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Computer Undergroud Digest Vol. 06 Issue 88
Computer underground Digest Sun Oct 10, 1994 Volume 6 : Issue 88
ISSN 1004-042X
Editors: Jim Thomas and Gordon Meyer (TK0JUT2@NIU.BITNET)
Archivist: Brendan Kehoe
Retiring Shadow Archivist: Stanton McCandlish
Shadow-Archivists: Dan Carosone / Paul Southworth
Ralph Sims / Jyrki Kuoppala
Ian Dickinson
Urban Legend Editor: E. Greg Shrdlugold
CONTENTS, #6.88 (Sun, Oct 10, 1994)
File 1--EFF Statement on Passage of Digital Telephony Act
File 2--The DT bill just passed in the Senate.
File 3--EPIC on Wiretap Bill Passag
File 4--Computer Freedom and Privacy-95 Conf info (corrected ver.)
File 5--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 10 Sept 1994)
CuD ADMINISTRATIVE, EDITORIAL, AND SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION APPEARS IN
THE CONCLUDING FILE AT THE END OF EACH ISSUE.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Sat, 8 Oct 1994 15:23:26 -0400 (EDT)
From: Stanton McCandlish <mech@EFF.ORG>
Subject: File 1--EFF Statement on Passage of Digital Telephony Act
EFF Statement on and Analysis of Digital Telephony Act
------------------------------------------------------
October 8, 1994
Washington, DC - Congress late Friday (10/7) passed and sent to the President
the Edwards/Leahy Digital Telephony Legislation (HR 4922/S 2375). The bill
places functional design requirements on telecommunications carriers in
order to enable law enforcement to continue to conduct electronic
surveillance pursuant to a court order, though the bill does not expand law
enforcement authority to conduct wiretaps. Moreover, the design
requirements do not apply to providers or operators of online services such
as the Internet, BBS's, Compuserve, and others. The bill also contains
significant new privacy protections, including increased protection for
online personal information, and requirements prohibiting the use of pen
registers to track the physical location of individuals.
Jerry Berman, EFF's Policy Director, said: "Although we remain unconvinced
that this legislation is necessary, the bill draws a hard line around the
Internet and other online networks. We have carved cyberspace out of this
legislation".
Berman added, "The fact that the Internet, BBS's, Prodigy, and other online
networks are not required to meet the surveillance capability requirements
is a significant victory for all users of this important communications
medium."
Privacy Protections for Online Personal Information Increased
-------------------------------------------------------------
The bill adds a higher standard for law enforcement access to online
transactional information. For maintenance and billing purposes, most
online communications and information systems create detailed records of
users' communication activities as well as lists of the information,
services, or people that they have accessed or contacted. Under current
law, the government can gain access to such transactional records with a
mere subpoena, which can be obtained without the intervention of a court.
To address this issue, EFF pushed for the addition of stronger protections
against indiscriminate access to online transactional records.
Under the new protections, law enforcement must convince a court to issue
an order based on a showing of "specific and articulable facts" which prove
that the information sought would be relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.
Berman said: "The new legal protections for transactional information are
critical in that they recognize that these records are extremely sensitive
and deserve a high degree of protection from casual law enforcement access.
With these provisions, we have achieved for all online systems a
significantly greater level of protection than exists today for any other
form of electronic communication, including the telephone."
EFF to Continue to Monitor Implementation
-----------------------------------------
Berman added: "There are numerous opportunities under this bill for public
oversight and intervention to ensure that privacy is not short-changed.
EFF will closely monitor the bill's implementation, and we stand ready to
intervene if privacy is threatened."
In the first four years, the government is required to reimburse carriers
for all costs associated with meeting the design requirements of the bill.
After four years, the government is required to reimburse carriers for all
costs for enhancements that are not "reasonably achievable", as determined
in a proceeding before the FCC. The FCC will determine who bears the costs
in terms of the impact on privacy, costs to consumers, national security
and public safety, the development of technology, and other factors. If
the FCC determines that compliance is not reasonably achievable, the
government will either be required to reimburse the carrier or consider it
to be in compliance without modification.
Berman said: "EFF is committed to making a case before the FCC, at the
first possible opportunity, that government reimbursement is an essential
back-stop against unnecessary or unwanted surveillance capabilities. If
the government pays, it will have an incentive to prioritize, which will
further enhance public accountability and protect privacy."
EFF Decision to Work on Legislation
-----------------------------------
Since 1992 EFF, in conjunction with the Digital Privacy and Security
Working Group (a coalition of over 50 computer, communications, and public
interest organizations and associations working on communications privacy
issues, coordinated by EFF) has been successful at stopping a series of FBI
Digital Telephony proposals, which would have forced communications
companies to install wiretap capability into every communications medium.
However, earlier this year, Senator Leahy and Rep. Edwards, who have helped
to quash previous FBI proposals, concluded that passage of such a bill this
year was inevitable. Leahy and Edwards stepped in to draft a narrow bill
with strong privacy protections, and asked for EFF's help in the process.
"By engaging in this process for the last several months," Berman noted,
"we have been successful in helping to craft a proposal that is
significantly improved over the FBI's original bill in terms of privacy,
technology policy, and civil liberties, and have, in the process, added
significant new privacy protections for users of communications networks.
We commend Representative Edwards, Senator Leahy, and Representatives
Boucher and Markey for standing up for civil liberties and pushing for
strong privacy protections."
The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is a non-profit public interest
organization dedicated to achieving the democratic potential of new
communications technology and works to protect civil liberties in new
digital environments.
Other Privacy Protections Added by the Bill
-------------------------------------------
The bill also adds the following new privacy protections
* The standard for law enforcement access to online transactional records
is raised to require a court order instead of a mere subpoena.
* No expansion of law enforcement authority to conduct electronic
surveillance.
* The bill recognizes a citizen's right to use encryption.
* All authorized surveillance must be conducted with the affirmative
intervention of the telecommunications carrier. Monitoring
triggered remotely by law enforcement is prohibited.
* Privacy advocates will be able to track law enforcement requests
for surveillance capability, and expenditures for all surveillance
capability and capacity added under this bill will be open to
public scrutiny.
* Privacy protections must be maintained in making new technologies
conform to the requirements of the bill, and privacy advocates may
intervene in the administrative standard setting process.
* Information gleaned from pen register devices is limited to dialed
number information only. Law enforcement may not receive location
information.
Analysis of and comments on major provisions of the bill
--------------------------------------------------------
A. Key new privacy protections
1. Expanded protection for transactional records sought by law
enforcement
Senator Leahy and Rep. Edwards have agreed that law enforcement access to
transactional records in online communication systems (everything from the
Internet to AOL to hobbyist BBSs) threatens privacy rights because the
records are personally identifiable, because they reveal the content of
people's communications, and because the compilation of such records makes
it easy for law enforcement to create a detailed picture of people's lives
online. Based on this recognition, the draft bill contains the following
provisions:
i. Court order required for access to transactional records instead of
mere subpoena
In order to gain access to transactional records, such as a list of to whom
a subject sent email, which online discussion group one subscribes to, or
which movies you request on a pay-per view channel, law enforcement will
have to prove to a court, by the showing of "specific and articulable
facts" that the records requested are relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation. This means that the government may not request volumes of
transactional records merely to see what it can find through traffic
analysis. Rather, law enforcement will have to prove to a court that it has
reason to believe that it will find some specific information that is
relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation in the records that it
requests.
With these provisions, we have achieved for all online systems, a
significantly greater level of protection than currently exists for
telephone toll records. The lists of telephone calls that are kept by local
and long distance phone companies are available to law enforcement without
any judicial intervention at all. Law enforcement gains access to hundreds
of thousands of such telephone records each year, without a warrant and
without even notice to the citizens involved. Court order protection will
make it much more difficult for law enforcement to go on "fishing
expeditions" through online transactional records, hoping to find evidence
of a crime by accident.
ii. Standard of proof much greater than for telephone toll records, but
below that for content
The most important change that these new provisions offer, is that law
enforcement will (a) have to convince a judge that there is reason to look
at a particular set of records, and (b) have to expend the time and energy
necessary to have a US Attorney or DA actually present a case before a
court. However, the burden or proof to be met by the government in such a
proceeding is lower than required for access to the content of a
communication.
2. New protection for location-specific information available in
cellular, PCS and other advanced networks
Much of the electronic surveillance conducted by law enforcement today
involves gathering telephone dialing information through a device known as
a pen register. Authority to attach pen registers is obtained merely by
asserting that the information would be relevant to a criminal
investigation. Courts have no authority to deny pen register requests.
This legislation offers significant new limits on the use of pen register
data.
Under this bill, when law enforcement seeks pen register information from a
carrier, the carrier is forbidden to deliver to law enforcement any
information which would disclose the location or movement of the calling or
called party. Cellular phone networks, PCS systems, and so-called
"follow-me" services all store location information in their networks.
This new limitation is a major safeguard which will prevent law enforcement
from casually using mobile and intelligent communications services as
nation-wide tracking systems.
i. New limitations on "pen register" authority
Law enforcement must use "technology reasonably available" to limit pen
registers to the collection of calling number information only. Currently,
law enforcement is able to capture not only the telephone number dialed,
but also any other touch-tone digits dialed which reflect the user's
interaction with an automated information service on the other end of the
line, such as an automatic banking system or a voice-mail password.
3. Bill does not preclude use of encryption
Unlike previous Digital Telephony proposals, this bill places no obligation
on telecommunication carriers to decipher encrypted messages, unless the
carrier actually holds the key. The bill in no way prohibits citizens from
using encryption.
4. Automated remote monitoring precluded
Law enforcement is specifically precluded from having automated, remote
surveillance capability. Any electronic surveillance must be initiated by
an employee of the telecommunications carrier.
5. Privacy considerations essential to development of new technology
One of the requirements that telecommunications carriers must meet to be in
compliance with the Act is that the wiretap access methods adopted must
protect the privacy and security of each user's communication. If this
requirement is not met, anyone may petition the FCC to have the wiretap
access service be modified so that network security is maintained. So, the
technology used to conduct wiretaps cannot also jeopardize the security of
the network as a whole. If network-wide security problems arise because of
wiretapping standards, then the standards can be overturned.
6. Increased Public Accountability
All law enforcement requests for surveillance capability and capacity, as
well as all expenditures paid by law enforcement to telecommunications
carriers and all modifications made by carriers to comply with this bill,
will be accountable to the public. The government is also required to pay
for all upgrades, in both capability and capacity, in the first four years,
and all costs after four years for incorporating the capability
requirements in the costs for meeting those requirements are not
'reasonably achievable'. A determination of whether compliance after four
years is reasonably achievable will be made by the FCC in an open and
public proceeding. Government reimbursement for compliance costs will
permit the public the opportunity to decide whether additional surveillance
capability is necessary.
In all, the reimbursement requirements combined with the reporting
requirements and the open processes built in to this bill, law enforcement
surveillance capability, capacity, and expenditures will be more
accountable to the public than ever before.
B. Draconian provisions softened
In addition, the surveillance requirements imposed by the bill are not as
far-reaching as the original FBI version. A number of procedural
safeguards are added which seek to minimize the threatens to privacy,
security, and innovation. Though the underlying premise of the Act is
still cause for concern, these new limitations deserve attention:
1. Narrow Scope
The bill explicitly excludes Internet providers, email systems, BBSs, and
other online services. Unlike the bills previously proposed by the FBI,
this bill is limited to local and long distance telephone companies,
cellular and PCS providers, and other common carriers.
2. Open process with public right of intervention
The public will have access to information about the implementation of the
Act, including open access to all standards adopted in compliance with the
Act, the details of how much wiretap capacity the government demands, and a
detailed accounting of all federal money paid to carriers for modifications
to their networks. Privacy groups, industry interests, and anyone else has
a statutory right under this bill to challenge implementation steps taken
by law enforcement if they threaten privacy or impede technology
advancement.
3. Technical requirements standards developed by industry instead of
the Attorney General
All surveillance requirements are to be implemented according to standards
developed by industry groups. The government is specifically precluded
from forcing any particular technical standard, and all requirements are
qualified by notions of economic and technical reasonableness.
4. Right to deploy untappable services
Unlike the original FBI proposal, this bill recognizes that there may be
services which are untappable, even with Herculean effort to accommodate
surveillance needs. In provisions that still require some strengthening,
the bill allows untappable services to be deployed if redesign is not
economically or technically feasible.
Background Information
----------------------
* The Bill:
ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel94.bill
gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony, digtel94.bill
http.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/digtel94.bill
All other files available from
ftp.eff.org, /pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/Old/
gopher.eff.org, 1/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/Old
http.eff.org/pub/EFF/Policy/Digital_Telephony/Old/
* EFF Analysis of Bill as Introduced: digtel94_analysis.eff
* EFF Statement on Earlier 1994 Draft of Bill: digtel94_old_statement.eff
* EFF Analysis of Earlier 1994 Draft: digtel94_draft_analysis.eff
* EFF Statement on Announcement of 1994 Draft: digtel94.announce
* EFF Statement on Announcement of 1993 Draft: digtel93.announce
* Late 1993/Early 1994 Draft: digtel94_bill.draft
* EFF Statement on 1992 Draft: digtel92_analysis.eff
* EFF Statement on 1992 Draft: digtel92_opposition.announce
* Late 1992 Draft: digtel92_bill.draft
* Original 1992 Draft: digtel92_old_bill.draft
For more information Contact
----------------------------
Jerry Berman Policy Director <jberman@eff.org>
Jonah Seiger Project Coordinator <jseiger@eff.org>
+1 202 347 5400 (voice)
+1 202 393 5509 (fax)
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 8 Oct 1994 00:55:41 -0400 (EDT)
From: "Shabbir J. Safdar" <shabbir@PANIX.COM>
Subject: File 2--The DT bill just passed in the Senate.
The Wiretap Watch
Final Issue
October 7, 1994
Distribute Widely
Recent Quotes: (It's been a busy week, we've answered over 2,000 emails)
"I think we should adjourn now [..] the country is safer when
we're not in session."
-Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) on C-SPAN
"Senator Wallop's office, may I help you?"
"Yes, I called to register my support for the Senator's
concerned position on the bill."
"Ok, got it. Thanks"
"Have there been a lot of calls today? Dozens? Fifty?"
"Hundreds so far today."
-A conversation I had earlier today with Sen. Wallop's
office
"I called Feinstein again and the offical breakfast food is
still a waffle."
-Another California caller on Feinstein's FBI Wiretap
position
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Contents
A look back at the bill
What you should do right now
Positions of legislators pro and con
Status of the bills
Brief explanation of the bill
-------------------------------------------------------------------
A LOOK BACK AT THE BILL
As you may have already discovered the Senate passed the bill tonight
on "unanimous consent". Although I will leave the soothsaying to more
eloquent folks, there are a number of things that need to be said and
people that need to be thanked.
1. A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT WAS ACCOMPLISHED WITH THIS LEGISLATIVE FIGHT
During this campaign, we asked people to contact several legislators
about the bill. This was a very effective means ofat mobilizing people.
When we put out the word that Senator Wallop needed support, hundreds of
calls were received the very next day -- their office was stunned.
This is the first time many of the sitting legislators learned that
constituents were concerned about privacy. We have begun to teach
them that this is an important issue. Educating a legislator is an
ongoing process that we'll continue to assist with in preparation for
the elections. It would be great if legislators begin to consider what
effects their actions will have on "the privacy vote."
Sincere thanks go out to the literally thousands of people who took the
time to call their legislators. The response we received to our alerts
was amazing. The mail itself was overwhelming; the letters really
kept us going on those late nights. When people wrote to us, saying
that they had faxed our press release to a dozen papers and called the
same number of legislators, it seemed inconceivable that we should let
something as minor as sleep slow us down.
Thanks to everyone who contributed by calling and faxing (and sending in
corrections). It appears that our technique of providing excellent
information with the research done for the reader is a technique people
appreciate. We'll continue to refine it in preparation for the next
legislative session.
2. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE
Much worse versions of the DT bill have been introduced. They were all
killed before really getting anywhere. When this version was brought up,
the EFF had a difficult decision in front of them: assume the soothsayers
were right about it passing this year and try to hack in some privacy
provisions, or try and mount a fight against it. Other factors such as
organizational direction played a part in this decision I'm sure, but I'm
not qualified to talk about that. (I'm about as far from an EFF insider
as you can get.)
There are several privacy provisions that have been added to the bill.
Had the EFF not intervened, they would not be there. PERIOD. I think
we owe them a thank you for that.
Did they really know what they were doing or was it a lucky guess?
Who's to say; we all have 20/20 hindsight. When EFF made this
decision, it was months ago. They were like an ace-in-the-hole should
the bill pass.
3. THIS IS STILL A PROCESS THE PUBLIC NEEDS TO MONITOR
There are several ways in which the powers in the bill could be abused
by law enforcement. The bill provides law enforcement with unprecedented
assurance that a wiretap will always be available. This will subtly
change the way law enforcement does its work. ("When your most ubiqitous
tool in a hammer, the world starts to look a lot like nails..")
Furthermore the process for creating the wiretap functionality standards
truly rests in the hands of the FCC. We have seen from past experience
with the CallerID blocking fiasco that the FCC is not the bastion
of privacy that we wish it was. In that instance, there was significant
public outcry against the proposal, and yet privacy still lost.
What's the good news? There are organizations who we can count on to
watchdog this process. The EFF wrote most (if not all) of the privacy
provisions of the bill. They will be in a great position to monitor
the progress of this process and ensure that not just the LETTER of
the privacy provisions are followed, but the SPIRIT as well.
Furthermore, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) is
aggressive in their FOIA efforts, which keep our government honest. I
sleep better at nights knowing they're keeping an eye out. I would
have given my left foot to be in the courtroom this week with EPIC when
the FBI's counsel asked for a five year delay on releasing twenty
pages of wiretap data, and the judge told the attorney to "..call
Director Freeh and tell him I said this matter can be taken care of
in an hour and [a] half."
Finally, I want to take a moment to thank David Sobel, Marc Rotenberg,
& David Banisar of EPIC for all the help they gave us. Not being in
DC, its difficult for us to simply "drop by" the office of a swing vote
legislator and present our arguments. We're very grateful to them for
this.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
WHAT YOU SHOULD DO RIGHT NOW
Nothing for the moment. The Senate passed the Digital Telephony bill
(S. 2375) a few minutes before adjournment tonight. The various holds
put on it by Republican Senators were removed and the bill passed on
"unanimous consent". This means that there was no opposition to it.
President Clinton is almost certain to sign it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
STATUS
STATUS SB 2375
It passed on the evening of Oct. 7 on unanimous consent literally
minutes before the Congress adjourned.
STATUS HR 4922
It passed on the evening of Oct. 5 on a voice vote.
Oct 7, 94 The Senate passed S. 2375 on unanimous consent minutes
before adjournment.
Oct 6, 94 Nothing happened, though a Senate vote was expected. Several
Senators have placed holds on the bill.
Oct 5, 94 House passes HR 4922 on a voice vote.
Oct 4, 94 House is scheduled to vote on HR 4922, along with more than
50 other items on the "suspension calendar". The debate
took place tonight; the House vote was put off until Oct 5, '94.
Oct 3, 94 Judge Richey instructs the FBI to comply with a FOIA request
to make available their wiretap surveys (which they claim
justify their bill) by Nov. 1.
Sep 29, 94 HR 4922 marked up and reported out of the Hse. Jud. Comm
and nearly to the full House
Sep 28, 94 SB 2375 amended, marked up, and reported out of the Sen. Jud.
Comm. to the full Senate
Sep 15, 94 HR 4922 hearing held in the Telecommunications Comm.
Aug 18, 94 HR 4922 reported back to committee (write to Rep. Jack Brooks!)
Aug 11, 94 Sen. Leahy & Rep. Edwards hold a joint hearing on the bills in
Wash. DC at 1pm in Rayburn 2237.
Aug 10, 94 HR 4922 referred to Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
Aug 10, 94 SB 2375 referred to Subcomm. on Technology and the Law
Aug 9, 94 Rep. Hyde officially cosponsors HR 4922
Aug 9, 94 HR 4922 referred to House Judiciary Committee
Aug 9, 94 SB 2375 referred to Senate Judiciary Committee
Aug 9, 94 Identical House and Senate bills are announced by their respective
sponsors, Rep. Don Edwards (D-CA) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
EFF states the legislation is "not necessary" and predicts it
will pass regardless.
For more information about the Digital Telephony bills, check the
Voters Telecomm Watch gopher site (gopher.panix.com) or contact Steven
Cherry, VTW Press Contact at (718) 596-2851 or stc@vtw.org.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
FINAL POSITIONS OF LEGISLATORS
Because the Senate version passed with "unanimous consent", all of the
sitting Senators supported it. This means that if someone is a Senator,
they supported it. No fancy ASCII tables required.
Three representatives we know of opposed the bill in the House:
Dist ST Name, Address, and Party Phone Fax
==== == ======================== ============== ==============
4 CA Doolittle, John T. (R) 1-202-225-2511 1-202-225-5444
1 OR Furse, Elizabeth (D) 1-202-225-0855 na
12 NC Watt, Melvin* (D) 1-202-225-1510 1-202-225-1512
Please call them and thank them for their privacy stances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
BRIEF EXPLANATION OF THE BILLS
The FBI's Wiretap bills (also known as the DT - Digital Telephony bills)
mandate that *all* communications carriers must provide wiretap-ready
equipment so that the FBI can more easily implement their court-ordered
wiretaps. The costs of re-engineering all communications equipment will
be borne by the government, industry and consumers. It does not cover
information service providers.
The bill is vague and the standards defining "wiretap ready" do not
exist. Furthermore, the FBI has yet to make a case which demonstrates
that they have been unable to implement a single wiretap. Although
we as a society have accepted law enforcement's need to perform
wiretaps, it is not reasonable to mandate this functionality as a part
of the design. In itself, that would be an important debate. However
without any proof that this is indeed a realistic and present problem,
it is unacceptable and premature to pass this legislation today.
The Voters Telecomm Watch (VTW) does not believe the FBI has made a
compelling case to justify that all Americans give up their privacy.
Furthermore, the VTW does not believe the case has been made to justify
spending 500 million Federal dollars over the next several years to
re-engineer equipment to compromise privacy, interfere with
telecommunications privacy, and fulfill an unproven government need.
There are some privacy protections built into the bill. Their benefit
does not outweigh the damage that building wiretaps into all communication
does, however.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 8 Oct 1994 16:06:52 -0700
From: email list server <listserv@SUNNYSIDE.COM>
Subject: File 3--EPIC on Wiretap Bill Passag
EPIC on Wiretap Bill Passage
The passage of the FBI Wiretap Bill in the closing hours of the 103d
Congress demonstrates the need for continued and aggressive advocacy
in support of communications privacy. The legislation, which mandates
the re-design of the nation's telecommunications infrastructure to
facilitate government interception, was enacted with no floor debate
and no resolution of the lingering questions concerning the need for
such an unprecedented and far-reaching change in the law. The
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) opposed passage of the
bill and believes that its enactment could establish a dangerous
precedent for the design and development of the National Information
Infrastructure.
The grassroots campaign that emerged to oppose the wiretap legislation
shows the potential of the Internet as a means of educating the public
and promoting democratic participation in the policymaking process.
In the two-month period between the introduction of the legislation
and its enactment, grassroots efforts demonstrated that a measure
initially touted as a "compromise" bill was, in fact, a highly
controversial proposal. Numerous Congressional offices admitted to
being astounded by the number of calls and faxes they received in
opposition to the legislation as it moved to consideration in both
houses. EPIC believes that the on-line campaign to defeat the wiretap
bill can serve as a model for the Internet community to build upon in
the future. We congratulate the thousands of individuals who
participated in the process and wish to express our appreciation and
admiration for the work of the Voters Telecomm Watch (VTW) in bridging
the gap between Washington and activists around the country. EPIC
looks forward to continuing to work VTW, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Internet Business Association and the many other
organizations that joined us in opposing the FBI Wiretap Bill.
Implementation of the newly enacted legislation must be closely
monitored. EPIC is committed to continuing its efforts to obtain
relevant government data under the Freedom of Information Act,
including the aggressive pursuit of our pending litigation against the
FBI for the release of information cited in support of the wiretap
legislation. EPIC also intends to monitor proceedings in the Federal
Communications Commission pursuant to the new law and to participate
in such proceedings to protect the privacy interests of network users.
EPIC will also continue its research and advocacy activities in the
areas of encryption policy, medical records privacy, transactional
data privacy, proposed national identification systems, and other
issues now emerging with the advent of the information superhighway.
Electronic Privacy Information Center
666 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E.
Suite 301
Washington, DC 20003
(202) 544-9240 (voice)
(202) 547-5482 (fax)
info@epic.org (e-mail)
------------------------------
From: Judi Clark <judic@MANYMEDIA.COM>
Subject: File 4--Computer Freedom and Privacy-95 Conf info (corrected ver.)
Date: Fri, 7 Oct 1994 14:27:22 -0700 (PDT)
Call for Participation - CFP'95
The Fifth Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy
Sponsored by the ACM SIGCOMM, SIGCAS, SIGSAC and Stanford Law School
28 - 31 March 1995
San Francisco Airport Marriott Hotel, Burlingame, California
INVITATION
This is an invitation to submit session and topic proposals for
inclusion in the program of the Fifth Conference on Computers, Freedom
and Privacy. Proposals may be for individual talks, panel discussions,
debates, or other presentations in appropriate formats. Proposed topics
should be within the general scope of the conference, as outlined below.
SCOPE
The advance of computer and telecommunications technologies holds great
promise for individuals and society. From convenience for consumers and
efficiency in commerce to improved public health and safety and
increased participation in democratic institutions, these technologies
can fundamentally transform our lives. New computer and
telecommunications technologies are bringing new meanings to our
freedoms to speak, associate, be left alone, learn, and exercise
political power.
At the same time these technologies pose threats to the ideals of a
just, free, and open society. Personal privacy is increasingly at risk
from invasion by high-tech surveillance and eavesdropping. The myriad
databases containing personal information maintained in the public and
private sectors expose private life to constant scrutiny. Political,
social, and economic fairness may hinge on ensuring equal access to
these technologies, but how, at what cost, and who will pay?
Technological advances also enable new forms of illegal activity, posing
new problems for legal and law enforcement officials and challenging the
very definitions of crime and civil liberties. But technologies used to
combat these crimes can threaten the traditional barriers between the
individual and the state.
Even such fundamental notions as speech, assembly and property are being
transformed by these technologies, throwing into question the basic
Constitutional protections that have guarded them. Similarly,
information knows no borders; as the scope of economies becomes global
and as networked communities transcend international boundaries, ways
must be found to reconcile competing political, social, and economic
interests in the digital domain.
The Fifth Conference on Computers, Freedom and Privacy will assemble
experts, advocates and interested people from a broad spectrum of
disciplines and backgrounds in a balanced public forum to explore and
better understand how computer and telecommunications technologies are
affecting freedom and privacy in society. Participants will include
people from the fields of computer science, law, business, research,
information, library science, health, public policy, government, law
enforcement, public advocacy, and many others.
Topics covered in previous CFP conferences include:
Personal Information and Privacy
Access to Government Information
Computers in the Workplace
Electronic Speech, Press and Assembly
Governance of Cyberspace
Role of Libraries on the Information Superhighway
Law Enforcement and Civil Liberties
Privacy and Cryptography
Free Speech and the Public Communications Network
We are also actively seeking proposals with respect to other possible
topics on the general subject of computers, freedom and privacy. Some
new topics we are considering include:
Telecommuting: Liberation or Exploitation?
Courtesy, and the Freedom to be Obnoxious
Commercial Life on the Net
How Does the Net Threaten Government Power?
Universal Access to Network Services
The Meaning of Freedom in the Computer Age
Online Interaction and Communities
Government-Mandated Databases
PROPOSAL SUBMISSION
All proposals should be accompanied by a position statement of at least
one page, describing the proposed topic. Proposals for panel
discussions, debates and other multi-person presentations should include
a list of proposed participants and session chair. Proposals should be
sent to:
CFP'95 Proposals
Stanford Law and Technology Policy Center
Stanford Law School
Stanford, California 94305-8610
or by email to:
cfp95@forsythe.stanford.edu
with the word "Proposal" in the subject line. Proposals should be
submitted as soon as possible to allow thorough consideration for
inclusion in the formal program. The deadline for submissions is
1 November 1994.
STUDENT PAPER COMPETITION
Full time students are invited to enter the student paper competition.
Winners will receive a scholarship to attend the conference and present
their papers. Papers should not exceed 2,500 words and should examine
how computer and telecommunications technologies are affecting freedom
and privacy in society. All papers should be submitted to Professor
Gary T. Marx by 20 November 1994. Authors may submit their papers either by
sending them as straight text via email to:
Gary.Marx@colorado.edu
or by sending six printed copies to:
Professor Gary T. Marx
University of Colorado
Campus Box 327
Boulder, Colorado 80309-0327
(303) 492-1697
Submitters should include the name of their institution, degree program,
and a signed statement affirming that they are a full-time student at
their institution and that the paper is an original, unpublished work of
their own.
INFORMATION
For more information on the CFP'95 program and advance registration, as
it becomes available, write to:
CFP'95 Information
Stanford Law and Technology Policy Center
Stanford Law School
Stanford, California 94305-8610
or send email to:
cfp95@forsythe.stanford.edu
with the word "Information" in the subject line.
THE ORGANIZERS
General Chair
--------------
Carey Heckman
Stanford Law School
Stanford Law & Technology Policy Center
Stanford, CA 94305-8610
415-725-7788 (voice)
415-725-1861 (fax)
ceh@leland.stanford.edu
To discuss potential CFP'95 speakers, topics, and formats, and to receive
additional CFP'95 information, subscribe to the CFP95 list. Send to
cfp95@lists.stanford.edu a plain text message consisting of subscribe cfp95.
Program Committee
---------------------
Sheri Alpert
Internal Revenue Service
Judi Clark
ManyMedia
Kaye Caldwell
Software Industry Coalition
Esther Dyson
EDventure Holdings
Mike Godwin
Electronic Frontier Foundation
Peter Harter
National Public Telecomputing Network
Lance J. Hoffman
George Washington University
Ellen Kirsh
America OnLine
Bruce R. Koball
Motion West
Gary T. Marx
University of Colorado
Mitch Ratcliffe
Digital Media
Marc Rotenberg
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Deborah Runkle
American Association for the Advancement of Science
Barbara Simons
USACM
Ross Stapleton-Gray
Georgetown University
Glenn Tenney
Fantasia Systems
Jeff Ubois
Author and Consultant
J. Kent Walker, Jr.
U.S. Department of Justice
Affiliations are listed for identification.
----
Please distribute and post this notice!
------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 1994 22:51:01 CDT
From: CuD Moderators <tk0jut2@mvs.cso.niu.edu>
Subject: File 5--Cu Digest Header Information (unchanged since 10 Sept 1994)
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------------------------------
End of Computer Underground Digest #6.88
************************************
