does this
negate the protection of everything (email included) within the
computer or all (most of it legal even by his standards) creative
work in process?
11. As the Affidavit itself states, the same BBS, content, and
video tapes were examined image by image, and tape by tape for five
weeks two years ago by the San Jose Police Department. The
affidavit clearly states that the SJPD found no evidenced of a
crime at that time. It is to be presumed that the police were
judging what they looked at by local community standards, and thus
the material involved (which has not changed one bit in character
since that time) is protected under 2000aa in the Northern District
of California if not elsewhere.
12. This does present an interesting problem for the courts!
Material could be considered obscene and not protected in one
District, and protected under 2000aa in another because of
differing community standards. Had the BBS been located in
Tennessee, a objection to the legality of the warrant because it
violated 2000aa might not be valid, but the 2000aa violation
occurred in the Northern District of California, and not in the
Western District of Tennessee, and thus local community standards
here must be used. It is apparent from the warrant itself (which
reported on the search two years ago) that there was strong reason
to believe that the BBS material was not obscene under local
standards
13. The doctrine of "community standards" brings up another
problem-- which community? Before electronic communications became
so pervasive, community was describes as physically proximate
neighbors. Nowadays, people properly speak of the global village.
People well connected to the net are more likely to have a strong
feeling of community with those they associate with electronically
than they are of their next door neighbors.
14. If "community" is considered to be made up of the 3500 people
who pay for memberships on AABSS, they certainly would not consider
the material obscene and thus subject to censorship. The same
could be said of those who read and download GIFs (which are at
least as raunchy as any on AABBS) from the largest groups on the
Internet, alt.sex[.bondage, .homosexual, .bestiality, etc.] The
net community, it should be noted, "interprets censorship as damage
and routes around it."
15. It is hard to determine the reasons the Western District of
Tennessee has reached out in an attempt to impose their standards
on the Northern District of California. Perhaps it is the simple
desire to obtain tens of thousands of dollars worth of computer
equipment. Had they applied for a warrant to search an adult book
store in San Francisco, they would have been laughed out of court.
Is an electronic version of an adult book store *that* different?
16. If they really have a concern that their citizens need
protection from the evils of either coast, they could have applied
for an injunction to prevent AABBS from doing business with any
citizen of Tennessee. In fact, a simple letter asking the AABBS
sysop not to do business with residents of Tennessee, or asking
that he limit what was available to them would have sufficed, since
it would have cost him under ten customers out of 3,500.
17. Quoting Mr. Scoble on page 10 line 11 through page 10 line 1:
"The defendants claim that the search and subsequent seizure
of their computer bulletin board system violates the Electronic
Communication Privacy Act (ECPA) Tile [sic] 18, United States Code
Section 2701 at seq. No such violation occurred."
18. In the very next sentence he quotes the relevant part of what
actions are required to violate the law, "or prevent the authorized
access to electronic communications." It does not require a degree
in computer science to see that authorized access to electronic
communications on the BBS were prevented during the five days it
was in the hands of agent Dirmeyer and the San Jose Police.
19. Mr. Scoble then describes the requirements to avoid being
subject to section 2701, namely the requirement for warrants for
mail which has been in the system for less than 180 days. No
warrant for *any* email was sought, because, I suspect, no
justification was available to intercept or interfere with any
member's electronic mail. He goes on to describe how careful the
agents were not to read the electronic mail while ignoring the
undisputed fact that they prevented authorized access to electronic
communications for all 3500 AABBS members for five days. It would
be interesting to ask Inspector Dirmeyer's superiors how the Postal
Service would react to someone taking a mailbox full of letters and
keeping it for 5 days. It is an easy prediction that the Postal
Service would consider taking a mailbox to be a violation of law,
weather the person taking the mailbox steamed open the letters or
not.
20. While interception in the fundamental sense of taking a
mailbox full of letters may have occurred, U.S. Attorney Scoble may
have such case as law as exists on his side in his claim on page 12
that an "Intercept" under the restricted meaning of Section 2510
may not have occurred. (Steve Jackson Games, Inc. vs. United States
Secret Service, 816 F.Supp. 432 W.D.Tex, 1993). This case is also
on point for 2000aa because it was found that the government agents
should have used less intrusive methods (i.e., subpoenas).
21. A subpoena certainly would have sufficed in this case. Robert
Thomas was willing, and stated so at the time of the search, to
provide copies of any file the agents wanted. (Why not? Any
member including Agent Dirmeyer could access the same GIFs from any
place in the world, including any courtroom.) Even though this
method was mentioned in the Affidavit as a desirable and less
invasive alternative to the search, the agents made no mention of
it at the time nor did not take Mr. Thomas up on his offer. It is
my belief that they wanted illegal access to electronic mail as
well as access to the membership base and the member's personal
passwords for the purpose of entrapment. I consider this an
example of bad faith on the part of Inspector Dirmeyer, along with
the his threats against Robert Thomas not to reveal who "Lance
White" was and his botched attempt to frame Robert Thomas on a
child pornography charge. The last charge in the indictment is
clearly bogus--because Agent Dirmeyer himself describes the package
of child pornography as "sent without his knowledge" [referring to
Thomas.] This level of lawlessness among those charged with
upholding the law should be entirely unacceptable to the courts.
22. The warrant affidavit itself reports on the failed previous
attempt to find child pornography on AABBS. Robert Thomas would
never put child pornography on his BBS, and would not permit others
to do so either. He has a widely known reputation for running a
"tight ship" at AABBS.
23. In consideration of the forgoing, claimants pray that all
fruits of this illegal search be returned to them, and the evidence
suppressed.
Respectfully submitted by
Richard D. Williams
Attorney for defendants/claimants
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 17 Apr 1994 19:38:24 +0200
From: Thomas_Ghezzi@INFORMABOX.INFORMACOM.CH(Thomas Ghezzi)
Subject: File 4--CuD Source in Switzerland
Here is another CuD source for European users in
Switzerland: informabox BBS: ++41 (0)41 55 60 59
The informabox BBS is a non-profit BBS. BBS-Usersoftware: TeleFinder for
Macintosh, Windows or Terminal-Emulation.
When you need more information about the bbs, than write me. Have a nice
time and I wait for the next CuD edition.
Best regardsIII
Thomas Ghezzi
informabox % Rothenhalde 5 % 6015 Reussbuehl % Switzerland
++41 (0)41 55 60 59 (BBS) % informabox (Fido 2:301/xxx)
++41 (0)41 55 60 51 (Voice) % ++41 (0)41 55 60 51 (Telefax)
Thomas_Ghezzi@informabox.informacom.ch % applelink informacom
------------------------------
Date: Sun, 17 Apr 1994 02:50:30 -0400 (EDT)
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@EFF.ORG>
Subject: File 5--Dutch Government wants to ban encryption!
A prime example of lousy US Administration policy setting "precedents" of
decidely questionable merit internationally. Any more detailed info on
this is welcome; pass it around, and cc it to mech@eff.org if you would.
Similar material from elsewhere is also welcome.
This and anything else I find out will be archived at:
ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Legislation/Foreign_and_local/Netherlands/
gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Legislation/Foreign_and_local/Netherlands
gopher://gopher.eff.org/11/EFF/Legislation/Foreign_and_local/Netherlands
http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/Legislation/Foreign_and_local/Netherlands/
______ begin fwd _____________
From: W.H.Sonnemans@kub.nl
Date--28 Mar 94 15:30:21 MET
Subject--Dutch Goverment wants to ban Encryption!
A News Flash from Holland:
The Dutch Department of Justice has pressed for legislation on
encryption. A parlemantary commitee is currently working on a
proposal that would effectively outlaw possesion, use, trade of
encryption devices. The commitee is constructing a proposal
which would tie a license to use of goverment approved encryption
devices. The proposal is prepared in secrecy but some details have
already leaked. Supposedly anyone who is caught using encryption on a
telephone line is fined and loses his telephone connection for three
? days. Your worst nightmare is becoming our reality. And what makes
it worse; the work of on the proposal has kept a low profile to avoid
public discussions on the matter. A member of the press interviewed
some members of parliament on the pre-proposal, one didn't know what
it was about, the other one knew something but stated that it did not
interest him! Here in Holland the public awareness concerning
encryption is very low. Unlike in the United States the use of
computers in the home is not that common. We will have a hard time
convincing our parliament to thoroughly evaluate any proposal
concerning encryption that might be introduced. Assisting the
parliament with the technical expertise to get them to truly
understand encryption and the implications of legislation wiil be our
main goal.
I hope that this information is of use,
With Regards,
Wim Sonnemans
W.H.Sonnemans@kub.nl
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 12 Apr 94 15:20:10 EDT
From: dlmgam@AOL.COM
Subject: File 6--Possible Skipjack algorithm leak
The following comes from: PC Week ('The National Newspaper of
Corporate Computing') April 11, 1994, Volume 11, Number 14, page 162,
article by Spencer F. Katt. I quote:
"Spencer's Clipper chip paranoia tidbit of the week was provided by a
Beltway gossiper claiming the Clinton administration is fearful that
an upcoming spy trial may reveal that the Skipjack algorithm made its
way to the U.S.S.R. (when there was such a place). The tipster
claimed the administration was working hard to confirm either way."
If this IS true, or even if this MAY be true, then WHY is the
government still pushing the Clipper Chip? Are they next going to
tell us that the Clipper Chip can not be reverse-engineered even WITH
the Skipjack algorithm?
Even if this is NOT true, I think it DOES bring up yet another reason
why mandated encryption in conjunction with outlawing alternative
encryption schemes is a Bad Idea (as if the Constitution and Bill of
Rights were not already good enough reasons).
Katt can be reached at: spencer@pcweek.ziff.com
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 18 Apr 94 22:04:13 -0700
From: tmp@NETCOM.COM
Subject: File 7--Clipper Satire
THE ROYAL CASTLE
Office of the Imperial Secretary
____________________________________________________
For Immediate Release April 1, 1894
STATEMENT BY THE IMPERIAL SECRETARY
Our Glorious Emperor today announced a new initiative that will bring
the Imperial Government together with industry in an involuntary but
nevertheless magnificent program to improve the security and privacy
of restroom accommodations while meeting most of the critical needs
of official government spies.
The initiative will involve the creation of new products to accelerate
the development and deployment of advanced and secure latrine
networks and State sewage facilities.
For too long there has been great whining, shrieking, agitation, even
terrorism, sabotage -- and scurrilous insults upon His Honor! -- from
heretical revolutionaries aimed at our hallowed institutions of
imperial law enforcement, all desperate attempts to ridicule our
meticulously crafted rhetoric about the grave tensions of plumbing
entrepreneurialism threatening the holy, universally-accepted
sanctity of government sewage surveillance (both foreign and
domestic). Rather than use our grand imperial technology to
accommodate the compatible interests of plumbing vitality, individual
privacy, and State sewage inspections, recent events have pitted our
Imperial Government against communist revolutionaries and evil madmen
hellbent on evil destruction.
Sophisticated plumbing technology has been used for years for
freshwater transfer. It is now being used in newfangled -- and at
times somewhat scary -- contraptions called "toilets" to convey
wastewater to cleaning plants. While sound plumbing technology can
help royal subjects protect their drinking water from contamination
and leaks in the way of their official allotments, and effectively
rid dirty household wastes from personal concern, it can also be used
by terrorists, drug dealers, pedophiles and other criminals to
conceal invariably damning evidence -- i.e. when they flush it down
their toilets.
A state-of-the-art apparatus called the "Crapper Sieve" has been
developed by the most ingenious Imperial engineers. The device
represents a New World Order in plumbing technology. It can be used
in these new, relatively inexpensive plumbing devices ("toilets")
that are attached to ordinary pipes. It filters wastewater using a
sophisticated technique that is more powerful than many in use today
(note that most people are not currently using any at all).
This new technology will help individuals rid themselves of their
everyday wastes and prevent the embarrassing unauthorized release of
their personal bodily fluids. At the same time this technology
preserves the ability of Imperial, state and local law enforcement
agencies to intercept lawfully the characteristically damning refuse
of criminals.
A "key-escrow" system will be established to ensure that the "Crapper
Sieve" protects the privacy of loyal imperial subjects and
incriminates everyone else (erring of course on the side of ensuring
the highest levels of purity). Each device is equipped with a trapdoor
requiring two unique "keys" that will be used by authorized
government spies to intercept any damning evidence recovered by the
sieve. When the device is manufactured, the two keys will be
deposited separately in two "key-escrow" piles, at locations
designated by the Key Commissioner, to be disclosed at a future date,
but guaranteed to lie on closely-guarded Imperial property and be at
least two feet apart. Access to the piles will be strictly limited
to government spies with legal authorization to conduct a toilet-tap.
(Excessive bribes are explicitly prohibited.)
The "Crapper Sieve" technology provides Imperial spies with absolutely
no new authorities to access the content of the private sewage of
Imperial subjects. It merely upholds the status quo and Imperial
tradition of thorough, state-of-the-art waste monitoring programs.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of this new technology, the Key
Commissioner will soon purchase several thousand of the new devices
and install them free of cost to the government in select areas
(foreign embassies, crack houses, convention centers, and homes of
private citizens with names starting with letters `Q-Z', with `X'
exempt). In addition, acclaimed and celebrated experts seemingly
independent from the government will be offered access to the
confidential details of the sieve to assess its capabilities and
publicly report their wholehearted approval and effusive
commendations.
The Sieve is an important step in addressing the problem of plumbing's
dual-edge sword: plumbing helps to transport the waste of
individuals and industry, but it also can shield criminals and
terrorists. Clearly, we need the "Crapper Sieve" and other approaches
that can both provide loyal subjects with access to the plumbing they
need and prevent criminals from using it to hide their crimes against
the State. In order to assess technology trends and explore new
approaches (like the key-escrow system), Our Glorious Emperor has
directed all Imperial agencies to develop a comprehensive policy on
plumbing that addresses:
-- the obsession of privacy among our citizens, including the need to
employ plumbing for personal hygiene;
-- the ability of authorized official spies to access private
plumbing, under imperial edict or other equally impressive legal
order, when necessary to protect loyal subjects and imprison the
revolutionaries, troublemakers, and hooligans;
-- the effective and timely use of the most modern technology to build
the National Plumbing Infrastructure needed to maximize Imperial
taxes, monitor the populace, and isolate us from enemy countries;
-- the most expedient coercion on companies to manufacture what the
government identifies as appropriate high technology plumbing.
His Royal Highness has directed evasive and infrequent consultations
with affected parties as policy options are developed to prevent
state secrets from falling into the hands of the numerous enemy spies
and traitors that have infiltrated the country and lurk everywhere
among us.
Since plumbing technology will no doubt play an increasingly important
role in the National Plumbing Infrastructure, the Imperial Government
is acting quickly to implement it steathily and covertly, and
ruthlessly silence all dissent. His Splended Grandeur is committed
to policies that protect all loyalists' access to state-sponsored
sewage conveyance while also protecting them from the dangerous
lunatics and traitors among us that question reason and sabotage the
State via illicit sewage effluxes.
Further information is provided in an accompanying fact sheet.
For additional details, call Mat Heyman, National Institute of
Standards and Technology, (301) 975-2758.
-----------------------------------
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE IMPERIAL ROYALTY'S
"PLUMBING ESCROW" INITIATIVE
Q: Does this approach expand the authority of government spies to
tap sewage flows?
A: No. "Crapper Sieve" technology provides law enforcement with no
new authorities to access the content of the private sewage of
loyal citizens. Imperial spies and police in our administration
have always routinely intercepted illegal refuse. Rest assured that
only disloyal citizens will ever be subject to inspections.
Q: Who will run the key-escrow data banks?
A: The two key-escrow data banks will be run by two independent
entities, for example, His Royal Gloriousness and his current
mistress, or trusted Imperial advisors while they are "busy".
Q: How strong is the security in the device? How can I be sure
how strong the security is?
A: We are pleased to inform you that this system affords the state
the highest level of security. While the device plans will remain
secret to perpetuate Imperial authoritarianism and control over
subjects, we are willing to invite an independent panel of
plumbing experts to evaluate the scheme if they promise to assure
all potential users that there are no vulnerabilities and
compliment His Royal Emminence in some novel and pleasant way.
Q: Whose decision was it to propose this product?
A: Ours.
Q: Who was consulted?
A: Miscellaneous bureacrats at every level in the administration. Even
His Highest Magnificence was even present on one occasion.
Q: Will the government provide the hardware to manufacturers?
A: Absolutely not! Manufacturers will be required to provide the
hardware to the Imperial Royalty.
Q: How do I buy one of these sieve devices?
A: We are in the process of coercing all latrine manufacturers to
incorporate the "Crapper Sieve" into their devices. Eventually you
will pay through an invisible "Crapper Tax".
Q: If the Imperial Administration were unable to find a
technological solution like the one proposed, would the Royalty
have to resort to more extreme measures, such as torture?
A: The Royalty is not saying, "since private toilets threaten the
public safety and effective government spying, we will prohibit
them outright"; nor are we saying that "every citizen, as a matter
of right, is entitled to unmonitored sewage." There is a false
"tension" created in the assessment that this issue is an
"either-or" proposition. Rather, both concerns can be, and in fact
are, harmoniously balanced through a reasoned, balanced approach
such as is proposed with the "Crapper Sieve".
------------------------------
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.35
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